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Abstract 
I read Neal Town Stephenson’s Cryptonomicon and The Baroque Cycle to interrogate what 
types of links they make to US countercultural writing, postmodern discourse in American 
culture, and perceived uninterrogated links to the term America itself in images of modern 
progressive liberalism. Postmodernist readings of literary texts came under increasing public 
scrutiny in intellectual debates of the 80s and 90s. My analysis is to situate and reconsider 
these fictions within debates happening in the North American academy at this time and the 
more recent one concerning the demise of poststructuralism in the humanities. Linking 
together works of Sean McCann, Michael Szalay, John Guillory and Mark McGurl I locate 
Cryptonomicon as constitutive of the postwar drift from the modernist aesthetic yet 
simultaneously developing within Sacvan Bercovitch’s model of dissensus. Through 
reference to McGurl’s work in particular, my thesis will offer the first sustained critical 
reading of Cryptonomicon relevant to the University’s new teaching standards of diversity 
and research excellence. Through Lauren Berlant’s concept of an intimate public I argue The 
Baroque Cycle develops a richly aesthetic form of criticism that challenges the consensus 
view of culturally affirming alternatives to American sociopolitical and economic life. In 
addition, each chapter charts specific aspects of the impact of European critical theories that 
presided over the marriage of intellectualism and professionalism in the North American 
academy. More specifically, and throwing particular focus on resistances to theory and canon 
change, I discuss how the politics of the classroom developed within the literary culture wars 
brought with it a renewed emphasis on what postwar professors taught in the classroom. 
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Introduction. Rethinking Twentieth Century Literary Theory in Neal 
Stephenson’s Cryptonomicon and The Baroque Cycle 
 
My thesis has three chapters and two main objectives. The first objective is to reappraise a mode of 
ambiguity in Neal Stephenson’s Cryptonomicon (1999) and The Baroque Cycle’s (2005) styles of 
writing. I will argue this mode, when reconsidered as a form of postmodernist experimentalism, 
invokes the 1990s new Americanist concerns about the cultural studies debates on the coercive 
aspects of assimilation in the formative stages of US literary canon formation. In my first reading, I 
will review critically Cryptonomicon’s writing and the links it makes to these concerns. This 
reading will take into account the specialised discourse community that became heavily involved in 
the mid to latter twentieth-century New Left and postmodernist critiques on the course of empire. 
When read through Sacvan Bercovitch’s key 1990s literary influences on the new Americanist 
Studies, this will also offer the opportunity to reappraise certain conditions that reflect the 
contemporary shift in attitude away from the postmodern culture-critique of ideology. I will argue 
that the anti-institutional political excesses of the New Left and the critical Left vocabulary that 
fuelled and stimulated the mid-1960s to the late 70s and early 80s public and academic debate on 
the coercive aspects of assimilation and cold war consensus politics have been replaced in the last 
twenty years in the US literary academy by a discussion on how the art impulse and the social 
instinct are reciprocally related to nourishing institutional norms. This reading offers the 
opportunity to reappraise how national politics is intimately related to literary production in the US. 
My thesis will take into account a wide range of views concerning these debates. This will include 
Mark McGurl’s recent book The Program Era (2009). In his book McGurl examines the academic 
relations between the postmodern-postructural claims on art and the postwar practices of the US 
system of higher education. Like John Dewey before him, McGurl argues that these practices when 
connected to the art impulse are also connected to the social instinct. McGurl ushers in a new era of 
progressive debate. His relationship between the postwar practices of higher education and a 
heightened respect for difference has provided much needed support and stimulation for the 
development of the graduate student’s personal growth in the modern changeover to a postindustrial 
economy. My aim is to interrogate the links between Stephenson’s writing on the transformative 
potential held in postwar literary theory and cultural studies and McGurl’s asking questions about 
“where does the individual’s recognition of the value of literary experience come from.”
1
 These two 
different but interrelated sets of readings offer the opportunity to explore further Cryptonomicon’s 
uses of a dominant postwar experimental mode of criticism. 
                                                          
1
 McGurl, The Program Era, 63. 
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McGurl’s reading of Cryptonomicon shows how its writing can relate to nourishing institutional 
norms. His reading also shows how its writing can bring back an elitist aesthetic discourse tied to 
the aesthetic inventory of interwar literary modernism. Cryptonomicon’s conceptually troubling and 
politically flawed uses of the critical Left vocabulary when connected to the romantic conception of 
genius, as we shall see, helps to destroy the gestures that can link white progressives to a racial 
ideology in its own right. McGurl’s pure collegiate piece of work, reading Cryptonomicon through 
the dialectic of the creative writing classroom, is, at best, brief; however, his dialectic can prove to 
be the most important in current debates when reviewing themes taken up by postmodernist authors 
from the mid to latter twentieth-century. Whether Cryptonomicon is, or, is not, affirming of a 
postmodernist text is not the final judgment I shall make on its experimentalism. As we shall see in 
chapter one, its uses of a mode of ambiguity can place it in alignment with the essentialist drift in 
what McGurl calls the “anti-bourgeois bourgeois aesthetic we call modernism.”
2
 From this 
viewpoint, I will take Cryptonomicon’s writing as at least partially connected to the postwar 
experimental impulses involved in the postmodernist acts of deconstruction. In its continuing 
resistances to a group of post-Vietnam university academics in the storyline we will also see, 
however, that when holding simultaneity of meaning in the modern leftist and liberal versions of 
what I take be is its ideology critique of US expansionist ethics it can also offer the opportunity to 
reappraise Sacvan Bercovitch’s way of understanding the importance of ideology in the shaping of 
the US. The second objective of the thesis is to tie my first two accounts on the humanities arts 
theory movement from interwar literary modernism to the poststructuralist use of language to 
Bercovitch’s renewed attention and the scrutiny he paid on the latter twentieth-century forms of 
politicised culture-critique in the American university.
3
  
 
In chapter three I will review a mode of ambiguity in Neal Stephenson’s three volumes of The 
Baroque Cycle. This offers the opportunity to reappraise a separate sphere of influence for the uses 
of the postwar modes of experimentalism. A debate that centres in these novels, I want to argue, 
lifts the concerns about the coercive aspects of assimilation and the projects of cultural diversity in 
the US out of a dialogue, or, more correctly, dialogism with their European critical counterparts.
4
 I 
                                                          
2
 See McGurl, The Program Era, 66. 
3
 In the 1990s a group of new Americanist revisited debates about assimilation and the projects of cultural diversity. 
The first wave of the now not so new Americanists were ousted from their dominant positions and practices in the 
American university by a movement that looked to reinsert literary historical discussion into the practices that were 
being projected back on nineteenth-century texts. This renewed debate about art and ideology and the American 
Renaissance canon signalled the beginning of the end of the deconstructionist and poststructuralist legacies as the 
predominant methodologies for textual and historical appraisal for the graduate student.  
4
 It is not my point to argue that many of the debates stemming from the anti-institutional political excesses of the 1960s 
and the projects of cultural diversity in the US were further fuelled by the entrance into the American academy of the 
French poetics of Barthes, Todorov, Derrida and more belatedly de Man and Foucault respectively. French poetics or 
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will offer this reading, for the practical uses of literary theory and for the study of literary history, 
through a reappraisal of Bercovitch’s mid-1980s to mid-1990s reconstructing of the American 
literary humanist tradition. His gathering together of twenty-one Americanist Studies scholars, as 
we shall see, formed a powerful literary-historical consensus. This consensus replaced the dominant 
literary paradigm of cultural studies and deconstructive attitudes towards art and expression in the 
antebellum era. What were also replaced were the intellectual commitments to the categories of 
gender and or identity, race, and above all culture in the contemporary public sphere. Bercovitch 
attempted to make a virtue out of the incommensurability of discourse that was building up in the 
American university. Critics like John Guillory and Gerald Graff, albeit from differing scholarly 
standpoints, followed suit. However, as we shall see, not all university professors took kindly to a 
reworking of the recent insights gained from European critical theory. The movement away from 
the interwar and pre-1960s literary historical critiques of art to the postmodern culture critiques of 
identity and race were now being reargued in terms of a homogenizing nativist impulse. Art and 
expression that contributes to the continuous formation of the individual was now considered as 
deeply enmeshed in the American cultural identity. The politicised acts of the deconstructionist and 
poststructuralist uses of language in cultural studies no longer offered the only deconstructive 
account of the comprehensive ideal of the representative American.  
 
It is important to note that in the 1990s cultural studies were coming under increasing scrutiny from 
both inside and outside the literary academy. From the inside, they stood accused of forming 
idealised disciplinary enclosures. From the outside, the radical attempts to politicise semiotic 
accounts of the cultural field was seen to have overburdened the traditional American identity. 
Bercovitch attempted to bridge these conflicting demands turning the outside in and inside out 
showing how the art impulse was connected to the social instinct, and vice versa. Bercovitch saw 
that with the differences in subject position now being defined as a new marker for achieving 
cultural difference, and with no real way of changing or affecting these consensus alternative 
perspectives were needed to regain radical initiatives in teaching and scholarship. Rather than stand 
outside his new consensus (or its practices) but also not to follow uncritically in the acts of 
deconstruction he identified the American selfhood as identity in progress. His studies into early 
American literature showed that American cultural diversity to be held in the basic recognition of a 
common pattern. Any profitable study of difference for Bercovitch, and for the new Americanist, 
from now on should be held in this recognition. His journey into the complex rhetorical structures 
that he argued constituted the meaning of America had profound consequences for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
theory as it came to be known replaced the dominant literary humanist approach in the academy. It is also not my case 
to argue either that the New Criticism was not devoid of theory. My point to make is that French theory changed the 
critical landscape in the literary humanities. I will locate the four primary texts in this post-1960s movement of 
humanities arts theory.       
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deconstructionist readings of the textual identity. As we shall see, Bercovitch’s readings held 
divergent implications for the postmodernist-poststructuralist themes of difference that were 
routinely being projected back in acts of deconstructions on the nineteenth-century classical works 
of American Literature.  
 
Lauren Berlant invokes concerns about Bercovitch’s devising of a new rationale for the textual and 
historical study of literary deconstructions. His ends, reconsidered for the successful achievement of 
social integration (hence his concern for appreciation), blamed the cultural studies approaches to 
rhetoric for having given up on what he saw was criticism’s social imperative. Bercovitch saw how 
the revolutionary potential in American rhetoric had been abandoned in the superficial postmodern 
synthesis and politicised culture-critique on much of the adversarial criticism in the US. The 
spontaneous philosophy of postmodernism’s discursive bloc, to borrow a phrase from John 
Guillory, was not where criticism’s social imperative lay. This imperative, Bercovitch argued, lay in 
an integrated narrative and alongside a changeable, volatile historical condition. This narrative and 
this alternative perspective on the truth of history (which would not be its meaninglessness) would 
bring about what he saw would be the ends of successful socialisation in a changed industrial 
climate. The ambivalences that American critics had previously defined as erupting into the text 
when surrounding the aspects of assimilation, for Bercovitch, was not in any way a form of 
surrender or a pathology in need of cure but rather the continuous creation needed for the successful 
uses of that particular culture’s symbology. If one could achieve this success (writing cleverly in 
more dramatic and compelling ways and to keep on writing cleverly in more compelling and 
dramatic ways) one had ultimately formed with the basis of a new revolutionary consensus.  
 
Bercovitch showed how dissent and being wedded to the American ideology were interdependent 
and commensurable. As he argues, the freedom to act in history is a function of consensus. To step 
outside this consensus was, in short, to achieve no recognisable aims for citizenship, prosperity, 
piety, progress, and futurity.
5
 Bercovitch looked to make a virtue out of the period he named 
dissensus, seeing the flowering of a new aesthetic ideology.
6
 McGurl’s criticism offers an example 
of Bercovitch’s integrative narrative. This narrative works for the coming together of the art 
impulse and ideological restriction.
7
 McGurl’s writing on feedback, which transforms actions into 
                                                          
5
 The second and the third of these aims conflate the importance and interdependence of secular and spiritual matters in 
the US, and could offer an account of Stephenson’s writing as a whole. 
6
 Bercovitch’s notion of ideological restriction and its relation to literature will be dealt with through this introductory 
section. 
7
 I would call this academic relationship with the Puritan rhetoric as schizophrenic single-mindedness. This, I want to 
argue, is the notion that we shuttle between agency and structure. For one example of a titanic struggle that entails this 
relentless psychic strain see McGurl, The Program Era, 67. For the actual nature of the origin of this struggle see 
Bercovitch’s concept of the “auto-machia,” The Puritan Origins,” 15-25.    
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meaningful experiences and back again, in real time, contributes to the continuous formations of 
rhetoric and social action (history for Bercovitch was rhetoric and fact entwined) that constitute the 
American individual, who is the sum of these experiences.
8
 Bercovitch’s dual cultural work on art 
and ideology became a prominent feature for the study of classical American literature. As we shall 
come to see in chapter two, attempts to achieve America came in all forms and from all angles in 
the US during the late 1980s to mid 1990s. The practices of theory, especially those connected with 
the works of the deconstructionists, in short, was being consigned to a disparate left wing maverick 
group - wholly alien and wholly other - not only by right wing Christian conservative demagogues 
but also by Bercovitch.
9
 Unlike Matthiessen and Spiller’s consensus on the art and expression of an 
earlier age, the deconstructionist attitude was to divide rather than offer coherency for the nation. 
Both cohering and dividing in Bercovitch’s narrative re-vision for a national reimagining amounted 
to the same thing. Showing how this was so Bercovitch argued would result in the achievement of 
contemporary criticism’s social imperative.
10
  
 
The women’s culture concept that I invoke in chapter three will set out a challenge to the nativist 
varieties of co-optation and varieties of dissent that constitutes the new meaning in the Americanist 
strands of cultural criticism. To illustrate this challenge I will read the emergence of a women’s 
culture concept in The Baroque Cycle’s three volumes, as held in Bercovitch’s recognition of a 
common pattern, and as an affective imaginary phenomenon. This will allow me to pace Berlant’s 
critical concept of a women’s culture.  
 
The transformative potential held in Berlant’s cultural work - a paradigmatic appeal for a female 
complaint genre with a host of paradigmatic female complainers - offers itself to Bercovitch’s 
semiotic paradigm of what I will consider is his American male discontent. Both of these arguments 
make claims for their particular culture’s symbology, and for their particular culture’s partial and 
contradictory interests. Berlant offers a women’s culture concept along what Paul Giles argues is 
dangerous fault line to reflect her notion of publics. Bercovitch, more in the mold of Habermas, 
believes in a singular American public sphere that traverses this boundary. However, this is space 
also with conflicting demands and holding partial and contradictory interests. Berlant’s female 
                                                          
8
 Rhetorically, if not for a long time in fact, America, for Bercovitch, was open to all people who covenanted to keep 
the American faith. He proceeds to argue the American Dream (future, hope, prosperity, piety, continual progression, 
and openness) can be reclaimed at least rhetorically by all those that keep the American faith.   
9
 Conflating these two together forms somewhat of an unholy alliance in the context of American cultural criticism, 
however, both, stood to accuse the critical Left vocabulary for exacerbating the differences between history and the 
dream. 
10
 In chapter three I will argue how Bercovitch’s model of understanding was to gain greater force as it was to achieve 
recognisable aims for social reintegration in what the political scientist Michael Sandel called “our culture of extremes.” 
Postmodernist criticism (and the theory function) in the US had, at this time, become largely unintelligible to the 
American public.   
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complaint genre paces Bercovitch’s male complaint genre (male and genre as equitable to the 
notion of one homogenous and singular national and integrated public in a singular homogenous 
public sphere). She saw his search for an affirming integrated narrative, “a deliberately transitional 
form of nationalism,” as both necessary and urgent. Berlant saw quicker than most how the 
American right had invariably won out in the 1990s debates about culture and transformative spaces 
held in her notion of publics.
11
 Searching for a female complaint genre that also offered itself in an 
integrated narrative would not be made further unintelligible to the American public. Debates over 
culture wars and the literary academy’s attempts to politicise the cultural field were pressing down 
on pluralist concerns. Making a virtue out of this type of dissensus, for Berlant, was always 
something of a double-edged sword, and she plays this new great man game with deliberate unease. 
It is her vexed narrative through which I will recognise the emergence of a women’s culture concept 
in the three volumes of The Baroque Cycle.   
 
The resistances that form from a women’s culture collective in The Baroque Cycle are held against 
the seventeenth-century Bourbon and newly emerging Anglo-Dutch colonial State rule. In the 
formal mode, the female characters, in the paradigmatic aspects of the female complainer, resist the 
replacement of the story’s setting out one set of ruling elites being chaster than the other. Looking 
at the sociocultural and political content of the world picture painted by The Baroque Cycle the new 
Anglo-Dutch monarchy attempt to carry women’s female lived experiences (of their private 
existences) through the new influences of power and technology. This brings into view the old 
humanist and cultural custodian argument about placing reigns on progress and technology. A 
waiting-in-the-wings elite in their new roles as Britain’s Royal successors now anoint old world 
power and ruling class positions around the world through the pressures they place on Sir Isaac 
Newton’s revolutionary seventeenth-century theorems on natural philosophy. His position, 
suggestively symbolically laden with the ideological restriction held in Bercovitch’s common 
pattern, is suspect. Although he is patronized by the leading and radical progressive thinker British 
Whig parliamentarian Roger Comstock, Newton’s occultist behaviors in his pursuits for Solomon’s 
lost gold is to taint his exemplary becoming warden of the Royal Mint as well as The Royal 
Society’s most preeminent natural philosopher.  
 
The Baroque Cycle offers its experimentalism to achieve the social imperative by reintegrating in 
formal or generic terms the lived experiences of the female characters, and their fictional (i.e. not 
public) worlds with the real abstractions of economic science and political dynamics as the feudal 
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 The Christian conservative right became the best at showing discontent with liberalism and in short hijacked the 
vocabulary of the left and its mobilisation of populist movements from the realm of culture while at the same time 
arguing how cultural decline had ruined the American dream.  
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corporation interlocks with Britain’s banking debt system. This approach, which offers a radical 
feminine sentimental culture fully enmeshed in the physical world but also isolated from it, I want 
to argue, invokes the ruination of the deconstructive initiative as it is led by the academics in 
Cryptonomicon. These figures, especially angry feminist and poststructural critic Charlene, have 
completely divorced the deconstructive initiative from any real world consequences. As we shall 
see, the novel blames these figure’s passive acceptances of historical power (more immediately at 
the hands of the Yale professor Dr. Kivistik) at the formation of another Anglo-Dutch pact. This 
time it is Roosevelt and Churchill who are the cultural custodians that set the conditions for 
progress and technology in America’s backyards. The Baroque Cycle or Cryptonomicon’s returns to 
the deconstructive initiative with fuller awareness (what others have argued is the salvaging of 
poststructuralism yet again for the left), on the aspects of the impartiality of history, whether this is 
universally held (as in Newton’s revolutionary theorems), or university led by Cryptonomicon’s 
academics and their new means of technological persuasion in language, offer the deconstructive 
method to show how real change (i.e. progress through technology) can turn into something like the 
routinisation of change. This is largely when confronted by the old world conflating of the feudal 
corporation with modern industrialisation processes and institutionalising impulses as one system 
simply begets another.  
 
The themes of the standardisation of the academics in lieu of what The Baroque Cycle recognizes 
are the uses the old world put to new technology becomes more evident when placed alongside the 
fictional Eliza’s attempts to liberate minority groups from the feudal modes of dominance and 
oppression. On a visit to Bridewell Palace she has cause to examine the work of the ex-prostitute 
Hannah Spates. Hannah is put to work as part of the new middle class reform methods taking place 
in Britain’s modern State transformation. Opening onto these questions of moral reform, and how 
the public intellectual is never far away from such guidance, we see how Hannah has been brought 
out of her life of drudgery, toil and degradation in the old male feudal corporation only to be 
dominated by another group of male’s in the newly emerging industrial one. Juxtaposing one 
atrocity with another (i.e. the movement within the feudal corporation to the industrial one) is a 
mode of experimentalism that affirms Stephenson’s writing to Richard Rorty’s critical left tagging. 
Rorty argued that Stephenson’s 1992 book Snow Crash followed the literary left position in their 
approaches to deconstructions. Rorty’s is a convincing assertion. In Hannah’s case the truth of 
history is up for grabs. What is wrong for Stephenson in The Baroque Cycle is that traditional 
history especially the old world history when pretending to be above politics “prevents people from 
creating the openly political history they need, a history endowed by them with a meaning for 
8 
 
which they alone are fully responsible.”
12
 I will salvage this point especially in relation to The 
Baroque Cycle and Cryptonomicon’s concerns for their female characters. This begs the question is 
Stephenson a feminist? We will come to see in what further experimental ways The Baroque Cycle 
and Cryptonomicon’s self-reflexive acts of deconstructions (of the self) manifest when the novel 
attempts to elude authorial control. This is more suspect when attempts are made to escape the 
clutches and influences lay solely at the foot of the old world, its legacies, its past, and even its 
previous literary productions.
13
 The Baroque Cycle and Cryptonomicon’s contrasting readings of 
Newton’s proof-texts as a way to understand voluntarianism, universalism and progress in US 
history is offered within an alternative vision when placed alongside Bercovitch’s proof-texts of 
radical rhetorical and political continuity and cultural change.  
 
A focus of my thesis is to reappraise the 1990s new Americanist notion that the British ruling class 
system formed in liberation (from the old class structure) is different from the American middle 
class structure formed in liberalism. This reading will also take into account Bercovitch’s way of 
understanding an American literary tradition begun by the early New Englander Puritan settlers, and 
how the subversive doctrine of individualism was co-opted into the Puritan rhetoric. In the 
routinisation of change, the old world Bourbon dynasty morphs into the British Hanoverian 
parliamentary one. This is just as dynastic just as perverse and just as ruling. In the Puritan rhetoric 
and approach The Baroque Cycle’s deconstructions resist the processes of European modernization 
and invoke speculatively: ‘the expression of a particular utopian consciousness developed within 
the premises of liberal culture. It carries the profoundly destabilising energies released by that 
culture in its formative stage.” Because these resistances are mainly offered through The Baroque 
Cycle’s formal appraisals of female characteristics I want to argue for Dewey’s approach to the art 
impulse and his claim that it is connected to the social instinct. This reading invokes Berlant’s now 
materialist search to find the art impulse for her female complaint genre through a genealogy of 
entertainments in the US. Fashioning a diverse range of female experiences through and from the 
mainstream media’s fetishising of the family/commodity form, I want to argue, poses a 
counterclaim to Bercovitch’s recalling all discontent in the expansion of his one 
dimensional/multidimensional seventeenth-century social, cultural, and ritualistic literary paradigm, 
which Berlant argues usually returns women’s culture to debates centred on books. The Baroque 
Cycle is a book, however, I will invoke parallels between it and Berlant’s tying regimes of truth to 
                                                          
12
 See Walter Benn Michaels, “Is There a Politics of Interpretation?” 250. 
13
 Newton’s proof-text principia is considered alongside the work of Leibniz or the later creative formations of Turing 
and Whitehead. The Baroque Cycle castigates Newton as “having done no creative work since 93.” We are told he now 
spends most of his time “rehashing new versions of old books.” Cryptonomicon condemns Newton’s principia for not 
being strictly mathematics. Newton’s failure to make full use of the calculus technology is something The Baroque 
Cycle implies allows the old world order to get to grips with the New Science that was currently destroying the Bourbon 
Dynasty.  
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their respective seventeenth and the twentieth-century institutional domains, where disciplinary 
nationalisms recall all dissent, however obliquely, into something like a rite of ideological consent. 
The Baroque Cycle and Berlant’s attempts to break out of Bercovitch’s confines of a particular 
cultural symbology, however, also offer the modes that offer the opportunity to reappraise 
allegiances to Bercovitch’s call for a nativist way of understanding the rhetoric of the dominant 
culture of the US. Interrogating what uses the forms of experimentalism are put to in 
Cryptonomicon and The Baroque Cycle’s critical reappraisals of that dominant culture’s rhetoric 
will offer the opportunity to reappraise deconstructive alignments and the intellectual commitments, 
albeit from differing scholarly viewpoints and perspectives, to offer alternative narrative re-visions 
on the continuous formations of posthistorical discourse and identity politics in the American 
university.
14
  
 
I will locate Cryptonomicon’s critiques of the cold war consensus politics emerging out of the data 
gathering methods in World War Two in the simultaneity of meaning that converts the novel into an 
act of deconstruction.
15
 This will give a contemporary reading of the US literary landscape, as well 
as offering a twenty-first century literary critique of intentionalism, and on the novels’ reaffirming a 
double meaning within contemporary approaches to literature. In literary deconstructions 
standardised distinctions are lost for an emerging epistemology. This scenario is used to overcome 
the violent history of racist politics by other, literary means.
16
 To illustrate such overcoming, the 
Deleuzian idioms of becoming or being offer politicised acts of interpretation. The event in history 
                                                          
14
 Although Stephenson uses the term posthistorical in Cryptonomicon’s condemnations of a sterile academic cultural 
politics this term is never fully explained. And because Cryptonomicon I want to argue is responding to what it sees is 
the failure of the critical left’s social imperative or at least its reification in the American university it is worthwhile 
elaborating the term posthistorical is favoured by Walter Benn Michaels. Michaels criticises literary theorists’ 
redescription of difference of opinion as difference in subject-position. The valorisation of identity makes the subject-
position primary. It is not my argument to give an account of Michaels’s sophisticated antitheory argument on identity 
politics, however where possible I will flag up its uses in my readings of the primary texts and the critical formations 
that I attach to my readings.  For two ways of understanding how Cryptonomicon adheres to two readings and two very 
different ways of separating identity politics from the political acts, and critical reappraisals of the deconstructionists 
see Walter Benn Michaels “The Shape of the Signifier,” and Mark McGurl, “The Program Era: Pluralisms of Postwar 
American Fiction.” Hereafter abbreviated Pluralisms of Postwar American Fiction.     
15
 For a simple and concise summary of criticism’s social imperative for deconstruction Michaels writes “an author can 
never succeed in determining the meaning of a text; every text participates in a code that necessarily eludes authorial 
control.” See Walter Benn Michaels, “Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and Deconstruction, 50. Hereafter abbreviated 
“Against Theory 2.” 
16
 The violent racist politics phrase is something that I borrow from McGurl. As we shall see, it is useful for a having a 
reading of Stephenson’s writing. McGurl uses this term primarily to condemn the white supremacist Forrest Asa Carter 
for abusing the postwar practices of higher education that played and ambivalent but central part in countercultural 
writing. Through McGurl’s reading we will see how Cryptonomicon’s anti-racist epistemological pluralism is similarly 
accused of destroying the gestures that link together the higher educational progressive acts of individual reform and 
postwar literary experience that, in turn, promoted the liberal ideals of cultural pluralism and diversity. We will see how 
Cryptonomicon destroys these gestures by fusing the anti-intellectual political excesses of the 1960s with textual 
performances of vocal authenticity of the 1970s and 80s. Also rather than become involved in competing claims to the 
current rhetorical historicizing of politicised acts of interpretation in the postwar period and in American literature 
McGurl follows in the act of what Michaels calls “creative supplementing.” See McGurl, The Program Era, 119-121. 
See also Mark McGurl, “Learning from Little Tree,” 250. See Walter Benn Michaels, “Against Theory 2,” 53.  
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becomes undecidable and no routes to the meaning of truth can be found. Rather than offer readerly 
or writerly expressive versions of literary theory to read Cryptonomicon or The Baroque Cycle’s 
postmodernist engagements with history (in which Neal Stephenson the author becomes a mere 
paper author contributing to his work as text) I will offer these novels’ acts of deconstruction within 
the new Americanist Studies and their approaches to the literary historical study on antebellum era 
topics. This will offer the opportunity to reappraise Bercovitch’s renewed sense of aesthetic 
judgement on the claims of the art novel, sentimental or otherwise, in the antebellum era. When 
reviewed alongside his renewed sense of the postmodern modes of indeterminate analysis and 
synthetic judgement Stephenson’s fictions become operable in Bercovitch’s paradigmatic analyses 
of the American Puritan imaginary. As we shall see, this shift in focus moved attention away from 
the sociopolitcal content of art’s meaning in the antebellum era to how the art-impulse in America 
offers a ritualistic form of writerly satisfaction.
17
  
 
In Bercovitch’s conflating of the pluralist imaginary and ideological restriction a meaningful from 
of social albeit co-opted criticism can be found.
18
 Bercovitch’s dual cultural work on art and 
ideology offer the revised understandings of the academic relations between literature and society, 
art and culture, rhetoric and social action. His renewed appreciations of the seventeenth-century 
New England imagination, in what I will reconsider is a classical sociological reflection, changed 
the way many cultural studies advocates chose to approach their separate areas of study on 
antebellum era topics. Held within the current twentieth century theories of language and their 
focuses on rhetoric was the historical fact that dissensus thinking was simultaneously nourished by 
that culture’s particular symbology as well as in continuous flight from it. His newly found and 
profoundly destabilising energies on the subversive elements of the art impulse moved the focus of 
attention away from the sectarian and self-reflexive methodologies of European critical theory and 
the rhetorical teaching strategies of de Man and towards the art of moral ambiguation in the literary 
strategies of Nathaniel Hawthorne. It is an aim of this thesis to follow directly Bercovitch’s critical 
route to the period he named dissensus and the ritualistic forms of dissensus thinking. Following 
this process will alter the perspectives on the readings of the four primary novels, and will offer the 
opportunity to reappraise the 1990s postmodernist acts of deconstruction and a liberal methodology 
that was intent on erasing all differences.  
                                                          
17
 Bercovitch wrote that classical American literature stood as amplifications of the figural import of the colony and 
testament to the culture’s sustained and sustaining vitality. See The Puritan Origins. 
18
 Bercovitch showed how classical American art and ideology were reciprocally related. He also showed how art was 
also reciprocally related to nourishing institutional norms. This useful comment on art and institutions provides relevant 
information when reviewing McGurl’s analysis on the intimate relations between art and the postwar institution. I deal 
with McGurl’s reading throughout my entire thesis and attempt to show its relevance in more ways than one to 
Bercovitch’s way of understanding art and expression in the American Renaissance, and how McGurl offers new 
directions in literary scholarship in the American university insofar as these new directions are considered endemic to 
American contexts. 
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Under the heading “Postmodernity or Nativist Viewpoint” chapter one will offer a number of 
competing viewpoints on how to read Cryptonomicon’s literary critiques of intentionalism. 
Foregrounding this chapter is the novel art impulse in America. This is connected to the social 
instinct. Cryptonomicon’s novel art attempts to free itself from aspects of what can best be 
illustrated by Pierre Bourdieu’s critiques of social distinction, in which social subjects were 
classified by their classifications. In Cryptonomicon’s sociocultural alignments it plays around with 
the experimental mode, and lays out the ground for a critical reappraisal of the influences of French 
theory, such as the academic uses of Bourdieu’s sociological method. The academics classifications 
of American Randy, as they attempt to turn aspects of Bourdieu’s understanding of classification 
into a post-Marxist counterclaim on the dominant hegemony of the US, and the traditional political 
frameworks used to combat a pervasive military economic power structure, have reified in the 
American university. The novel jokingly turns the academics’ views on the American global 
hegemony, now ludicrously set out in their “major interdisciplinary conference “War as Text,” into 
something of a parlour game (fuelled by empty “distinctions”) for the cultural elite. Beyond 
Cryptonomicon’s jibes on academia, the academics, and the literary marketplace, Rorty argued that 
this type of academic left was something the oligarchy in America always dreamed of. 
Reconsidered in a classical pragmatic mode of criticism the academics talk on “the Spectacle” (51) 
make no difference to Randy’s previously held store of opinions, about himself or about others, or, 
“the other.” In the classical mode of pragmatism William James argued that a difference that made 
no difference was no difference. In this classical vein, Rorty argued that left liberal academics that 
attempted to teach the average or the working class American how to recognise otherness would 
face a stiff revolt. Rorty, a conversational experimentalist, held the belief that values were only 
dropped when new ones had successfully redescribed the old ones. The academics in 
Cryptonomicon have not been so successful in their redescriptions, and we see how their attempts to 
get Randy to recognise “otherness,” from their politically enlightened middle class views on 
oppressed or minority cultures falls on deaf ears. Cryptonomicon, similar to Rorty, sees how the 
New or critical Left taking over from the old progressive left has botched the job. This is when 
coming to what they believe is a successful form of social integration for all Americans including 
your average white one like Randy.  
 
Considered from the standpoint of Rorty’s position on the proletarianisation of the American 
bourgeois, or even McGurl’s schizophrenic single-mindedness on a version of modernism he calls 
lower-middle-class-modernism, Cryptonomicon, I want to argue, returns to previous literary 
12 
 
productions to offer its postmodernist concerns about a white racist, nationalist hegemony.
19
 
Feeling a little bit left out of the academic’s powers of persuasion and their implications of how the 
technocrat is now embedded in Randy’s white male subject position the novel in attempts to 
distance itself from these attacks and associations presents the white male Anglo-Saxon patriarchs 
Roosevelt and Churchill in the wartime storyline as not typical Americans but the spokespersons for 
the dominant elite.
20
 Cryptonomicon’s writing believes a form of white male supremacy, imposing 
command and violence wherever it goes, is now inherent in the dominant American Superpower. 
However, its writing also believes that this imposition now covertly exists in the normative 
communicative forms of the elitist educational field of US based cultural criticism. Cryptonomicon 
attacks the institution for allowing what it sees is a spurious and more aggressive form of cultural 
pluralism (and the stories it now tells to America) to exist in the now becoming idealised 
interdisciplinary enclosures of literary study. The novel sets out to show how the public intellectual 
has reified in these debates. The academic’s liberally enlightened views on the dominant super or 
transnational class in the US and the progressive aspects of technology have stalled as they have 
linked their debates on the dynamic interaction amongst social networking sites and groups from 
their privileged positions in the American university to worthless views about the Internet.  
 
Cryptonomicon attacks the fictional Yale School establishment in the storyline (telling stories) for 
allowing such views to be held by the young liberal American art student. The establishment that is 
set out to protect the young in America Cryptonomicon’s writing believes is falling woefully short 
in its ethic of civic duty. The university, in short, is unable to guard the American way 
(voluntarianism, universalism, progress) from bouts of elitism, narcissism, and classicism now 
brought forward in the sectarian methodologies of the academics. Like Rorty, Stephenson 
ambivalently portrays that the American project is benign and sets people out in good faith to show 
this. It is, instead, institutions that are perverse. In a politics of bad faith the institutionalising 
impulses hide an ethic of aggression that is now being transmitted in America through the young 
liberal academics. The common sense for this discourse community is to transmit their dubious 
                                                          
19
 See McGurl, The Program Era, 66-67. 
20
 McGurl argues how Cryptonomicon’s writing has to slip itself into the style of the other to offer this critique. From 
this position of other narration McGurl argues how Cryptonomicon’s writing ultimately destroys the gestures that link 
white progressives and seemingly a white retrogressive like Stephenson to a racial ideology in its own right. Do we 
really have to take Stephenson slipping into a mode of other narration so seriously? Possibly, however, we can also see 
McGurl defending a progressive educational act in the institution that offers itself as a creative supplementing on the 
questions of American identity and the projects of cultural diversity but also in a reading of Cryptonomicon offers this 
creative formation on American selfhood as the condition of argument. This condition may be intentional as the 
replacement of disagreement for a difference in subject position was seen to have caused many problems for critical 
thinkers on the left. The point being that behind McGurl’s reading of Cryptonomicon is the dependence of the narrative 
on argument, which as Jonathon Culler writes in another context, can offer the narrative as turning back on itself to 
efface the order of the event. This, in turn, can obliterate what Rorty calls telling stories and denigrate into inquiry, into 
arguments. America, in short, needs something, as Jane Tompkins once said, to argue (war) about in order to perpetuate 
itself.     
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research methods and latest versions of epistemological pluralism, and their almost lunatic disbelief 
in physical reality, to a wider non-academic audience.
21
 To get its point across that America from its 
beginning was neither murderous nor foul (but the world’s fairest hope) Cryptonomicon’s writing 
places Charlene’s research methods alongside other dubious research data gathering enterprises 
coming out of the military industrial complex during World War Two.
22
 (A wartime code breaker 
Commander Schoen in Cryptonomicon is shown as becoming particularly deranged as he has to put 
his mathematical skills to work in hunting down and killing as many people as he can. It is these 
types of murderous abstractions that mirror both sets of public intellectuals in the novel’s storyline. 
In both sets of cases psychic dissonances ensue as the intellectuals become attached to their 
research methods but as consequence alienated from their respective environments). In both 
contexts, we begin to see how Cryptonomicon’s concerns about the old world traditional humanist 
argument on issues of progress and technology is fed through the practices of theory conjoined to 
the American postwar system of higher education and its projects of cultural diversity.  
 
Returning to Dewey’s notion of the art impulse as beneficial to the child’s development in the 
processes of industrial modernisation, for Randy this art impulse is no longer connected to the 
social instinct for the ends of successful socialisation, or for something that can foster, in relation to 
his Epiphyte Corps Group, the mutual interdependence of the future labour force or citizenry.
23
 
Cryptonomicon’s concern, I want to argue, raises the twenty-first century concerns about the 
                                                          
21
 As I will attempt to show in chapter two Cryptonomicon does not so much as offer itself in the postmodern discursive 
bloc that John Guillory railed against for its colonizing of scientific views on social constructions but rather attempts to 
put different views on social reality that provides an alternative vision of philosophical discourse.    
22
 The public intellectual in Cryptonomicon’s contemporary and wartime stories answer to specific institutional needs. 
Following what can be considered are the anti-institutional political excesses of the 1960s, an increasingly specialised 
technical discourse trains a group of wartime academic military personnel to prepare for a techno-managerial role rather 
than a public intellectual. When taking a line of thought borrowed from John Guillory’s socioanalysis of the Yale 
School culture, this offers a mode of critical reflection in which to examine Cryptonomicon’s conflating of the dubious 
institutional uses put to the World War Two and the contemporary Yale School intellectuals. The intellectuals’ offer 
traditional humanist arguments on uses put to new technologies. This offers the novel in terms of the conflicts of the 
faculties between the sciences and the humanities. It is not an intention to offer a full account of how Cryptonomicon 
involves itself in this debate. However, in chapter two I will argue that its views on social construction return to the 
nineteenth-century’s realist promise of a conflict free and integrated world. This is in marked contrast to the latter 
twentieth century’s literary theorists’ views on social construction, which the novel believes is a “social [con]struct,” 
and which Cryptonomicon views as not much use in motivating actions. I want to argue, Cryptonomicon’s writing still 
believes in an ultimate reality to be had, and this makes it a looser baggier style of writing in the postwar experimental 
mode in terms of a writing held in the postmodern discursive bloc. See Cryptonomicon, 76-77. See also Christopher 
Newfield, “The Value of Nonscience,” 512, and John Guillory, Cultural Capital. See also John Guillory, “The Sokal 
Affair.” 
23
 McGurl expressively opposes Cryptonomicon’s attacks on the way post-1960s graduate students were informed by 
the teachings of literary theory for the successful ends of socialisation in the US. This debate hinges on what 
Cryptonomicon and McGurl see is the best way to inform the young in order for their successful social reintegration 
into a postindustrial economy. Is it through reading books like Cryptonomicon, or going to university and reading works 
of criticism like McGurl’s? If we take this one step further we can see how Cryptonomicon sides with Rorty in the sense 
of holding an ambivalent patriotism. Rorty wrote “the residual left and the academic left is the difference between those 
who read books like Thomas Geoghegan’s Which Side Are You On? […] and people who read Fredric Jameson’s 
Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. The latter is an equally brilliant book, but it operates too 
high to encourage any particular political initiative. See Rorty, Achieving our Country.   
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politics of access to university institutions. This is now more pressing than the politics of 
representation carried on within these institutions that were dominant throughout the latter stages of 
the twentieth century. Using his contemporary notion of feedback McGurl attempts to respond to 
this new concern in real time Taking a step back from McGurl’s approach and taking a step towards 
a perspective from Rorty it is perhaps best not to see these writers and thinkers as holding views on 
subjects of common concern, which McGurl implicitly does and which Stephenson implicitly 
condemns academics for, but rather to “think of [their] philosophy in other ways-in particular, as a 
matter of telling stories-stories about why we talk as we do and how we might avoid continuing to 
talk that way.”
24
 To save Cryptonomicon from McGurl’s critique in a story telling way can form the 
bases not of a productive argument but the ends for the successful coming together of difference. 
This can be a way to foster the mutual interdependence of the future labour force and citizenry 
without argument or disagreement.  
 
The conflating of a general empiricism with a thematic novelty to attack the business and military 
institutions can further tie Cryptonomicon’s writing to the aesthetic or Derridean essential drift in 
modernist literature. In this drift the author lost the ability to control his or her willing acts of 
interpretation. This loss of authorial control became a political act in itself. Rorty criticised Snow 
Crash for taking this type of attitude. The main criticism for Rorty was that Stephenson’s textual 
politics ultimately fails to argue for his views against the views of others. For taking what Rorty 
called a spectatorial left attitude towards politics and literature Stephenson was critically maligned. 
Rorty argues how this approach replaced the Deweyan participatory pragmatic left and its approach 
to politics and literature. Using McGurl’s analysis on Dewey’s aspects of child-centred educational 
philosophy and the progressive aspects of learning, which fed into a modern American industrial 
society he writes: “Dewey theorised that mere activity in the world does not count as authentic 
experience until it is connected with the return wave of consequences that load mere flux with 
significance.” This type of feedback loop McGurl writes mobilised curiosity for the successful ends 
of socialisation.
25
 Rorty’s belief, on the other hand, was that Stephenson’s “incorrigible 
knowingness,” a term he uses for Stephenson’s relinquishing of any possible views on objective 
claims to truth, had helped to destroy these types of progressive reform movements and educational 
acts. Books like Snow Crash and Leslie Marmon Silko’s Almanac of the Dead (1991) played up to 
the politics of representation and identity conducted within the 1960s postwar institution. Because 
these books, for Rorty, were seen to add very little for the successful ends of American socialisation 
he argued that their failure was to liberate narrative from the dependence on argument, and at the 
same time to offer nothing on Dewey’s “return wave of consequences that load mere flux with 
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 I borrow this phrase from Michaels, See “A Reply to Richard Rorty: What is Pragmatism?” 471. 
25
 McGurl, The Program Era, 86-88. 
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significance.” Rorty ultimately saw these novels’ as degenerating into inquiry, into an exchange of 
arguments that when placed alongside a discourse community attempting to branch out of their 
respective disciplinary enclosures would find their projects did not have the legitimacy of a unified 
political theory. As we shall see, however, the return wave of consequences that draws on a mode of 
ambiguity in Cryptonomicon, what Rorty would argue is its mere flux, is loaded with newfound 
significances for telling stories albeit in the confines of the none transcendent hermeneutics of the 
Puritan American identity.  
 
As the academic left taught Americans how to recognise otherness Rorty argued this discourse 
community without the status of a political project would secede to a bottom-up style of populist 
revolt.
26
 In the 1990s a bottom up populist revolt was organised by such groups as the Christian 
conservative right who stood against the American liberal and cosmopolitan middle classes. This 
revolt was formed against the literary academy. Rorty attempted to close the distance between the 
critical left and a wave of populism and mounting pressure forming against the liberals from the 
East and West coast. The mainstream media was heavily collusive in shackling the views of liberal 
attitudes and the politics of difference, or identity, or of recognition with religious right wing 
fundamentalists. This, as we shall see, was not only highly irresponsible but was also alienating the 
heartland voters, who rather than vote liberal on testy subjects such as the pro-life debate abased 
themselves before the throne of big business.
27
 Thomas Frank argues this was rather than vote for 
the latte drinking liberal with their know-it-all methods and cosmopolitan class attitudes towards 
American art and culture in a time when Frank argues values mattered most. I will deal with 
Frank’s expose on the culture wars in chapter two. Cryptonomicon can find itself shackled to these 
debates on issues of art, American culture and Middle American family values. In American culture 
wars Rorty writes, “Nobody is setting up a program in unemployed studies, homeless studies, or 
trailer park studies because the unemployed, the homeless and residents of trailer parks are not other 
in the relevant sense.” Instead of offering a know-it-all criticism Rorty devised his way of telling 
stories at the same time as keeping theory intact. This was on the basis of a narrative, or what he 
calls a conversation, with no claims to know.  
 
                                                          
26
 This populist assault proved largely to be correct if one actually took to believing that what the school transmitted 
was the politicised acts of deconstruction and not simply the politics of the school culture. I will deal with this aspect of 
the 1990s school culture and the effects the determining apparatuses had on theory through the work of John Guillory. 
McGurl chose not to get involved in “the so-called culture wars of the 1980s and 90s, in which the mass media took a 
brief interest in the “scandal of differentiation.” See McGurl, The Program Era, 56. 
27
 If one wants to take a closer look into issues raised in Cryptonomicon on war, the death penalty or even aspects of 
forced sterilisation, the academics in the novel that come to watch Charlene’s war as text conference come from places 
like Berkley, Paris, and Heidelberg. The choice of Heidelberg may be apt as it was a NSDAP University involved in 
Nazi eugenics and forced sterilisations.  
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As we shall see, McGurl’s reading of Cryptonomicon takes up Rorty’s story in part.
28
 He criticises 
Cryptonomicon’s crude populist uses of the experimental mode tied to the academic or literary left. 
Like Rorty, McGurl wants to return to the waves of progressivism tied to the educational reform of 
the postwar experience, and of literary production in this period. McGurl’s return, I will argue, is 
loaded with new significances in an attempt to turn the flux of a failed critical left’s approach to 
literature, politics and society into a meaningful act of social, artistic, educational, and economic 
reform. This, however, hinges on an argument. McGurl wants to extricate Cryptonomicon’s social 
imperative from the progressive acts of educational self-development, as he sees its critiques on the 
institution of the university as destroying the progressive acts that channelled the socialisation 
aspects of American assimilation into a heightened respect for cultural difference. These acts, which 
taught American university students to recognise otherness, are something McGurl argues should 
not be attacked, turned back or repealed. McGurl wants to offer an alternative perspective, a re-
vision, to show how this was a very successful educational developmental program in what he calls 
“the second wave of progressivism in its suburban phase.”
29
 He also wants to show that these 
feedback processes, with the art impulse and therefore the social instinct, inextricably linked to the 
respective projects of cultural diversity and multiculturalism in the university, have become 
conceptually troubling and politically flawed when in the wrong hands.
30
  
 
Cryptonomicon’s attacks on the wartime and the contemporary institution of Yale and on a 
predominantly white nationalist elitist educational field allow me to trace its concerns to a legacy of 
anti-institutional criticism in the US. Richard Ohmann’s pioneering research in the 1970s made 
concrete many of the New Left’s objectives on the cold war university, as a Research and 
Development laboratory. As I have tried to show this type of criticism of the university as the 
research and development centre for the cold war laboratory become very different in McGurl’s 
socioanalysis of how art, and the consequent claims on art, interacts with institutional norms and 
how these are loaded with new significances each time they form feedback processes and come into 
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 McGurl actually takes a position to stop arguments falling back into debates about moral incrimination.   
29
 See McGurl, The Program Era, 88. 
30
 McGurl argues the US system of higher education offered the substitution of a heightened respect for difference for 
the progressive aspects of Deweyan assimilation as part of an ongoing strategy for the successful democratisation of the 
art impulse. Dewy saw how this impulse was connected to the child’s social instinct of self-expression. He “envisioned 
a thorough democratisation of the romantic conception of genius” that would mobilise curiosity for the ends of 
successful socialisation in America. McGurl argues the forward reaching plans of postwar progressive educators in the 
second wave of progressivism would not form benefits for the old modern American industrial society but for the 
emerging postindustrial economy. Dewey’s implementations of child-centred progressive education are imagined first 
as benefits to modern American industrial society. For McGurl, Cryptonomicon’s wrongheadedness is that it fails to 
recognise that cultural diversity was not a true reflection of difference per se but the ends for the successful mobilising 
of curiosity and the art impulse. When connected with the social instinct in the young this would form the successful 
ends for socialisation in the information, creative and experience economy. McGurl offers a damming indictment of 
Cryptonomicon when it takes its postmodern discursiveness to the internal workings of the American middle classes 
and the progressive aspects of higher educational reform.  
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contact with their environment. McGurl’s systems theory approach, as I will demonstrate in chapter 
two, stops short of involvement in its third developmental stage. McGurl, in short rather than 
continually offer processes of self-reflexivity that would see the definite shift into a postmodern 
society holds a sociological reflection up to the feedback processes, where the first impulse is 
reflected back and forth over and over again. The third stage is more recognisable and identifiable 
with the works of Katherine Hayles. McGurl argues how second order feedback process are useful 
to show how the art impulse returns to the university. These returns for McGurl manifest directly 
through the creative writing classroom. McGurl takes issue with many of the thorny debates written 
about the creative writing school, mainly targeted for “producing a standardised aesthetic, a 
corporate literary style.” Calling on his second wave of progressivism he binds together a distinctly 
national migrant, free-enterprising project in the university. This stands against the reductive anti-
institutional political excesses of the 1960s that McGurl argues forced an imaginary politics on the 
progressive aspects of educational reform. Implicitly tied to McGurl’s critique of Cryptonomicon’s 
attacks on the postwar practices of higher education is to show how the art impulse in America is 
reciprocally related to nourishing institutional norms. Combining the creative writing classroom 
with the postwar practices of higher education, McGurl demonstrates how this act (of educational 
reform) offers a deep substantiation of American nationalist culture loaded with new significance 
and meaning through which to found new alignments with the American university and American 
culture. As Patricia Waugh writes in another context this use of creative writing is a crafty reading 
of postwar literary theory. We will come to see how McGurl’s nationalistic expression is deeply 
radical in affirming the processes of the potentially subversive doctrine of individualism but also 
just as deeply tautological in terms of how these profoundly destabilising energies ratify embedded 
political structures of assent at the same time.  
 
Cryptonomicon’s fusion of the New Left’s imaginary with Ohmann’s pioneering research on the 
postwar American university for McGurl exacerbates the differences between history and the 
dream. Although this type of representation offered the opportunity for the minority writer in the 
US to answer back to the dominant nationalist hegemony (i.e. the openly political history they 
needed for a history to be endowed by them) Cryptonomicon’s allegiances to racial otherness now 
stands accused by McGurl. McGurl feels the time is right to take back the current laudable objective 
of affirming cultural diversity. His analysis of Cryptonomicon offers the opportunity to engage with 
how we (as university students or at least those trained in contemporary Americanist Studies in the 
university) should now respond to postmodernist authors responding to themes of authenticity and 
cultural diversity in the US. His reading of Cryptonomicon also offers the opportunity to engage 
with certain weariness in the US surrounding the project of exposing and demystifying the 
18 
 
ideological forces at work in art and culture. Viewing Cryptonomicon through these concerns offers 
a critical lens through which to reappraise the contemporary discipline of textual and historical 
criticism of the US and the twenty-first century substitution of disagreement or argument for 
language shored up by a politics of difference. 
 
Cryptonomicon’s formal attempts to politicise its acts of interpretation manifests two mutually 
antagonistic outlooks. Its overtly deconstructionist one I have so far covered. Holding simultaneity 
of meaning, Cryptonomicon also presents challenges to Robert Spiller and F.O. Matthiessen’s 
consensus formations. I borrow a reading of their positions from Bercovitch’s mid-1980s standpoint 
of reconstructing classical American literary history. Bercovitch, in particular, looked to take 
“American Renaissance terms out of the realm of cultural schizophrenia that was a legacy of the old 
consensus and to relocate it firmly in history.”
31
 This would enforce a sort of liminal interior 
dialogue that in effect would reinforce the mainstream culture.
32
 Politicised acts of interpretation 
holding out the subversive elements of art and expression in American literary history came under 
renewed processes of interpretive pressure through Bercovitch’s paradigmatic reappraisals of 
ideological restriction in American Renaissance literary forms. Tying Bercovitch’s reading to the 
declining social and bonding capital in the US that was formed partly out of the extreme response to 
a history of US criticism collusive with a history of veiled white racism connects my reading of 
Cryptonomicon to the issues that emerged as a result of the perceived social bias inherent in US 
literary canon formation. The pervasive influence of a dominant white hegemony that was seen to 
underlie national politics was also seen to pervade the consensus of opinion coming out of the cold 
war.  
 
A deconstructive thread can run throughout my entire readings of Stephenson’s fictional attacks on 
the seventeenth-century, World War Two, and Cold War institutions. This offers collusions with his 
writing with the revisionist interventions into the US canon. Others have argued manifestations of 
Cryptonomicon’s understandings of code make the literary critique of intentionalism into the 
posthistoricist valorisation of identity.
33
 This is where arguable beliefs are replaced for conflicts 
over subject position. These politicised acts of interpretation when considered in the postmodern 
discursive bloc were used to interrogate the cold war legacies and their underlying virulent forms of 
white racism and masculine forms of social aggression.
34
 As I have tried to show, acts of 
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 Bercovitch, “The Problem of Ideology,” 642.  
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 Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad, 204-205. 
33
 See McGurl, “Pluralisms of Postwar American Fiction,” 124. 
34
 For the understanding of a discursive bloc in postmodernism Guillory argues “the scandal of the Sokal hoax was 
marked […] by confusion between the discursive bloc of postmodernism and the field of science studies.” See Guillory, 
“The Sokal Affair,” 473
19 
 
deconstruction as a way and means of interpreting political liberalism and liberal racism have been 
superseded in the US by the 1990s new Americanist Studies ways of approaching and thinking on 
the issues of literature, race, cultural identity and cultural history. Bercovitch’s discovery of history, 
as rhetoric and fact entwined, in young American literature rejected in advance any possible 
grounds for the conversion of dissent (whether expressed implicitly by literary works or explicitly 
by political groups) into the bases for actual social change. He looked to make a virtue out of the 
period of dissensus, and believed that underwriting his critical project was the current rewriting of 
the terms for the successful social reintegration of US literary scholarship. Politics in the guise of 
epistemology at the time had come to seem ludicrous in the public sphere, and Bercovitch’s 
reconstructing of American literary history was seen by many as a positive step forward for the 
reclaiming of criticism’s social imperative, and the breaking of the ties placed on US literary 
criticism by the acts of deconstruction.
35
  
 
Cryptonomicon’s rewriting of American literary history, as we shall see, is somewhat shackled to 
the mainstream media’s polemical views and its way of portraying the 1990s liberal academics’ 
almost “lunatic disbelief in the physical world.”
36
 Bercovitch sidesteps this argument. His aim for 
the successful reintegration of literary theory was to show how its achievement lay not in the 
politicised acts of deconstruction but in the social imperative. This was not the way many 
postmodern professors believed that their politicised acts of interpretation should re-enter the social 
fields of public debate. However, Bercovitch’s way of making it new rejuvenated the cultural field 
in a dissensus thinking that taught literary historians, cultural critics and theorists alike to cohere, 
unify, or integrate their reading methods rather than divide, defer or disseminate. We will see in 
chapter one some of those that followed the search for alternative perspectives, and an integrated 
narrative that would regain radical initiatives in teaching and scholarship and some of those who did 
not. Bercovitch’s critique of authorial intentionality stood in directly oppositional terms to the 
poststructuralists and deconstructionists that had directly separated the author’s intention form the 
meaning of the text. In turn, they used this one-dimensional technique to lift the veil of oppression 
from arguable beliefs.
37
 These beliefs although previously challenged from many angles, as Andrew 
Dubois argues, “the New Criticism was not devoid of theory,” were used to promote the works of 
classical canonised authors as the expressions of an age. Rather than offer the poststructural 
celebration of indeterminacy in writing, as the representative American self embedded in these 
                                                          
35
 Guillory argues how this antirealist agenda had become unsustainable in the public sphere. See Guillory, “The Sokal 
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approach to the pluralist method of writing. To engage with this method one has to develop what Bercovitch calls 
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masterworks became rerouted from meaning and wedded to the American ideology as a system in 
the service of evil, Bercovitch argued for more consideration of what he saw was the American 
identity continually in progress.  
 
In short, Bercovitch did not look to step outside of practice to liberate the narrative from argument 
to challenge beliefs, as Rorty had tried to do, but stepped metaphorically inside criticism to show 
that the American individualism of a wilder kind was also the product of a belief system. Dissensus 
thinking, then as now, for Bercovitch, offered the American writer the re-cognition of the successful 
forms for social reintegration. Whether one took to accepting in a period of dissensus what he called 
was the coming together of the American form and the American way was entirely of one’s own 
self-cognition. However he warns  
 
For though in some sense, certainly, a work of art transcends its time though it may be 
transhistorical or transcultural or even transcanonical it can no more transcend ideology than 
an artist's mind can transcend psychology; and it may even be that writers who translate 
political attitudes into universal ideals are just as implicated as the others in the social order 
and, in the long run, are perhaps more useful in perpetuating it.
38
 
 
Postmodern identarian politics and the history of US criticism up until the antebellum period now 
took an important turn in Bercovitch’s newly found significances in terms of the American self as 
the embodiment of prophetic universal design. Bercovitch showed that dissent, which was at once 
radical and embedded in structures of political continuity, in American literary cultural criticism 
once firmly planted in history would tell a new story of America. This would tell stories from the 
viewpoint of a narrative that would partially liberate that culture from the dependence on argument. 
On the other hand, it would reload mere flux with significance “intensifying the feedback loop that 
transforms actions [Bercovitch’s creative writing] into meaningful experiences [that] contribute to 
the continuous formation of the individual who is the sum of those experiences.”
39
 Assimilation as 
the aversion of difference now found new internal routes to meaning and intention that, in turn, 
would renew the projects of cultural diversity in the American university.  
 
The Nurture of Contemporary Cultural Criticism 
Having established Cryptonomicon and The Baroque Cycle’s writing with a recourse to a discourse 
of difference but also offering the opportunity to reappraise new directions taken in literary 
scholarship in the US I invoke the heralding of the possibilities and the problems in Bercovitch’s 
nativist calls for the return to the traditional horizon of achieving an authentic American identity 
and voice. Bercovitch’s way of understanding the visionary and symbolic power of the American 
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Puritan imagination was decisive insomuch as it signalled perceptively the beginning of the end of 
the dominant sectarian methodologies of deconstruction and poststructuralism. New ways and 
means of interpreting literary texts were sought that were more expressive of their age. Bercovitch 
offered his rationale for an integrated curriculum through his earlier studies on a nativist form of 
imaginary passed down through the Puritan vision, language and thought. This would halt the 
emerging postmodern epistemological pluralism and antirealist literary consensus currently forming 
their idealised interdisciplinary enclosures around Americanist Studies contexts. Bercovitch’s 
campaign for dissensus took on new impetuous in the constructing of the massive eight volume 
tome of the new Cambridge History, and offers an enlivening argument through which to engage 
with Cryptonomicon and The Baroque Cycle’s attempts to administer a certain kind of fictional 
imperfect postmodern justice on seventeenth and twentieth century environments. We will see how 
these texts can simultaneously resolve and exacerbate the conflicts inherent in the comprehensive 
ideal of the representative American self.  
 
It is currently beyond the scope of my thesis to fully account for how my primary texts lay out in 
thematic terms the critical formulations that would do justice to the critical ground covered in 
Bercovitch’s The Puritan Origins to The Rites of Assent. However, what I will demonstrate is that 
Stephenson’s novels can be implicated in Bercovitch’s reconstructing of American literary history 
through the readings of Nathaniel Hawthorne’s uses of a mode of ambiguity. Hawthorne’s literary 
strategy rather than highlight the betrayal of an irresolvable object illustrates the demands for 
radical social change within structures of political continuity. This literary strategy was not 
contradictory. It, in other words, achieved the parameters for successful social reintegration tactics 
by reflecting the expression of a particular utopian consciousness developed within the premises of 
that liberal culture. It is also not possible to examine fully the implications of McGurl’s critique of 
Cryptonomicon through the creative writing school acting as both structure and agent, and its tying 
together the postwar themes of difference and projects of cultural diversity for the mutual 
interdependence of the future labour force and citizenry. I will however draw on McGurl’s notions 
of feedback processes to show that Cryptonomicon’s critique of the (Yale) school culture offers the 
opportunity to re-examine what McGurl means when he argues the niche fiction of the post-1960s 
American literary marketplace now reinstates violent racist politics by other, literary means. 
Whether it is right that McGurl should arrive at this conclusion for Stephenson’s writing is not the 
overall argument I attempt to make. What can be answered is McGurl’s criticism stands as a way in 
which Americanist Studies students can now interrelate and more importantly form a new 
consensus for the successful reintegration of criticism’s social imperative (in which they can modify 
their behaviours to illuminate one or more paths ahead) with a world that was painted previously by 
22 
 
a neoliberal worldview of difference that bears little resemblance to the world McGurl argues 
graduate students currently live in. 
 
Returns to a nativist national symbolic held in Berlant’s project with the unfinished business of 
sentimentality in American culture informs my reading of The Baroque Cycle’s style of crossover 
writing. In McGurl’s notion of feedback this would be to recalibrate behaviour in a context that 
makes it emotionally resonant. The movement from synthetic modes of indeterminate analysis does 
not mean that to jettison the idea of posthistoricist judgements means the jettisoning of the idea of 
having a material textual politics of interpretation in the institution. It merely seems that in response 
to the current logic university critics have to make their political acts of interpretation on national 
politics, or ethnic or migrant writing or the conflicts inherent in the very meaning of free-enterprise 
and the further incursions of consumerism into the academy more convincing, as Amy Hungerford 
aptly points out and in a world McGurl argues has many other things to attend to. The Baroque 
Cycle holds up an elaborately performative I am in this context to offer a reflection of how Berlant 
self-reflexively changes her acts of interpretation as not something chosen or free at their point of 
contact with the physical world but something deeply enmeshed in the physical world. 
 
Bercovitch’s resistances to eclectic students of American culture’s “bricolage approach” (what he 
calls “those vacillating combinations of sectarian methodologies”) offers the opportunity to 
reappraise the historicising of deconstructionist and poststructural formalisms in the American 
university. What Bercovitch calls his cultural close reading of an American community allows me 
to interrogate Cryptonomicon’s critiques on the postwar literary subjectivism but also why its 
irreconcilable yet hopeful double allegiance to theoretical speculation and practical power is not 
born out of the allegiance of either jettisoning or deconstructing the canon.
40
 As we shall see, 
Cryptonomicon offers its own form of postmodern scepticism and ideological criticism on the 
wartime expansionist legacies and cold war literary subjectivism. However, the inability of the new 
historicist themes of power or the deconstructive legacies to offer a framework for literary value is 
implicitly criticised. Seeing both problems and possibilities in Cryptonomicon’s deconstructionist 
writing technique, The Baroque Cycle’s treatment of women’s individual self-development, I want 
to argue, moves out of the latter twentieth-century debates on politicised acts of interpretation. 
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 The notion of an American community is very important in Cryptonomicon. A mode of ambiguity surrounding the 
notion of community can be expressive of Derrida’s elegiac lament for de Man. However, as Bercovitch recounts in 
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covenantal promises that ensure success); and finally a prophetic vision that unveils the promises, announces the good 
things to come, and explains away the gap between fact and ideal. 
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Women in particular in The Baroque Cycle, as we shall see, prefer not to get with Bercovitch’s 
homogenous offering for women’s individual or collective identities. As an irresolvable object their 
contradictory positions, as we shall see, stand in isolation. However, as we shall also see their ways 
of interpreting injustices in regimes of truth are never the results of free political choices.  
 
Dissensus 
Because much of the aesthetic dimension had been lost in the successive movements of literary 
theory, Bercovitch’s rejuvenating of aesthetic judgement and the social instinct connected to the art 
of appreciation offered renewed scholarship (with due regard for intellectual rigour) on the 
integrated perspective through which to approach his sweeping vision of the textual America.
41
 His 
journey into the complex rhetorical structures that constituted meaning in America saw the retrieval 
of a Puritan vision and language for the Americanist scholar of American literary history. Only 
demanding that their analyses should be offered in terms of an integrative perspective on art and 
ideology he believed his calling could revitalise a society caught between the clashing inscriptions 
of postmodern theory. Bercovitch writes  
 
That implicit and insidious problem is the central concern of this paper, and it may be well 
to begin with a general definition.
 
I mean by ideology the ground and texture of consensus. 
In its narrowest sense, this may be a consensus of a marginal or maverick group. In the 
broad sense in which I use the term here (in conjunction with the term "America"), ideology 
is the system of interlinked ideas, symbols, and beliefs by which a culture-any culture-seeks 
to justify and perpetuate itself; the web of rhetoric, ritual, and assumption through which 
society coerces, persuades, and coheres. So considered, ideology is basically conservative; 
but it is not therefore static or simply repressive. As Raymond Williams points out, ideology 
evolves through conflict, and even when a certain ideology achieves dominance it still finds 
itself contending to one degree or another with the ideologies of residual and emergent 
cultures within the society-contending, that is, with alternative and oppositional forms that 
reflect the course of historical development. In this process, ideology functions best through 
voluntary acquiescence, when the network of ideas through which the culture justifies itself 
is internalized rather than imposed, and embraced by society at large as a system of belief. 
Under these conditions, which Antonio Gramsci described as "hegemony," the very terms of 
cultural restriction become a source of creative release: they serve to incite the imagination, 
to unleash the energies of reform, to encourage diversity and accommodate change-all this, 
while directing the rights of diversity into a rite of cultural assent.
42
 
 
 
Coupled with his figurative analysis of the errand embedded in the early ideal of American 
literature and how it, in turn, ratified embedded structures of political assent Bercovitch draws out 
protest and turns it into a rite of ideological assent. His search for an integrated perspective on 
ideology and the aesthetic to take to the canonised classical tradition (American as Canon and 
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 Literary theory moved from its concerns with the materiality of the signifier during the 70s and early 80s to its 
commitments with race, gender and culture in the late 80s and 90s. See Michaels, “The Shape of the Signifier,” 274.  
42
  Bercovitch, “The Problem of Ideology,” 635. 
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Context) provides a centrally important theme for my reading of Cryptonomicon and The Baroque 
Cycle’s destabilising energies, even more so when tackling the latter twentieth century commitment 
to personhood through the categories of race, gender and above all culture.
43
  
 
Highlighting significant concerns about the deconstructive strands of poststructuralism and cultural 
studies approaches to literature, and how the postmodernist author and the cultural critic was 
responding to the themes of inauthenticity and diversity in the postwar period offers the opportunity 
to reappraise a distinct challenge to the lasting legacies of the white monocultural nationalist 
hegemony in the US. Bercovitch showed how the rhetoric of the dominant culture of the US was 
passed down through a dominant form of Puritan rhetoric, which found proximity in the language 
and thought of diverse figures throughout history such as Cotton Mather, Martin Luther King, and 
Ronald Reagan. McGurl’s argument offers what I want to argue is another supplement or creative 
re-reading on Bercovitch’s contributions to the continuous formation of the American individual.
44
 
McGurl, however, offers a dialectical reading to supplement Bercovitch’s rhetorical undecidability 
of the representative American, and to offer what he argues is “the symptom of a more generally 
reflexive modernity embedded in this American confusion.”
45
 The creative writing classroom for 
McGurl acts as the purest form of nationalistic symbolic expression for the feedback process. This 
symbolic association adheres to his way of understanding the university as the axial institution of a 
postindustrial economy. This conflating offers the newest form of dissensus thinking for 
transmitting Bercovitch’s liberal pluralist cultural dynamic. Cryptonomicon’s writing style when 
developed through these differing but interrelated viewpoints on the technologies of culture and 
language in and by which literature (and the American textual identity) comes into being (either 
rhetorical or dialectical) reflect on how cultural studies attitudes brought forward to tackle the 
problems of racial prejudice and social bias in the formation of the US literary canon (that 
contributes to the continuous formation of the individual who is the sum of these experiences) have 
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 Bercovitch offered an ingenious way to move beyond postmodern relativisms and the inability of identity politics to 
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reified in the public sphere to allow a persistent white monocultural nationalist identity to reappear 
in the postwar university environment. McGurl, in particular, sees how Cryptonomicon’s claims on 
art is now offering in systemic terms feedback process that is reifying the profoundly destabilising 
energies released by that culture in its formative phase. McGurl takes up Bercovitch’s perspective 
to view how art is reciprocally related to nourishing institutional norms and how these energies are 
currently reorganising the university with greater internal differentiation. Institutional norms, for 
McGurl as for others, count as a form of ideological restriction but also hold a reflection of a system 
and a culture ingeniously geared to the production of variety. Rather than project this inside-outside 
alignment as an indomitable force or external other McGurl offers a feedback process for 
Bercovitch’s regime of disciplinary individualism supplying the ways and means of individuality 
from without to offer it as a deep expression of that nationalist culture within, and which he argues 
seems for now to be holding educational institutions together fairly well.
46
  
 
The School Culture  
Showing how the demands for radical social change through Nathaniel Hawthorne’s art of moral 
ambiguation were complicitous with a more pervasive cultural ritual that ratified embedded 
structures of political assent, this allows me to reappraise John Guillory’s work on the determining 
apparatuses of the school culture. At the time of the publishing of his highly influential Cultural 
Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation (1993) the literary academy was fuelled by the 
liberal methodology intent on erasing all differences. Not acting as politicised acts of interpretation 
in the deconstructionist sense Cryptonomicon and The Baroque Cycle offer reconsiderations on the 
school culture and its regime of capital distribution in the 1990s. As I have shown Bercovitch 
interpreted away the divisive acts of US literary interpretation by showing how those acts were not 
the results of free political choices. Guillory similarly saw how deconstructions were not the results 
of free political choices but were a symptom rather than reflexive of the internal political and 
institutional conditioning effects of literary criticism. Guillory’s work carried on the work of 
Bourdieu arguing how literary distinctions were being given on merit on the uses of theory that 
were at the same time being mistakenly identified. He argued that by denying that the terms 
distinction and merit and the uses of classification, which were regarded as no longer operating in 
the school culture, the graduate’s failure to recognise the value of literary experience and where it 
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came form had lead them to being co-opted into a wider social and economic transformation. It 
might be said that The Baroque Cycle offers a weird allegory on this transformation when 
reconsidered in terms of Bercovitch’s paradoxes of dissent. Guillory argued theory with its oblique 
purpose of forming a rapprochement of the old school culture was something that theory itself could 
not solve. The higher your level of technical abstraction the higher the merit granted and so forth.
47
 
The most interesting point about the debate for Guillory was how literariness and the cycle of 
distinction, merit, and classification would reappear in an otherwise changed more streamlined, 
more technologically efficient (efficient meaning the downsizing and “technobureaucratic 
restructuring” of the contemporary tenured academic labour force) university environment.
48
 In the 
terms of modern industrial transformational processes and in response to the distributing and 
regulating access to a new form of the cultural capital we call literature Guillory posed the question 
what came after theory.
49
  
 
Cultural capital distribution in the 1990s was largely distinguished through Guillory’s highly 
influential work on the school culture and literary canon formation. Working on Bourdieu’s 
analysis that the literary academy was a closed and autonomous system Guillory argued the 
school’s historical function as in the past as in the present was to distribute and regulate access to 
the cultural capital we call literature. For Guillory, the necessary critical work done on persisting 
social problems in the US had reified in the university as empty distinctions were now alienating 
the student from the literary functions and intellectual commitments unique to criticism’s social 
imperative.
50
 The fact that students could no longer achieve this imperative was largely due to the 
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 Following Bercovitch, McGurl’s more rigorous historicist reappraisal of postwar literary productions asks not what 
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 Bill Readings argued against Guillory’s attacks on the school culture to move the debates on culture towards the 
University of Excellence. The problem according to Readings was that the stakes of the university’s functioning was no 
longer essentially ideological because they are no longer tied to the self-reproduction of the nation state. Therefore to 
reinstate a debate about the university’s role in the wider non-academic terrain with relation to how it operates in culture 
i.e. the University of Culture was to bring back into the university markers of cultural capital that would reinstate both 
the organicist tradition and the feudal corporation. Guillory took the opposing view and saw how it was critics like 
Readings that had allowed the university to reify the literary functions and intellectual commitments of academic critics 
and criticism. Guillory looked not to do away with political acts of interpretation per se in the forms of deconstructive 
or rhetorical readings of the text but to reinstate the theory function. This aim he argued had been lost in the conflating 
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limits set upon it by the deconstructive legacy and the dismantling of successive notions of nature 
as art, or beauty as art, or the truth of art. In short, aesthetic judgment had been lost as those 
ideologues that undertook to seek out regimes of truth saw the sociological reproduction of art as 
only complicit with acts of political oppression, even torture.
51
 Guillory’s analyses on the direction 
taken by the university as an institution challenged the dominant postmodernist views held on social 
construction.
52
 A lack or inability to reclaim criticism’s social imperative for the graduate student 
he argued had been caused through the inability of liberal arts students to see past their severances 
from art. This had caused blindness’s to how the technobureaucratic organisation of intellectual life 
fit with both the rise to prominence of the theory canon and the academic superstar. Theory, in 
short, was an interim solution to the problem of specialisation in a newly developing post-industrial 
economy, and as such the problems of theory were not the problems theory could fix. On 
deconstructions Guillory argued  
 
While the term deconstruction encloses the work of de Man and Derrida within a set 
of generalised theoretical motifs and procedures, it does so only in the practice of 
literary criticism. This fact has ensured the consequence that Derridean philosophy is 
largely transmitted to literary critics through the lens of his reception in the 
immediate context of de Man’s critical writing. It is through de Man’s work that the 
term deconstruction is disseminated, as the name of a school of criticism.
53
  
 
How the determining apparatuses affected the views taken from the theory canon (i.e. the 
individual’s recognition of where does the value of literary experience come from) Guillory argued 
was a more pressing concern than the alluring slabs of postmodernist theory that sat on the literary 
syllabus: the sort of thing that at the time was the staple of introductory graduate courses in method. 
Guillory attempted to take the school’s story back from the technobureaucratic restructuring of the 
organisation of the intellectual life of the critic, “where canonical development of literary theory 
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 Guillory affirms Bercovitch’s analyses on art and ideology as he argues how the reductionist claims on the claims of 
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answered to specific institutional needs.”
54
 The most important aspect of this debate for Guillory 
was what came after theory in a reshaped university environment. Thus what became doubly 
important was not primarily to solve the problem of an alienated, divided and disempowered labour 
force and contemporary citizenry but to reinstate the theory function in the professional literary 
critics’ tackling of social issues. The idea was not to do away with theory altogether but to give up 
its invocation of the name of the political. In sum, Guillory argued if the literary academy were to 
reappropriate the humanities, that is, to take back the authority to define cultural capital embodied 
in its curriculum of study it would have to devise a rationale for an integrated curriculum of textual 
and historical study exceeding the current laudable objective of affirming cultural diversity.
55
    
 
Although not condemning the institutional aspects of the school culture or literary theory per se, 
which also he did, Guillory proffered a socioanalysis internally driven to reflect the school’s 
strategies of internal differentiation that would mark its reuniting with the real classical abstractions 
of economic science and political dynamics.
56
 Guillory sought to implicate the whole school culture 
in the refunctioning of techne or craft in the social domain, and how theory was more productively 
read when considered reflective (classical) rather than reflexive (perhaps postmodern) of the restless 
promiscuity of commodity exchange.
57
 What the school transmitted in terms of political and 
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 This reuniting has to take into account McGurl’s way of understanding that there has been no such shift to a 
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 Bercovitch’s understanding of how contemporary cultural work was ideological mimesis and Stanley Fish’s notion 
that theory was just another form of critical practice, placing together these distinctive forms of expression alongside 
Guillory’s is to show how theory formed a conundrum. First, posthistoricist theory looked not to stand outside practice 
to govern practice from without. Second, theory was implicated in its refunctioning in the whole economic order and 
thus theory was a symptom of something which theory’s emergence could not solve. Finally, if theory was implicated at 
the moment of reception in the whole socioeconomic order then it was a form of ideological mimesis, using 
Bercovitch’s terms at once in flight from society but also in a constant engagement with it. Therefore, the subversive 
elements many critics attached to forms of literature, which were excluded from the canon in terms of social bias, were 
not subversive but actually ratified embedded structures of political assent. The problem was how to make academics 
see that their substitutions of posthistoricist identities for arguable beliefs were, as Bercovitch argued, “works of 
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cultural achievement in the debate over canon concerns, and its attacks on artistic expression, was, 
for Guillory, the politics mainly of the school culture. He argued because of the direction taken by 
the university as an institution this had effectively formed the abandonment of the literary functions 
and intellectual commitments set by the previous achievements of criticism’s social imperative.
58
 
Guillory having no way of answering his own question to what came after theory (seeing how the 
school at the time of the early 1990s was still handing out merits of distinction (posts) for those that 
professed cultural work taken from the poststructural strands of deconstruction and when reading 
seriously the new canonical works of Barth, Pynchon or Powers) decided to return to critical 
prophecy in the past this time to restore the complex relations between the academic, the political, 
the scientific, and the economic concerns exemplified in 18
th
 century moral philosophy.
59
 The 
functioning of a supposedly singular charisma to reproducible technical rigour is a contradiction 
that runs throughout my reading of Cryptonomicon, and presses concerns about postmodernist 
styles of writing and the homogenisation effects of theory on critical language.
60
  
 
White Philosophy in Cryptonomicon 
Using Gordon and Newfield’s understanding of white philosophy, Cryptonomicon’s “white 
backlash against affirmative action or unabating white anxiety about the presence of social and 
political actors who insist on the continuing significance of racism,” becomes a conceptual error for 
McGurl when he addresses the problem of its handling a history of veiled white racism in the US.
61
 
McGurl’s reading of Cryptonomicon’s identifications with a white national cultural identity (insofar 
as Bercovitch argued American identity was a cultural identity) becomes a problem, as we shall see, 
of education and a problem not of the politics of culture. McGurl takes it upon himself to take back 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
ideological mimesis, at once implicated in the society they resist, capable of overcoming the forces that compel their 
complicity, and nourished by the culture they often seem to subvert.” The new period of theory, then, was at once a 
flight from persisting social problems but also a constant engagement with these problems. Theory’s terms of dissent 
had embodied a ritual form of assent, which in turn lead to consensus by ideology. Authority, in this sense, was 
interpreted away at the same time in which it re-emerged. What had been lost in this critical formulation were art’s 
intimate relations with ideology. The terms of this new revolutionary consensus in a changeable volatile historical 
condition changed the shape of Americanist Studies in the US when dealing with American Literary History. See 
Guillory, Cultural Capital. Fish in Knapp and Michaels, “What is Pragmatism,” 466. Bercovitch, “The Problem of 
Ideology,” 642.     
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 Guillory, Cultural Capital, 79-81. 
59
 As we can see with hindsight Guillory’s work was to raise the profile for the individual’s recognition of the value of 
literary experience and where it came from. 
60
 Rather than empower the contemporary alienated citizenry represented through main fictional protagonist Randy in 
Cryptonomicon theory, as for Guillory as for Randy, is so much shadowboxing as it fit with the technobureaucratic 
restructuring of the organisation of intellectual life. Cryptonomicon offers the opportunity to reappraise Guillory’s 
concerns about art as a “socially constructed discourse.” Fledgling deconstructionist critic Charlene in the novel is 
expressive only in that she mimics master theorist and “fiftyish Yale professor Dr. G.E.B. Kivistik.” She is a young 
liberal arts student that offers a suspect demonology of technology. Her role proves to be detrimental to UNIX hacker 
boyfriend Randy. In sum, she is trained to prepare for a techno-managerial role rather than a public intellectual, and 
offers the view of how the disciples of de Man whose tendency to mimic the master fits in with the technobureaucratic 
organisation of intellectual life linking to a supposedly singular charisma to reproducible technical rigor. See 
Cryptonomicon for how it also sees art had been lost in postwar ideology critique. (77) 
61
 See Gordon and Newfield, “White Philosophy,” 739. 
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the themes of marginalisation, power, and the magnification of discipleship as they are now 
structured in American pluralist markets (in the postmodern discursive blocking) arguing how 
Cryptonomicon’s speculative allegiance to racial otherness is only superficial, and white writers like 
Stephenson “have been most likely to assert the privilege of other-narration […] [while] minority 
writers […] have typically been asked to slot themselves into a single ethnos.”
62
 McGurl attempts to 
reclaim certain racial tenets of characters’ back stories in the novel, and from postwar American 
literature as a whole.
63
 Rather than restate the hierarchy of narrative, as in McGurl’s case, that can 
in some aspects, as Jonathon Culler argues, double back on its initial duality to efface the order of 
the event Cryptonomicon’s “story ways of telling” follow Rorty’s postmodernist thoughts about the 
rooting out of subjectivist conditions of ideas of truth. I will therefore argue its return to previous 
literary productions is to recover a condition of America from the founding and ailing practices of 
European culture by turning this debate into a story.
64
 When interpreted through Bercovitch’s 
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 McGurl, The Program Era, 382. 
63
 A notion that builds from community in the novel that connects such disparate figures as American and German 
wartime code breakers, homosexuals, contemporary hackers, a Holocaust descendent, a wartime Fourth Marine, a 
Japanese soldier, a young Filipino nursing student, and a half-American half Filipino treasure seeker can pass off as a 
radical community bereft of any social meaning. (This, as Michaels argues in another context, makes the literary critical 
critique of intentionalism into the posthistoricist valorisation of identity. In other words, it is difference itself (rather 
than arguable beliefs) that emerges as intrinsically valuable). Lawrence Waterhouse is a musician before being put to 
use for the war effort as a code breaker. He and other musicians in the wartime story are given desk jobs after the 
sinking of their ships at Pearl Harbour. The novel adds however that they are “musicians [...] greeted without being 
welcomed and saluted without being honoured” (66). Lawrence and his group are put to use decrypting the enemy’s 
most significant codes. This group includes a diverse mix, as diverse as Randy’s contemporary group, and the novel 
attempts to forge through a series of experimental relations (posthistoricist identitarianism) resistances to institutional 
impulses that were seen to turn their individual code breaking tenors into an automated cold war construct. On the other 
hand, and this is where the narrative becomes quite vexed, the academic crowd is given no such storytelling allegiance, 
as they claim the end-of-history narrative in which it is no longer intellectually defensible to equate historical 
knowledge with western history. In sum, and conflating the recent insights gleaned from critical theory, the academics’ 
convictions to convince Randy of the truth about himself and their desire to get him to be the same (as them) is given a 
certain repetitive quality. (Michaels argues the mistaken critique of the end of history narrative was that it made 
disagreement impossible). Their entrance into the storyline invokes Raymond Williams and John Guillory’s 
understandings of the homogenisation effects of theory on critical language, and how the novel sees the making of 
meanings infinite as a betrayal of the story of liberal education cloaked in European consciousness. The academics, as 
we shall see, hail from Anglo-American centres of elite and privileged learning and turn their postmodern relativisms 
inspired by the recent insights of European critical theory on Randy. 
64
 In The Baroque Cycle the Stuart dynasty is an ailing pox-ridden warring system. This is to be replaced in Britain’s 
changeover to a modern state by another equally fatuous, equally reprehensible masochistic system. This time it is the 
Georgian reign. Although the novel portrays the changeover from one system in terms of real hope for women like 
Eliza who is violently ripped from the traditional life of the land the changeover for women like Hannah Spates simply 
transfer her from one system of oppression to another. What we have to see in many ways is Eliza reflects the literary 
critique of intentionalism. Yet beyond the question of intention it is difference itself that emerges as intrinsically 
valuable. This is a very complicated suggestion for Eliza yet in the three volumes of The Baroque Cycle we see how she 
offers routes beyond the question of intention insofar as “from a certain distance, or a certain angle, in a certain light 
[she has a certain formation] and the fact that from another distance, at a different angle, and in a different light they 
don’t.” Eliza is called a whore, she is and is not. She is considered a counterfeit princess, she is and is not. She is 
revered for her mechanical cruelty, something she holds and something she does not. She is seen to profit from slavery 
she does and does not. (This is something which costs Eliza dearly, as her one true love half-cocked Jack buys the 
cowrie shells to profit from the slave trade to be just like her. Jack is unlike Eliza as he cannot find the means necessary 
to turn this internal conflict into a source of intelligibility). The point being for Eliza “there is no necessary or intrinsic 
conflict between these positions, no question of right or wrong, true or false,” as Michaels argues. Eliza’s recourse to 
difference and identity is in many ways still a subservient formation to the new great man game. Her lover Bob Shaftoe 
sums this up adroitly as he waxes lyrical to the Puritan Daniel that new and cleverer players are currently resetting 
trends and re-writing the rules for the new system. The novels’ encounters with the routinisation of change expresses a 
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nativist imaginary we see how its rhetorical concerns can also offer challenging readings on the 
postmodernists’ vocabulary.  
 
As well as offering a form of social criticism that McGurl argues recreates the archetypes of the 
racial unconscious in its own image Cryptonomicon draws on the theories of pedagogy that Sean 
McCann and Michael Szalay argue played a central but ambivalent role in the countercultural 
imagination. One aspect of this pedagogy was that it allowed students to free themselves from the 
school as system of repressive socialisation.
65
 McGurl sees the eruption of ambivalence into 
Cryptonomicon as a problem when reading aspects of its racialised narration especially how it 
relates to other postmodernist styles engaged with processes of information technology and their 
approaches to assimilation and cultural diversity. In a style of writing he calls technomodernism 
McGurl argues Cryptonomicon is a somewhat looser and baggier type of novel in this mode, which 
emerged out of the countercultural imagination (and into the literary academy) during the sixties. 
Cryptonomicon attempts to overcome the types of literary academic politicisations that defined the 
postmodern cultural field in the 1990s. In doing so, it offers the opportunity to reappraise the 
politics of liberal pluralism and its commitments to the categories of personhood when they were 
transferred to the institutional environment engaged on many levels with the problem and promise 
of cultural difference.
66
 Its way of sidestepping postmodernist arguments also reflects McGurl’s 
Liars Paradox as it commands us to see a strain or struggle with the dominant mode of discourse, 
which is the art of self-governance.
67
 This, as we shall see, orients Cryptonomicon’s mode of 
narration towards the past, which can see it forming the uncomfortable alliances with old 
Americanist consensus formations on ideas of truth. However, as we shall also, when viewed 
through the lens of Bercovitch’s recovery of the Puritan rhetoric, Cryptonomicon’s struggle for self-
governance developed in the links it makes between a group of disparate wartime characters and a 
white male UNIX hacker, can offer a reading for a form of cultural restriction that may become a 
source of creative release. This offers an antagonistic criticism to take to the 1990s postmodern 
academics’ appeals to a history of veiled white racism in the US.  
 
The Academics in Cryptonomicon 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
mode of contingency in the American form that I will argue can find a different meaning when read through the Puritan 
rhetoric of the New Englanders, which became the rhetoric of the dominant culture of the US. 
65
 See McCann and Szalay, “Introduction: Paul Potter and the Cultural Turn.” 
66
 Invoking these references from Guillory and McGurl respectively demonstrates without hopefully adding another 
spontaneous philosophy how progressive educators within the postwar university “worked to re-gear US schools for the 
systematic production of original persons […] more than a few of whom would become the most celebrated form of the 
self-expressive individual, the writer” and how views on social construction were not entirely the same between cultural 
and science studies. See Guillory, “The Sokal affair.” 487-488, and McGurl, The Program Era, x; 83. 
67
 McGurl’s concept of the Liars Paradox relates to a construction in Forrest Carter’s The Education of Little Tree in 
which a linguistic construction tells us to beware the artifice of language. See McGurl, “Learning from Little Tree,” 
248.    
32 
 
Cryptonomicon is aware that views on the literary academy are bought to the public sphere’s 
attention through the politics of cultural conservatives who largely fashion the mainstream media 
for their own ends. It, however, condemns the academics takes on racial otherness. Their recourse 
to difference has, in other words, become ineffectual in the public arena. To show its concerns to 
how the domain of the arts has become inoperable in the social domain and no longer holds an 
effective view on the issues of racism, patriarchy, or homophobia to name just a few of the issues 
the novel engages with the academics cultural politics are brought into a debate surrounding a 
deregulated corporate environment in the 1990s. Deregulation initiatives alongside the academics 
turning away from old fashioned ideology critique and towards post-Marxist identarian politics and 
neoliberal initiatives are brought together and traced to old world sources of concern, such as 
institutionalizing impulses, and the European discourse of mastery that centres with greater ease in 
wartime Europe and Britain. Drawing comparisons between what the novel sees as the perverse 
capitalist impulses coming from Europe with Guillory’s analyses of the culture of the school 
through The Sokal Affair we see that Cryptonomicon’s condemnations of the “spontaneous 
positions – antirealism, relativism, antifoundationalism […] is to condemn literary and cultural 
studies to rehearse without surpassing the conflict of cultural criticism with science.”
68
 
Crisscrossing the academics anti-intellectual link ups with new media (both raced and gendered, 
and in many aspects, as we shall come to see, lacking in aspects of a unified political theory); 
Cryptonomicon attacks the politics of the academics insofar as these theorists see that their ways of 
interpreting new technologies are the result of free political choices. As Charlene’s group becomes 
less and not more informational less and not more communicational when reviewing the 
deregulation initiatives of the 1990s, Cryptonomicon’s writing believes the academics views on the 
Information Superhighway has helped increase the further dominance of the first over the third 
world (82). Cryptonomicon will not concede to the type of passive-aggressive tactics the academics 
use to push their antirealist views on the declining bonding capital in the US. Setting up an 
unfeeling postwar academic and a somewhat sensitive “hard scientist” (58) I will argue the novel 
attempts to deal with an ineffectual response to the corporate environment and the supposed 
depredations of mass culture.  
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 The Sokal Affair invoked many responses but the one I choose to focus on is Guillory’s. I will also focus on 
Christopher Newfield’s response to Guillory concerning the “giant dissing of the literary and cultural studies field.” The 
Sokal affair largely addresses the way in which Alan Sokal’s hoax reproduced “postmodernism as a discursive bloc, in 
effect, the ideology of a party in the culture wars.” Considering that many academics wanted to free their arguments 
from such discursive blocking effects Guillory reconsiders the Sokal affair for how it brought science studies and 
cultural studies views on social construction into an idealised disciplinary enclosure. Guillory looks to separate literary 
and cultural studies views on social construction to restore what Newfield calls the “theory function.” The theory 
function, as described by Newfield, “supposedly incarnates methodological rigor as a base for disciplinary unity.” The 
lost aspect of this critical rigor came about as Sokal conflated together the disciplinarity of science studies, science 
wars, culture wars, thereby producing the postmodern discursive bloc that was having trouble redeeming itself in public 
opinion as a political movement. See Guillory “The Sokal affair,” 473; 506; 587. See Newfield “The Value of 
Nonscience,” 509. 
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The academics in Cryptonomicon’s contemporary storyline refuse to believe they are part of any 
declining social or cultural values in US contexts. Cryptonomicon attacks them not only for 
believing they can stand outside practice in order to govern practice from without 
(antifoundationalist theory hope) but also for their isolationism and their purism. Liberal arts 
student Charlene, main fictional protagonist Randal L. Waterhouse’s soon to be ex-girlfriend and 
newly tenured campus (Yale) College radical, stands in directly referential terms to women’s 
marginalisation and disidentifications within pre-existing patriarchal power structures. She and her 
“academic friends” (81) bring the turn to theory proper, and politics of representation in 
Cryptonomicon, into relief. The scene around a dinner table where the academics gather together to 
give their opinions on the social world, opinions derived from the extending of their literary 
techniques, highlights what the novel sees is imbalances in those that seek to structure discourse to 
their own, oftentimes-spurious, advantage. In many ways the novel condemns the academics for a 
presentist lapse as they push their posthistoricist positions involving conflicts of interpretation onto 
Randy. Their posthistorical (Benn Michaels’s preferred idiom in his “against theory” apotheosis of 
postmodernism) denuding of a World War Two veteran’s image strips him of what they believe is 
any universal significance. The novel follows what for it are highly contentious uses of postmodern 
research methods and “the way in which these statistics were gathered” (76) to where new media 
plies its trade i.e. the public sector. Classroom studies are contrasted with the bigger stronger media 
corporation views that restate their own forms of well-established superiority over mass cultural 
opinion. The academics cultural politics and subsequent claims on labour and work power in the US 
become largely ineffective to the malfeasance of the rampant individualism that exists in 
Cryptonomicon’s rather messy global corporate environment. 
 
Guillory argued “the temptation to understand the processes of canonical revision according to such 
political models as ‘affirmative action’ [is] a very dubious analogy which trivialises a necessary, 
fragile, and altogether too limited political practice whose site is very different – the site of 
employment.”
69
 The academics are tied to themes of self-serving individualism, which is 
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 Newfield and Gordon offer a thoughtful reply to outcomes that defend systems that produce racialising effects “often 
in the name of some matter more urgent.” Although this type of argument develops a strand of sympathy rhetoric 
denoted in their appeal to matters of importance “often considered more urgent” this type of sympathy training is not 
the kind of approach circa 2012 to take to the literary marketplace. Appeals to feeling and sympathy-training on aspects 
of liberal racism are from McGurl’s point of view boring and ultimately reductive. He, like Benn Michaels, treats the 
categories through which racism operates, is felt, and is addressed as conceptual errors. Like Michaels, McGurl locates 
the racism of cultural pluralism in its use of racial and cultural identity rather than in the liberal racism in which 
pluralism coexists. Like Michaels, McGurl does not get beyond the white moderate position on race but furnishes it 
with a philosophical rationale. Although both do agree racism is a problem they prefer to see what the neoliberal order 
has produced. McGurl does not support racialised perspectives on racism on the grounds that they are a kind of reverse 
racism that offers an expression of a rational truth about race that does not link it to a racial ideology in its own right. 
This was the expression of truth Readings became concerned about. In many ways, McGurl’s’ appeals to persuasion are 
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considered none threatening to corporate class abuses insofar as their postmodernist applications on 
information technology have no political involvement in the real world. In short, the novel sees the 
academics as heightening the fears surrounding technology and its misuses. Their conflating the 
mercenary and military interests of the wartime technocrat with the contemporary hacker 
reproduces a demonology of technology, which allows in many ways further regulatory measures 
for what the novel sees is the elite to further anoint around the world.
70
 The Internet we are told has 
only one important function for Randy. He uses it to communicate with other people through email 
(51). The novel in this reading does not follow the internet enthusiasms of the 1990s on the grounds 
of what Guillory argued “was an undisciplined, “enthusiast” eagerness to take the whole world as 
its subject.”
71
 As we shall see, it is the academics takes on racial otherness and their 
commandeering of public perception surrounding the uses of the Internet that Cryptonomicon’s 
writing tackles. Cryptonomicon, then, sets out its challenge to the retreat it sees taking place inside 
the university. The aspects of the career minded professionalism of the academics repeat 
Tocqueville’s basic social problem of democracy. Their escalating logic of strong overstatements 
serves only the purpose of standing out from the rest. Cryptonomicon links the academics recourse 
to a discourse of difference unfavourably to squeamish university professors and their uses of 
French literary theory, views on social construction, and pluralist claims to a globalised world riven 
by difference as opposed to disagreement. Their technical views of language have become a very 
spurious and co-opted criticism for hacker Randy. 
 
Bercovitch’s restating of a “rhetorical battleground” gave many postmodern professors the chance 
to voice disagreement as well as retaining aspects of “a permanent diversity within the semantic 
field.” This is expressive in the characters Bobby Shaftoe and Goto Dengo. These figures are 
involved in numerous conflicts yet show an unwavering belief in the other. Some of the distinctions 
attached to these characters of course cannot hold. However, Cryptonomicon develops through them 
more of the posthistoricist identarianism that should be a property of the academics in the novel. In 
this reading we see how Cryptonomicon stakes out less of an issue with the recourse to a discourse 
of difference but how institutions make for problematically institutional subjectivities. In short, and 
using Gordon and Newfield’s argument Cryptonomicon “locates the racism of cultural pluralism in 
its use of racial and cultural identity rather than in the liberal racism with which pluralism 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
for an America without race. This is an urgent appeal. If one thing Stephenson’s writing does reflect it is politics in the 
guise of epistemology in the public sphere had become unsustainable. McGurl links the redeployment of racial identity 
as the result of racism in Stephenson’s writing in the public sphere emphasising how race consciousness is a greater 
problem than racism. McGurl’s turn to Cryptonomicon is to revoke the race problem with the “race” problem to turn it 
back again. McGurl, The Program Era. See also Gordon and Newfield, “White Philosophy,” and Guillory Cultural 
Capital, 345. 
70
 This barely veiled stab at how the old world humanist elite have conquered technology for their uses brings back into 
view the old conflicts in the faculties.  
71
 See Newfield, “The Value of Nonscience.” 
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coexists.”
72
 This as Paul Giles has recently argued replaces cultural identity with racial identity or 
the race problem with the “race” problem as the major issue in US based cultural criticism. 
However, as I have tried to develop through the critical lens of Bercovitch his one-dimensional 
nineteenth-century dissensus paradigm offers a force of pluralism that is more convincing than the 
deconstructionist or poststructural accounts of becoming or being. We will come to see how 
Cryptonomicon largely blames the academics for processes of mass distraction through their 
passive acceptances of historical power. These deconstructionist critics are further attacked for their 
pluralist views because they offer a rather one-dimensional suspect demonology of the scientific 
uses put to wartime technology.
73
 I therefore read the novel, conversely to McGurl, as an attempt to 
recapture discourses of ideas of truth that can renew twentieth century cultural pluralist perspectives 
on assimilation and diversity, and social bias as the determinant of canon formation in the US that 
have reified in the institution.
74
  
 
Cryptonomicon is concerned about the loss of rigor in Charlene’s cultural criticism and 
constructivist view of the social field. Its struggle for self-governance, I want to argue, emphasises a 
comprehensive national ideal, and the fictional embodiment of a representative American self. 
Impossible blood ties in Cryptonomicon signify retractable aesthetic qualities for McGurl as he 
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 Conflating Benn Michaels’s descriptions in “The Shape of the Signifier” with a deconstructive reading of these 
characters can show that “we have to respect the rights to their uses of their own language and by the same token if we 
don’t value the names they give for themselves it cannot be because we think their languages are mistaken.” Also, there 
are numerous accounts in the novel where it attempts to resist an absolute to semantic state to offer an account of 
performativity in language that can offer what Judith Butler argues is “permanent diversity within the semantic field 
that once acknowledged enables us to recognise that no utterance has the same meaning everywhere hence that the 
context in which the meaning is assigned to an utterance has become a speech conflict. I believe it is worth spending 
more than a few moments of this type of critical investigation into Cryptonomicon.  However, it will be suffice to 
reflect on Michaels’s comments when he writes “one of the points of [Butler’s] Excitable Speech is thus to argue 
against hate speech laws that by trying to fix the meaning of the terms like queer and nigger make both the theoretical 
mistake if imagining that utterances can have a single meaning and the political mistake of foreclosing the opportunity 
to appropriate those terms from the dominant discourse and rework or resignify them and thus to rally a political 
movement.” See Michaels, “The Shape of the Signifier,” 275.  
73
 Following Bill Readings’s argument we see how the academics are condemned in the novel as they are reconsidered 
as “the educational subject [that] is now the system and the autonomy one gains through education is to occupy a 
preconstituted place in this system, which we usually describe in terms of working for oneself.” Readings further argues 
“Guillory’s tendency to the ad hominen attack in relation to de Man and his disciples seems problematic in that it seeks 
to hold individuals responsible for their blindness to the fact that they are not individuals individually responsible for 
their blindness to the fact that they are not individuals but tools of the system.” See Readings University in Ruins, 157; 
139. 
74
 Michaels argues how Cryptonomicon’s writing substitutes posthistoricist identities for arguable beliefs. I will argue 
its resistance of an absolute semantic state can also be re-described in Bercovitch’s contextual re-description of 
ideology within the rhetoric of the dominant culture of the US. In short, the posthistoricist substitution of identities for 
arguable beliefs is reframed within a very specific contextual framework. One of the arguments against postmodern 
theorising was its notion of content-less environments rallying politics. Bercovitch restates a context for the substitution 
of identity for ideology and thus offers a framework in which identity politics can become just that i.e. politics. McGurl 
and Michaels concur that Stephenson conflates his science studies in its engagements with information technologies 
with cultural studies, which reinstate for these critics aspects of violent racist politics by other, literary means. This is a 
serious assertion to make. However, McGurl associates Cryptonomicon with the writings of the white supremacist 
Forrest Asa Carter. McGurl expresses that Cryptonomicon is a looser and baggier style of writing in this mold 
especially as it intersects with science studies. However, the outcome is the same for McGurl as both authors 
(Stephenson and Carter) reinstate violent racist politics by other, literary means. 
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questions its attacks on a bunch of Yale School academics. The academics newest form of literary 
expression in the novel is at best considered naïve when attempting to deal with a code of co-opted 
liberal heroics. McGurl’s more rigorous textual and historical way of dealing with Cryptonomicon, 
thereby reinstating Guillory’s calls for the theory function and Bercovitch’s dissensus appraisals, is 
by showing how its “overtly pluralist fiction” in the postmodernist writing style problematically 
produces “a symbolic placeholder for a paradoxically non-ethnic ethnicity.”
75
 McGurl aligns 
Cryptonomicon’s attempts to placate the racial identity in a national cultural identity with old 
subjectivist conditions of ideas of truth. In doing so, he attempts to unmask older forms of the 
aggressive expansionism tied to its narrative. Applying a more rigorous analysis to its claims for a 
valid cultural knowledge McGurl seeks to make “visible the machinery involved in its production 
of difference,” and offers its engagements with information technology held by a condition of the 
elitist aesthetic inventory of the modernist aesthetic. Cryptonomicon’s antecedent romanticism (and 
the omnivorous egoism of the imperial self) now masquerades in a form of non-ethnic ethnicity. 
McGurl writes, “doing so, we see how even the whitest technomodernism can function as a 
discourse of difference, producing a symbolic placeholder for a paradoxically non-ethnic ethnicity, 
that might as well be called (with apologies to John Guillory) technicity.”
76
 McGurl’s analysis sees 
Cryptonomicon’s arguments about racial identity as symptomatic of specific sociological conditions 
of production and consumption, and of a specific institutional-aesthetic totality. He also sees how 
this institutional aesthetic can reify when its successes have partially reified in the public sphere or 
have been turned inwards on its own modes of co-opted expression. Moving onto how the world 
looks in the twenty first century environment McGurl treats the categories through which racism is 
felt in Cryptonomicon as conceptual errors politically troubling and intellectually flawed and 
something in need of new realignment. 
 
Cryptonomicon opens up themes of an insistent monolithic whiteness, which anchors formulations 
of early US national identity. Holding two mutually antagonistic outlooks it also opens onto debates 
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 McGurl’s symbolic placeholder is significantly different from the one Charlene and the other academics in the novel 
condemn Randy for. Randy, in short, is critiqued as Foucault’s placement of Power, which determines possibilities for 
other subjects. The academics in the novel use the New Historicist technology to critique Randy’s bourgeois self. New 
Historicism and semiotic analysis entered history and the political economy in the US through the work of Foucault. 
McGurl, Bercovitch, and Guillory, as we shall see, each test these semiotic readings when delivered through the rhetoric 
of the dominant culture in the US. For McGurl’s quotation see The Program Era, 382; 62. For the understanding of the 
reinstatement of the theory function Christopher Newfield writes, “Guillory’s giant dissing of the field for its allegedly 
pandemic “spontaneous philosophy”—its skepticism—as an attempt to revive not realist theory per se but the theory 
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Guillory’s institution would be the institution you get if the university was an apolitical pastoral space and not the brute 
enforcer of methods of communication. 
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surrounding what John Miller argues is the constant clatter of derision aimed at the idea of 
Americanisation. Miller argues this has undermined public confidence in the country’s ability to 
assert itself in the vigorous way necessary to make assimilation work. Cryptonomicon’s 
poststructural critic Charlene offers her bricolage approach on an American monoculture racked by 
Cold War literary subjectivisms. She is also highly susceptible to dividing rather than cohering 
forces. The “highly intelligent but scattered and flighty Charlene” (59) leverages her discourse into 
a counter attack on the ideologies stemming from World War Two and the Cold War period. Her 
“academic crowd” develop what they perceive is a more relevant psychology and philosophy of 
power relationships beyond the simple conceptual framework provided by traditional formal 
politics. Charlene and her academic crowd believe in precipitating the end of history (of ideological 
conflict) for a universe to be defined by difference rather than disagreement. Cryptonomicon sees 
this as an erroneous pursuit, reproducing a toxic culture of denial. Therefore, I argue its attempts are 
to reshape questions of an affiliation that shapes an emerging ironically monoracial national 
identity. This reading allows me to reconnect the debates surrounding the conflicts of interpretation 
and the performativity of political discourse, and those that take their inspiration from 
deconstructive theories of language and cultural diversity in the contemporary period to 
Bercovitch’s critical reviewing of radical liberalism’s critical-rhetorical returns to the antebellum 
period. Cryptonomicon in its approaches to these terms offers a mode of ambiguity that places it in 
two dominant postwar modes of criticism. My aim in chapters one and two is to establish which one 
is best suited to fit the purpose of the novel. 
 
Berlant openly acknowledges that she works from within Bercovitch’s dissensus model. Whether 
she really dose so is not my case to argue.
77
 Her task is not made any easier as critics such as Ivy 
Schweitzer have remarked the model of dissensus is “a seductive from of ideological consensus in 
which dissent is constitutive, disarmed, and thus truly impossible.”
78
 Nevertheless, Berlant offers 
her not uncritical allegiance to the nativist mode of analysis. Her reconstructive reading of 
Nathaniel Hawthorne in a nativist symbolic is to offer alternative perspectives on Bercovitch’s 
model of fictions that are at once implicated in the society they resist. To ward off the political 
defeat that accompanied what are now considered many arcane theories that energised literary 
departments of the 1970s, and 80s, Berlant argues:   
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Hawthorne thus expresses in my view a problem of modern mass national identity yet to 
be solved in practice or in theory. He provides a field of negatives condensed in the 
word local that are not simply critical of the nation in the mode of dissensus but 
restlessly predictive of other collective utopian political forms and social movements. 
The affective intensity of the local and everyday life provides a floating buffer zone 
within the nation refuting both its totalising claims and its horizontality as a referent for 
social thought even against Hawthorne’s own intimate identification with the privileges 
of nationality.
79
 
 
As we shall see, and unlike poststructural critic Charlene in Cryptonomicon, when plumbing the 
emotional and conceptual ground of a character such as Eliza in The Baroque Cycle through 
Berlant’s utopian-anti-utopian female complaint genre its mode of writing does not transmute 
women’s partiality or contradictory interests into a consensus by ideology but offers the opportunity 
to explore other traces of sources of rhetorical continuities passed down through  the proof-texts of 
American history. These sources were not formed in ideological restriction. In short, and within 
Berlant’s recuperative tactics and alternative vision of a National American Symbolic, the 
emergence of a woman’s intimate public in The Baroque Cycle marks out a contradictory domain of 
intimacy in a recourse to difference (let’s call it a genre) that Berlant believes will enhance the 
ability of a residual culture to contest for meanings (where women have the freedom to act in 
history), and which cannot be absorbed into Bercovitch’s dual cultural work of art and ideology. 
 
Finally, Paul Bové argues how Bercovitch’s bases of analyses will always provide unsatisfactory 
results as it offers “a persistent concern with the epiphenomenal that would be always preliminary 
to an “American” criticism.”
80
 My main concern, however, is to locate Cryptonomicon and The 
Baroque Cycle’s modes of ambiguity within Bercovitch’s concept of history as rhetoric and fact 
entwined. In sum, Stephenson’s novels offer the opportunity to consider in what ways initiatives in 
US literary and cultural studies have moved on from previous approaches to assimilation and 
separation and from deconstructionist (textual) and cultural studies (historical) approaches to 
interpreting literature and are unique in their focus on devising a new rationale for the academic 
relations between national politics and literary production. Taking Bercovitch for instance, he 
looked to restore the symbolic modes of expression that could be remade and reimagined first and 
foremost as a means for the ends of successful socialisation. Bercovitch took assimilation very 
seriously as an achievement and not in any form surrender. His reading of Nathaniel Hawthorne led 
him to reconsider in what ways modes of ambiguity had led to a powerful form of symbolic 
reconciliation and interaction (art and expression) that were reflected in the social material 
engagements of classical or American Renaissance writers. Bercovitch’s remaking of American 
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Renaissance terms in the US taking it out of the old consensus formation of Spiller and Matthiessen 
on art and cultural expression and into a newer form alignment charting ideological restriction as a 
new enlivening form offers an alternative perspective on the multiple arrays of increasingly 
dazzling and solo performances of the postmodernists and their replacements of disagreements with 
differences.
81
 I will argue that when interpreted in terms of Bercovitch’s discovery of New England 
Puritan rhetoric Stephenson’s writing rather than be interpreted through postwar themes of diversity 
and difference can lead to more imaginative ways of engaging with postwar literary productions in 
the US and offer the opportunity to reappraise Bercovitch’s nativist approach to reading and 
writing, which aspires to the traditional horizon of retrieving an authentic American identity and 
voice. 
 
Chapter One 
Defining what shapes and modes of analysis characters viewpoints form under becomes a key 
concern in this chapter, as I ask questions about Cryptonomicon’s concerns about postmodern 
identarian politics and the themes of cultural diversity and difference in the postwar American 
university. Declining to choose between an absolute certainty of meaning for Cryptonomicon’s 
mode of ambiguity I argue how its antagonistic outlooks towards tyranny in the modern and 
contemporary environment (both in the institutional and public spheres) present the powerful 
postmodern and nativist varieties of co-option and dissent. Driving my reading is the attempt to find 
a mode of writing for Cryptonomicon that pace the postructuralist and the postmodernist themes of 
inauthenticity and difference but also how the novel offers an affirming non-contradictory sense of 
place for reappraisals of the acts of deconstruction. Tending toward an adversarial impulse 
Cryptonomicon’s writing offers a deep inbred suspicion to the academics alien cultural criticism on 
traditional ways of knowing and seeing. Finding within its continuing resistance to current demands 
for social change I will attempt to uncover a hopeful message for this chapter where America is still 
a condition of possibility holding out further hope for future generations, and where consensus can 
be formed and newer conflicts made. I will pick out some themes from Cryptonomicon in terms of 
its attempts to recapture nature, beauty, and truth as a point of view on sources of history. Older 
styled literary critiques of intentionalism will also be given to mark out what Cryptonomicon’s 
writing ultimately believes is the failed intellectual commitments of the academics to achieve 
criticism’s reintegration into the public sphere. Threaded through the real abstractions of economic 
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science and political dynamics the novel blames the founding practices of Europe for the state of 
America’s liberal decline. Cryptonomicon’s mode of ambiguity, thereby, offers the opportunity to 
reappraise concerns about the political effectiveness of Yale School approaches to the old humanist 
impulses tied to values inherent in literature. Literary theory and the academic attempts to move 
theory and more specifically the deconstructive strands of literary theory to the centre of the 
teaching curriculum are considered in this chapter as collusive with old world ideas on subjectivist 
ideas of truth, and we shall see how Charlene’s confusion of literary analysis with social action is 
harmful to what Cryptonomicon’s writing believes is more encompassing forces of social 
integration for American society. 
 
Chapter Two 
Linking my reading of Cryptonomicon to Guillory’s sociological analysis of theoretical pluralism 
(as it became transferred from the institution to the wider non-academic terrain) allows me to 
reappraise Mark McGurl’s recent attempts to reintegrate the social conditions of production and 
consumption of postwar American Literature. Although McGurl concentrates on the school’s 
specific sociological conditions of production in these areas, he reads these conditions to understand 
and redeem aesthetic transformations of American fiction in the second half of the twentieth 
century. His other project is to safeguard the institution. Cryptonomicon’s returns to engagements 
with the nineteenth-century’s realist promise I want to argue offer similar condemnations of the 
pluralist critics’ assignation with inauthenticity. The literary academy’s attempts to politicise the 
cultural field in terms of their antirealist agenda in the 1990s offers the opportunity to reappraise 
Cryptonomicon outlining a narrative that incites a lost world of political aspiration in the name of 
science not and not in the name of the politics of literature. The literary and cultural critics 
redescribing reality in sceptical and relativist terms also offers the opportunity to reappraise the 
concerns about 1990s culture wars. These debates express how politics in the guise of epistemology 
had become ineffectual in the public domain. These debates are useful for my reading of 
Cryptonomicon insofar as they take in the views of Richard Rorty. Rather than explore Rorty’s 
critique of Stephenson’s book Snow Crash I further want to argue in this chapter in what ways 
Cryptonomicon exceeds the laudable objective of affirming cultural diversity that repositions its 
narrative in the 1990s debates about literature. What I want to argue emerges in a reading of 
Cryptonomicon in this chapter is a thought experiment similar to Guillory’s, as he attempted to 
overcome the impense of antirealist or postmodern project and Leftist discourse in the university. 
The mixing of fiction and function in this chapter can put Cryptonomicon at odds with its own 
oftentimes postmodernist confusing of mixing high art and low diction. The return to realistic end-
oriented literary forms will be argued for or against as distinctions are spread farther afield in a 
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more complex social reality. Cryptonomicon offers a way to read through these debates on social 
differentiation, as its objects are isolated in what it portrays as the chronic shortage of functional –
not fictional—process. A final idea will be to locate Cryptonomicon’s writing with Richard Rorty’s 
views on the fields of socially produced knowledge in US academic criticism conflating Rorty’s 
ambivalent patriotism with Cryptonomicon’s adherences to a sense of place.   
 
Chapter Three 
In chapter three I move out of the heralding of new possibilities in the shift in the attention in detail 
taken towards the aesthetic in terms of McGurl’s sociological dialectic of the university classroom 
acting as both structure and agent to read the continuing formations of American identity and return 
to its converse position, which offers the debate on the relationship between the subject and its 
location as always an affective imaginary phenomenon. I will offer this mode of criticism through 
the contradictory stances taken by women in The Baroque Cycle. Through this reading of The 
Baroque Cycle I will offer Berlant’s not uncritical allegiance to Bercovitch’s pluralist semiotic and 
his alternative perspective of a multidimensional-one-dimensional US public sphere. Conflating the 
critical work of Berlant’s women’s culture concept with my reading of the contradictory standpoints 
taken by women in The Baroque Cycle offers what I hope is a challenging reading to Bercovitch’s 
way of making process an affirmative means of controlling culture and what Berlant saw was the 
codification of cultural studies in the humanities.
82
 Offering Berlant and Bercovitch’s key 
conflicting arguments on views about social construction and views on ideological restriction and 
repudiation becomes a key focus of the chapter. I will appraise how women’s expression of their 
individuality can form in either of these pluralist accounts. However, rather than reconciliation or 
repudiation form the basis for my analysis for a women’s culture concept in the three volumes it is 
Bercovitch’s emphases on an American pluralist semiotic and ideological restriction and not 
Berlant’s in this chapter that I will conclude my readings. As well as bringing forward other ways to 
retrieve the aesthetic point of view on history for the revised rationale for an integrated curriculum 
in the US I will conclude my thesis with what type of university I believe Neal Stephenson prefers, 
i.e. either Bercovitch’s way of understanding the University of Culture or Bill Readings’s way of 
understanding the University of Excellence. This will offer a final opinion on Bercovitch’s nativist 
approach to reading and writing which aspires to the traditional horizon of retrieving an authentic 
American identity and voice.  
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Chapter 1. Postmodernity or Nativist Viewpoint 
 
Introduction 
In this opening chapter I want to show how fictional characters, such as Lawrence and Randall 
Waterhouse and Goto Dengo and Bobby Shaftoe, create a complex genealogy of a wartime code 
breaker, contemporary hacker, and World War Two Japanese and American soldiers. The 
characters in Cryptonomicon’s wartime storyline strike up an impossible friendship, as they come 
through the horrors of war. Their interracial subjectivities offer what I will argue is an alternative 
perspective on a conservative impulse to preserve the attainment of the good. The good in this 
context meaning a culture that combines the conditions of modernization in the United States with 
the principles of liberal democracy. This early American ideal can be seen in the way characters 
form racial bonds across friendships. Similarly, in the contemporary storyline, although the novel 
suggests that UNIX hacker Randy’s friends are of a different kind to any that newfound partner 
Asian-American Amy or America Shaftoe has seen, these friendships can form in what was largely 
considered the male homosocial bonds that emerged in a political sphere that excluded women. The 
relation between academic and political concerns via literary departments during the 1970s, 80s, 
and 90s saw such bonds of male affiliation as threatening and ultimately recreating the archetypes 
of the racial unconscious in the classical image. Conversely, Cryptonomicon’s writing believes the 
aspects of a latent racial unconscious taken from old world classical ideals have been transferred 
into the academic’s cultural work. It is this new ethic of aggression that is transmitting its effects on 
the purportedly disengaged scholarship of the art impulse of the US canon.  
 
We begin to subjectively identify with the abstract rendering of a character like Lawrence 
Waterhouse only when he turns down the offer to join Lord Comstock at the new Black Chamber. 
Because Lawrence is surrounded by the creation of the comic moment we never directly enter into 
his character. Lawrence is expressly made to stay away from circumstances in the novel, which 
involve notions of tragedy. There are many ways to argue for the way in which the character 
Lawrence is subliminally transferred or left in a state of halted or suspended agency, in order to pull 
at a certain desired effect. The novel creates a storyline distance for Lawrence that isolates him 
from his immediate military community. He can offer a refused identification with the World War 
Two command centres and the ensuing Cold War technological arms race. British hegemony is 
always an echo to play itself out in American institutional contexts in relation to these concerns. 
The novel shows its concerns with the white British hegemony and wartime elite and American 
corporate interest in the war. Alan Turing we are told disappears from Lawrence’s view into the 
“the realms of classified” (122-123). Lawrence is part of a diverse group that challenges the military 
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industrial complex. He is good at keeping secrets, and too valuable to the wartime higher-ups in the 
retrieval and decryption of information, therefore, he must stay away from the war. The creation of 
distance in which Lawrence pulls at the unconscious level can be given an account with an older 
style of literary subjectivism and literary critique of intentionalism. In George Poulet’s 
identification of the tragic moment in Moliere he writes the tragic moment in Moliere is “easy of 
achievement,” and leads to author-reader subject-object identification. However, Poulet writes “the 
comic is the very opposite of the unitive consciousness, which forms around the tragic moment.” 
Not able to enter the character of Lawrence directly in this reading, he is expressively made to stay 
away from any moments of tragedy and thus we enter his character (and a sort of liminal interior 
dialogue with him) always through moments of ridicule or farce, it is necessary to confront what 
Lawrence as the opposite of unitive consciousness proposes. It is apt that Lawrence who is 
significantly important in the novel elicits no subjective and more importantly no moralising 
response until the final few pages when he destroys the Arethusa transcripts he has been set to 
decrypt. As we shall see it is therefore always difficult to give a correct type of literary value for 
Cryptonomicon’s critiques of intentionality. 
 
Cryptonomicon responds to the postwar growing concern that institutions left to their own devices 
make for problematically institutional subjectivities. Lawrence, I want to argue, however, also 
brings forward not only rhetorical concerns surrounding what Sean McCann and Michael Szalay 
argue were the ambivalent theories of pedagogy that enabled Native Americans, Gays, Lesbians, 
Blacks, and Women to find their voice so to speak, but also the return to the study of antebellum era 
topics and issues concerning social bias and the purportedly disengaged scholarship of the US 
canon. These concerns amidst others, as we shall see, operate within a fusion of opposites between 
a handful of characters that exacerbate the difference between history and the dream, whilst also 
alternatively offering a form of symbolic reconciliation that ratifies embedded structures of political 
assent in the US. 
 
The way in which the novel pulls us in to merge with imaginary voices or worlds in this chapter I 
want to argue attempts to hold us at a distance forcing us consciously to apprehend the performative 
operations and formal construction of poetic language. For instance Lawrence Waterhouse is a 
wartime code breaker and gives the reader access through which we begin to understand the 
complex nature of Alan Turing. Lawrence gives off characteristics that see him as ultimately 
benign. He politely refuses Turing’s sexual advances, and via rational self-reflection opines why 
there are men like Turing i.e. homosexual. On the other hand, Turing is a tragic figure abused by the 
wartime military elite. Turing’s historical past is well known, and the novel looks to construct his 
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historical abuses into the storyline. The novel doubly indicts Turing. He cuts a forlorn figure in the 
novel as he attempted to step outside the historical forces that looked to control him. Turing then is 
abused not only by the military wartime elite but by his own theoretical impulse to stand outside the 
domineering forces that make him a victim of a patriarchal society. This charge, as we shall see, is 
leveled at the academics in Cryptonomicon’s contemporary storyline in terms of 
“antifoundationalist theory hope.” The novel in many ways attempts to show how there is no 
discourse independent of belief. In its incessant story making, it attempts to interpret away this kind 
of divisiveness in which to escape belief systems there has to be a giving up of all beliefs. This 
reading shows that Cryptonomicon’s writing has moved out of Rorty’s damning critique of Snow 
Crash and now offers its mode of experimentalism in terms of Rorty’s ambivalent patriotism and 
Bercovitch’s ideological restriction. We then see how the novel creates a complex characteristic, as 
a determining impulse cannot be centred through wartime patriot Lawrence. He is rather an object 
that we must confront rather than draw empathy from or elicit any emotion towards. He is a humane 
figure yet he allows himself to be made an instrument of war. His code breaking exploits help to kill 
thousands of people yet Lawrence never questions his role in the war effort. The novel, on the other 
hand, does question his role through a series of experimental relations and Lawrence is to force 
upon the reader a dual consciousness. It is not until the end of the novel that the reader can feel any 
sympathy for him. 
 
In this chapter we will also see how Cryptonomicon is a book steeped in understandings of the 
contemporary period where the radical agency of human community is always paradoxical, a 
Derridean community of those without community. Lawrence joins the military a solider neither 
saluted nor honoured (Cryptonomicon, 66). He and his kind, as ordinary marine grunt Bobby 
Shaftoe often picks out are incomparable to anything that he and his “buddies” from “Shreveport” 
and “Pittsburgh” can fathom out (4, 34). Lawrence’s group of code busters are largely 
incommensurable to the war effort (66), and as Derrida remarks in another context, come under the 
aegis of radical “heterology asymmetry and infinity.” This runs counter to the “homology symmetry 
immanence and finitism and politicist concord,” Ivy Schweitzer argues, is a property of classical 
friendship.
83
 The gendered “we” of Lawrence’s community is therefore always paradoxical a 
community of those without a community. Lawrence and his group similar to the men in DeLillo’s, 
Libra where a counter-community is formed are men that are not idealized, as this community itself 
is a site of betrayals and conspiracy. And like the men in a Pynchon novel, the men in Waterhouse’s 
group refuse to surrender themselves to the play of policy, which is to rebirth in America. Again 
underlying Cryptonomicon’s refused identifications with America is a deeper underlying politicist 
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concord with America that refuse the tarnishing of World War Two heroes through the process of 
their absorption and recycling in the European critical theories of poststructuralism. 
 
Because I want to argue there is a search for a community in the novel, which I will also argue 
attempts to undo the academics complex politics of posthistoricism, Cryptonomicon challenges us 
to think through the contemporary period’s dialectical and rhetorical responses to the cultural and 
global significances of knowledge disclosed by contemporary and postmodern literary theory, and 
on the status of the US in world history. We are pulled into a mode of cultural nationalist self-
redefinition with Randy and Lawrence Waterhouse as they promote discussions of racism, 
particularly in its friendlier modern ones, like institutional racism. Bobby Shaftoe and Goto Dengo, 
on the other hand, bring institutional racism to view in their respective public domains. These 
public spheres are largely more benign offering a space from which the novel can retrieve a world 
of dynamic friendships in and across racial boundaries and stereotypes. Cryptonomicon understands 
that the ability to talk about such issues has reified in the institution and how the new neoliberal 
order has in fact largely reified what was once a progressive world of interrelationships. Yet it also 
uses the deployment of postmodernist techniques, which complicates our ways of understanding 
commitments to culture in the postwar university and, as we shall see, the postmodernist niche 
fiction of the post-1960s literary marketplace. 
 
 
I will argue how the novel shows its discontent to the high philosophical abstractions of the 
academics, and the criterion behind their use of a specialised discourse. The novel embeds the 
academic’s abstract philosophical proposals and interrelated philosophical problems conflated as 
jargon into a spurious form of indoctrination. Randy we are told wants children. Charlene, on the 
other hand, does not (81).
84
 Finding a somewhat moral fecundity inherent in the refusal of 
academics to have children Cryptonomicon draws the language of theory and the eclectic student of 
culture through a process of historical and rhetorical antitypes. It conflates the project of academic 
theory with the projects of the theorist of pure expression in wartime and draws both accounts into 
America’s own backyards tainting Roosevelt’s wartime policies with spiritual, moral and 
ideological codes of mastery. Taking issue with either fascistic wartime abuses, or spurious uses of 
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Continental forms of theoretical indoctrination I argue the national centre (at least in rhetorical 
terms) holds in Cryptonomicon. It views postmodern abstractions and postmodern theorising as 
wrongheaded. It is therefore the easy and glib postmodern abstractions on the nature of “the 
Spectacle” in Cryptonomicon that I want to argue the language brings to the fore in this chapter and 
not a deeper expose into the validity of the nature of the Spectacle itself. Rather than turn to how 
Cryptonomicon assumes that to expose these hard facts is to dispel the claims of rhetoric its 
surrounding the wartime community of the codebreaker, or the contemporary community of the 
hacker in an imaginative and more appreciative framework evokes America, as it has so often 
declared itself, the nation of the future. In its returns to a symbolic community of hackers, which no 
longer fits historical description (since the academics have conflated Randy’s hacker ethics with 
that of the wartime technocrat) or its return to wartime codebreaking communities (again heavily 
criticised by the academics for having their origin in political modes of control) Cryptonomicon 
offers its own deconstructive tendencies up for reconsideration.  
 
Opening up this thesis’s account of Cryptonomicon symbolic self-definitions protect many of the 
key figures (healing fractures) from the clashing inscriptions of the movement of theory and the 
deconstruction of common sense values in America. In short, I argue the novel isolates the conflict 
theorist’s radical doubt in the university. In doing so, it offers the opportunity to reappraise 
concerns taken not towards harmful ideologies of modern Western thought but towards the absence 
of reflection on the school as an institution. Tackling the school’s use of theory and the middle-class 
liberals who look to transcend their disciplinarity it obfuscates the use of academic jargon in a 
public domain racked by crude sociologies and poststructural formalisms. In the confusion 
surrounding the uses of academic theory Cryptonomicon’s writing does not divorce itself from the 
limitations of material social engagement. Main fictional protagonist in Cryptonomicon’s 
contemporary storyline Randall L. Waterhouse is locked into competing systems and subsystems of 
domination. Told that he is wedded to a system of ideas in the service of evil (the American 
ideology) he leaves academic girlfriend and postructural critic Charlene. Attempts at the reassertion 
of Randy’s American selfhood are made in his long and drawn out exile abroad and newfound 
courtship with Asian other Amy or American Shaftoe. Randy’s leaving one America to find 
another, is a way in which I read the novel’s complex resistances to an institutional environment 
engaged on many levels with the problem and the promise of cultural difference. Although Randy is 
a figure cocooned from America’s recent cultural past he offers challenging ways in which to view 
the university projections on his identity that as will now see the 1990s versions of cultural studies 
failed to translate in practice into any meaningful reform.  
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The University in Ruins 
Bill Readings, in his compelling reading The University in Ruins (1996), argued that the debate 
between dead white males and multiculturalist talk of diversity was a moot point, as culture had 
become a meaningless term in the university’s pursuit of new teaching frameworks. Readings 
argued that, with the onset of cultural studies, culture as a meaningful term that would unite the 
humanities disciplines had ceased to exist. Although a particular methodological challenge to race, 
gender, and empire or national identity, the 90s turn to the model of consensus by ideology, for 
Readings, failed to translate in practice into any meaningful reform. Readings’s new watchwords 
for the university were diversity and excellence.
85
 Despite a compelling reading, Readings’s book 
gives a bleak reading of the university system, arguing that it behaves more like a corporation, and 
the central figure of the professor has shifted to the administrator. He saw how a general 
administrative logic of evaluation had replaced the interplay of teaching and research as central to 
the functioning of the university.
86
 Invoking allusions to how mechanisms for governance have 
shifted towards corporate form, Readings argues the university has become a site where it is no 
longer easy to establish a community of scholars, but rather tertiary institutions are now regarded as 
resembling a place of work. Through mocking ironies of the professionalization of posthistorical 
scholarship exemplified in liberal arts student Charlene’s recruitment to Yale—both characterised 
as dropping any pretence to structural alignments to reason for the promotion of labile optimistic 
pluralist perspectives— Cryptonomicon’s character assassination of the postwar academics 
questions the literary curriculum as a site of political practice and the university professor’s role in a 
wider non-academic terrain. Reflecting the recent failure of classroom politics to adapt adequately 
into the US public sphere, and viewed through the works of Guillory, Graff, McGurl, and Readings, 
in this chapter I reflect on the nature of literary and cultural studies in the United States, as 
questions are asked of necessary linkages between leftist politics and antirealist or postmodern 
epistemology. 
 
Reflecting the 1990s failure of university classroom politics to adapt adequately into the US public 
sphere, and rather than denounce literary theory, as antitheory practioners Steven Knapp and Walter 
Benn Michaels were to do, Gerald Graff maintained that a broader theoretical framework was 
needed to teach and evaluate literary texts.
 
Graff after reconsidering theory and its uses looked to 
place it at the centre of the teaching curriculum rather than dismantle it. His method of teaching the 
conflicts stood directly oppositional to the antitheory avowals of the American pragmatism of 
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Knapp and Michaels. They posed the question why do we need postmodern literary theory at all. 
Graff, on the other hand, and caught between mounting pressures on academic standards conducted 
from the very top (as the likes of Lynne Cheney and secretary of education William Bennett were 
pushing hard against the trashing of western culture and relativism in the university), devised a 
novel way to move literary theory to the centre of the teaching curriculum, believing that with the 
recent insights taken from European critical theory postmodern issues of multiculturalism and 
diversity could still be dealt with in a traditional way.
87
 Graff saw the need to defend cultural 
diversity as the university was radically transforming itself into a bureaucratically organised and 
relatively autonomous consumer-oriented corporation. His method of teaching the conflicts, he 
argued, would stem the current disquiet that had surrounded debates over representation in the US 
canon whilst also eradicating any attempts to resituate the university or the canon as an ideological 
arm of the state. 
  
The critical background surrounding representation in the canon was reconsidered in the US with 
the publishing of John Guillory’s highly influential Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary 
Canon Formation (1993).
88
 Guillory argued that the radical pedagogical theorists call for a 
democratic curriculum did not have legitimacy of priority of status as a political project. He wrote:  
 
The debunking of totalities […] is a sort determined by the present political and 
institutional conditions of literary criticism [...]. In the language of theory, its 
language of rigor is the problem of specialization or the effects of the 
technobureaucratic organisation of intellectual labour on the discipline of criticism.
89
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 Such was the nature of competing and conflicting interest inherent within textual composition, and the inevitable 
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Guillory took to understanding the emergence of a theory-canon as a problem of the elevation of 
“rhetoric as a technical practice.” He argued that this process was “quite unlike either the art of 
interpretation or even the more intuitive exercise of judgement or taste, the art of appreciation.”
90
 
Guillory saw how cultural politics were yet to cement their space, and therefore were not yet 
identical to social imperatives outside the classroom. Because of the literary left’s failure to 
transform their social claims into political objectives the politics of New Left academics that was 
extended into potential space was, in short, overdeveloped by the pluralist version of liberalism 
emergent in post-Vietnam American society.
91
 Cryptonomicon, although part of a dominant postwar 
collective of aesthetic dispositions characteristic of an aesthetic drift from pernicious national 
traditions delivered through the problematic of the Kantian aesthetic, also offers the opportunity to 
reappraise a backlash to cultural studies and cultural politics, and the deconstruction of 
commonsensical values in the American literary humanist tradition. As I will come to argue, 
Cryptonomicon gets trapped between legacies, critiquing the old-world colonial state infrastructure 
and the dominances of the American ideology. In positing awareness of being vulnerable to both 
European and nativist scrutiny, it is important therefore to look behind contexts and critiques of 
American imperialist exploits, and to focus on the importation and transference of French theory 
into the North American academy.  
 
Guillory extended this argument into potential space overdeveloped by the pluralist version of 
liberalism emergent in post-Second World War American society.  
 
The adjustment of critical practice to new socioinstitutional conditions of literary 
pedagogy is registered symptomatically within theory by its tendency to model the 
intellectual work of the theorist on the new social form of intellectual work, the 
technobureaucratic labour of the new professional managerial class [...] rigor in the 
idealized self-representation of rhetorical reading translates in practice into the 
routinization of charisma [...] I [...] read this problem as the failure of de Manian theory 
(and theory in general) to function as anything other than an interim, imaginary solution 
to the new conditions of intellectual labour, conditions that will certainly require a 
thorough rethinking of what it is literary critics do in the class room and in their 
writing.
92
    
 
Using his emphases on the emergence of a distinct theory canon, and subsequent questions of what 
the political means in the context of the school as an institution, fictional protagonist of 
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Cryptonomicon, the nerdy UNIX hacker Randall Waterhouse’s conceptual reason is transferred 
from the intuitive hypothesis of canon exclusion.
93
 Amending McGurl’s recent analysis of the 
signature preoccupation of modernist fiction, Randy’s preoccupation with signature does not find 
new meaning when it is transferred to an institutional environment engaged on many levels with the 
promise and problem with cultural difference.
94
 Viewed through the crisis surrounding cultural 
capital in literary canon formation, Cryptonomicon’s returns to previous literary productions rather 
than bring into play the initiation of discursive practices act as counter to indiscriminate use of a 
canon of theory in American contexts that looked to govern practice from without. Crisscrossing 
anti-intellectual link ups with New Media, the novel extends the opportunity to reappraise 
politicised culture-critique in US academia as it deals with aftermath of poststructural theory in the 
US.
95
 
 
Neorelativist critique is tied to Charlene and her group’s leftist politics. Dr G.E.B. Kivistik, a 
“Fiftyish Yale professor” (81), is criticised by Randy for using the “academician’s ace in the hole: 
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everything is relative, it’s all just differing perspectives” (83). Through Randy we see how this 
antirealist epistemology when tied to leftist and liberal politics forms an ineffectual response to the 
corporate environment. Randy and his business partner Avi in the early stages of the novel to make 
“fuck you money” in the Philippines. 
 
This is an allusion to a Randy/Avi conversation of two years ago wherein Avi 
actually calculated a specific numerical value for “fuck-you-money.” It was not a 
fixed constant, however, but rather a cell in a spreadsheet linked to any number of 
continually fluctuating economic indicators. (26) 
 
While Randy and Avi we are told are “kicking the crap out of everyone else in the world when it 
comes to networking” (26) Charlene’s crowd and their new media linkage between postmodern 
epistemology and leftist politics stops short of real political involvement. The performative aspect 
of their cultural work is further criticised by their strong overstatements on descendents of white 
European males. This crowd believe they have surpassed a Marxist critique of the reproduction of 
unequal social relations but in their stereotyping of Randy they pigeonhole their theory of the 
performativity of political discourse offering an exact view like Marx before him.
96
 As a 
consequence the academics become caught up in ineffectual battles of cultural representation 
allowing resurgent forces of corporate populism and reactionary conservatism to gain the moral and 
political high ground on left conceptual thinking. In the furore surrounding the conference poster 
the novel attacks rather than defends the latter day embrace of postmodern epistemology and 
conflicts of interpretation in the institution. 
 
The contradiction that shows itself in my reading of Cryptonomicon is that the antagonistic 
approach that attempts to retell a story not from the ordered centre is not the abandonment of the 
realist and leftist narrative (as Richard Rorty extols for Snow Crash) but, rather, that neo-
progressive movements in deconstruction and pragmatism are not used as structural movements 
through which we trace the humanist condition. To recuperate the self as self-presence, 
Cryptonomicon’s objectifying of its characters becomes part of a tradition in the US that stretches in 
a literary tradition from Kant to Georges Poulet. In short, however, Stephenson’s fictions, as 
atypically aligned to post-modernist writing, can often be mixed with a genealogy of concepts and 
terms surrounding what Edward Said called the “informationalization of cultural knowledge.” This 
transnational content has ostensibly destroyed traditional alignments to the literary humanist 
perspective. To propose Cryptonomicon as finding origination in terms such as “the information 
economy,” “the Spectacle,” or “the American new pragmatism” is antithetical to my overall 
reading. However, characters in Cryptonomicon often mark themselves out as radically oppositional 
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to traditional aspects of literary aesthetic humanism. Arguably one of the better interpretive models 
of the information economy (notwithstanding McGurl’s recent systems theoretical analysis of 
postwar American fictions in The Program Era) is Guy Debord’s notion of the all-encompassing 
spectacle and the sophistication and brutality of this modern integrating form. I offer an 
interpretation of Debord’s method, however, only insofar as it was criticised by Michael de Certeau. 
De Certeau among others saw how Debord was too dogmatic in his approach to historical 
authenticity.
97
 Postmodern critics argued Debord had taken on the spatialising objectives of the 
metaphysical imperialist perspective. Many subsequent postwar scholars believed this perspective 
became lodged in the reading process and used deconstruction techniques and putative nonconcept 
of textuality (that cannot reform in the symbolic consciousness) to liberate the signifier from its 
dependence on the logos or primary signified.
98
  
 
Cryptonomicon’s liberal grad student Charlene is condemned in the novel as she is indoctrinated by 
the will of one man. Dr. Kivistik is suggestive of a sleeping old-world leviathan (he is an expatriate 
of British and Finnish descent). His will to appropriate is attuned to how Charlene revises her 
political effects in the social domain. The novel makes an altogether different play on Kivistik’s 
political intentions, as he attempts to introduce moral truths to the general mind in America through 
a fascination with the media spectacle. Nowhere in the novel will Randy concede to this type of 
domineering and nowhere will he believe the academics or the media’s propositions, in which to 
enter into a state of fascination with the media spectacle it becomes possible to undertake in 
Guillory’s terms “the project of awakening the master’s desire.”
99
 Kivistik comes to the West Coast 
to recruit Charlene for Yale, but UNIX hacker boyfriend Randy, “really, really suspects that he was 
there [...] to fuck her” (81). Although the narrator underlines Randy’s comment, suggesting that he 
feels somewhat “whacked out” (81) when he makes this statement, what lies behind Randy’s 
sentiment is a nativist response tied to Charlene’s cultural alignment with New Media projects and 
the post-structural alignment that extols différance. Although main fictional protagonist Randy does 
not represent an easy cultural standard for the Americanist, he is to stand for unanxious ideas about 
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honesty, industry and integrity in the American truth system. Randy’s first thoughts offer an 
encounter with imperceptiveness to his privileged technocratic status and are the way the novel 
offers a critique on traditionalisms in America’s pasts. However as an object posed, not being able 
to find easy relatability content with him, he is to offer critique on the imaginary separation that 
enabled liberal subjects like Charlene to experience the otherwise threatening contradictions 
released by the cold war consensus as the negative capability of a whole self. Cryptonomicon 
finally interprets away the sort of divisiveness that leads to liberal arts student Charlene failing to 
deal with a problem of the whole self head-on: she annexes this negative incapability to 
antagonisms with the State.    
 
Randy is incensed that Kivistik, who is emblematic of everything that is old-world driven, has 
dragged reigning critical practice and criticism’s social imperative to the theme of information in 
the US. Old-world passions imbued in Kivistik’s passion for mastery are further drawn into the kind 
of thinking that characterises posthistory as the academics enter America from elite and privileged 
centres of adult learning: “they stumbled in from Heidelberg and Paris and Boston and Berkley then 
sat around Randy and Charlene’s kitchen table drinking coffee and talking at great length about the 
Spectacle” (51). Randy becomes angry that Kivistik is ignorant on the subject of technology. He is 
aggrieved that the college professor has turned his “contrarian view of the Information 
Superhighway into more air time than anyone who hadn’t been accused of blowing up a day care 
centre” (81). Kivistik is foreign in ways and symbolic motives from the touching on borderline “red 
American” Randy.
100
 The novel drives home themes of inauthenticity, and in nativist terms offers a 
transgenerational critique to take to Charlene’s liberally progressive views on a global capitalist 
world-reality. As I argue, a patriotic notion of national identity imbued in American canonical 
figures is latent in the novel. It is relatively straightforward to locate un-patriotic modes of political 
organisation within social space opened up by literary styles centred on cultural importations of 
French theory into the North American academy, which Cryptonomicon’s experimental writing 
forms a part. Shedding some distinctive light on psychology in US writing Winfried Fluck writes:  
 
while the works of Emerson or Thoreau are traditionally said to embody a new 
patriotic spirit in American literature, it is important to recognise how this sense of 
nationhood emerges from a negotiation with and partial suppression of transnational 
frictions and disturbances so that the development of transcendentalism should be 
seen as interwoven systematically with the belligerent Anglophobia of this era.
101
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From a postcolonial narrative Charlene’s views on the modern spectacle are turning active 
principles of debate into passive agreement with historical power, and her replication of Guillory’s 
problem of representation in the sphere of democratic politics is presented as capturing very little in 
essence of what diverse social movements against pernicious national traditions tell us of 
progressive historical change.
102
   
 
Cryptonomicon sets up a divide between those that see the founding political origins of America as 
technologies of oppression and those that still believe in commitments to the Constitution neither 
liberalism nor conservatism have prevailed in the up keep of these principles. Cold war tactics are 
processed from unscrupulous information gathering methods. However the novel also offers the 
opportunity to explore how these tactics were transplanted into American contexts not simply from 
cold war consensus politics but in imported post-Marxist philosophies. The novel draws focuses on 
problems inherent in the institutional projection of pluralism as the academics become obsessed in 
their attempts to unmask power from under ideal reformulations of law. Its interrogation of the 
academic Left’s failure to concentrate on economic selfishness effectively colludes in the 
proletarianisation of its bourgeoisie. This amounts to what Robert Putnam in his book, Bowling 
Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital (1995) characterised as the spread of increasing 
detachment and isolation in America.
103
 Reacting against the performative voluntarianism of the 
academics the novel reflects a bottom-up popular revolt against the increasing isolation Americans 
feel from one another, and connects new directions in scholarship taken in the United States with 
old world discourses of mastery fascism-socialism. In attempting their radical cultural overhaul of 
public space, now potential space, through identity politics the novel reflects that the cultural Left 
point of view missed the complexity in the traditionalism of society leaving figures such as Randy 
bereft and in isolation. 
 
Creating a contrast between young liberal arts student Charlene, who brings to the fore demands of 
de Manian American discipleship that disseminated the syllabus of theory into a wider non-
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academic terrain, and a young and beautiful Filipino nursing student Glory, the novel critically 
dialectically juxtaposes different sets of characters.
104
 The wartime characters bring forward 
surrounding notions of interest-group politics, which counter what is considered an ineffectual 
response to global capitalist aggression: the portability of cultural politics in the contemporary 
setting. Although embodying a certain binary (light over dark) distinction, Glory is celestially 
dressed in a “white nurse’s uniform,” (44) Kivistik for his part is painted in the fashion of a 
diabolically black robber-baron as he steals Charlene from Randy; she never becomes an easy 
container for man’s ideological containment. Glory does not need to be defended, and becomes the 
leader of a resistance movement against forced wartime expansionist ethics. Her characterisation 
works in tandem with the wartime assassin Bobby Shaftoe. Shaftoe is a Fourth Marine. Given this 
moniker as the novel merges fact with fiction, Cryptonomicon makes character adjustments to how 
the US Marine Corps was to conduct covert killing ventures for the State in both Second World 
War and Vietnam. Shaftoe’s search for Glory offers a form of resistance, as they rebuke the 
machinations of the larger military war machine and military industrial complex. Her goodness (she 
is young and a nurse) sheds reflective light on his and his country’s descent into a moral abyss. 
Shaftoe becomes a delusional animal in war. Unable to cover himself in Glory, she becomes lost to 
him; he becomes a revenge taker and spirals into the abyss, becoming a heroin addict. His farce-like 
simplicities often cover the depth of what is actually being portrayed in the novel (instrumentalism, 
war, death, rape, loss of hope in humankind). It is important, therefore, that we should highlight the 
weaknesses from the loss of seriousness, which James Wood argues is a weakness of a certain kind 
of postmodern novel, but not overlook how the author is attempting to engage with sophisticated 
problems of his own day.
105
  
 
Before moving on it is important to note that representation in Stephenson’s literary trajectory 
beginning from Snow Crash through to Cryptonomicon becomes increasingly distanced from the 
American way. Also, Cryptonomicon comes under the sub-intellectual line of criticism of 
historiographic metafiction, and therefore it does not make much sense to speak of a key core of 
American interpretive texts that open onto a transhistorical reality that fit the confines of genre 
fiction. The storytelling act of life and narrative in metafiction becomes not one of representation or 
realist investigation or interpretation, but rather its key terms are sourced from the radical and open 
affair of textuality. This technique carries similar weight to tactical strategies and perceived 
powerful conversionary ethics that sought to resist spectacular co-optation of organised forces of 
the capitalist economy. For taking one version of this type of what Rorty called a “spectatorial, 
                                                          
104
 For an altogether different account of a dialectical interchange in Cryptonomicon see Katherine N. Hayles, My 
Mother Was a Computer: Digital Subjects And Literary Texts, 118-142. 
105
 Wood, How Fiction Works, 115. 
56 
 
cultural left” attitude to literary invention and public policy in the US Stephenson was critically 
maligned.
106
 The question of the impasse surrounding dead white males and multiculturalist talk 
about diversity is then not made so much a moot point in the novel as an interestingly complex one. 
Randall L. Waterhouse is Charlene’s boyfriend. The L. stands for Lawrence, and connects Randy to 
the wartime story. Through taking the name of his codebreaking grandfather Lawrence Waterhouse, 
the novel holds out a radically ambivalent critique towards Charlene’s poststructural trashing of 
white western culture. By omitting Randy’s father from the story (Randy’s father and mother do 
emerge but simply as a notional “Mom” and “Pop”) Cryptonomicon duly casts its own postmodern 
critique on fathers and sons, as it looks to challenge the presentist lapse and smug moralism of the 
academics.
107
 This, in the novel—no matter how problematically posed—replaces the American 
Dream with an alien cultural criticism.  
 
Cryptonomicon’s attack on male behaviour, especially when engaged on the information front in 
the Second World War, signals how white Anglo-American male patriarchs such as Roosevelt and 
Churchill became involved in wartime murdering sprees in information wars. Holding out its 
Anglophobic concerns towards the academics, a lot of the restriction on contemporary Internet 
freedoms is ultimately sourced from this old-world affair. Colonel Chattan is a man of rank and has 
“no difficulty issuing difficult, unpopular commands” (145). He tells Lawrence Waterhouse at a 
top-secret meeting, “Turing is presently engaged on at least two other fronts of the information war, 
and could not be part of our happy few” (145). In the opening pages of the novel Bobby Shaftoe 
takes issue with unpopular commands, and the novel casts its critique over latent aristocratic norms. 
I deal with Shaftoe’s reluctance to give orders in chapter two. Lifting the meaning of such a high 
profile Anglicized phrase taken from Shakespeare’s Henry V into the storyline, is in many ways 
telling of Cryptonomicon’s surface conversion to a postwar code of classroom ethical adjustment: 
one that berated America as a proto-imperial Empire that was in the process of picking some 
colonies up for itself.
108
 However, in registering a model of dissent it offers the opportunity to 
reappraise narrative continuity within an originary political rhetoric and traditional ways of 
                                                          
106
 Rorty argued that those shored up by the politics of difference had lost in their virtuoso acts of self-expression most 
but the performative connections with continuing struggles against domination. See Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 146. 
107
 Cryptonomicon critiques cold war ideology and transgenerational links between postwar fathers and sons. It 
similarly critiques unscrupulous information gathering methods in World War Two and data gathering methods in 
1990s telecoms and software industries. In the wartime setting Earl Comstock, a spokesperson for corporate class 
interests, tells Lawrence Waterhouse that he has a “fatherly affection for [him] as the result of [their] work together” 
(895). However, as well as offering a critique on a regime of capital distribution in the military industry complex, it also 
takes cultural criticism to task for what it sees as offering an ineffectual politics. New political readings, such as 
psychoanalysis, semiotics and feminism were to defeat postwar sometimes known as cold war ideology up to a point, 
however, the novel also recognises that alongside the partial substitutions of Freud for Marx as a source of social theory 
specific modes of deconstruction have now lapsed into an institutional tendency reforming in Rorty’s “spectatorial Left” 
approach towards politics and culture. See Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 76; 146. 
108
 For a postcolonial narrative in American literature see Lawrence Buell, “American Literary Emergence as a 
Postcolonial Phenomenon,” 435. 
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knowing and seeing. I deal with returns in terms of the American ideology in chapter three and 
understand notions of intertextuality in Harold Bloom’s psychological struggle to achieve 
selfhood.
109
 
 
Charlene is a fledgling deconstructionist critic. She is part of the organising committee and presents 
at the up and coming “War as Text” conference (50; 77). The novel ridicules the system of the 
conference and the university circuit presenting it as centralised network of organisations. 
Charlene’s universities’ “computer systems are linked into one. They exchange teachers and 
students. From time to time they host academic conferences” (50). Charlene’s university and its 
centralised closed system are juxtaposed to “sprawling penitentiaries and three and four star hotel 
rooms” (50), suggesting the conference organisers and the university offers a narrowing theory of 
hope and optimism disseminated to and for the enlightened few. Juxtaposing the centralised closed 
system of the university’s computer network and a prison and hotel system offers a way in which 
we see how Cryptonomicon is dealing with what it considers is routinized and formulaic systems. 
Randy, on the other hand, “knows that [...] system[s are] not closed loop[s]” (75). Similar to The 
Diamond Age, where Nell’s closed system is not a closed loop, as the primer is “staffed from afar 
by an empathic woman,” Cryptonomicon offers the opportunity to explore an alternative outside to 
closed systems, which is categorically different from the one the academics it argues choose to rely 
on when that system chooses to posit an outside to itself.
110
 
 
The way in which the novel sets up the discord between Randy, the academics and the War as Text 
conference is to suggest that the novel sets out a problem with what Stanley Fish termed 
postmodern “antifoundationalist theory hope.”
111
 This moral conundrum plays a part in the 
conference. The conference sets out views of the postmodern academics as they attempt to unmask 
hegemony. To escape imperialist bondage philosophical assumptions have now been updated to 
postmodern theory that is nontrivial. Charlene attacks Randy because of his beard and her research 
centres on Unshaveness, which becomes a signifier of male patriarchal aggression. This scene 
although comically set out draws attention to Randy’s ruling forms of (habit) consciousness based 
on an unseen ethics of privilege. In the academic’s posthistorical denuding of meaning of the 
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 Harold Bloom and Richard Poirier both appropriated Emerson in the face of postructural neopragmatism seeing in 
him the only hope for our imaginative lives and to point to something beyond scepticism, to possibilities of personal 
and cultural renewal. 
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 See McGurl, The Program Era, 45 for the comment on The Diamond Age. 
111
 Fish argued “neither empirical generality nor thematic novelty is enough to make an argument theoretical in more 
than a trivial sense, that is, in a sense that marks it as importantly different in kind from other critical arguments. Theory 
in a nontrivial sense always consists in the attempt to stand outside of practice in order to govern this practice from 
without and this strong (foundationalist) kind of theory is the kind whose coherence we deny.” In terms of 
antifoundationalist theory hope we see the moral conundrum Cryptonomicon’s writing poses for the academics as they 
look to shore up their theories of difference. See Fish in Knapp and Michaels, “What is Pragmatism.”  
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subject Randy’s art of self-governance is deconstructed. Charlene and the rest of the academic 
crowd reduce him to a social position to unmask hegemony. Rorty argued how  
 
many self-consciously postmodern writers seem to be trying to have it both ways – 
to view masks as going all the way down while still making invidious comparisons 
between other people’s masks and the way things will look when all masks have 
been stripped off.
112
 
 
In their treatment of Randy as a placement of power the academics follow the anti-humanist 
stridency evident in humanities departments throughout the 1980s and until the mid-1990s. The 
novel, read from antifoundationalist theory hope, draws attention to the antihumanist critique of the 
symbolic self associated with foundational structures of American bourgeois humanism, and draws 
attention to the notion that Randy’s ability to commandeer a notion of the whole self was modelled 
out of cold war consensus politics. 
 
Highlighting a shrinking public sphere in terms of “antifoundationalist theory hope,” and academic 
freedoms that face growing pressure from the technological centralisation of economic and political 
power, the novel brings together two contemporary strands of postmodern theory: an end-of-history 
narrative and the politicised culture-critique of historical memory. Charlene’s openly hostile 
movement from the secular discourses of modernity to writerly practices of postmodernity allowed 
the deployment of écriture to redefine all rules that embellished the civic religious principle of 
Emerson’s proverb that “nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own mind.”
113
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 For this and the Stanley Fish quotation see Rorty, Feminism and Pragmatism, The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values, 12-13.   
113
 It is an important aspect of this thesis to see what type of mind Cryptonomicon and The Baroque Cycle’s styles of 
writing bring back to the reading process. As expressed McGurl argues how Cryptonomicon fundamentally re-creates 
the archetypes of the racial unconscious in its own image. This is levelled at Cryptonomicon in terms of its uses of 
points of view. Because Cryptonomicon offers a mode of ambiguity McGurl rather than see this writing style in the 
deconstructive attitude towards literature demonstrates how its writing on minority voices carries within it the 
classically modernist technique of impersonality. He argues how this technique was rotated into a minor position as the 
postwar university enabled students to break from an elitist aesthetic to find their voce in theories of textual 
performativity. McGurl sees Cryptonomicon’s staging of a point of view in the postmodernist style as ultimately 
damaging to progressive aspects of postwar education, and from a different angle somewhat equates Cryptonomicon’s 
writing with that of the white supremacist Forrest Asa Carter and his uses of the practices of higher education. To be 
able to see into an author’s mind, which is arguably what McGurl attempts to do when offering his critique of intention, 
can also lead to a phenomenological interpretation. The idea to use Emerson was to link the author to returns in the 
novel that covet a singular ideal sovereign agency. McGurl, we can argue, sees Cryptonomicon opposing whilst also 
reinstating this value and brings forward a complex argument on how Cryptonomicon brings back the romantic 
conception of genius and with Emerson’s omnivorous egoism of the imperial self. For McGurl, Cryptonomicon 
capitalises on the theories of pedagogy that played an ambivalent but central part in the countercultural imagination. 
This imagination became tied to a downside: the anti-institutional political excesses in the 1960s. Cryptonomicon’s 
conflating this type of excess with a mode of criticism that was working to re-gear the school for the systematic 
reproduction of original persons for McGurl actually destroys the genealogy that links the gesture to the social positions 
and racial interests of white progressives i.e. a racial ideology in its own right. McGurl looks to reverse engineer the 
processes of these links by restating the author into the narrative at least as a function of process. Speculatively we can 
add this is to ward off the crude attacks that are now being placed on cultural diversity as failed critical response to the 
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Historically, and because inferences can be made to strands of German idealism in the novel, rather 
than Emersonian society tack to the physical link from which John Locke made a blueprint intuition 
for Emerson became the source of truth where individual perception would illuminate the structures 
of the world.
114
 The turn to influence studies in this context is significant. Allan Bloom argued how 
the critical juxtaposition of postmodern relativism with Locke’s physical link to the blank tablet of 
the mind had disastrous consequences in American university contexts.
115
 Emerson’s turn to 
imaginatively localise civilization was to bring out potentiality embodied in the representative 
American. The break from an Emersonian literary and historical tradition in the arts and the 
contemporary movement in the humanities to a politics of the image and reduction of the political 
to the cultural is a reduction that the novel presents as critical theories weakening rather than 
enhancing literature’s power to teach and challenge readers.
116
   
 
As Cryptonomicon rises to the challenge of relentless outside pressures from marketisation, another 
theme of hope emerges. This time it is in the wartime setting, and which counters the academics’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
increase in inequality in contemporary environments. For the quotations see Emerson cited in Leitch, “Ralph Waldo 
Emerson,” in The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, 718. See also Lentricchia, Ariel and the Police, 116. 
114
 My initial readings of Stephenson links Emersonian thought traced through George Poulet’s phenomenology of 
reading where the attempts are to pose a literary critique of intention.  McGurl significantly updates terms of how to 
resituate the reader’s of the kinds of writing that ask to be called literature and the postwar writer back into contextual 
alignment. A contact with Emerson’s “sovereign agency in the citadel of subjectivity’ on the other hand can follow in 
the tradition that sought to ‘undermine at all costs – whether lordly or bourgeois - European privilege.” My literary 
critique of intentionalism found many problems when attempting to develop a frame of reference though Poulet’s 
psychologism. Foucault’s notions of the initiation of discursive practices and the author function make this literary 
critique of intentionalism redundant especially when noticing how the novel’s posthistoricist substitution of identities 
for arguable beliefs had followed the claim of this form of redundancy. In other words, returns to the past can be quite 
quickly dealt with insofar as they reform in the symbolic consciousness the imperial metaphysical perspective as the 
agent of knowledge production, which enables the subjugation or accommodation of differences and differance. It is 
this tension that I spotted in the text and it is a tension, as we shall see, that brings into view many complex critical 
arguments in Americanist Studies approaches to literature on the substitutions of identities i.e. deconstructions for 
arguable beliefs. My intention was to see how Cryptonomicon’s writing resituated literature in the recent university 
studies on history. Again there were no offerings of terms that would situate literature in history form a style of writing 
that was “writing” in the postmodernist style reflective of deconstructions. Routes to the reading experience are never 
formed in a way in Cryptonomicon, where the reader can reach common purpose with the author through external 
processes of identification. Therefore I dealt with aspects of Leibnizian monism and Emerson’s remapping of 
Leibnizian monadology in characters that follow similar understandings where comprehension of their internal logic 
cannot be given by their outwardly (mechanistic extension) forms. This was to offer a literary critique of intentionalism 
but was always off the pace. These readings, among many others such as externalities that should shape characters 
internal activities that never confirm to a Heideggerian reading and psychological phenomenology or a reading that 
would turn this over for a Husserlian-type transcendental one of how certain characters can form within Kant’s 
disinterested purposiveness of form that approaches the beautiful and the good directly “but only in intuition reflected 
upon, not in its concept, as we do morality,” were specifically to relate the language in the novel as not going strictly 
over to playing the text in a European poststructuralist sense.  American transcendentalist Emerson rejected John 
Locke’s systematic empiricism holding instead to a Leibniz-like monism, which in turn held to the unity of the world 
and God. And although I state that there is not necessarily a theological argument to be drawn from Cryptonomicon 
there is a search for monistic unity, or in modern literary fictional reading terms a desire for consensus. 
115
 See Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind. 
116
 Guillory wrote: “the reduction of the political to the instance of representation, and representation to the image is 
only the first step toward a political critique of the literary curriculum to say that it is a medium of images. This mode of 
canonical critique reduces the curriculum to such a medium and thus to a mass cultural form. In this sense the critique 
of the canon betrays its determination by certain postmodern conditions by those conditions in which media images 
have the central ideological function of organizing our response to virtually all aspects of our lives.” See Cultural 
Capital, 8. 
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theories of optimism and postmodern suspicion of all dreams of return. Lawrence Waterhouse, 
Bobby Shaftoe and Goto Dengo motivate the action in these scenes and form part of an interracial 
and positive plot characteristic. Through their cultural montage the novel finds its place in larger 
multiplicitous whole. A value (rather than fictional) judgment taken on their relationships informs 
us that white America was not only built from capitalist models of aggression and colonising 
instincts, which the academics look to pin on Randy. The wartime characters present a foil to the 
academics. Biographies are sincere. The moralising Dengo, the becoming aware psychological 
motivation of Lawrence, the dehumanisation of Shaftoe, and his unwavering belief in working 
things out are transformed into a larger narrative that not only wards off the “high” irrational logic 
of the academics but offers a narrative that supports America to counter contemporary antihumanist 
strategies to denude the historical subject of referential meaning. Charlene’s constructivist view, 
where language and self-description are key, is considered a social “con[struct]” (77) and not much 
use in motivating actions. Charlene sees her critique of male behaviour as a tactical point to engage 
with a society in which it is increasingly difficult to distinguish the natural from the socially 
constructed at any point. Kivistik as the name of theory in the novel wryly induces a thought 
process in Charlene that is not hers, and she is cut off from an intellectual appraisal and artistic 
appreciation of books and symbols of natural beauty native to American understanding and 
representation (77). What is cut off from Charlene’s viewpoint, as she reduces a symbolic image of 
America to an economic variable, is the functioning and positioning of the school and how the 
institutional site of canonical revision mediates its political effects in the social domain.
117
 Through 
Randy’s alarmist resistances to theory in which the world is viewed not simply as a linguistic 
construct we see how tyranny rather than constituted in cold war bureaucracy is now constituted in 
Kivistik’s neorelativist critiques and the university’s promoting of mass liberal communication 
methods through dubious uses of theory. This challenge draws focuses on dividing rather than 
cohering forces that emerged between postwar radical college professors and average American 
citizens like Randy. 
 
Cryptonomicon’s is to reacquaint the reader with a pre-postmodern critique of postwar and Cold 
War American society. It mixes idealism with social criticism—and often imagination for its own 
sake, as allusions to Lawrence’s dream of the Hindenburg airship disaster in the opening passages 
confirm (18-19). It can be argued that its primary engagement with a historical background is not 
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 Guillory draws out what he considers a false enlightenment when he writes: “The work of art was crucial for 
political economy’s founding distinction between use value and exchange value. The conflation of these two terms in 
current anti-aesthetic arguments betrays how much present critique of judgment has forgotten about intimate historical 
conditions between aesthetic and economic discourses. The cost of that amnesia is a kind of false enlightenment and 
restatement in altogether more reductive terms of a relation between the aesthetic and the economic much more 
interestingly and problematically engaged in 18
th
 century moral philosophy.” Cultural Capital, xiv. 
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Hitler’s “hellish empire” (193), and thus giving a very modern take on the Holocaust novel, or 
America’s Cold War project that looms large with the likes of Alan Turing disappearing from 
Lawrence Waterhouse’s view into the “realms of classified” (123), but the anxiety felt towards the 
selling out of educational freedoms in the university’s mergers with big business and the private 
sector. The novel openly engages with the dominances of wartime and aggressive business interests, 
and ensuing proto-imperialist legacies of the US as it took over from the old-world in terms of 
military and economic power. The Philippines were largely brought into American-styled 
domination in the twentieth century as they were labelled unfit for self-management and duly 
considered as part of the white man’s burden. However, as we will see, the attack on US 
paternalism in Cryptonomicon presents itself only in so far as it is to offer a renewed connection 
with hope in the present. Through differing perspectives of a handful of characters and small 
groups, we begin to see how questions surrounding theories of optimism is diverted away from the 
Sixties New Left claims on progressive educational opportunities and democratic reform and 
directed towards institutionalizing impulses and murderous abstracting perspectives that centre in 
wartime Europe. Pushing against what the novel considers is the reification of historical processes 
as Charlene takes fringey countercultural movements and New Left activism into the graduate 
school Cryptonomicon to supplement a somewhat blighted story of heroic freedom fighters creates 
distance from knowledge informed by the hegemony of the subject position: a presentist lapse that 
is now imbued in the American university professor’s complex politics of posthistoricism, and 
which the novel characterises as suggestions from the state.  
 
To get more of a feel for a novelistic utopia and how resistances are formed to State 
instrumentalism and corporate managerialism, which the novel caricatures now inherent in the 
university system as an institution, and which, in turn, it presents as the commitment to the 
dissemination of founding European practices into a continuation of corporate capital by other 
means, Michael de Certeau, in his Practice of Everyday Life, criticised Debord’s method of 
revolutionary engagement.
118
 Debord attempted to bring truth and historical authenticity back into 
the world of semblances. Aligning Debord to a dogmatic approach when it came to complex social 
realties de Certeau argued that his flaneur type acts of resistance had taken on the spatialising 
properties of the imperial essence. The point here is not to argue the pluses and minuses of de 
Certeau’s neorelativist critique of Debord, but to argue that Cryptonomicon delivers a similar 
judgment on the high-powered academics. It is their abstracting visions infused with anti-
intellectual link ups and New Media in information economies that now imbue the objectivist 
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 Leo Marx argued how a certain group of Americanists handed over unintentionally the “UR” coding in the 
conception of America to an elitist corporate standard. See Marx, “On Recovering the “Ur” Theory,” 118-134. 
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interpretive method, and theory, whether structuralism or capitalism, for Randy, is the remedy of 
difference.
119
  
 
Cryptonomicon’s non-academic characters resist a new type of corporate overview discretely tied to 
themes of information and postmodern relativism, and take to the streets to fashion a form of self-
protest. Randy will not take a cab in Manila, much to the detriment of the sex workers and other 
cabbies, preferring to walk everywhere (88). This theme of walking, which Rebecca Solnit argues 
does not have a radical history in America, rather than be tied to an avant-garde deformation of 
form through flaneur-type acts of resistance, offer direct contrasts given in spatialising objectives 
taken from aeroplane flights.
120
 This is highly suggestive of a latent anxiety in the novel concerned 
with incoming threats into and out of America. Working from the technical point of view of 
narration is ways in which we see the novel interpret away US divisiveness. The aeroplane as a 
symbol of freedom and futurity is a device that can highlight the novel’s political aspirations.
121
 
 
Cryptonomicon takes on an imperialist overview when characters make more use of the panoptical 
overview.
122
 Spanos writes: 
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 Reverting to Benn Michaels’s argument on liberal racism and how it appears in cultural pluralism we see how 
Cryptonomicon reflects Michaels’s position. Charlene’s liberal racism is a product of her cultural pluralism and her 
anti-essentialist views on Randy’s commitments to personhood are in fact considered in the novel as a form of racism 
that carries within its viewpoints all the subjectivisms and imperial essences Cryptonomicon’s writing locates it in the 
cultural pluralist perspective. Finding it difficult to lodge an appeal with the academics that can challenge their 
subjective opinions, which they believe are no longer opinions that compel disagreement but something that must be 
brought into Randy’s opinions and views of himself. This recourse to difference in the novel is in short the subjugation 
of all differences into views on social construction that Randy believes is based on very redoubtable data. In sum, 
Charlene’s non-essentialising posthistoricist position is just as essentialising as Randy’s yet she chooses to deny her 
contradictory position none more so reflected in her hiding her cache of bodice ripper novels in the basement of the 
house she shares with Randy. In short, the replacement of cultural identity as a replacement for racial identity has not in 
fact replaced the essence of Charlene’s partial or contradictory interests. Choosing to hide these interests a nocturnal 
furtive secret enforces Michaels’s antitheory argument that cultural identity is a form of racial identity.    
120
 Here again we see how Cryptonomicon becomes a vexed narrative. It critiques the views of the academics for their 
unwillingness to offer value judgments however at the same time the novel prefers to use a similar recourse to 
difference as it offers its own disagreements not through opinion or disagreement but rather through the difference in 
point of view. Michaels writes the point of appeal to perspective in this context eliminates disagreement. McGurl 
revises this understanding and argues how the appeal to perspective is a classically modernist technique, which rotated 
itself into the staginess of the postmodern novel to enable a textual performance of vocal authenticity for the “other” 
writer. Because McGurl argues Stephenson is a white writer that stands in for other narration he argues how its use of 
ambivalence hides its own racist genealogical links and ties to the male-dominated and misogynistic modernist literary 
establishment. McGurl, in short, is worried how a novel like Cryptonomicon ties its frames of reference to recent 
cultural alignments to readings of race and racial identity in the university yet in many aspects sees how its racialised 
narration destroys many of the internal lines of differentiation that were in fact the orderly appearance of new subfields 
in the humanities. See McGurl The Program Era, 56, and Rebecca Solnit, Wanderlust, 15. 
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 This fear of threat by incoming airborne assaults on American soil highlights a state of anxiety, which in turn can be 
reflective of a general feeling of insecurity in America, as its increasing military aggression on the world-stage was 
being fed through aerial outrages. See, for instance, Robbins, “Introduction: American Novel Dossier,” 1-10. 
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 Although McGurl argues how Cryptonomicon brings back into the text a reverse racism a systematic understanding 
of this charge is at best considered only briefly. What I mean by this is that Cryptonomicon’s characters display many of 
the deconstructionist philosophies. Although deconstruction perhaps at this moment does not have the valence as a 
political project when viewed from the site of political defeat we can give quite a full and comprehensive reading 
notwithstanding McGurl’s argument of the novel in its attempts to overcome a male oriented misogynistic public 
sphere. Although this as suggested no longer has a political orientation it nevertheless can offer a full accounting of the 
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The European consciousness, which has become the burden of an exceptionalist 
America to assume in its betrayal by the Old World is essentially an imperial 
consciousness, insofar as it has, from the beginning, been oriented by a metaphysical 
perspective.
123
 
 
We meet resistance to high-minded ideals in Bobby Shaftoe when he is “trudging among [his] 
platoon” (94). However, when on a plane ride to carry out a secretive wartime mission for the 
government, missions that no longer make sense to Shaftoe as orders have been turned over to 
steering media, his plane is shot down, and a man of rank is mutilated. A Bahktinian ethos of vulgar 
exuberance is given as Shaftoe stands in Lieutenant Etheridge’s quivering giblets (180). This 
grotesque projection upon wartime spatialising objectives casts aspersions on high-powered 
academics in the tradition of the grotesque. Like the Lieutenant, the academics are uncritical 
recipients of orders, and are tasked in the novel as highly inflexible when dealing with matters close 
to the ground. Those that do not display adaptability, or do nothing at the pretence of doing 
something (this is more seriously iterated in the enemy Italians who let Shaftoe and his band of 
political assassins move unhindered in their country in wartime), often come to a grotesquely 
humorous end.
124
 The extreme flexibility overlaid onto the Philippines and its peoples, which 
becomes synonymous with democratic vitality and ideals that repudiate high cultural norms, 
counters the reification and obfuscation that forms a central tenet of the academic character’s back-
stories.  
 
The academics fly in for Charlene’s conference from old and new world centres of privilege. Their 
new spatialising objectives are connected to more forms of technological domination. Digital media 
studies, for David Golumbia are a “First World Culturalism.”
125
 His understanding offers further 
reifications of what Thomas Streeter calls Internet enthusiasms of the 90s.
126
 In short, the novel 
represents the digital strategies of the academics as just another form of technology, and one, more 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
theoretical moves novels were trying to make to break from the classically modernist orientation of impersonality and 
the literary critique of intentionalism. This systematic accounting of deconstructionist acts in the novel is beyond the 
scope of this current essay however a more sober accounting of Cryptonomicon’s uses of the posthistoricist substitution 
of identities for arguable beliefs could offer a basic platform to view and review the current situation of discourse. This 
is notwithstanding the sophisticated antitheory arguments and newer resistances to the right’s attacks on left conceptual 
thought.       
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 Spanos, “The Question of Philosophy and Poiesis,” 152. 
124
 The Swedes and the Finnish are also blasted for their listless and hypocritical nature in war in the novel. 
Cryptonomicon threads a link to this listlessness through character association with Kivistik. A non-conflict attitude is 
disparaged and connected to the non-conflict oriented approach of the academics and the “postmodern unwillingness to 
make value judgements” (709). These connections are drawn out, as Julieta Kivistik’s unknown son could be college 
professor Kivistik. His initials represent G(unter), E(noch), B(obby). Each of these characters has a relationship with 
Julieta. However we are never quite certain as to who is the father of Julieta’s baby but we can muster a suggestion that 
Julieta Kivistik is synonymous with leading poststructural critic Julia Kristeva and the novel’s intended pun on the 
postmodern existential dilemma. 
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 Golumbia cited in Lennon, “Gaming the System.” 
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 See, for instance, Streeter, “The Moment of Wired.” 
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or less, in the tight grip of traditional media dominances. The poster furore surrounding the Second 
World War veteran in the novel becomes an “Official Object of Controversy.” (51) The novel’s 
engagements with the veteran’s sensationalised image is highly suggestive of the way TV and 
traditionally-styled journalistic acts were used to knock the stuffing out of postmodern Leftists who 
fought for the underdog in terms of revolutionary modes of becoming or being.
127
 A similar 
disillusionment about the private appropriation of “free information” and the Leftist views on 
challenging these concerns comes as Randy and Avi’s business call over the Pacific Ocean (23) is 
given a conversational ethos of money markets. Following what Katherine Hayles calls “the dream 
of information which beckoned as a realm of plenitude and infinite replenishment” the narrator tells 
us “Randy used to be fascinated by software, but now he isn’t” (53).
128
 In the novel not only are the 
postmodern academics tasked as some kind of standing disposable reserve for the old-world, but 
their concept of information as a utopian dream follows closely spurious telecoms deregulation 
initiatives of the 1990s, and the billions that went missing in this big gaping hole. Randy and Avi 
act as a salient reminder of the individualism built into the rhetoric of free information and 
explosive growth in telecoms, and more saliently the telecommunications scandals of the US in the 
90s.  
 
The academics, notwithstanding their civilizing mission to convert Randy, attach a problematic 
ethic of duty towards his bunch of techies. These techies are maligned for happily living in and of 
blithely accepting what Charles A. Reich considered the corporate state.
129
 Randy and Avi’s social 
restraint is made problematic. In their attempts to erect a data haven in light of the Philippines’ lax 
democratic laws, their status as sympathetic fictional protagonists is in doubt. The novel will not 
rejoice in their American identity, giving voice to Rorty’s concerns over Stephenson’s unpatriotic 
behaviours.
130
 Cryptonomicon instead focuses upon how the Philippines were becoming heavily 
impregnated with western expansionist legacies as the telecommunications and free market 
revolution of the 1990s ballooned into what Thomas Frank argued was “the most fabled New 
Economic field of them all.”
131
 Cryptonomicon wants to open the whole fictional account to 
challenge customs and assumptions around institutions and greedy corporations—not only of the 
present, but also on traditionalisms that invoke the past. Cryptonomicon is therefore not a 
straightforward indictment of the poststructural academics as it attempts to invoke the revoking of 
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 Newfield argues that associations that uphold the naïve antirealism connected to literary and cultural studies came 
from the medias promulgating of the literary academy’s lunatic disbelief in the physical world. See Newfield “The 
Value of Nonscience,” 511.   
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 Hayles, My Mother was a Computer, 62. 
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 Reich delivered damning counterculture indictments on education as means of repressive indoctrination and looked 
to change repressive systems through non-traditional means. See Reich cited throughout McGurl, “Learning from Little 
Tree,” 243-267. 
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 Frank, What’s The Matter With America, 40.  
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freedoms from civilizing exploits in the US.
132
 Information legacies, the delegitimation of 
knowledge and Second World War triumphalist narratives are brought into these scenes, as the 
official history of the war is overturned and the benign aspects of modern technological 
development are infused with Big Business and the university’s seceding to corporate power. All of 
this further dehumanises the Little Man, now characterised by Randy. 
 
The imperial rhetoric of the civilizing mission imbued in flights and “killing zones from above” 
(540) are countered in the wartime context, as the author engages in third person limited narration 
with Lawrence. McGurl argues what is gained from third person limited narration is experiential 
intensity.
133
 Narrative structure is important in these scenes as it becomes a mode of realistic 
interpretation; dramatic contrasts are made through Lawrence’s often-confused states, leaving the 
reader open to what the character is feeling and seeing and describing. Lawrence’s thoughts are 
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 Lawrence Waterhouse’s World War Two experiences bring into historical consciousness the politicised culture 
critique of subjectively negative experiences of theoretical expansionist models. As expressed theory that is nontrivial 
in the guise of expansionist legacies are built from within predominantly European wartime legacy. Expansionist 
experiences manifested in and through the character Lawrence are doubly posed through a trans-generational relay and 
conflicts in his interpretation. These via his subject position link the novel pedagogically to contemporary American 
environments. The latter link when tied to Randy’s story relay the richness of cultural critique and postmodern 
scepticism towards wartime instrumental uses of higher order levels of communication. In the novel the tyranny of 
America’s bureaucratic system reflected in Earl Comstock who looks to build a new-old styled Star Chamber system 
become adumbrated into disciplinary measures. Postmodern scepticism towards unscrupulous information gathering 
methods of World War Two is similarly represented in Avi’s paranoia of the digital age upon which the contemporary 
environment in Cryptonomicon is largely built. In turning down the offer to join Earl Comstock’s new National Security 
Agency and what resembles the American dream Lawrence is offered the job at the NSA because he is good at keeping 
secrets but declines pastoral property ownership (house in horse country) and modern conveniences in relation to 
material goods (a new Hoover). Lawrence is an ambiguous figure in the critique of Americanism in the postwar context. 
He sets out on the one hand a transnational representational critique of the image of American national character the 
tyranny of bureaucracy and of instrumental reason as the chief problems of American society however he also offers a 
trans-generational link between grandfather’s and sons. The digital connection is always made tenuous in the novel as 
Avi tells Epiphyte corps group that they live in a world of real people pointing to a map of the globe. This suggests 
disenchantment with the medium of information protocols dedicated to world peace. What is more interesting is that the 
total indignation of Avi and Amy towards injustice is countered with Randy’s weak passivity. His model of a “weak 
feeling” against injustice resounds in affect theory’s counter-conceptual claims to strong emotions of negative critique. 
The novel in this sense always oscillates between a new progressivism and the fear of anti-essentialism.  See Ngai, Ugly 
Feelings. 
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 Because Lawrence can only speak from limited experience through the third person narrator we see what the 
character really feels not what she says she feels. Thus the novel adds irony though simple point of view tactics. This 
reinforces the limitedness of a central character’s point of view. Thereby, when we rotate this viewpoint through the 
posthistoricist substitution of identities for arguable beliefs Lawrence and his community’s isolation in the wartime 
context just as Epiphyte Corps and Randy are in the contemporary context becomes a source of radical posthistoricist 
identity critique on the triumphalist template. Lawrence’s stages the retreat from the permeation of the military into all 
aspects of his life. He is a soldier greeted not welcomed saluted not honoured as he is drafted to his new military 
position in information retrieval. Lawrence no longer has a ship after the sinking of the Arizona and Nevada at Pearl 
harbour and becomes valuable to the war effort only in that he is instrumental in the new great man game. Like Bobby 
Shaftoe Lawrence is flung into situations beyond his immediate comprehension or control. In a moment of rye pre-
Kennedy nationalistic self-observation Lawrence wonders to himself after hearing of Alan Turing’s departure to 
England to work in the realms of classified what uses his country would find for him. Similarly we see that Although 
Lawrence critiques the classical centre in a politics of the image the novel is at pains to never allow the reader to enter 
or relate to the character Lawrence as a feeling being until the last few pages when he destroys the Arethusa transcripts. 
This thwarts Earl Comstock’s claims for full system’s control. Lawrence, Bobby Shaftoe and Randy all share similar 
character traits in this aspect as they from doubling effects with each other, which in turn isolates the importance of 
their community from the larger belief systems that circumscribe their personal commitments to national politics. For 
notions on third person limited narration see McGurl, “Understanding Iowa: Flannery O’Connor, B.A., M.F.A.,” 540. 
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directly contrasted with war, paranoia, Bletchley Park and Wartime Lipstick. Each theme is driven 
out of context, and challenges to customs and institutions are made. Vanity, reflected in Lipstick, is 
taken out of context and challenges the vapid nature of celebrity academic culture and the romance 
eroding effects of their new civilizing mission. The academics disfigure an image of a Second 
World War veteran with lipstick and the novel draws this scene together with a grotesque image. 
Wartime lipstick is left over “from whatever tailings and gristle [...] once all the good stuff [animal 
fat] had been used to coat propeller shafts” (141). Bletchley Park and heroic individual quests 
surrounding information legacies are similarly given a grotesque styled exuberance as the novel 
attempts to expel its old world anxieties. Its old-world gables are covered in “bird’s shit” (193), and 
the motorcycle farts its way past such fabled towers as Lawrence turns up. The sign of filth in 
particular is not something Americans usually associate with such a place of earnestness and 
recognised wartime historical importance. Because this response can also be seen as a response to 
America’s Cold War bureaucratic project, invoking Cryptonomicon in simultaneity of meaning can 
offer Americanisation in the multicultural critique of American ethnocentrism characterizing the 
dynamics of American culture as a multiculture with various conflicting dimensions of cultural 
difference and social heterogeneity.
134
 Conversely it can transform a symptomatic sense of the 
exilic condition into a fully knowing one. I deal with accounts of formal exile in chapter three. 
 
McGurl knows that to return to a naive empiricism from the perspective of a “completely 
discredited foundationalism” would make him sound “goofily anachronistic.”
135
 Instead, and paying 
homage to the impasse of the pluralist agenda, McGurl does not seek to covet returns to a singular 
ideal of Emersonian sovereign agency, but looks to reinstate reductions of the author back into the 
narrative at least as a “function of process.”
136
 By returning the reading of literature to an 
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 As I attempted to show in the introduction Cryptonomicon’s narrative can sit on an uncomfortable and dangerous 
boundary line that offers the elision from a national into a transnational perspective with intersecting cultures formed at 
America’s inception. Conversely, it can follow routes to meaning through Bercovitch’s Puritan rhetoric. The former 
intersecting narrative can be traced in the work of either Berlant or Paul Giles’s criticisms’ of Bercovitch’s nativist 
pluralist homogenous semiotic.      
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 See McGurl, “Pluralisms of Postwar American Fiction,” 129. 
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 I argue that the problem McGurl sees with cultural pluralism is in terms of its conceptual errors i.e. the race problem 
become the race problem. What I mean by this is that cultural pluralism as marker of difference and a way to ward of 
racism has been co-opted by white writers like Stephenson that have destroyed the genealogy of its links with 
progressive reform. This is what McGurl ultimately argues is the exacting of the revenge of the low-brow being taken 
out on the middle-brow for its failed intellectual response against elitism, inequality, racism and so forth.  McGurl then 
rather than return to a notion of supplementing the text to ward off further counts of critical interpretation of his 
argument and when divorced from its author and contingency of its origin to make itself free for new relationships takes 
what I consider is an argument from Michaels. In sum, McGurl is not so much as interpreting intentional meaning of the 
text but changing it. Michaels argues “thus the act of creative supplementing would be an act of creative writing 
producing not a new interpretation of the text […] but a new text.” In short McGurl is writing himself into historical 
record not by giving two different meanings to one text i.e. postwar literary production (the common object) but by 
changing this text’s meaning in alignment with nationalist culturalist significance and historical importance. McGurl 
can return to the past not with another interpretation of what that past meant but rather from a new context to review the 
past or what he calls long modernism. McGurl even alludes to this new common object of past and present when he 
states that “this is the difference that his book (and fifty more years of literary history) would make in our take on the 
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institutional a priori that is not, as Foucault would suggest, as carceral (or, Emerson suggests, 
perverse), McGurl in my view solves the postmodernist scepticism of all dreams of return.
137
 
Cryptonomicon, rather than offer a reflexively reflexive position similar to McGurl, often attempts 
to reach the power of the American a priori by surrounding characters with the use of comic or 
tragic moments. These moments can act as a source of subjective identification with previous 
historical production. Rather than this isolationist critique offer the posthistoricist substitution of 
identities for arguable beliefs in its mode of ambivalence it is distributed across the cross-
generational narrative where the reader is returned to a mythical or transcendental awareness of 
America’s past, through either processes of identification, or withdrawal from that identification. 
The reading-in of a distributed agency tied to monism and Emersonian self-reliance challenges the 
systemic idealism held in the Newtonian-Lockean interlock of constitutional time-space and 
abstract individualism made problematic in liberal ties with postmodern relativism. Similarly, a 
type of formal arrangement expressive of Leibnizian individualism challenges the individual 
appetite of the Japanese, which the novel exemplifies through Goto’s unwillingness to be scripted 
into wartime expansion controlled by extrinsic forces.  
 
Wartime codebreaker Lawrence is only second in importance in data encryption to that of his close 
associate Alan Turing. Randy and Lawrence Waterhouse are tied together with Turing as a 
community hell bent on promoting individual freedom whilst remaining true to civic life. These 
character’s insights are to take what is best out of wartime heroic freedom fighters, and a 
transference of values tied to a reading of their behavioural response in the novel offer counter-
assertions on the hacker and the digital computer as it was and still is tied unremittingly to the 
technocratic elite and mercenary corporate interests. In Lawrence we see that the historical descent 
of the hacker is given an alternate locus of temporal articulation from that which the academics 
place on Randy. Lawrence counters language of the momentary big pay-off for complicit co-option 
into technobureaucratic institutions of power. Although an instrument of informational think-tanks 
that put him to uses for war, he finally refuses to be bought off. He destroys the original Arethusa 
transcripts that would allow Earl Comstock greater systems control in ensuing Cold War Power 
Networks. He rejects Comstock’s barbed offer of the American Dream, “the nice house in the horse 
country, gas stove and Hoover” (897), as palliative to join America’s “new Black Chamber” (895). 
Lawrence not only is a symbolic characterisation of the attainment of the good enshrined in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
history of modernism.” This has many divergent implications, such as what we intend is always what we mean 
regardless of when the author is divorced from the intention and contingency of its origin. In short, we cannot simply 
interpret the past away we have to change the text’s (the common object) meaning. This as Giles argues has replaced 
racial identity as the persisting problem in US cultural criticism. See McGurl, “Understanding Iowa Flannery 
O’Connor, B.A., M.F.A.,” 543, and The Program Era, 368. See also Knapp and Michaels, “Against Theory 2: 
Hermeneutics and Deconstruction,” 53.   
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Declaration of Independence: as he internally and externally fights to ward off the abstracting 
process and its entwinement with a regrettable old-world context involving state domination and 
belligerent homophobia (Turing and Rudy are regarded as inferior beings in both British and 
German contexts) he also sounds out a ringing un-endorsement to the large payoff to individuals 
living in the inherently pluralistic conditions of postmodernity.
138
 Charlene’s group are individuals 
that fought against the excessive rationalism of the wartime elite, yet somehow their individual 
natures, like that of the wartime code breakers, have been turned over to a covert legacy of systems 
control. Lawrence, as one of America’s Greatest Generation, finds within him the embodied civic-
minded means that refuse the survival neatly repackaged back to him and rebranded in the form of 
commodities. Reattached to him is the return to a republicanism ethos of egalitarian attachment, and 
we see how the novel struggles with its own deconstructionist critique as it latently carries the 
traces of subjectivity, which its own critique up to a point attempts to erase i.e. that all men are 
created equally and sovereign of their own minds and have capacity to think. Whether this makes 
the author of Cryptonomicon personally responsible for the recreation of the archetypes of the racial 
consciousness in the US is what this thesis attempts to deliberate fully upon. 
 
The radical theorists’ call for a pedagogical curriculum is reflective of what Thomas Frank argued 
was a reactionary backlash to right-wing vilification on the basis of the latte-libel. This term is used 
to represent what Frank saw was a failure of the liberal left to respond to a reactionary conservative 
politics, as the Republican party took control of the moral high ground and attacked liberal 
democracy from the Right. Placing an emphasis on culture wars, Frank points out how “know-it-all 
college professors” and liberals from the coast were alienating the “heartland” common voter with 
their power-in-discourse methods on how to run America.
139
 Frank’s insights are helpful to 
illustrate why liberal thinker Randy finds it a fruitless tactic to take issue with the side of Charlene’s 
civic view of humanity or that her of friends. The assumption that they are tied to a nativist 
response is compounded as we are to learn that they have developed “some academic jargon [...] 
Randy would [n]ever understand unless he became one of them” (52). Although the academics fail 
to engage seriously with those outside the academy Randy represents the US imperialist mentality 
that the academics’ condemn him for, and which they somewhat paradoxically confirm as old-world 
driven. On a plane flight, the northern Luzon rainforests, to Randy, are “just a shitload of trees [...] 
[he] wants to bulldoze all of it” (507). This is on his third Business Foray in the Philippines. 
Through an understanding of Randy’s business ventures, the novel links together an understanding 
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 In many ways we can see here how the novel brings forward the problems inherent in deconstructions in that it was a 
methodology that could be deconstructed in terms of its own findings. Both Foucault and de Man criticised Derrida’s 
anti-philosophy for blindness that would lead to further commentary. See De Man, “The Rhetoric of blindness,” 118; 
139, and Foucault, “What is an Author,” 1625. 
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of real estate via the idea of private property ownership. On “Randy’s Second Business Foray” (80) 
he earned enough to buy and own the old Victorian house that he shares with Charlene, and we are 
told the Victorian house gave him “a feeling of safety” (80), which is scripted as part of the 
possessive individualism of Randy. Many critics of Lockean liberalism came to see this view as 
conservative and again we can see how Cryptonomicon is tied to the postmodern view on traditional 
ways of knowing and seeing.
140
 Overall Randy is tolerant of others although this often leaves him 
isolated in the academic’s engagements with US liberal culture. Randy’s isolation, as he is 
unwillingly scripted into a new historical role and reinserted in the academic crowd’s fundamental 
reconception of the historiographic method, is countered through his relationship with others. The 
academics take issue with Randy’s forthright views with them, and we see how their academic 
jargon is often juxtaposed alongside their postmodern unwillingness to make value judgements. 
Cryptonomicon’s experimental attacks on themes central to postwar American culture are 
overturned in these scenes, and it is Charlene and her friends who are perceived as reducing the 
world to an increasingly mechanized or mechanical humanity. 
 
We find out that it is Randy who wants commitment “by wanting to have kids” with Charlene but it 
is Charlene who has “issues with kids” (81-82). The novel has Avi tell Randy to “fill in the fucking 
blanks” as to why after ten years he has not married Charlene (28). Frankness of speech and civic 
and familial notions of duty through which the traditional individual in America first touched based 
with public interest (institutions and the State) explain how Randy and Avi, and Randy and Amy’s 
relationship challenges assumptions on the dominant anti-humanist stridency in the contemporary 
university. As the novel moves closer towards an anxious understanding of the erosion of traditional 
freedoms, either in Charlene’s cold hard professionalism or academic cohort Nina’s promiscuity 
(85), there is a retreat or even a recreation of an almost Southern will to order.
141
 Richard H. King, 
writing on the Southern response to abstraction argues,  
 
what is wrong with modernity [for Southerners] can be encompassed by abstractions 
such as individualism, reductionism and materialism. For Lytle, in discussing 
Warren’s All the King’s Men, the issue is “the inadequacy of the autonomous mind” 
(112), the individual cut loose from family, community, social order, and the 
“tradition of fathers.” Montgomery defines “Yankees” to be “those who are given to 
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 For a retort to scholars that belittled foundations on the basis of John Locke’s conjoining of liberalism and property 
rights in the constitution see Diggins, On hallowed ground: Abraham Lincoln and the Foundations of American 
History, 48. 
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 The sexuality of grad student Charlene and academic Nina in the group is a problematic source in the narrative, and 
relays a link to how Allan Bloom understands the great books of western thought had been devalued in the 
contemporary university as a source of wisdom and how sexual habits of modern students had lead to their inability to 
fashion a life for themselves. A sterile social-sexual habit is given to Nina as she attempts to catch Randy’s eye at the 
dinner table (85) while Charlene is painted with an inability to fashion a life for herself as she decamps from Randy to 
set up house with the older Yale Professor (578).  
70 
 
wilful, aggressive pretences to innocence, wherever and whenever they are 
born”(13).
142
 
 
Randy’s protestations to being ousted from history and labelled an elitist technocrat can infer upon 
him King’s deep bred racial suspicion, as he is pushed to any familiar intelligible ethnic or religious 
group loyalty. With it, the novel captures a distinct set of meanings for the regional philosophical, 
and, more importantly, as we will see, the “white” faculty history of postmodern America.  
 
Cryptonomicon’s aura of seriousness (as mock contrasts often lighten some of the more top-heavy 
claims in the novel) is arranged as searches are mobilised. Although not adding any particular 
suspense to the plot (as the novel is too heavily involved with getting across numerous ideas) these 
searches present a foil to the academics’ posthistorical discourse. In a storyline that takes him to the 
strangeness of the Philippines a travelogue of local customs and greetings cuts across the novel’s 
spatial properties, offering a distinct narrative counter-assertion that throws focuses on the 
academics’ spatial imaginings. Realising and describing the Philippines’ past and present complex 
urban and rural dynamics through Randy, a narratological allegiance begins to be held with 
distinctive intermixed sociocultural (and topological) elements as the novel contrasts the Philippines 
in a number of dramatic ways. Randy leaves America and Charlene. His journey can follow a 
number of themes which stand in an oppositional reading to the academics’ takes on racial 
otherness, not least because of its lengthy discussions about local customs and sustained scenic 
descriptions. As others have argued, nature, books and action carry a distinctly new-world recipe 
that can lead to a cultural nationalist program.
143
 These elements in the opening pages of The 
Baroque Cycle (as Benjamin Franklin plays a cameo role to devalue classical education through a 
noncosmopolitan and pragmatic application) testify to such tendencies in Neal Stephenson’s 
fictional writing.
144
 
 
Tiger economies in Cryptonomicon attempt to replicate American style democracy at the expense of 
becoming “economic laggards” (866) in the surrounding environments, and this engagement throws 
a portent of seriousness behind the comic relief placed on Charlene’s American based pluralist 
perspective. Also rather than learn from direct experience or hard work (Randy explores racial 
otherness at first hand in his journey westward and southwards quite a complex statement in itself 
as it hold connotations of American manifest destinies), the novel criticises the academics’ lack of 
honesty and industry. Charlene turning her back on the image of the American dream is 
characterised as not coping with a problem head-on; she submits to institutional blindness in the 
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form of Kivistik. Charlene is, in fact, doubled in exilic conversion: her affair with Kivistik is 
characterised as a spurious love affair between radical self-interest and Kivistik-as-the-name-of-
theory. Both these traits are as equally collusive in eroding socially cohesive views from the 
immediate bonds of locality where frankness of speech and hard work is key. “Randy is forever 
(and without rancour) telling people that they are full of shit” (81). This is something the academics 
cannot abide believing that no person especially a white American and misogynist male like Randy 
should offer pretence to be “right or wrong about anything” (81). Cryptonomicon rather than 
succumb to the academic group’s nihilistic assertions on ideas of truth offers Randy as ultimately 
flexible in a non-specialized way. He unlike the academics gets to grips with despondencies of the 
Second World War telling Avi “quietly and without rancour” that he is “obsessed with the 
Holocaust” (25). Randy, in short is put forward as Emerson’s, “right kind of reader.” Rather than 
take up any specialised discourse or academic jargon he relies on himself to go to the local store and 
buy the books that would see him learn the art of computer language (81). Randy is to offer an 
audacity to the academics bringing his own truth system to First World digital media studies. On the 
other hand, Kivistik and Charlene offer, at best, what is construed as only technical support to the 
nation qua nation if their aim is to spread intercultural literacy. The academics, now presented as 
imagineers, want the key to success without the effort. Because they paint Randy with labels (84) 
the liberal worldview they offer is considered as an arrogant assumption, and a postmodern 
distortion that has intensified to a complete breakdown of all mutually recognizable forms that can 
give a dynamic world of interrelationships.  
 
Although Randy’s incursion into the Philippines hatches into an imperialist-type adventure, (which 
invokes spurious deregulation initiatives and telecommunication scandals of the 1990s) this plot 
also mobilises a romantic relationship with Amy. McGurl sees how a problematic antecedent 
romanticism in Cryptonomicon comes through in a displaced representation of a paradoxical 
nonethnic ethnicity in postmodernist fiction.
145
 Notwithstanding McGurl’s argument of how high 
ideals of Romance find their way into Cryptonomicon the genre of romance offers an alternative to 
critique the crushing hegemony of the US as it flexed technological prowess and global power on 
the world stage—without, however, completely discrediting a prospect of America that can renew 
hope and optimism. As well as the novel following scientific developments in warfare and then in 
social conditioning in the US, these conditions are ultimately not as important as the classless 
romantic adventures that underline a handful of characters that symbolise both real or utopian hope 
and the idea (and ideal) of America. Abstract denouncements of the State were already heavily 
shackled to old-world prejudices (and Cryptonomicon has little problem in understanding these 
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abstractions as structural abstractions of old world ruling elites), yet the novel also criticises further 
abstract denouncements in the postmodern tendency, which have built confused social relations.  
 
The aura of seriousness behind the novel’s often vicious deadpan humour and comic dry wit 
(directed towards modern day global capital and its eroding effects on the human and human rights) 
emerges in the capitalist jobbing out of the space age death facility. Governor Alejandro tells Randy 
that to implement this facility was too costly and thus they have now many men waiting on death 
row (755-757). A postmodern theme of suspended or halted agency such as this arises on more than 
one occasion.
146
 Because the novel has such little artistic unity it is through patterns that characters 
draw around them and the characters themselves that can tell us more about the novel’s 
engagements with a sense of historical agency underlining its imaginative engagement with specific 
locales. Notwithstanding the economic expediency that has been placed on the death control that the 
US exports to the Philippines, and which is comically portrayed to highlight the dehumanisation of 
life characters form a counter to a State that organises death in such a way.
147
 
 
Cryptonomicon’s inability to free itself from religious awareness points to the academics’ inability 
to cope with religious awareness. In doing so its postmodern counter to State-death forms in a 
vexed way. Glory Altamira will not give death his due, as she occupies a subliminal state in the 
narrative, being neither dead nor alive in her contracting of leprosy. Bobby Shaftoe answers the 
amount of killing he has to do by searching for the missing dead body of the Altamira boy lost in 
the battle of manila (775-776). Shaftoe deals with tragedy not with martyrdom, but with the 
affirmation of life. Shaftoe’s death itself is simplistically portrayed. Through Goto Dengo, now 
Americanized and suggestive of the openly democratic nature of the early ideal of young American 
literature that would take any individual wishing to uphold its ideals and renounce its own (this 
Americanization is made easy in the novel as the Japanese are busy committing terrible atrocities 
and thus the autodidacticism of assimilation in the early ideal is also challenged in the comic 
portrayal of General MacArthur “Christianising Dengo’s ass,” [769]) we watch in solemnity as the 
“General Issue coffin containing Bobby Shaftoe is laid into the earth. [Dengo] crosses himself, 
staring at the coffin lid stained with dirt, and then, with some effort, lifts his head up again, towards 
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the sunlit world of things that live” (859).
148
 The transcendent imagery of America as a founding 
democratic ideal and the love for the wise, the good and the beautiful, which provide the image of 
order, is strong here, and distributed throughout the entire novel’s experimental form. Through the 
fusion of opposites in the character Dengo, the novel challenges the postmodern politically-correct 
atheists and their upper middle class neo-Marxist, anti-democratic reform policies, which the novel 
accrues as having no answer to real suffering in this world. Although Cryptonomicon returns to 
religious awareness it will not give easy acceptance to a conservative intelligence and man’s 
intuitive biological quest for the divine. Glory is, after all, a pun on the Christian metanarrative of 
redemption, sacrificial goodness of the afterlife and righteous belief in America’s victory in the 
Second World War. Bobby Shaftoe at one time inadvertently calls his one lost love “Gory” (617). 
Also, Dengo’s fortitude and sincerity is given a sardonic (almost ludicrous) twist in relation to 
Bobby Shaftoe. Bobby Shaftoe in turn fucks Glory in the early stages of the novel in front of the 
thorn-clad figure of Christ (47-48). A strain of virulent white racism is always latent in Shaftoe, 
suggestive of how the author is confronted everywhere by the sexism, heterosexism, racialism or 
imperialism that the academics believe lies at the core of an American racial monoculture.  
 
Characters that occupy in-between states such as Bobby Shaftoe (who should have died with the 
rest of his Fourth Marine core at Guadalcanal [94]) or his girlfriend Glory (who contracts leprosy 
and who should have died when the marauding Japanese army “took Manila” [128]) are indicative 
of more than experimentalism but how these characterisations are embodiments of a culture that 
oppose easy centralisations of modern technology within the state. Charlene’s specialised technical 
discourse and theories of individual powerlessness has eroded what little is left of this romantic 
charge of democracy and subsequent hope for the young in the US. Cryptonomicon’s vexed 
relationship with the postmodernist agenda characterises this Democracy as entering mass 
production in the US through very spurious means, such as the dehumanising transference of values 
(characterised through the literary teaching pedagogy of Kivistik). The academics are portrayed as 
using New Media via neo-Marxist philosophy to spread and expand the struggle for global literacy. 
The novel form offers their global spread of democracy within the centralisation of modern 
technical forms as antithetical to a founding ideal of America, and critiques this centralisation 
through the spatial narrative and its themes of exploration and travel, the mobilising of love plots 
(surrounding and encapsulating the ideal of what America is or was about to become before 
dispassionate and dehumanising objectives took hold) and themes that emerge surrounding the East 
Coast academics and co-opted university sites. There are, of course, many problems with these 
points of view—not least a point of view that sees humans as easily co-opted and manipulated as 
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passive consumers of information. Cryptonomicon is not a science fiction dystopia in the fullest 
sense, and there is pursuit of an optimistic or utopian outcome and positive message through the 
small groups and a handful of characters. Reading in the American form these characters generate 
the Jeffersonian image of a genuinely free society composed of a hierarchy of self-governing units. 
Characters adhering to the original cult of liberal self-reliance where the impression was that the 
people could do no wrong and the government could do no right open and close the book in the 
novel’s underlining of a positive and somewhat conservative message that can tackle problems with 
contemporary society, whilst also taking on poststructural thought and its failures in dealing with 
dangerous consequences of a globalised world.    
 
If Stephenson writes for America as Rorty expresses, it is in terms of ambiguity, ambivalence and 
knowingness. The exception to this viewpoint is held within the academics’ position, suggesting the 
novel’s focuses and social criticisms are tied to this immediate literary-cum-social-cum-historical 
background. A non-specialised flexibility that is averse to the academics’ careerism and competitive 
edge is given in Dengo. He “was a good swimmer but not the best, a brave soldier but not the 
bravest” (555). Similarly Bobby Shaftoe gains command in the military not by traditional means, 
which would also enforce Emerson’s notion of the cult of the hero that turns into the worship of his 
statue. These men in the novel follow no ranking order, and are personifications of individuals 
rising not by any force of will, or by bending or appropriating another’s will to their own reason, 
but by a condition of their humility. These characters challenge the simple minded militaristic 
chauvinism of Comstock putting humility rather than reason before contingency in a world ruled by 
old world terrors. Although we see a twist in the ethics of community that exploits notions of the 
irreducible presence of the other, Cryptonomicon never burrows deep inside the other of French 
theory to make its claims: rather, the language positively eschews such a deconstructive writing 
ethic. This can be seen not only when Bobby Shaftoe meets his missing son for the first time (and 
attempts to impart knowledge that is more sustainable and less jargon-oriented) but also as the 
language pursues the purpose and limits of equality (found in Charlene’s academic feminist 
philosophies that theorists have now argued as the dilemma of difference).
149
 
 
The academics invoke Benedict Anderson’s imagined communities as they turn the nation into a 
spatial conception.
150
 The novel again adopts a postmodern tendency as it argues how making large 
scale distance as the basis for space is a complex and erroneous principle. In his everyday life 
theory, de Certeau looked to collapse the objectifying view by taking to the streets of New York. 
Randy, as with many other characterisations in the novel, collapses the panoptical view, by taking 
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to the streets or to the jungles of the Philippines. A point of view that is created in engagements 
with these fictional characters and far-off spaces, as they form their meaningful interactions with 
those close to the ground, draws out resistances to spatialising objectivist approaches bound 
together by cause and effect:  
 
Shaftoe realises that his mental concept of what this mission was going to be like, as 
he reviewed it with officers in the LCM, bears no relationship to the reality. This is 
only about the five thousandth time Shaftoe has experienced the phenomenon in the 
course of the Second World War; you’d think he’d no longer be surprised by it. 
(788)  
 
A direct rebuke to the academics, Shaftoe is to create street-level views that shift emphasis away 
from grand narrative totalising perspectives. It is not only the military and business interests in 
Cryptonomicon that define these views. The novel suggests that the spatialising perspective, which 
can be traced back to Newtonian principles of cause and effect, is now firmly encamped not in 
astrophysics or the pulpit but somewhat paradoxically in the high cultural pluralist perspective.  
 
Without a satisfying climax or clear denouement in the novel a more salient aspect of pluralism is 
delivered into the storyline when fed through Randy as a point of view of American socialization 
His posing an objection to the way Charlene gathered her research statistics is brutally pushed aside 
as “counterintuitive” (76). Charlene’s derailing of any perspectives other than her own is countered, 
as Randy is to find himself in the Philippines. Where Randy offers a type of bildung, Charlene uses 
her time while he is away in order to get “her friends” (81) on side over the relationship breakdown. 
She “has been able to structure the discourse to her advantage, just like a dead white male” (584). 
The dead white male assertion is tied to Charlene in the bureaucratic nomenclature defined by new-
styled managerial elite in the institution. This characteristic given to Charlene aligns the whole 
novel (and not just a handful of characters) to stand in reconsideration of the academics’ 
overdevelopment of morality in their talk of diversity. In the confrontation between the academics 
and Randy, he, now standing as an agent of power/knowledge production, displays an 
uncharacteristic bout of emotion; a humanist impulse he is seen to have lost in the years that he has 
spent living with Charlene. Being labelled a “technocrat” (83) Charlene’s “group” (27) scrutinise 
him as a figure cocooned from America’s recent cultural past, viewing him very much in a manner 
in which he feels as if “he were a test subject on the wrong side of a one-way mirror” (52). Randy’s 
short but indignant outburst as the academics attempt to force upon him a postconventional 
knowledge structure indicates a disaccord that the novel distinguishes as views held between 
contemporary academic projections of and on his social identity, and university presses that 
organise the faux radicalism of the conference circuit. The way in which the novel sets up the 
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discord between Randy, the academics and the War as Text conference is to compound the notion 
that the novel sets out a problem with postmodern theory and antifoundationalist theory hope, as 
contemporary academics sought to push for new relationships that would tie together more equally 
the environment and the individual, culture and self. What the novel largely fails to recognise is that 
its experimental energies are taken from their readings of literature, semiology and rhetoric. 
 
Antifoundationalist theory hope is a complex characteristic written into the War as Text conference, 
and sets out the optimistic culturalist views of post-modern academics as they seek to unmask 
nationalist hegemony to promote new worldviews. Exceptionalist America is seen as a betrayal by 
old-world consciousnesses and the academics look to uncover it, step outside it, and then govern it 
as they round upon Randy. Deep strategies for ordering relations denoting an invisible imperialist 
structure are updated in Charlene’s “beard work” (77) over which “three different Ivy League 
schools are fighting to hire her” (77) and which is characterised as “part of some academic jargon” 
(52). Her research centres on “Unshaveness as a signifier in WWII Movies” (77), and becomes a 
signifier through which we view Randy’s links (Randy has a full beard) and associations to male 
patriarchal aggression (77). The academics’ ideas are farcically portrayed, and the slapstick quality 
of the narrative at times broadens out onto the academic and the individual’s capacity to form a 
view based on life that is not formed by the State or the fascination with the media image or 
spectacle. The creation of the comic moment as we enter characters through ridicule or farce or the 
grotesque often makes it harder to uncover the text’s moments of profundity as it deals with the real 
horrors of war. The sinking of the Nevada and the Arizona is dealt with in a flat, deadpan (rather 
than tragic) style, with Lawrence traipsing about on the burning deck with his glockenspiel 
(Lawrence played this musical instrument before the attack). There is a passage of great beauty in 
this scene as Lawrence flings the musical instrument overboard: “a military lyre of burnished steel 
that sings a thousand men to their resting places on the bottom of the harbour” (64-65).
 
However in 
the novel’s rush to get its ideas across, the passage is often lost. James Wood argues how in 
Pynchon the making of “flat” characters, only to rush them away, comes at a real cost to the “final 
seriousness” of his texts, as “everyone is ultimately protected from real menace because no one 
really exists.”
151
 Immediately after this scene (as Lawrence is whisked away in the novel’s incessant 
story making) are Lawrence’s first engagements with information theory. Sustained descriptive 
passages are given, that render in the imagination Immanuel Kant’s supersensible substratum, 
where the power to ward off irrationality and horror is fed through the faculty of reason and the 
mathematical sublime. The horrors of war are not lingered upon, but some attempts are made to cast 
aside postmodern existential dread and rationalise such atrocities.   
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Often the emphasis to feel revulsion or pity is hard to tie to a single moment in Cryptonomicon, as it 
does not transpose the singular shock of the historical moment to the reader. This as expressed can 
mask the text’s profundity leading to a reading of the grotesque and associated links with 
contemporary approaches to literary and cultural studies. The attack on Pearl Harbour, as seen 
through Lawrence’s eyes is a case in point. The absurdity of Lawrence traipsing aimlessly around 
the deck of the Nevada with glockenspiel and support alternates between the singular compelling 
dramatic situation and the deterioration of reading through an open interpretation of the text. The 
throwing of Lawrence’s glockenspiel overboard in the direction of the Arizona is replete with 
emotional depth. However, this moment of intensity can never resonate completely, as the 
arrangement of the narrative structure leaves no accumulation point through which the reader can 
explore the dramatic sequence. As also suggested, the novel does not fall prey to total indignation 
that isolates historical caution to the winds of mass distraction or the postmodern tendency to 
reduce complexity to the quick assimilation of the already known. This in itself can suggest that the 
story is complex and does not rely on the emotive transference of values, which would bring a sense 
of dramatic relief to the reader. Through aesthetical comprehension where the sublime is routed 
through the mathematical, the horrors, which we (through the senses) fear, can be overcome by the 
logic of the mind. If the faculties of horror through the concept of the sublime belong to the mind 
alone (as Kant suggests) then we have reason to ward of unavoidable suffering. This is a very 
complex (or a very old) association to make of intentionalism in Stephenson’s text, but it is one way 
of making sense of attempts in the novel to make use of a mathematical comprehension of the 
sublime. In other words, Cryptonomicon tells a story of the unavoidable suffering destined for men, 
and that there are oppositions in life that can never be overcome. Reason alone is a way to ward off 
the fear of an incomprehensible object – the evil that men do, which is formless, vast and spacious. 
Often in Stephenson’s text there is a display of recognition when the illogical (machinations of evil 
corporations and evil men) can be given full or absolute comprehension. Through Randy, in turn, 
we see how fundamental elements of philosophy are foregone, and with it the academics’ 
conclusions are stereotyped to formulas that have befallen the whole American university system, 
and a specialised technical discourse that trained graduates to prepare for technical-managerial roles 
rather than that of public intellectuals. 
 
The novel derides Charlene and her feminist politics and her dispassionate criticism of Randy. Her 
condemnations on his patriarchal views are overturned somewhat as she has a stash of “bodice-
ripper novels” (762) in the basement of the house that she shares with him. This “huge cache of 
paperback romance novels, none of which Randy had ever seen before” (762) form a microcosm of 
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the macrocosm of the European worldview. Spanos argues that the ideal European text mirrors in 
the microcosmic form the macrocosm posited by the speculative metaphysical consciousness.”
152
 
The old Victorian house is isolated in the novel. Anything devolved from the old-world such as 
Randy owning this house is antithetical to a community minded “stout yeoman righteousness” that 
can be drawn from Randy.
153
 Again an Americanist response can be tied to Randy as he posits 
resistances to a bourgeoisie mechanics of motion motivated by personal self-interest. This argument 
in itself can be fraught: Lukacs saw how it was the bourgeois that conducted a violent struggle in 
interests of its own class, using every means at its disposal, including those of imaginative 
literature. However, there are differences between the emergence of a European bourgeois formed 
in liberation and an American one formed in liberalism. Extricating Cryptonomicon from two 
strands of liberal ethics is important and I deal with this aspect in chapter three. House ownership, 
ideal texts, and class-interest surround and encapsulate the academics’ use of posthistorical 
discourse which in turn draws complex space around Randy’s perceived ruling forms of (habit) 
consciousness and the academics’ implicit critique of exceptionalist America. Through the flawed 
characteristics of Randy, the novel, by not drawing an ideal attachment to his characterisation, 
opens up to further interrogation the content of the academics’ posthistorical discourse and its use 
of metafiction. 
 
In their treatment of Randy as a placement of power and knowledge production, the academics 
follow the anti-humanist stridency evident in humanities departments throughout the 1970s, 1980s 
and 1990s. Like many other contemporary literary critics, Patricia Waugh now feels it is time to 
draw a line under the period of high theory and deconstructionist ethics and to merge with the 
empowering discourses of literature and literary value.
154
 Jurgen Habermas responded to 
postmodernists at the time, calling them young conservatives. Tying Stephenson’s outlook to 
Habermas’s perspective, the novel draws attention to the lapsed potential in antihumanist critique, 
and false reformism of the university as it based new social commitments on rejectionist politics of 
modernity. The novel similarly draws attention to the notion that Randy’s ability to commandeer a 
notion of the whole self was modelled out of cold war consensus politics. This latter critique 
historically locates the novel’s perspective within a community of American postwar poets, 
fictional writers and literary critics that forged transatlantic links and views and adjacent critical 
discourses of différance and diaspora, which positioned “America” as a completely discredited 
foundationalism. Although the novel offers its own critique of postwar (sometimes known as cold 
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war) ideology, it reconciles the legacy of class-rooted politics with the necessary corrective offered 
not by cultural studies and poststructural theorizing (that postulated notions where social position 
and economic class would no longer matter or at least argued against in terms of ethnic and racial 
ties) but in commitments to an early ideal of America and new social movements. To Charlene’s 
academic crowd (an apt moniker for this group as they become reflective of the homogenisation 
effects of theory on critical language and cultural uniformity) Randy’s indignant outburst at being 
labelled a technocrat offers, at best, a primitivist reflection or nativist response to their politicised 
culture-critique. Being backed down into using “oppressed-person’s language” as the academics 
criticise him for his old-fashioned views (84-85) the novel asks how far such strategies for 
deconstructing totalizing world views and promoting subaltern or minority perspectives have had 
the paradoxical effect of legitimating the world view such disciplines claim to subvert. What 
becomes most recognizable in Cryptonomicon’s convoluted configurations is how the conventional 
narrative provides an eclectic mix of old-fashioned ideas about US cultural continuities to halt the 
ethic of dehumanising brought forward by the academics’ broadening the scope of power finding 
resources for hope in the primary care of people, families, neighbourhoods and small groups.  
 
A way to analyse the author’s anxiety towards ruling class minorities is that cultural separatist 
movements isolated the traditional American self from him or herself. These stakes seem too high 
and Cryptonomicon falls back into a form of American uniqueness. Cultural politics challenged the 
traditional liberal worldview for its non-inclusivity of poor Americans, Native Americans, Black 
and Mexican Americans. The idea here, following Mark Rupert’s line of enquiry, is that although 
not making a direct tangible link to strains that existed in a one-sided affair between giant car plants 
and its white workers (imperilled privilege) the novel typifies this type of anxiety through its 
mobilisation of an anodyne cultural pluralism that was used to quell resistances to new changes, in 
what was arguably a harshening of the democratic order and erosion of traditional liberal policies in 
America.
155
 While most academics and Leftist intellectuals were following postmodern distortions 
on culture and society, a Left according to Rorty that the oligarchy in America dreamed of, the 
adverse effects of the importation of radical French philosophy became apparent in the Reaganite 
Revolution of the late 1970s and early 1980s.
156
 Many new deregulation initiatives were being 
installed whilst the Left (linked to postmodern epistemology) were fighting economic selfishness 
from a labile and optimistic culturalist perspective, and as such had an ineffectual politics in which 
to halt the rise of economic selfishness in this era of capitalist growth.
157
 The crystallisations of an 
ethnopoetics and politics of difference was already the product of administrative processes designed 
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to facilitate domination according to Ayers and separating economics from cultural reform was a 
false directive in a struggle for power to have one’s voice heard.
158
      
 
Cryptonomicon deals not only with microscale instances and managerial perspectives in Charlene’s 
discourse as a spurious product of administrative process, but also post-Second World War liberal 
consensus. Literary space surrounding Randy’s connections to the past in the reading process is 
theoretically distinct from space surrounding Charlene and her radical critique of American literary 
history. In her new Left moralism (and in a bout of unselfconscious presentism) she has fallen out 
of love with romantic belief in the idea of America, and in Randy she sees his white humanist-
aesthetic liberal side as little more than a right-wing construction; it is a reflection of the violated 
core of the principles of democracy. Leaving Charlene and meeting Amy, Randy’s posthistorical 
position in which he is given a new subject position is expressed as a class position. This is brought 
to the forefront of his intellect by America (Amy) Shaftoe’s ability not to be culturally or 
economically determined (104). Charlene, on the other hand, is determined. Power, in her mind, is a 
new determining basis for everything. We see how in the novel this is to become detrimental to old 
republican values of liberty and virtue and erode any form of political meaning from subversion. In 
her intimacy with Continental post-Marxist thought, class politics for Charlene become radically 
new informing cultural concepts, and she begins to show deep resentment and antipathy towards 
Randy’s problematic self-fulfilment. It entails the arrogant assumption that life could be made 
fundamentally better by coming to grips with reality in this public space. Charlene and the 
academics feed into Charles Reich’s countercultural conception of how the school was dangerous to 
the individual.
159
 Rather than a politics of access to educational institutions, postwar academics 
became concerned with the very nature of education as an existential process. Randy’s easy-going 
relationship with technology alongside bureaucratic organisational structures is problematic for 
Charlene. However her attempts to negotiate between cultural, technological and older-style class 
distinctions becomes infused with separatist strategies and ideological essentialism that a 
postmodern liberal Left took towards politics, education, and culture. This left, which replaced a 
Deweyan pragmatic participatory Left, as it existed prior to the Vietnam War, was seen as essential 
to extend the domain of the political and political agency into the (formerly a-political) pastoral 
space of higher education.
160
 Cryptonomicon conducts its own quizzical analysis into Charlene’s 
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oppositional identity politics and absences of class analysis that centred with much greater ease in 
Continental and British contexts.
161
 
 
The socialisms the academics play out in the novel are, from Randy’s perspective, nothing more 
than a liberal ruling class extension, part of a false abstracted totality that is exclusionary and alien 
to the individual’s specific wants and needs. Randy is terminally locked into this new isolating 
perspective. He, however, is given a characterisation that symbolises hope in the primary cares of 
people’s needs, and attempts to redress in his novelistic journey the sense of personal loss of 
American freedom’s slippage into further reification. The socialism from Europe, as the novel 
testifies in its condemnations of the academics’ adaptations of neo-Marxist philosophy, cannot 
incorporate within its understanding the burgeoning spread of the globally oppressed or 
unincorporated. The understanding of self-reliance and self-sufficient reason, combined within 
motivating actions of small disparate groups, act as counters to the academics’ existential 
philosophies on the very nature of education and their largess and arrogant assumption that to sit 
around all day and talk about such things would eventually alleviate the problems that they foresaw. 
A form of communal self-government is never taken from these groups and there is always an act of 
resistance that builds a model of real hope. It is in language used between Amy and Randy and their 
group that there is a wider remaking of a participatory democracy. Charlene and her academic 
friends, on the other hand, in their language and style, invoke demagogue potential within language 
games and new media as they offer a black-and-white-almost Gnostic-refusal of any emancipation 
narrative, particularly in so far as they stem from the Second World War. Epiphyte Corp., Randy’s 
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telecommunications company, counters dispassionate academic slogans, telling its members that 
they still think and feel in a world of real people (188). Its projected business interests are always 
tempered by the tragically obsessed Avi, who although keeps the need for the understanding of real 
people alive through his experience of the camps, turns the camps into an overriding gesture 
towards the building of new solidarities. Avi brings real people into the equations of Epiphyte 
qualifying projections, but at the same time he isolates the experience throwing the individual back 
upon themselves through traumatic points of exchange. Attached to Avi is the negative 
incommunicability of this event. However, we are to learn that it is within the action of others 
(Gunter, a German U-boat commander is to wilfully and without coercive force sacrifice himself for 
Rudy, a homosexual) that there were just as many men and women who died to halt this terror, as 
there were conscious and unthinking supporters of it. 
 
Randy and Amy function as a foil to the academics’ attempts to speak to and for the masses. 
Between their perspectives a love plot is mobilised, and a reconstruction of educational and cultural 
reform can be made. Charlene believes that she and her academic friends act as radical disjunctions 
in the older system characterised by economic determinisms, thereby adding tactical counter to 
alleviate its harsher mutations and forms. Marxist historian Ellen Meiksins Wood’s quotation here 
is useful to reappraise Charlene’s problematic historical revision of an unreformed capitalist 
economy. Wood writes: 
 
It is worth noting that the totalizing tradition has not prevented Continental culture 
from spawning the most complete disintegration of the social world in the doctrines 
of post-structuralism, including fashionable currents in post-Marxist theory. Here 
contingency has become the fundamental principle of social life and history, and all 
the critical totalizing power of social theory has been definitively suppressed. At the 
very moment when the world is coming ever more within the totalizing logic of 
capitalism and its homogenizing impulses, at the very moment when we have the 
greatest need for conceptual tools to apprehend the global totality, the fashionable 
intellectual trends from historical revisionism to cultural postmodernism are carving 
up the world into fragments of difference.
162
  
 
It is in Charlene’s misplaced pessimisms that she turns away from active engagement. Through the 
relationships Randy enters into, we are afforded viewing space on a thinning of the imagination that 
has ensued among academics, which encourages them to become bourgeois. The academics have 
lost sight, in the context of mass cultural production and in their failures to recognise their own 
ideological dependency of economic selfishness’ become embroiled with computer-generated 
symbols. Complex genealogies in the novel upbraid the academics’ mediated critique of 
surrounding structures. Bobby Shaftoe is made an instrument of wartime capitalist aggression sent 
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out to protect business interests. This time the specific business interest is Lawrence Waterhouse’s 
efforts in data encryption. Shaftoe is made complicit (as the Marine Corps were historically) with 
state run incursions into new uses for language, yet he is also a maker of symbolic poems. The 
narrative aligns his figurative use of language to the way in which he resists systemic orders to 
conduct his own more personalised wartime missions.  
 
In an article for Wired Stephenson expresses his complex relationship with the “whole western 
freedom thing” and American sense of democracy.
163
 He understands that “America is the hardest 
to ignore instantiation of a cultural and philosophical system that can be seen in a few other places” 
(866) and refers to it as such in Cryptonomicon. He imbues the Western freedom thing as a 
contemporary shining light in modern world affairs. In this article on China he upholds symbolic 
virtues of his country reappraising American collusion in joint venture business capital 
arrangements with China to the scene of the dead pro-democracy student with his brains splattered 
out over the square. The whole western freedom thing is a complicated affair compared to some 
Asian countries, Randy muses, and comes to the conclusion that in Asia “no one gives a shit about 
human rights” (866). As Stephenson says in his article “for a Westerner to trash Western culture is 
like criticizing our nitrogen/oxygen atmosphere on the grounds that it sometimes gets windy.”
164
 It 
is, of course, hard to ignore that Western freedom was imbibed with Nazism. However this threat 
was channelled into the greatest allied force ever assembled to halt Germany’s attack on the 
democratic underpinnings that created Western society. Cryptonomicon can be said to take its 
underpinnings perhaps a little ashamedly from the very foundations of American thought. It pushes 
for the large and the small, and brings to light not simply postcolonial power relations between men 
and women (the Bletchley WRAFs and WRENs, Montgomery, MacArthur etc) but also upholds 
moral integrity in the American economic system. This is a strange amalgamation in fiction, as not 
only does it tell us how the world works (turn fiction into social theory) from an Americanist 
perspective, but also it taps into historical memory, which can give a feeling for this perspective 
that rises above the poststructural trashing of white western culture.  
 
Randy is one of a long list of Waterhouses who stands opposed to the primacy of economic 
relations. America, in a reading of his specific interest-group politics, is still (or can be) a shining 
example of hope, democracy and policies for peace and freedom. But first, the novel suggests, it has 
to untangle itself from the confusions of the postmodernist agenda over whom and what constitutes 
a threat to further multicultural and democratic reform movements. What begins to emerge through 
Amy’s primary care of Randy and his subsequent displays of emotion towards her is the signalling 
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of an order of relations with others in the novel that are not governed by the calculation of 
competitive advantage. The novel, rather than do away with old US cultural continuities, retains 
linkages, commitments and realignments in certain sensitive areas such as public morality, (Bobby, 
Glory) religious intuition (Laura and Scott), and orthodoxy of language, (Amy and Randy).
165
 
Cryptonomicon tries to hold onto its literary “little man” cultural capital and responds to 
dissolutions of active reception and living response that can turn on an effective community of 
experience. It recovers specific understandings of key core values of an American humanist 
tradition, where self-sufficiency, self-reliance, personal independence and creative reading and 
writing practices (greater freedoms) have come undone in intellectual link-ups with news media 
systems of communication, transmission and dissemination. Its contemporary take on the Spectacle 
does not alter old Americanist subjectivist beliefs, but rather emphasis is drawn towards those who 
have misapplied the deconstruction of the Cartesian cogito with radical culture critiques on the 
storytelling market.
166
 My position when reading Cryptonomicon is similar to Guillory’s when he 
argues that those who have abstracted discourse from literary contexts reform continuations in “the 
great game of cultural capital.”
167
  
 
The Conference Poster 
In this final section I cover a few of the themes from the introductory section, and demonstrate how 
anxiety in the novel shown towards politicised culture-critique is explicitly drawn from the 
academic conference poster. The conference poster shows a Second World War veteran denuded of 
                                                          
165
 The issue of Laura and Scott arises in Cryptonomicon in relation to critical attacks on the academics’ secular 
constructions of reality (595).  
166
 Highlighting Georges Poulet and what he calls Descartes “initial or naked moment” can find saliencies in my reading 
of Bobby Shaftoe’s search for Glory. Separated from Glory, Shaftoe lurches from one frightening experience to the 
next. The way the novel deals with Shaftoe’s search and the way it organises a plot around this search for all its deadpan 
wit and humour invokes an anxious search for something one has lost. I draw distinctions as to how the author attempts 
to make writing again the American problem after thirty years of French radical critique. See Poulet, Studies in Human 
Time, 14.       
167
 Because my thesis will deal with aspects of McGurl’s closed systems reading of Cryptonomicon where high art 
moves into a larger cultural industrial system it is important to link McGurl’s literary studies insights into how Guillory 
viewed the emergence of a theory-canon as specifically a literary question having to do with the movement and 
transition of literature to what Raymond Williams calls a “new phase of civilisation.” Guillory writes: “we are in a 
position now to recognize that the career of theory had everything to do with the status of literature in a new phase of 
civilization.” Cultural politics and cultural theory is largely in Guillory’s view an opportunity to examine regime change 
in the redistribution, or granting access to cultural capital that the school hands out. In his words, it is not a political 
question but an institutional question which surrounds “the school’s historical function of distributing, or regulating 
access to, forms of cultural capital.” Bill Readings, on the other hand, took a distinctively oppositional view. He saw 
reversion back to a game of accounting in closed systems of exchange would restore the basic principles of 
Enlightenment modernity in a University that was developing toward the status of a transnational corporation. As I will 
come to argue McGurl tackles this problem when he recognises that Readings gets it “crucially wrong in seeing [the 
University] as a measure of bureaucratic efficiency alone.” McGurl argues rather than the University of Excellence 
facilitate the smooth running of the pluralist machine, insofar as American culture had become a corporate culture, it 
cashes out in the workplace as referential to something wholly other than itself. In this aspect new emergent knowledge 
will be produced when we learn how to read the postwar educational experience from a galvanised modernity. See 
Guillory, Cultural Capital, 262-263; vii, Readings, The University in Ruins, 106; 164, and McGurl, The Program Era, 
406. 
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absolute value and historical meaning. Through the poster, the novel challenges the reader on many 
assumptions, and not only the poststructural influence on making effective political claims on the 
functioning of social and cultural norms. Randy is a figure that does not, for the most part, work on 
the tacit assumption that America stands as technocratic monolithic force over the rest of the 
world—or if he does, the novel introduces this comparative dimension only to suppress it.
168
 The 
academics for their part do not see themselves tacitly upholding suggestions from the state. They, in 
other words, like Thomas Pynchon’s postmodernist Oedipa Maas, believe that the sheer febrile act 
of communication itself will bring the government down. In many aspects, the academics sign on to 
the Foucauldian Left point of view that argued to sign on to a political program was to be complicit 
with abuse or political domination.      
 
The saga surrounding the poster in the novel arises as a Second World War infantryman is given a 
grotesque face-lift for an up and coming conference called “The Intermediate Phase (1939-45) of 
the Global Hegemony Struggle of the Twentieth Century (Common Era)” (50). The narrator 
jokingly relays that “this is a bit of a mouthful and so it has been given a pithy nickname: War as 
Text” (50). Scenes surrounding the conference hold many references to the state of the domain of 
the arts as useful for making valid interpretive claims on the social and political functions of 
cultural norms.
169
 The conference poster reflects badly on Charlene and her academic crowd. They 
have flown to California specifically for the conference where a great deal is made over what the 
academic crowd and the conference circuit represent to the state of American democratic society in 
dealing with complex issues, such as pluralism, global and technologically oriented discourse, 
posthistoricty or Marxist historicism, and transnational capitalism. These complex issues are 
brought together in the opening pages, and the novel in part deals with easy or routine formulas as 
political institutions are reduced to theatre and politics to symbol manipulation in the space of new 
Media as they take up competing views on the Spectacle. Charlene’s pluralist assumptions on 
knowledge are challenged further still as she utilises the positive critical value of the current mass 
media where the act of perception is enriched to the point of seeming to author the world it 
perceives.  
 
As Cryptonomicon’s plot is chronologically complex, we are introduced to Randy as he is flying 
across the Pacific on his way to Manila. Randy has already had his final bust up with grad student 
girlfriend Charlene “who actually gives every indication of being his ex-girlfriend now” (50). The 
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information or knowledge economy is where the academics dream of a vision where social position 
and economic class cease to matter, and is to arise later in the novel when the academic group 
typecast and label Randy an elitist technocrat. Randy and his business partner Avi are tied into the 
conversational ethos of money markets, and their association with telecommunications exploitations 
of the Manila data havens are characteristic of what the academics see as only one in a list of what 
is a very long and extended history of imperialist, capitalist and bloody aggression directed towards 
the exploitation of the Philippines. The novel itself does not form an injunction against the 
academics’ reading of capitalist aggression, and indeed alerts the reader to such exploitative ends. 
Avi tells Randy that one of the oldest parts of Manila, “Intramuros,” which means inside the walls, 
“was annihilated by the Nipponese in 1945” (25). Randy’s rumination “inside the walls” provokes 
another awakening of historical consciousness, however, which tells Randy how America’s material 
bases are being separated from the culture of its material social life (50). What is further brought 
into the scene in which the new class of intellectuals is already occupying and directing sites of the 
new cultural and information technologies is the conception of the “global village.” The global 
village in this reading becomes metonymic of Lyotard’s language games, where it was possible to 
celebrate the carnival of sociolects that called for the erasing of a common language installed in the 
populace by means of a privileged literary curriculum. It takes an understanding of the Philippines 
tragic history in order for Randy to ruminate on his own cultural past. The co-opting of his material 
social life is now being made complicit with academic endorsements of stylish consumer society. 
The academics talk confidently at the dinner table of their product and its planned marketing, and 
they somewhat unknowingly are closely engaged with the major supplying corporations (Hollerith, 
ETC, Hollywood) and the myriad new specialist agencies and their interstices.  
 
The novel’s simplistic or flat characterisations draw emphases towards the dispassionate tone of the 
radical liberal intellectuals, and their uses of the Internet. Theirs are largely dispassionate attempts 
to deal with social issues such as internal colonialization, information economy, posthistorical 
discourse and transnational capitalism in New Media spaces. Randy’s outward displays of emotion 
shed light on anti-humanist stridencies, as the digital revolution deterritorializes human relations 
and the novel makes him ill-prepared for the proposition which encapsulates his American way of 
life. His movement through novelistic space, leaving America and making contact with others, acts 
as a foil to America’s newest cultural reform movement. In relation to the academics, his flatness 
(he is largely unreflective, naive and idealistic to them) draws emphasis towards a figure that has 
been cocooned from America’s recent cultural past but also towards those that have abstracted the 
historical subject from any forms of a Universal history. Spurious allusions are made as the 
academics seek to challenge traditional political methods previously critical of patriarchal 
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aggression. Turning away from direct political action associated with conflict, the conference 
poster, to make its statement, shows a photo of a “haggard World War Two infantryman” (50). 
Although this whole scene is comically portrayed, an aura of seriousness builds as Cryptonomicon 
resists the intelligentsia’s image of the Second World War veteran and their specialized academic 
jargon. The organisers of the conference sensationalise the image of the veteran. It is “worked over” 
by “an artist in San Francisco” (50).  
 
He started with a black-and-white half tone photo of a haggard World War Two 
infantryman with a cigarette dangling from his lower lip. He worked this image over 
using a photocopier, blowing the halftone dots up into rough lumps, like rubber balls 
chewed by a dog, and wreaking any number of other distortions on it until it had an 
amazingly stark, striking, jagged appearance; the soldier’s pale eyes turned an eerie 
white. Then he added a few elements in colour: red lipstick, blue eyeshadow, and a 
trace of red brassiere strap peeking out from the soldier’s unbuttoned uniform shirt. 
The poster won some kind of award almost the moment it came out. This led to a 
press release, which in turn led to the poster’s being enshrined by the news media as 
an Official Object of Controversy. (50-51) 
 
The “poster saga” (52) sets up a round of confrontations between Randy and Charlene and the 
academic crowd. In doing so, the novel challenges the state of the liberal arts education in America. 
The academics that come to stay at Charlene and Randy’s house show tendencies towards Kivistik 
that reflect upon culture wars surrounding postwar teaching methods. Cryptonomicon’s character 
assassination of the academics invokes Bill Readings’s comments on Guillory’s critique of Paul de 
Man. Readings expresses how Guillory “says some important things about the disciples of de Man, 
whose tendency to mimic the master fits in with the development of the technobureaucratic 
organization of intellectual life by linking a supposedly singular charisma to a reproducible 
technical rigor.”
170
 The academics’ ingratiating himself or herself before Kivistik is oppositional to 
Randy’s “sappy romantic need for ingratiation” (331). Randy is accused of being a romantic on at 
least three occasions in the novel, which is considered patriarchal and misogynistic by Charlene in 
its unreconstructed state. Kivistik, on the other hand, is largely presented as a poststructural 
propagandist who gets by “parlaying [a] strongly contrarian view of the Information 
Superhighway,” which Randy believes is turned “into more airtime than anyone who hasn’t been 
accused of blowing up a day care centre should get” (81). Kivistik is consistently the aggressor in 
his contacts with Randy, and his statements on transatlanticism, cosmopolitanism, and diaspora as a 
critical response to capitalist globalisation, to Randy at least, are made without qualification and the 
novel presents the Yale professor with narrow-mindedness. Randy, excellently conversant with the 
Internet and encryption, presents a foil to Kivistik, yet it is the latter, with his newly-endowed 
cultural capital taken from the North American university system that is to win out in this specific 
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culture wars battle with Randy. The transformation of the Arpanet to the Internet is a message 
buried in Cryptonomicon that extends not only to business and civil government, respective in 
Randy and Avi’s flight over the Pacific and the National Security Agency locked into laws of civil 
government, but now in the institution of the University.     
 
Connected to the furore which surrounds the academic poster is the dinner table scene, in which 
middle-class research methods and politically correct misapprehensions and ineffectual politics are 
brought forward in the face of the triumphalism of the post cold war liberal capitalist discourse. 
Spanos writes: 
 
The highly remarked impasse of the now privileged left-oriented thinking […] 
whether that of neo-Marxism or new historicism or feminism or cultural criticism or 
postcolonial criticism or even that globally oriented ‘‘posthistorical’’ discourse that 
would ‘‘dwell in the ruins’’ of the corporatized university, bears telling witness to 
this ominous condition. So, too, not incidentally, does the spectacle of university 
presses (such as Harvard, Yale, and Duke, to name the most prestigious of these)—
the traditional forums at least for originative, nuanced, and densely articulated 
thinking—competing with the culture industry in the global marketplace.
171
  
   
We view the dinner table scene through Randy as he is brought to bear witness to privileged Left-
oriented thinking of the academics. A blow is “righteously struck” (81) and landed when Kivistik 
labels Randy as part of an elitist technocratic group. In setting up these specific character traits we 
see how the author is informed by (and somewhat shackled to) polemics in 1990s culture wars. The 
culture wars were synonymous with the conservative Right’s attack on liberal pluralism and the 
academic Left’s dismantling of tradition, influenced heavily by influential structural and 
poststructural traditions. The then United States Secretary of Education William Bennett derided 
pluralist views for having left a “terrible scar across the face of America the beautiful.” Randy in 
many ways offers the opportunity to discuss Lauren Berlant’s work, where this quotation from 
Bennett comes from.
172
 He, feeling imperilled by Charlene’s inessential discourse, returns to a lost 
world of political hope and nationalist aspiration. This utopian horizon is built as Randy meets 
others on his novelistic journey. Bennett’s polemics spelt out (among other things) the making 
public of a crisis in the humanities. Randy invokes more than a passing reference to Bennett’s 
comments, expressing how out of touch Charlene’s academic crowd really are with the common 
voter. “He knew perfectly well that if he were stuck in academia with these people, and the things 
they said, would seem momentous to him. But where he came from, nobody had been taking these 
people seriously for years” (81). The novel offers its critique on the academics’ radical agenda into 
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colonialist and technocratic theorising by way of what it sees as a death by neglect in new media 
forms. For ordinary American Randy (at once a symbol of the disenfranchised white American 
feeling left behind by history and narrative technique that can get the novel’s ideas across) this is 
made apparent in his contrasting media state with Kivistik.    
 
Kivistik develops a culture wars parable. As Guillory’s “master theorist” he invokes allusions to 
Paul de Man and the emergence of the reproducible academic star charisma that Guillory found so 
disconcerting.
173
 The novel furthermore invokes allusions to de Man’s anti-Semitic past, 
dramatising in farcical nature Kivistik’s East Coast/Old World villainy as he comes to California to 
recruit Charlene. Allusions are made that Kivistik charms the disillusioned lower middle class 
liberals in American university departments.
174
 Similarly, through Randy, speculative insights are 
drawn concerning how the US is becoming to be made up of many one-sided generalisations. 
Although they show the “postmodern unwillingness to make value judgements” (709) there are no 
pictures of grey in the academics’ world-reality when it comes to Randy’s frank exchange of views 
at the dinner table. Aggression typically associated with males has now been covered over by the 
morally squeamish professors with their non-conflict approach towards Randy’s uncontrollable 
urges. One of the academics, Tomas, is appalled that Randy understands honesty and industry in 
this way: “that if you work hard, educate yourself, and keep your wits about you, you can find your 
way in this society [...] The proconsensus, anti-confrontation elements seized control of the 
conversation and broke it up into small clusters of people vigorously agreeing with one another” 
(85). The academics invoke allusions of the old-world judgements on the masses that were 
incapable of abstract thinking and concerned with little outside their circle of immediate experience. 
The critique of the individual’s capacity to form a life view on personal experience attests to how 
the novel sees American freedom’s slippage into reification, and alludes to how the modern 
technological concentrations of economic and political power have destroyed both American liberal 
and humanist traditions.  
 
The conference poster and the scene at the dinner table draw attention to a lack of communication 
between those perched in “ivory towers” and those such as Randy.
175
 Though current radical 
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pedagogical theorists call for a democratic curriculum, the academics show a professorial 
commitment to social transformation, thereby narrowing the implied audience to those teachers who 
already share their politics (and their vision of pedagogy as its appropriate instrument). Randy turns 
from the narrowing of the curriculum and tries to be a likable kind of guy, and “this is why he hates 
business. He wants to tell everyone everything. He wants to make friends with people” (107). 
However he was prone to “saying something undiplomatic [...] partly as a childish but fruitless 
tactic to get attention he craved from Charlene” (52). Charlene and Randy have been together for 
ten years but are not married and not committed (27). Their lack of communication is put down to 
the differences between the traditional view held by ordinary American Randy, who wants to have 
kids, and the portrayal of Charlene who believes “kids raise issues” (81). Charlene’s progressive 
teaching views and abstract conceptual poles on a parochial and misogynistic America, such as her 
semiotic deconstruction of men’s beards and her intellectual media project involving the denuding 
of meaning of the historical subject, brings Guillory’s understanding to bear on the novel’s critique 
of Charlene’s criticism’s social imperative. He writes  
 
No program of multiculturalism will succeed in producing more than a kind of 
favourable media image of minority cultures if it is not supported at every point by 
an understanding of the historical relations between cultures. If the curriculum is to 
produce intercultural literacy, in recognition of the imbricated sites of cultural 
production, we must assume the context is nothing less than global.
176
   
 
The novel caricatures the academic crowd as offering only a pale counter to forced aggressions such 
as patriarchy within its diversity project. There is even a form of spectacle dissent in 
“computerphile Jon” who dares to challenge Kivistik (82). Jon is presented merely as cannon fodder 
and it is Kivistik’s spurious proposition that the novel wishes us to focus on. Politicised cultural 
critique is to become the spurious new proposition the US/State uses to encroach upon Randy’s 
American way of life. Randy, on the other hand, although made into a flat-depthless figure in 
relation to the privilege he holds, is to pool his resources of history and dissent from sites farther 
afield than the nation. Randy leaves America and the communication networks the academics 
support, as they in turn believe that they have liberated themselves from superstition and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
the Profession (1976) argued that universities were not “ivory towers” following a disinterested liberal pursuit of 
research operating to produce pure knowledge, but the instruments of industrial and military research. However, rather 
than take the university’s overall complicity with the military-industrial complex further, and the notion that 
contemporary American literature is largely the product of the Research and Development University, it is the treatment 
of the university professors and their habits and inclinations towards theory and cultural work within the contemporary 
institutional framework that for my purposes warrants major concern. I argue the novel creates distance not dissimilar to 
Guillory’s thought experiment and Cryptonomicon’s aestheticism is to force a separation between the automated 
community of the crowd and the mechanical community of the technocrat. 
176
 Guillory, Cultural Capital, 54-55. 
91 
 
unpleasantness. It is through this dichotomy that the novel explores the academics presentist lapse 
and subsequent waning of effect characterised in posthistorical discourse.    
    
Charlene follows a specific model of the liberal arts education that denies Randy access to previous 
forms of cultural capital. To Charlene’s crowd, Randy is a placement of power, which determines 
possibilities for other subjects, and no longer a subject that can determine communication. Randy, 
male, white and a technocrat, is an argot to feminist and post age scholar Charlene. Although the 
novel understands both the emancipation and loss of the self in the transition to postconventional 
identity structures, it is liberal pluralist Charlene’s retakes of Randy’s Renaissance humanism that is 
brought forward and which is seen to have reified what is a very long and extended history. 
Charlene, being young, invokes allusion as to how her voice has been silenced, only this time it is 
the sleep of her negation that is being challenged.
177
   
 
The novel reflects on a behaviourist solution to channel inner activities like imagination and reason 
into a conditioned response. In Guillory’s terms, the “pluralist strategy of institutionalizing the 
category of the noncanonical is equally incapable of grasping th[e] essential ambiguity of the school 
as an institution.”
178
 He writes:  
 
But here we return to the fundamental point: pluralism has been able to affirm 
different cultures but not the fact that cultures are inseparably interdependent both at 
the moment of a cultural work’s production and at that of its consumption. The 
question is whether or not the school is to acknowledge this postmodern condition. It 
is certainly acknowledged in the domain of mass culture, where cultural products are 
very often produced for particular constituencies, but where their circulation 
interculturally is virtually assured by the restless promiscuity of commodity 
exchange.
179
  
 
By denying a particularity of her selfhood, Charlene offers a flawed view of the history of America. 
Her knowledge, as an object of cultural capital and object of appropriation, takes an opposing 
reading as she utilises the positive critical value of the current mass media to voice her concerns. 
This positive critical value, as Charlene’s academic crowd becomes “fully integrated into media 
culture mediating the desires of every class and group,” offers itself in terms of transnational and 
global.
180
 Everything that is bad about Randy stems from his localism and provincialism. As the 
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novel creates a narrative that puts distance between the academics and Randy (“Randy does not 
want to move to the East Coast. Worse yet he has a full beard, which makes him feel dreadfully 
incorrect” [77]) it alludes to localisms symbolised in canon wars between the Northern costal and 
the Midwestern Southern states (the Second World War veteran denuded of meaning in the 
conference poster hails from Kentucky). And this suggests—paradoxically—how the American 
(Right) saw an increasingly shrinking public sphere through commitments to globalised 
posthistorical discourse and diversity projects. Not offering a full blown nationalistic redressing as 
Bennett’s polemics in a book such as his, De-Valuing of America: The Fight for Our Children and 
Our Culture (1992) the novel can be seen as a rally against Theory and the glib theoretical 
abstractions which tended to dominate textual practice in the postmodern engagement with history.  
 
Another poster is presented in the novel. This time it is in the London Underground. The poster 
shows a demure lady eavesdropping on a “naive young serviceman” who is “gabbing away behind 
her” (138). As Lawrence passes this poster on his ride to Bletchley he sees cables  
 
Neatly bracketed to the stone walls in parallel courses. They are like the creepers of 
some plutonic ivy that spreads through the darkness of the Tube when the 
maintenance men aren’t paying attention, seeking a place to break out into the light. 
When you walk along the street up there in the Overground, you see the first tendrils 
making their way up the ancient walls of the buildings. Neoprene jacketed vines that 
grow in straight lines up sheer stone and masonry and inject themselves through 
holes in windowframes, homing in particularly on offices. Sometimes they are 
sheathed in metal, sometimes they are painted over by their owners, but all of them 
share a common root system that flourishes in the unused channels and crevices of 
the underground. (138) 
 
Through the juxtapositions of the two posters, the novel draws new technologies into a cooperative 
end-of-history narrative. In part the novel characterises this conjunction as collusive with 
triumphalist Leftist discourse, and an otherwise defeated or fragmented liberalism driven to police 
the borders of its diminished territory within the university. The wartime poster offers the 
opportunity to think through the failures of the neoliberal worldview rather than collapse into 
superficial postmodern synthesis. In the wartime setting, a group is formed that challenges the 
entwinement of instrumental reason, technology in the form of new information technologies, and 
domination. A dialogic of the synthetic and indeterminate caught up in the flexible specialisation 
characteristic of post-Fordist working practices is further questioned: Bobby Shaftoe’s wartime 
remembrances of Glory act as complex critique of Charlene’s poverty of memory, and the novel 
provides a more inclusive social mix between diverse groups and gender distinctions.
181
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Finally, and in a counter to diversity projects, Joel Pfister argues that Mark Edmundson in his 
Literature Against Philosophy, Plato to Derrida: A Defence of Poetry (1995): 
  
Rolls up his sleeves as literature’s public defender [...] irritated by the idea that 
theory and historicism presume to tell literature more than it knows about itself [...] 
Edmundson treats literature as an Emersonian individual whose aesthetic complexity 
has often been violated rather than clarified or enriched by theory and history.
182
  
 
Bobby Shaftoe reflects Edmundson’s indomitable source of Emersonian human self-interest, which 
cannot be bought off by the big psychic melodramas of Hollywood and military industrial 
economy.
183
 These social insights were still in their infancy in Hitler’s totalitarian system, but 
guided the work of many later social theorists and orators that could appeal to hidden forces that 
could motivate men’s actions. Bobby Shaftoe, Lawrence, Randy and Goto Dengo will not 
relinquish their hold on unique and individual takes on freedom. These characters—rather than 
exemplify social science’s introductions into literature or Derrida’s philosophical-cum-literary 
understanding of a community or social system bereft of any possible meaning—give voice to 
Jefferson’s American ideal of a genuinely free society composed of a hierarchy of self governing 
units. 
   
Because there is movement and fusion of American telos in characters that feed into 
Cryptonomicon’s modern American and contemporary environment I have attempted to discern on 
which side of the postwar divide these characters rest. In chapter two I take a different approach to 
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my reading of Cryptonomicon to suggest that it is a novel informed by culture wars. I further look 
to see what national form of cultural identity takes hold in the novel suggesting that its alternative 
states sometimes transposed in a singular character sometimes distributed across the whole text can 
find alignments with McGurl’s social systems reading of postwar literary experience, and how a 
novelist is no longer acclaimed for their ability to transcend cultural particularity but a compelling 
aesthetic vehicle for its appreciation. 
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Chapter 2. Culture Wars 
As long as America loves authenticity, my home state of Kansas is going to be 
symbolically preeminent. 
Thomas Frank
184
 
 
Introduction 
Having attempted to establish how Cryptonomicon manifests the truth of traditional history is its 
meaningless and how this reading places it in the acts of postwar literary deconstructions, in this 
chapter I will argue how its writing becomes shackled to the 1990s debates about the culture wars. 
Culture wars were the spilling over of the literary academy’s attempts to politicise the cultural field. 
As suggested these debates had moved on from the conflicts in the faculties and resurfaced in the 
postmodern discursive bloc. Seeing how Cryptonomicon’s writing believes the academic’s present 
an almost lunatic disbelief in the physical world I will draw out some themes to demonstrate how 
Cryptonomicon attempts to extricate itself from their postmodernist views on the social construction 
of reality. The manifestation of its own theoretical explanations about the truth of wartime history is 
its meaningless becomes a crudely inaccurate formulation to take the postwar critical left’s position. 
Because Cryptonomicon’s writing believes that there is an objective reality to be had this reading 
can offer its writing as vexed. It ultimately manifests the conditions that chapter one argued that it 
stands against: the notion that there is any worthwhile truth in the validity of objective historical 
knowledge for the claiming of an objective truth about reality. Such is the influence that novel 
places on the academic’s ruination of traditional political methods in their versions of leftist cultural 
criticism Cryptonomicon’s returns to the realist oriented ends of criticism retains the elements that 
equate it with a nineteenth-century science fiction dystopia. The academics in the storyline have 
become the spokesperson of the popular affirmation of technological processes. This, as we shall 
see, is something Cryptonomicon’s writing tirelessly-exasperatingly attempts to put right. Its returns 
to the aspects of realism offer the opportunity to draw parallels with John Guillory’s reappraisals of 
literary and cultural studies in this chapter. I will invoke Guillory’s deep corrections on the literary 
and cultural studies approaches to the social environment that, in turn, offers a reflection that 
Cryptonomicon indirectly condemns the academics philosophical incompetence and their faulty, 
politicised and co-opted forms of pseudo-realism.  
 
Giving an account of the intellectual commitments that became attached to the 1990s culture wars, I 
argue, is not to overlook a specific sociological symptom that can offer a judgement for 
Cryptonomicon’s vexed forms of writing. I will argue, in part, it adjusts its forms of 
experimentalism - attached to its attempts at politicised acts of interpretation - in order to separate 
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its antirealist commitments from the idealised interdisciplinary enclosures of postmodernist literary 
criticism. The culture wars in the 1990s, as we shall see, moved out of the debates ranged between 
the two faculties, moving into what were being considered citizenship concerns in US contexts. The 
literary academy’s attempt to politicise the cultural field stimulated a diverse range of views both 
inside and outside the university. Richard Rorty, as we shall see, offered his own expressive version 
of literary theory. He was quick to argue that there was still an independent reality having 
condemned Stephenson’s earlier book Snow Crash for taking what he argued was the critical left 
position towards politics and culture. As we shall see, Cryptonomicon’s speculative writing 
although still radical has changed in emphasis since the publishing of Snow Crash. It restates the 
theory function of science studies. Therefore, the truth of history does not become its meaningless 
but is offered through scientific and more explainable terms. Cryptonomicon’s ability to reason 
through science changes when its acts of deconstruction are turned on the old world wartime 
legacies of science, technology, and reason. Charlene’s university history, in these terms, is still 
offered in terms of its meaninglessness. When offered alongside a history of individual code 
breaking exploits we shall see how a history of ultra-violent white racism becomes explainable. The 
type of belligerent Anglophobia that I established exists in Cryptonomicon’s writing in chapter one, 
where one history can be made sense of while on the same level another history offers the 
plausibility that it makes no sense, offers the acts of deconstruction in terms of a literary history 
more equable with the American form although now in a more radical ambiguous form, where men 
of science are known for getting things done.
185
 I will conclude this chapter arguing postmodern or 
antirealist epistemology had become unintelligible when in conjunction with the term America.
186
  
 
Rortyism 
Richard Rorty became an exponent of a certain brand of literary theory. Key to understanding 
Rorty’s poststructural pragmatism is postmodern relativism, which Hilary Putnam somewhat 
comically branded as Rortyism. Although heavily involved in the movement of literary theory and 
the conflation of European poststructuralism and American pragmatism, which John Diggins 
argued was an invitation into the abyss of postmodern relativism in the US, Rorty argued 
throughout the 1990s for more patriotism, and that the academic left should finally put a 
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moratorium on theory.
187
 Worn down by canon deformation, he was not the only literary critic to 
react in such a way. Overt proto-Foucauldian macrocritcal leftist readings and a Derridean 
philosophical-cum-literary-rhetoric-political teaching framework had radically reconceptualised an 
American culture of criticism. In the recently compiled Cambridge History of American literature, 
Gerald Graff—although not denying that these antifoundational views found salience in American 
contexts—argues that many theory claims were too grandiose, and largely unsustainable in the 
American public-political sphere. These views, which many on the conservative Right saw as 
threatening to American notions of selfhood, were eked out in university departments over many 
years. Before the burgeoning Continental philosophy came under intense public and media scrutiny 
Foucauldian views were exercised routinely by many Anglo-American critics that looked to 
deconstruct classical canonised texts as authoritative career statements over American interpretive 
selfhood. These movements in the literary humanities are now being reconsidered in the US as 
positions of overstatement and too narrow for the terms of successful social integration.
188
 In the 
1980s the Yale Group was one of the main proponents of deconstructive literary theory. This group 
became indirectly linked to the new historicism and the rhetorical reading of de Man. Both views 
reconsidered the technology of America as a technology of oppression, and both were connected to 
canon change that linked together different emancipatory social movements in the US.
189
   
 
There are many reasons why postwar American liberal scholars in the North American academy, 
schooled in deconstructive literary theory and the new historicism, sought to rearrange terms of 
debates against greater forced oppressions. Not all were directly political. Under Harold Bloom’s 
anxiety of influence, the school’s radicalism did not cease to focus on literature’s potential for 
negation and resistance. All it did was to assess the prospects for negation and resistance 
differently. To illustrate Bloom’s point David Shumway’s comment proves useful. He writes: 
  
The proliferation of interpretations under the New Criticism had already occurred and the 
rise of theory was beginning to add many more. Still, there were texts, like F. O. 
Matthiessen’s American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and 
Whitman (1941) and Robert F. Spiller’s Literary History of the United States (1948), which 
were understood to define the field. This shared sense of field definition made it possible to 
judge relatively easily the import of new contributions that accepted its boundaries, but it 
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also shaped and made intelligible those that challenged them. Early feminist studies, such as 
Annette Kolodny’s The Lay of the Land: Metaphor as Experience and History in American 
Life and Letters (1975) and Judith Fryer’s The Faces of Eve: Women in the Nineteenth 
Century American Novel (1976), were radical in their gender politics and their focus on 
women writers, but they continued to read literature in ways made familiar by the previous 
generation.
190
 
 
In the 1990s a group of Americanist scholars came together to take account of insufficient trans-
cultural readings of Foucault’s theory of power. Foucauldian Leftists were seen to preserve the 
transcendental performances in the basic concept of power, while driving from it every trace of 
subjectivity. As such, his political program, grounded in the notion that all knowledge rests upon 
injustice, was seen as a moralising tautology increasingly incapable of recognizing itself as such. 
The unearthing of de Man’s wartime writings made sure that debates concerning the substitutions of 
the economic and political programs of welfare state liberalism and socialism for tying the aporias 
of language to the theories of power and theory of individual powerlessness became correlated to 
what in the US became known as the culture wars. 
 
It was Richard Rorty who argued most publicly against what a “Gothic” or “cultural left” made of 
the philosophical framework of Derrida and Leftist views of Foucault. He writes “emphasizing the 
impossibility of meaning, or of justice, as Derrida sometimes does, is a temptation to Gothicize – to 
view democratic politics as ineffectual, because unable to cope with preternatural forces.”
191
 Rorty 
attempted to develop a new pragmatic solution to historical contingency based on the concept of 
Enlightenment modernity. He looked to reiterate the literary modernists’ problem of self-grounding 
whilst applying a check on corporate capitalism in attempts to keep a sense of American fraternity 
intact, no matter how fragile.
192
 Rorty opposed postsructuralists for what he saw was their nihilistic 
assertions upon the loss of transcendence. He argued how the promulgation of an ethics of 
difference for political reason failed to uphold systematically cultural appeals over more traditional 
politics. The abstract quality of these appeals could only be upheld systematically by culturally 
contextualizing them, and thus making their validity contextual. Many critics followed Rorty’s line 
of thinking, arguing that using theories of power as a relevant critique of white western liberal 
humanism led to an unplanned response to conservative laws of government, and did little to 
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achieve any recognizable aims. Within the heyday of appeals that stressed equality as well as 
mutual recognition, neoconservative politics was gaining greater clarity and force.  
 
Frank Lentricchia notes that Jonathon Culler’s book, Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, 
Linguistics and the Study of Literature (1975), “was a key moment of incursion by the apparently 
dispassionate discipline of structuralism into the humanist-dominated literary-critical 
establishment.”
193
 Canon or theory wars indicated the academic Left’s abandonment of the 
American humanist tradition. When Stanford in 1988 dropped a required freshman course in 
Western culture those vocally defending the new style of literary professionalism celebrated what 
they thought was an effective political organisation that would finally discredit a pre-Sixties Left. 
James T. Patterson writes: 
 
Conservatives mobilised to battle against liberal faculty members at universities such as 
Stanford, where in 1988 discussions took place that later resulted in the widely reported 
dropping of a required freshman course in Western culture. It was replaced by a variety of 
humanities offerings that though including many Western classics were a little less Western 
centred. Anguished defenders of the Western canon including education secretary William 
Bennett explained that Stanford was trashing Western culture. Stanford faculty members 
retorted by hailing the changes as enabling at last a birth of multiculturalism within the core 
of university courses.
194
 
 
Issues surrounding historical contingency were raised and the implicit understanding that any moral 
hierarchy was better than that of white European males. The old Americanist literary establishment 
previously considered historical contingency as a “cosmos ruled by fortune” where virtuous, 
communal or civic acts were “required to sustain republics.”
195
 With the ascendancy of 
poststructuralism and the new academic notion of historical contingency, Marxist historicists, 
feminists, and socialists (and a few classical republicans) were given a wider theoretical base 
through which to take on the liberal establishment social order. Because there was increasingly less 
ontological difference to be made between art and ideology, Modernist literature was seen by many 
as pervaded by imperialism, racism, sexism and heterosexism, and had failed to realize its 
adversarial promise.  
 
Fluck gives some indication to how the New Historicist intellectual line in criticism dealt with 
unseen politics of power in the university. He writes  
 
Henry James became a favourite target for […] New Historicism for the reasons mentioned 
in Ruth Bernard Yeazell’s review of two books on James by Jonathan Freedman and Ross 
                                                          
193
 Culler cited in David Ayers, Literary Theory: A Reintroduction, 95. 
194
 See Patterson, Restless Giant, 256. 
195
 See Malachuk, “Loyal to a Dream Country,” 89. 
100 
 
Posnock: Both writers strenuously resist any attempt to understand the artist as somehow 
transcending the forces of his culture, a mystifying move that they identify with the triumph 
of high modernism.
196
 
 
For Fluck, “in New Historicism […] the writers of the American Renaissance […] precisely 
because of the power of their works are actually especially effective transmitters of systemic power 
effects.”
197
 Canonised texts of American Literature as the embodiment of a single quality of 
literariness were questioned, attacked and revised. Under politicised culture-critique, the existing 
American professoriate were considered the direct producers and beneficiaries of governing 
(aesthetic) norms of behaviour, and the aura of rarity they imposed became increasingly less 
appealing to a radical group of Modern Language scholars. Over time the New Historicism 
eventually became exacerbated in the US when aligned with the historical “fact” of de Man’s 
concealed “Nazi past.” Ayers commenting on “PC Wars” writes “it has been suggested that the 
1988 controversy surrounding the concealed Nazi past of Yale deconstructionist Paul de Man had 
attracted attention to the shenanigans of theory and may have prompted a new scrutiny of 
University life.”
198
 In these contexts the first meaningful salvos of American-styled culture wars 
had been fired. 
 
In a 2005 edition of The Yale journal of Criticism, Sean McCann and Michael Szalay analyse 
politicised culture critique in the aftermath of postructuralist theory in the humanities. With 
poststructuralism losing its hold on humanities disciplines, their concerns were to focus on lasting 
1960s humanities theory and countercultural legacies that fed into the American University. Behind 
McCann and Szalay’s central argument is the claim that, in the decades after the 1960s, a 
debilitating version of the New Left’s cultural politics became a central feature of the era’s 
dominant literary ideology, evident most powerfully in the therapeutic ethos of postmodern fiction. 
Postmodern politics were seen to have pervaded American culture of an assignation with 
authenticity, and postmodernists were seen to have paradoxically neglected to account for value 
judgements in their own work. Using Mark McGurl’s contribution to this debate McCann and 
Szalay draw our attention to the current marginalization of experimentalism in the humanities by 
attempting to undo debates hinged on an American Left which had been allowed to build a favoured 
status in the postwar university. Taking issues with lasting countercultural movements and legacies 
they write: 
 
McGurl reveals the manner in which Little Tree deftly draws on the conventions that enable 
Native Americans to represent both sides of this ambivalence, and he shows the way that 
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Carter’s novel dramatizes the development since the 1960s of a thoroughly institutionalized 
and anodyne cultural pluralism. McGurl details the set of assumptions that allowed many 
academics during the 1960s to locate their politics in the kind of content they taught in the 
classroom. Generations of teachers turned to Little Tree, he points out, largely because its 
appreciative rendering of Native American life enabled them to overlook the forms of 
socialization important to their own institutions.
199
 
 
McCann and Szalay reconsider McGurl’s argument not for revelations of Forrest Carter’s “long 
career as an ardent propagandist for segregation and white supremacy” (which implicitly it also is), 
but rather his emphasis on how postwar American literature and a culture of criticism must begin to 
be spoken of as a product of the school.
200
 In doing so they argue: 
 
McGurl shows how the turn in emphasis during the 1960s from activism to culture ended up 
changing the terms of political engagement within the institutions of higher education. The 
turn to culture, he argues, coincided with a relative shift in interest from the politics of 
access to educational institutions to a politics of representation and identity conducted within 
these institutions.
201
 
 
As noted in the introduction, McGurl does not follow earlier literary critics by unloading his 
“political aspirations onto the delicate filaments of language, literature and culture” but wants to 
“shift these discussions to the actual institutions, technologies, and practices from which postwar 
American fiction emerges.”
202
 This dialectic, as I have previously noted, is to renovate the terms 
behind the successful assimilation techniques that are now being deployed for the contemporary 
graduate scholar of literature in the US. In sum, McGurl replaces the rhetorical question for the real 
political one. In the twenty-first century what sort of culture do Americans want to foster?
203
 
 
Cultural materialist arguments can still provide an important supplementary argument for McGurl’s 
analysis. For instance, Spanos argues how the “corporatised university” in this period began 
“competing with the culture industry in the global marketplace.”
204
 Rather than protect the cultural 
studies field from market optimisation Spanos views the “annunciation of the end of history” in the 
turn from deconstructive theory to cultural criticism as erroneous. Spanos, concerned with new 
cultural linkages to privileged Left-oriented thinking, wishes to return to the deconstructive 
initiative with fuller awareness. His point is not my point to argue here, but it is worth noting that he 
sees the turn to cultural criticism as no accident, enabling the “systematic obliteration of the 
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memory of the Vietnam war.”
205
 Spanos, like McGurl, links 1990s cultural criticism with the 
corporatized university as it became caught up in the cult of the celebrity (academic star system) 
vying for consumers with the culture industry. McGurl understands this shift, which illustrates the 
shift from the dominant hegemony of theory (or as the academics in the novel understand this as 
having no arguable beliefs only differences in subject-position) to the dominant hegemony of a 
revised analysis for textual and historical study within the institution of the academy very 
differently, and uses it to argue how the university “stepped forward in the postwar period both to 
facilitate and buffer the writer’s relation to the culture industry and the market culture more 
broadly.”
206
 The University for McGurl was already a part of corporate restructuring and he argues 
how many academics have failed to realise this important potential as a way out of the current 
pluralist agenda.
207
 
 
The turn to the mystification and to postmodern writing according to Thomas Frank in his 
retrospective look at 1990s culture wars also pervaded culture of its assignation with authenticity.
208
 
He argues how the conservative right rallied support for its initiatives and how college professors 
from the coast suspended traditional routes to justice, which fed into the right’s fight to retake 
control of moral high-ground. He writes: 
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For the conservatives politics is something different: politics is about blasphemous art and 
crazy lawsuits filed by out of control trial lawyers running down America [...] Politics is 
when the people in small towns look around at what WalMart and ConAgra have wrought 
and decide to enlist in the crusade against Darwin.
209
 
 
Dropping school standards and subsequent postmodern relativisms fuelled rising unrest in 
traditional heartlands against what they saw was a moral crusade by the liberal left. For a while 
these views became a hot-button topic in US media debate. Graham Thomson unearths meaning 
behind the press and media reaction to postwar radical liberalism. He writes: 
 
The use of the word kulturkampf is interesting. Literally meaning “cultural fight,” it was a 
term originally used at the end of the nineteenth century to describe Otto von Bismarck’s 
battle with the Roman Catholic Church for control not just of economic and political power, 
but for control over intellectual and cultural power too. The word has been supplied to the 
US by social conservatives like Pat Buchanan, but has more readily been translated “culture 
war” to describe the battle over social and cultural power between those on the Left and the 
Right […] [T]he social conservative backlash against the 1960s was every bit as important 
an element in Reganomics as was the supply-side economics aimed at turning around the 
American economy.
210
 
 
Character assassinations in Cryptonomicon correlate to the American Right’s attack on Leftist 
conceptual thinking of know-it-all college professors. Rorty at the time argued how these campus 
radicals were so busy unmasking hegemony in the present that they have no time to discuss what 
laws need to be passed in order to create a better future.
211
 Because of the Left’s unplanned 
response to conservative laws of government Rorty argued how they failed to get to grips with a 
rising tide of corporate populism and reactionary conservatism. In their link ups with theories of 
power this left a critical new Left with no place to go.  
 
Informed by the culture wars, Cryptonomicon—rather than condemn outright the entwinement of 
instrumental reason and domination and the uses put to the men in the wartime story—shifts its 
concerns to how individuals like grad student Charlene come into a revolutionary-styled being in 
contemporary US culture. In a series of persistent attacks, its narrative circulates around just how 
far the academics’’ uses of postmodern relativism (83) was taken in terms of condemnations of cold 
war consensus politics and the invention of America, or more abruptly, in the academics’ view the 
invention of white male and misogynistic America. In Randy’s ritualistic flaying at the dinner table, 
where he is routinely stereotyped as a white elitist male technocrat, he is dispossessed of an 
originary political rhetoric in the post-political turn to identity. He is embittered and dragged 
between the two poles of canon battles in the culture war debate, as Cryptonomicon is in general. I 
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deal with the author’s shuttling between two nationally-inflected positions in chapter three. 
Antagonism held towards the academics’ unwillingness to make value judgements centres on 
Charlene’s crowd’s upper middle class liberal ideals (27), insufferable political correctness (80), 
and academic jargon (52). The academics’ radical remaking of a multicultural perspective that 
would take it away from the cloying one New England mind is given the postnational draw of the 
new Americanist status in Cryptonomicon. These now not-so-new Americanists based their 
revisions in part on the radical historical revision of American literary history. The group that 
constitute Leo Marx’s “Great Divide” in American scholarship are tellingly presented in 
Cryptonomicon as an academic crowd (80). As such their claims on US public policy and political 
status are reflected negatively. Marx worked on the principle that literature worked towards 
realizing the adversarial in culture; Cryptonomicon follows Marx’s ethic, seeing now another 
dangerous era for literary studies as Anglo imperialism ever was.
212
 The school, from Randy’s 
perspective, has distributed and regulated access to a favoured new form of cultural capital. Under a 
consensus view of a truly representative canon free from social bias the academics’ are no longer 
concerned with Randy’s pre-Sixties sense of self or educational upbringing, and, rather like the 
Second World War veteran in the poster saga, they willingly consign him to the ashbin of 
posthistorical discourse.  
 
Randy’s knowledge and moral authority is seen as a by-product of lasting systemic effects of 
power. Cryptonomicon paces the poststructuralist assault on the American Way until Yale professor 
Kivistik becomes somewhat synonymous with Guillory’s account of de Man. Kivistik “as the name 
of theory” holds the key to unlocking public access to scholarly acts of interpretation and 
appreciation in the American context. Randy testifies to this spurious state of affairs. “Kivistik was 
too big and real […] [and] probably more influential in the real world than Randy would ever be” 
(80). The novel, although referring to Kivistik’s power in the University, attempts to take back 
some of the academic charisma attributed to real Yale school scholars and isolates their power 
within the culture of the school. Although we are told that where Randy came from no one had been 
taking these people seriously for years, we are never quite sure where Randy really comes from, and 
his ambiguity can remain an irreducible literary presence in the text. The academics, on the other 
hand, are locked down into a form of 1990s culture wars enmity and an accompanying ontological 
stasis. Rather than being considered a character that confirms negation and ambiguity of literary-
based critical knowledge as an invention, behind which lies something completely different from 
itself, Randy becomes reflective of how New Critical formalism distanced literature from ideology. 
This type of conceptual distancing is put to use overtly as Kivistik comes to the west coast to recruit 
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Charlene to prestigious north coast Yale. Cosmopolitan coastal region types, especially of the New 
Haven, New England type according to Thomas Frank, underestimated old traditional media 
dominances including the literary journalistic styled backlash to the celebrated overburdening of 
conventional American identity.
213
 The academics attempting to take on the culture industry (and 
remnants of a literary class of American journalists) results in them being largely worse off, and we 
are told in no uncertain terms that they are driven to police the diminished borders of their territory 
within the university. As a result, active feminist Charlene and her academic group are undermined 
in Cryptonomicon’s US pluralist group context.  
 
Rorty argued cultural Left-oriented thinking offered very little in the way of resistance to economic 
selfishness as they taught Americans to recognise otherness. As I have tried to show McGurl turns 
this simple statement around for the benefits of the whole postwar experience that describes a 
partially democratised modernism. While the academics are fooling around with their technological 
image of the veteran, the novel relays different types of integrated constellations of machines and 
materials-handling systems that went into the restructuring of post-Fordist labour processes.
214
 
These processes result in real American social and corporate class abuses around the world. Avi 
painstakingly reminds Epiphyte Corp’s tech-minded group members that the world is where their 
I.T. applications make sense. “He taps the whiteboard. In the real world. You know, the big round 
wet ball where billions of people live” (188). Because we are also told the Philippines are an 
“Arday R-D-A-E., Rapidly Developing Asian Economy” (30) deregulation initiatives in the 1990s 
come to the fore. In the US these corporate initiatives went largely unchecked and allowed for the 
explosive growth of telecoms industries. These industries, Frank argues, encouraged “a staggering 
amount of fraud and overconstruction” as companies went on their way to amassing vast amounts 
of wealth across the globe and in America.
215
 Possibly an overstatement on Cryptonomicon’s 
behalf, and confirming to how it is implicitly tied to the conservative response and backlash 
imagination to culture wars, it ties scandalous telecommunications abuses not only to capitalistic 
moguls and nefarious business types who want to make information a market commodity abroad, 
but to the public intellectual who was capitulating to a networked intelligence. When tackling 
themes of Randy and Avi’s displays of economic selfishness, or inferences towards academics Nina 
or Charlene’s uninhibited displays of sexuality the novel’s focuses isolate radical and enlightened 
liberal worldviews within the school culture, showing how the modern academics offer little 
resistance to social injustice and state of moral decline on a global scale. Similarly, the academics’ 
mass intellectuality is increasingly reconsidered as being less communicative and informational 
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nationally. They are in turn reconsidered as succumbing to the rhetoric of free information. Randy 
and his band of nerdy hackers, on the other hand, although not completely free from the spurious 
“explosive growth in telecoms” (30) are presented as ingenious freedom loving types who have not 
lost the art of critical thinking. When posing a resistance to theory and when viewed through the 
emergence in the 1990s of a novel such as Tom Brokaw’s The Greatest Generation (1998) a certain 
ancestral worship can account for an implicit structure in the text, which can bring to the surface 
more of the American pragmatic mind behind lasting legacies of French literary theory.
216
 Wartime 
data encryption and themes of the informalization of cultural knowledge, although maligned in 
Cryptonomicon’s contemporary and wartime settings (as allusions to America’s National Security 
Agency [proto-imperial power] and Charlene’s ineffectual digital media studies show), is still 
viewed as a positive useful tool through which to found new democratic projects.   
 
Rorty’s various New York Times op-ed pieces increasingly called for the rebirth of a new sense of 
hope and optimism for the young American. Rorty was concerned that a corrosive postmodern 
moral scepticism would tumble back into moral authoritarianism. Recriminations to antirealist or 
postmodern epistemology and Leftist agendas were slowly building. These linkages were to become 
hugely significant to the conservative backlash to modern liberalism. Legal scholar Robert Bork’s 
polemical book Slouching towards Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism and American Decline (1996) 
highlighted two main themes that many conservatives bemoaned in the 1990s: America was in 
decline, and liberals were to blame for culture wars that were splintering the nation. Although Rorty 
argued values were not eternal, paradoxically in a time when “Values Mattered Most,” he believed, 
like William James before him, that values were only ever dropped when they no longer made a 
practical difference.
217
 The enlightened worldview of the academics’ postmodernist abstractions 
make no practical difference to Randy’s previously held mess of opinions (that is if we do not count 
the splitting headaches he gets when he is around these people). Rather than being brought to a new 
state of evolutionary thinking in new Americanist antifoundationalist tracts and the “new style of 
literary professionalism” designated as theory Randy deigns to leave America instead. Leaving one 
America and finding another in the form of “America Shaftoe” tells the reader a lot about the 
novel’s literary and political pretensions and who it considers is to blame for an increasingly 
shrinking public sphere.
218
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Rather than offer Fredrick Jameson’s postmodern waning of affect in American contexts, or the 
academics’ paradoxical criticizing the rhetoric of free information as they themselves plug into 
useless Internet enthusiasms of the 1990s a complex fascination emerges with old solid dominances 
of technologies and the human machine interface. Cryptonomicon’s formal appraisal of objects 
returns its literature to a source of previous American literary productions. Classical masterworks 
from Emerson to Whitman are not just a symptom of racism, empire, or heterosexim, but nativist 
attempts to extricate independent forms of thought from the high abstractions of old world 
categories. My case is not to argue whether these classical American writers actually achieved a 
truly independent mode of thought only to state that the emergence of a US canon was in part to 
dismantle the notion of old-world tradition. We will come to see how these American writers types 
of formal alignment became a powerful cultural symbology when read through the Puritan vision 
and its rhetoric. 
 
Cultural criticism takes a detour from literary postmodernism in Cryptonomicon’s almost Luddite 
type cultural criticism of technology. Amy’s Company “Semper Marine Services” (106-107) is 
synonymous with Semper Fi, an old Marine Corps motto, meaning “ever faithful” and signals how 
discrete functions of technology and human and machines interact. This is quite abstruse in 
historiographic metafiction. Deep-sea diving is literally brought to the reader’s attention as a 
functional (not fictional) process, leading to a more realistic, less sceptical approach to governing 
America’s historical past and present relationship with technology. Amy’s relationship with 
technology is unlike Charlene’s postmodern ephemeral embrace of spectacle events and TV media 
images. Diving takes a lot of in-depth and self-taught knowledge learned over many years, and a lot 
of dives. Randy is to learn each diver is dependent on the other, yet each dive is very specific to 
each diver (457-458). Self-governance, like the aura of rarity (authenticity) in this relationship, 
between the human and the machine, remains an integral act in the novel, and each diver’s discrete 
relationship with technology stands against the image-critique of the academics and their decentring 
of the unified subject as legitimate source of moral and cultural authority. Charlene’s relationship 
with new technologies, like that of Kivistik’s is glib, abstract, and routinized. In the no-longer-
pastoral space of the university, the aura of rarity is now construed as a power-structured 
relationship where power is as much as inside one as outside one, and the will to appropriate 
indoctrinated into the Yale professor Kivistik. Nativist independence (and therefore realism), on the 
other hand, is often the starting point from which Cryptonomicon jumps off to make its most 
revealing juxtapositions.
219
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Cryptonomicon not only poses resistances to the deconstruction of the aura of rarity in Charlene’s 
feminist and gender corrective to patriarchal ideology and technobureaucratic constraints on the 
global labour workforce, but also to sympathy-training. Readers’ relationships with Epiphyte 
Corp’s group members should be solidified, however, their relatability is often compromised in the 
novel. Randy and Avi and the rest of the Epiphyte group are rarely construed as likeable characters. 
For instance, Tom Howard and John Cantrell intend to be cryogenically frozen at the time of their 
deaths. A similarly gross or hedonistic impulse is characterised in the “rendering of Manila Bay” in 
digitised “3-D graphics” (102). This is traded as vulgar in the novel, more so as it is to impress a 
future business clientele made up of hoods and villains that want a piece of the Intel Epiphyte Corp 
is selling. Epiphyte’s computer graphics replace what the novel still sees as very important: old-
fashioned maps. These are given great significance, and although fraught with their own problem of 
imperial conquest, a map is the kind of technology that required a certain amount of determined 
effort and a notion of being in the world, rather than the sixties postmodern existentialist drama, 
which reappears in the novel in the posthumanist excessive loosening of constraints of what it 
means to be an American and basically human. The novel delivers the notion of being in the world 
more emphatically and pragmatically to the rest of Epiphyte Corp’s group, through the more 
embodied experiences of raped women, pillaged villages and seared or burning flesh in wartime.  
 
In many ways, the novelistic or literary historical perspective pulls out realist terms of virtuous 
memory, and not the ghostly memory in the history of new historicism. Epiphyte Corp’s stylish 
graphics are overlaid with more solid geometries such as the solid dominances of old 
communication signals like the “signal fire on Corregidor” (94) that were used to deliver messages 
from island to island in the Philippines. Rather than trace the Philippines’ forgotten pasts to bring 
what McCann and Szalay call a type of postmodern “imperfect justice” to counter the direct 
excessive rationalism of the wartime military elite, Cryptonomicon implicitly builds through a 
Pacific revolutionary discourse fraught with US relationships and new technology.
220
 Air to ground 
Internet conference calls, video phone links and GPS receivers are rehashed with old tech methods 
of communication and imperialist data flow such as “lines of sight.” Erecting a rooftop antenna on a 
“non-descript four-story office building between Fort Santiago and the Manila Cathedral” (103), a 
history of communication is not obliterated in the novel. Rather, this scene brings forward a low-
tech encounter to counter the excessive posthistorical image-critique in the academics’ complex 
politics of historicism and enlightened upper class views on new media technology and the Internet. 
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In short, the novel seems intent on extricating itself from the postmodernist versions of literary and 
cultural criticism transformed into theory.   
 
Although hugely sympathetic to many New Left objectives, Rorty in response to culture wars, 
posited damning critiques of Foucauldian leftist views. McGurl picks up the study of apocalyptic 
French philosophy that became the norm for essential preparation for Leftist initiatives in the US. 
Likening Forrest Carter to a “red-neck Paul de Man” McGurl argues how theories of pedagogy play 
a central and ambivalent role in the countercultural imagination, as they do in the tradition of 
American liberalism more generally.
221
 Before McGurl’s attempts to deal with the political nature 
and intercultural interdependency of literary discourse and how the culture of the school and the 
apparatuses that surround it are intuited by that particular culture are introduced into the economy – 
not that culture’s autonomy, Guillory linked together the notion of the school and the literary 
curriculum as a site of political practice.
222
 He argued how these under-theorised teaching projects 
culminated in the dismantling and redefinition of literary English. What is becoming increasingly 
clear in the twenty-first century (if we take a line of thought from Guillory’s line of questioning) is 
that the movement away from literary English, at least in liberal arts contexts, was not as academics 
had hoped but rather the replacement of literariness in new forms. Guillory writes, “it is not clear 
whether a cultural studies curriculum has been conceived which does not replicate the theoretical 
hermeneutic paradigms of literary interpretation.”
223
 Rather than turn that discipline over to 
language and rhetoric and recognizing how the school appears as both the central institution of 
repressive socialization and, more positively, as a promising means to fashion a more diverse and 
yet harmonious society McGurl’s reading of Cryptonomicon makes a compelling argument for how 
a regional faculty philosophy and an embedded literariness return in a larger socially differentiated 
cultural industrial system. 
  
Theory wars take a different turn in Sacvan Bercovitch’s dissensus model. A new group of 
Americanist scholars were brought together to placate the impasse that had built up around 
postnational narratives in the US. The dissensus model is not without its problems. Jane Tompkins 
had earlier critiqued Graff’s conflict-oriented attempts to move beyond culture wars as a typically 
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male centred approach. It is Tompkins’ less permeable cultural boundary distinction that separates 
Charlene from Randy. Illustrating a more recent concern surrounding dissensus and the 
marginalization of experimentation in the humanities, Lauren Berlant’s feminist realist 
sentimentality and female complaint genre tackles the default gender of the American citizen. 
Berlant is concerned with how dissensus largely returns to debates centred on American books.
224
 
Berlant saw quickly the backlash imagination brewing behind the newly emerging predominance of 
the word nation in the 1990s’ turn to culture. She argued how many critical theorists had adopted a 
labile and optimistic culturalist perspective, as it was the Right who grasped more significantly 
language as a political and communicational tool for domination. Not wishing to return to an 
antebellum liberal sentimentality and unreconstructed Romanticism, Berlant moves her frames of 
reference from inhibited sexuality to the realms of affect and emotion. Carrying on the work of Eve 
Sedgwick, Berlant, like McGurl, looked to reunite Leftist initiatives around integrative modes of 
analysis for cultural politics and the aesthetic. Berlant, as we shall see, however, was only to offer a 
competing act of interpretation for a mode of oppositional dissent so that her project of the 
unfinished business of sentimentality in American culture could not be easily worked into 
Bercovitch’s paradoxical forms of ideological dissent. The point is not to draw out Tompkins’ or 
Berlant’s enriching points of argument here on a postcolonial matrix of repudiation in US literary 
studies today. Rather, it is that from the perspective of dissensus, many scholars have implicitly 
decided to reunite the Left around real politics, and the return to history and commonsense values 
over and against cultural politics and those who have buttressed it with empty formulas of 
sociological political rhetoric.  
 
Previously, both Harold Bloom and Rorty noted that those that practiced Foucauldian Leftist views 
from within the radical caucus of the Modern Language Association had in turn formed a “School 
of Resentment.”
225
 Rorty’s contention was that a nation could not reform itself unless it takes pride 
in itself or its Great writers. Stephenson, for Rorty, was morally averse to both. In a culture morally 
held to be in precipitous decline, Leo Marx developed a similar line of questioning. He wrote, 
“those who write in the unintelligible jargon of critical theory have developed a hatred for America 
so visceral that it makes one wonder why they bother studying America at all.”
226
 Drawing attention 
to the image-critique and academic jargon of Charlene’s group, Randy becomes indignant to the 
way academics recklessly treat the Second World War veteran, seeing in their critique of him a 
distinct failure of the imagination. The academics’ conformist politics and their long-standing 
devaluation of the aesthetic reflect an increasingly frustrated America, beset by optimistic pluralist 
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criticisms of the Baby Boom Generation. The novel portrays this generation in defeat and clothing 
its resentment of this fact in jargon. Included in this generation is the figure of grad student 
Charlene who, post-Vietnam, offers an image critique of the US as being a universal cipher for an 
ever-expanding source of evil. Before rallying to the point of what evil really is, Cryptonomicon 
deals with the academics’ hostility towards the US largely through Randy.  
 
Randy had spent a lot of time around these people, and thought he’d gotten used to them, but 
during those days he had a headache all the time, from clenching his teeth, and he kept 
jumping to his feet in the middle of meals or conversations and going out for solitary walks. 
(76)  
 
Doing their best to alienate Randy, the academics invoke what Rorty calls “the state of the soul of 
those people who had learned from Jameson and others they can no longer enjoy the luxury of the 
old-fashioned ideological critique, the indignant moral denunciation of the other.”
227
 Randy, for his 
pains, on the other hand, “decided to get patriarchal with Dr. G.E.B Kivistik” (83). This act is the 
resounding nail in the coffin of his and Charlene’s relationship and precipitates her moving out of 
the house she shares with him and into the one in Connecticut with the Yale professor (578).  
 
Randy saying something undiplomatic is brought into 1990s conservative jeremiads surrounding 
family decline in America. Randy’s previous attempts to be polite with the other academics, we are 
told were largely a “fruitless tactic to get the attention he craved from Charlene” (53). His 
unrequited love stands for a novel turning away from dispassionate posthistorical critique when 
invoked into family spheres. Notwithstanding Berlant’s image of a “national supericonicity” for 
Randy, Allan Bloom fired important shots (Bloom did not consider himself a conservative) in 
culture wars, arguing how moral cynicism had destroyed loving relationships, and how commercial 
pursuits had become more highly valued than love.
228
 We see in Charlene’s relationship with 
Kivistik, and her spare time pursuits of “sea kayaking and going to foreign films” (59) extensions of 
Allan Bloom’s reading of useless classroom erotics. Bloom’s saving of historical Romance by 
making it non-heretical to Christian theology can be reconciled in Randy’s “romantic enthusiasm” 
for a foundational and optimistic faith; a religious faith which has been unceremoniously dumped 
by the academics.
229
 Crossing Randy’s indignation felt towards the academics’ secularization of 
chemistry professor Scott and his wife paediatrician Laura (584-585) with Rorty’s emphasis on the 
moral scepticism of the liberal postructuralist invokes culture wars’ stances on moral decline. 
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Professor of Law and Ethics Martha C. Nussbaum extended an impassioned plea to push Rorty’s 
notion of patriotism out of national public forum debate. In her adherence to multiculturalism, 
Nussbaum looked to reform the politics of nationalism in support of what Anthony Appiah called 
the “cosmopolitan patriot.”
230
  
 
A culturally conservative backlash spilled over into the public domain in the late 1980s and early to 
mid-1990s, as the Republican Party joined ranks to argue against counterculture radicals and 
poststructuralists. Republicans took on the academics (now with their unfortunate or marginalised 
elements of liberal pluralism) from the Right side of culture. David Blankenhorn, director of the 
institute for American Values, exclaimed in 1993 “America’s central problem was family decline.” 
He added, “it’s not the economy. It is the culture.”
231
 Jeremiads about American decline seemed to 
hit a larger cultural nerve. Culture wars were, according to leading conservative and political 
historian Gertrude Himmlefarb (and a few liberal writers), cutting the nation in half. Many 
postmodern academics saw this as a conservative ploy to hike up unrest and were openly dismissive 
of these attitudes. Thomas Frank argued how liberals refused to take the backlash seriously. He 
writes, “they believe it is nothing but crypto-racism [...] or the random griping of religious 
rednecks, or the protests of “angry white men” feeling left behind by history.”
232
 Guillory took out 
his socioanalysis on the school culture at the time Republicans were winning the vote, to argue that 
academics not only missed their own institutional location in canon debates, but also failed to 
theorise adequately in response to their project. Around this time the democratic vote was under 
increasing strain, which finally lead to the Republican revolution of 1994. This in turn helped to 
shift the Democrats to the Right.
233
 Rorty had warned of such epistemological shortcoming if one 
wanted to branch out of the institutional domain and into the wider cultural field. While scrutiny 
surrounding de Man’s anti-Semitic writings had already boiled over in the public sphere into culture 
wars stalemate, Guillory showed how the defence of or resistances to theory had little if anything at 
all to do with political questions relating directly to assimilation (who should be in or out of the 
canon) or cultural degeneracy. Like Richard Ohmann before him Guillory reconsidered new 
directions in historical, political and literary scholarship taken in the US since the 1960s. Guillory 
argued how it was the emergence of a distinct canon of theory and its historical conjunction with a 
newly trained academic elite that follows a primary literary response to ensuing “technical” debates 
surrounding literature, which came to reify new languages of emancipation with the fracturing, 
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from above, of the Standard of English.
234
 Using Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital, 
Guillory argued that academics were gathering (or being gathered) within the specificity of a new 
bureaucratic nomenclature that would serve the future technobureaucratic elite.
235
 In his most 
serious assertion, Guillory foresaw the purging of liberalism in American contexts, as academics 
were impoverished in 1990s corporate restructuring to the extent of being pushed into policing the 
territories of their own borders, in what was rapidly becoming a diminished, segregated and isolated 
institution. 
 
Metafictional Paradox 
Invoking the twenty first century concern over how university professors were becoming 
increasingly distanced from public debate, Cryptonomicon reflects how theory and its over-
organisation in postwar US humanities departments overconstructed the potential to create 
difference in liberal culture, with disastrous effects. Charlene’s semiotic reading of Randy’s facial 
hair bears hallmarks of what the real Yale Group made of Derrida’s anti-philosophy and Barthes’ 
structuralist understanding of social space, in which the theory of the text can coincide only with a 
practice of writing. The novel shows how the academics, in their rush to move past Harold Bloom’s 
influence, fall headlong into the anxiety of their own irrelevance. Randy’s protestations to how 
Charlene’s “statistics were gathered” are considered “counterintuitive” and the narrator tells us 
“Charlene was having none of it [...] she was in a big hurry to move on to the meat of her 
argument” (76). The theory of individual powerlessness that the academics project onto Randy is 
reflected back upon the academics in a negative way. This tells us how their countercultural visions 
have fortified in the university. The novel presents Kivistik’s assumptions on the subject of the 
Internet as worthless (83) and which are largely turned towards antagonism with the State. Randy 
does not want to be empowered in the way these postmodern professors see fit. It is not so much 
their politics that is in doubt as the way the academics go about delivering them, and their habit of 
advancing careerism over the real social agendas. As such this Leftist agenda, as McGurl suggests, 
can be limited to the narrow few, and rather than offer a panacea for social ills is presented in 
Cryptonomicon as no longer in touch with the newly emerging electorate and the common voter 
epitomised in Randy.  
 
Cryptonomicon’s attacks on countercultural legacies spilling over into discourse ethics can be 
contrasted with Eric Lott’s favourable observations on a countercultural Left. Lott challenges recent 
                                                          
234
 Guillory, Cultural Capital, 203. 
235
 Guillory, Cultural Capital, 82; 264. See also Readings for a concise summary of Guillory’s way of understanding 
cultural capital and the circulation of cultural value in relatively independent economies. Readings, University in Ruins, 
108. 
114 
 
arguments against “blaming the counterculture for the cultural turn in Left political theory.”
236
 
Cryptonomicon does not offer similar relief to the poststructuralists. Lasting countercultural 
energies are portrayed through Andrew Loeb and his exercise in “meta-historical scholarship” (57). 
Loeb’s research takes in the dietary habits of local American Indian tribes and relates directly to 
other terms of going native in the narrative. Frick a marine core sergeant in Bobby Shaftoe’s 
platoon turns Asiatic in a derogatory manner. His racial grief when leaving Shanghai is presented 
largely as the result of structural racism where according to Anne Cheng the racial other is at once 
rejected and retained.
237
 On the other hand, Bobby Shaftoe is genuinely curious about diverse forms 
of life as he walks into the Japanese restaurant in Shanghai: “and if he could, he wanted to spend a 
few calm minutes in here and learn a few things about it” (34-39). Diversity project’s partial 
substitution of Freud for Marx projects an understanding of Frick’s racial grief into what Cheng 
calls the melancholy of race. The novel’s juxtaposing of these two attitudes; the curious and sincere 
Bobby Shaftoe the racist undertones of Frick’s racial grief move into the contemporary sphere as 
the academics’ attempt to teach Americans to recognise otherness.
238
 
 
Cryptonomicon rather than compound its interpretation of racial melancholia interprets away this 
sort of divineness. Charlene and the academics operate in the realm of the culture of the celebrity 
and invoke what Frank calls “a politics of the beautiful and the well-born where these people tell 
the unwashed how to behave and how they should stop being racist or homophobic.”
239
 The 
academics not only fail to see their own institutional location in canon debates, thereby despoiling 
any chance of meaningful interaction with Randy but fail to move past regurgitations of 1960s 
countercultural legacies as shown in their continued use of images of the man in the Gray flannel 
suit. McGurl argues how this type of dialectical adjustment to economic forms such as the 
information economy limits its reach as a descriptor of the environment, “and threatens to sell us 
short on a set of images of corporate life – in effect, the world of the man in the gray flannel suit - 
that have been out of date since the 1960s.”
240
  The novel in turn relays how “one evening when Avi 
and his family had been over for dinner, Randy had said, “I’m the beard, Avi’s the suit” as a way of 
explaining their business relationship, and from this point on Charlene had been off and running” 
(76). Cryptonomicon invokes interpretive lack not in Randy’s blindness to his not being able to see 
himself as a tool in the academic’s semiological rerouting of the postwar system but rather how 
they cannot fashion an adequate interpretive response for him from lasting countercultural legacies 
and post 1960s humanities theory.  
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Notwithstanding the familial juxtapositions of the fatherless Randy and the many-fathered Avi, 
whose “wife had been pregnant almost continuously for the four years they’d been married” (30) 
Charlene reinvents the image of the family in her semiotic reading of Randy as relevant critique of 
past and postwar American abuses.
241
 The academics’ need to play on the overstatement – 
“Charlene proved that having a beard was just one element of a syndrome strongly correlated to 
racist and sexist attitudes” (77) - is taken from the context of a defensive posture held within the 
university, and reflects the novel’s anxiety: that the people have become an abstraction in liberal 
progressive views on politics and global world reality. In their subsequent failure to keep abreast 
with economic selfishness in the US, Rorty argued that New Left academics colluded in 
proletarianizing the postwar bourgeoisification of the American white proletariat, which would 
culminate in a bottom-up populist revolt.
242
  
 
Surrounding what Rorty argued was the cultural Left’s ineffectual politics (the homeless and 
residents of trailer parks were not considered other in the relevant sense according to Rorty
) 
McCann and Szalay reappraise the academic visions with libertarian attitudes.
243 
 Like Rorty, they 
infer that the literary academy of the time was largely complicit in eroding regulatory environments 
that existed previously between the nation, State and family stating that “theory [...] lent intellectual 
credibility to libertarian attitudes [and this] would dominate the literary academy in the last decades 
of the twentieth century and retain a predominant, increasingly sclerotic hold on the humanities to 
this day.”
244
 The turn to deconstructive theory and Cultural Studies projects in McCann and 
Szalay’s joint project become, as Rorty had forewarned, types of meaningless reform.
245
 Whether or 
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culture technologically savvy but also, as McGurl sees it, less able to see the real gestures that link white progressives to 
a racial ideology in its own right. Cryptonomicon’s slotting itself into styles of other narration is conceptually flawed 
and politically troubling for McGurl as he sees forms of white philosophy resurface in its narrative. For the Rorty 
quotation see Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 83. 
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writes: “Crudely (but not, I think, inaccurately) put, White thinks that recognizing history's meaninglessness makes it 
necessary, or at least possible, for people to choose a history for themselves: since “there are no grounds to be found in 
the record itself for preferring one way of construing its meaning rather than another,” people should see themselves as 
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not Rorty in the 1990s has the “fetid whiff of […] Lash in the 80s and Jacoby in the 70s” as Lott 
suggests, McCann and Szalay now extend with greater hindsight the liberal Left’s ineffectual 
politics, as postructuralism begins to fray around the edges in US humanities departments.
246
 
Linking together the works of McCann, Szalay, Guillory, Rorty and even Readings the postmodern 
academics miss the irrelevance of their politicised culture critique, insofar as McGurl argues, 
“American culture had become a corporate culture.”
247
 What we are left with in Cryptonomicon, in 
face of Rorty’s “noiseless Left” and Readings’s university, is Thomas Frank’s concerns on the 
culture wars. Cryptonomicon, in other words, is about blasphemous art, and politics is about crazy 
lawsuits filed by out of control lawyers (51-53). Randy, as a once liberal, Democrat voter, now 
looks with distaste at those involved with the liberal worldview, and once tolerant of other people’s 
worldview up to a point, he cannot stomach Kivistik’s propositional offering on issues surrounding 
US public policy.     
 
Thomas Frank brings Randy and Kivistik’s cultural struggle up-to-date. Frank sees how America 
has been left in a state of permanent culture war, which he connects to countercultural movements 
of the 1960s, and know-it-all college professors of the 1990s.
248
 Frank attempts to sort out why 
once traditional Democratic heartlands turned into Republican hotbeds, and offers his view on a 
social conservative backlash to American liberal costal excessiveness. For Frank, democratic 
heartlands like Kansas were left feeling isolated and bereft as university professors from the coast 
overburdened traditional identities and nationalistic civic views with their cosmopolitan views on 
race, ethnicity, homosexuality, environmental issues, identity, and culture. David Blankenhorn 
throws further emphases on an elitist liberal injunction into political history when he writes how 
“the hauteur of upper-middle class liberals and an elitist Left wing liberal culture [...] had captured 
universities, foundations, Hollywood and the media.”
249
 In Cryptonomicon’s contemporary setting, 
Hollywood is “merely a specialised bank” (79). In wartime it is a place where Reagan goes to “nail 
a starlet” (109). In either context, when the postwar university is competing with or resistant to the 
culture industry a certain amount of jacked-up narcissism and mini-dictatorship is an inevitable 
conclusion. The academics fail to register in their link-ups with celebrity news or media culture 
rising public contempt in heartlands for the Clintonite and New Democrat’s “patently phoney 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
free to “impose a meaning where none is to be found” (p. 130). Interpretations of history are thus political acts in the 
fullest sense-the products of political choices for which people should be held responsible. See Michaels, “Is There a 
Politics of Interpretation,” 252. 
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compassion.”
250
 With the Left reuniting around cultural struggle Zbigniew Brzezinski writes what is 
one to think of Bill Clinton’s response in 1993 to a questioner who asked him on MTV whether he 
wore boxers or briefs? Perhaps thinking of the youth vote Clinton replied “usually boxers.”
251
 As 
the radical academics take their politicised culture critique to Randy he is viewed as something akin 
to a cultural and political Neanderthal. To the academic crowd, he is the angry white male feeling 
left behind by history. Randy, after being stereotyped by the academics, cannot easily answer back 
for fear of being labelled a conflict oriented patriarchal misogynist or an “admittedly privileged 
white male technocrat” (620). Randy is resigned to the fact that he would never be as important as 
Kivistik in the public realm, a double pun as this is now a media realm.
252
 Facing death by neglect 
in the postmodern age of media culture Randy distances himself from the public sphere and 
contemporary media frenzy surrounding anti-intellectual link-ups and new media by turning his 
back on software.
253
 His stance on the university’s embrace of diversity projects and the academic 
star system repositions in an aesthetic appreciation the way New Democrats and the academic left 
did not take what lay at the heart of culture wars matters seriously i.e. the people. 
 
Average white American Randy typifies the US public sphere and the group interest. Being white 
and having every available access to new technology, he is attacked by the academics. Noting the 
gaps between the academics’ non-formalist appraisals of him as they empty out Universal 
significance from a US wartime military veteran, Cryptonomicon poses a question that seeks to 
reintegrate the loss of a traditional self that Charlene’s particular strand of feminist identity politics 
seeks to celebrate.
254
 The academics form in “consensus clusters” (85) on the night when they 
attempt to rob Randy of his private link to knowledge of the world. They, on the other hand, no 
longer hold any significance for Randy’s economic vision or personal or familial links to selfhood. 
As he comes back to America to sort out his and Charlene’s personal belongings, “Randy has been 
classified as an abandoner, no better than a married man who ups and walks out his wife and 
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children never mind that he was the one who wanted to marry [Charlene] and have kids with her” 
(584). The academic culture leaves Randy feeling bereft of any emotion, which the novel attempts 
to reinstate through his novelistic quest for Amy. Randy’s search to act out rituals of maturity and 
purification focuses on a strain of reactionary conservatism, and Rorty’s suggestion of a bottom-up 
populist revolt to a cultural Left reform program which no longer has power to illuminate situations 
and motivate actions. Randy’s inability (or unwillingness) to make the transition to 
postconventional identity structures, or any authoritative statement (save free consensus between as 
diverse a variety of citizens as can possibly be produced), sets up a clash between antihumanist 
discourse and what is now being considered conformist politics of postmodernism.
255
 
 
Randy, unlike Charlene, can find no place in a new order of social relations defined by academic 
appeals to persuasion. Cryptonomicon hints at how a “new ethic of aggression” (synonymous here 
for militarism) is latently stored in politically correct views and non-conflict attitudes shored up by 
a politics of difference, identity or recognition. Attempting to draw Randy into their strange Marxist 
sociability, the radical intellectuals are gradually turning the proposition country of America into a 
socially conservative state. The socialisms of Britain and Europe, run through Charlene’s abstracted 
objectivity (which is pulled into a certain narrow-mindedness when framing her critique of the 
transnational or multicultural), masks itself in Cryptonomicon as false directives of a struggle for 
power. Charlene is, in turn, being inducted into the sleep of negation spuriously proposed by New 
England settler and Yale conformist Kivistik. This challenges assumptions about the academics’ 
complex politics of historicism and the newly abstracted objectivity that disembeds local 
determinations in what the novel implies as East Coast villainy—and more specifically, Yale-styled 
Yankee imperialism. The novel never outright expresses movement towards a fully administered 
world of late modernity, but it becomes recognisable through the academics’ appeals to specialized 
production. The notion of the new executive authority of a Europeanized West is extended through 
Kivistik invoking concern surrounding an arty liberal crowd’s pathologization of previous executors 
of modernism. The social elite that Second World War codebreaker Lawrence Waterhouse finds 
himself having to perform for in the wartime story is relocated in the historical class system of the 
Anglo-American modernist church of impersonality, as the Oxbridge don waxes lyrically on 
information theory (123).
256
 The feminist corrective of male American anglicised patriarchal 
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ideology that lurks behind a specific type of necessary eloquence in the US is reconsidered as 
having lost some of its urgent appeal as political mode for understanding American society and 
culture. Charlene’s antihumanist jargon is given a negative or comical framework, suggesting that 
her liberating response to an American nation judged by its literature has been commandeered by 
powerful social networks and clever players in the new system, who are busy turning the 
postmodern pedagogic relation (characteristic of the ambivalence Guillory saw in de Man’s literary 
pedagogy) back into a site of subjective calculation.  
 
The academics’ politicized image-critique is reconsidered largely a dispassionate surface attempt to 
deal with deep social issues such as internal colonialization, information economy, posthistorical 
discourse and transnational capitalism in New Media spaces. Randy’s indignant attitude towards the 
academics, software and the Internet reflects significantly on the digital revolution as it 
deterritorializes human relations.
257
 To distance Randy from such views, Cryptonomicon makes him 
ill-prepared for the proposition of a new technological sublime. The novel removes him from 
Charlene, under the pretence that she finds more comfort and security in Kivistik. Randy’s 
movement through the novelistic space, leaving America and making contact with others, recreates 
the three-dimensional topics that act as a literary foil to America’s newest cultural reform 
movement.
258
 However, because Randy is largely unreflective, naive and idealistic, and 
disconnected from the nexus of money and media, he draws reflexive emphasis towards a figure 
that the academics believe has been cocooned from America’s recent cultural past. This reflexivity 
is never made overt to the character Randy, and the main reflexive emphasis draws focus towards 
those that have abstracted the political and historical subject from any forms of a universal history. 
Questions are raised as the academics seek to challenge, non-aggressively, a culture of American 
criticism previously critical of patriarchal aggression. “Conflict,” the novel tells us, when it is 
“acted out openly and publicly, was a male model of social interaction – the foundation of 
patriarchal society which brought with it the usual litany of dreadful things” (82). Although this 
whole scene is comically set out to draw us into the farcical nature of 1990s American postmodern 
media culture and culture wars there is seriousness being built up and resistance to the way in which 
the intelligentsia’s image of the Second World War veteran is abused, abstracted and denuded of 
historical meaning. In this scene, the novel lays claim not to an understanding associated with root 
causes of a society’s ills--aggression typically associated with –males—but to crisis in historicity, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
postmodern in this sense it fails to find an independently critical stance that will move it away from Bercovitch’s way of 
understanding of the American ideology.        
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as the academics deploy impersonal rhetorical tropes and deterritorialized networks to denude the 
veteran of meaning. Although the academics are acting in a non-conflict zone to counter the 
aggressive rhetoric of capitalist globalization, this scene challenges thirty years worth of theoretical 
expression, as it became culturally and technologically arranged to challenge history and the canon 
as a vehicle for progressive social change. 
 
History Against Theory 
William Bennett and Lynne Cheney, among many other neoconservatives, took great offence at the 
debunking of the canon, believing in part that this destroyed the American dream, based as it was 
around certain fundamental ideals. Ayers sets these debates out in a wider context, as he joins the 
chorus across the Atlantic to now reconsider twentieth century literary theory. In part, canon 
dismantling, akin to destroying Western philosophy, found voice in 1980s Foucauldian 
nonsubjectivist literature. Rorty placed almost insurmountable significances on damage done by 
this literature to democratic liberal ideals without reformist Left agendas. The reformist Left, in 
Rorty’s view, came undone in New Left agendas: where the Old Left sponsored sixty years of 
liberal reforms, he argued that “the New Left botched the job.” The culture wars, although largely 
forgettable for both Thomas Frank and McGurl—albeit for differing reasons—are the grounds from 
which Rorty believed reliable partisans of the New Deal rallied to the standards of conservatism to 
abase themselves at the throne of big business. The setting up of divides in the novel between New 
Right and Old and New Left politics, postwar secularism, radical campus college professors, 
popular resistance movements, and the current mass media are centrally thematic to 
Cryptonomicon. In reluctances to embrace technology as a way forward for America, Randy is to 
throw focus on the ambivalent professional-managerial aspect of modern academic liberalism. The 
novel reinterprets this malady, to suggest that what is being translated into practice in America 
amounts to an erosion of hard-fought freedoms. Kivistik’s proposition, as he looks to recruit 
Charlene to Yale, holds America tight in the grip of the postmodern pluralist condition, and what is 
fast becoming seen as a flawed multicultural democratic reform experiment initiated from within 
humanities disciplines in universities.  
 
The notion of culture spelt out by Charlene’s group tells of the end Readings’s modern University 
system, or at least of its uses of culture as a useful and meaningful humanist term. Charlene places 
herself somewhat as a guardian of true culture, of which the extant regime is merely a false or 
ideological version. The notion of culture spelt out in Bobby Shaftoe, on the other hand, can 
forestall the rush to move past instructive values of the past. John Diggins argues against such 
thought, which has gone into criticising America as isolationist and exceptionalist. He writes, 
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“much modern thought and meaning which theory critical of the enlightenment produced draws no 
distinction between force and persuasion, the exercise of power and the exercise of legitimate 
authority.”
259
 Cryptonomicon draws parallels towards such a reading, as Shaftoe at the beginning of 
the novel reminds private Wiley, “if he refrains from running over the coolies they will have some 
explaining to do” (3). Cryptonomicon not only defamiliarizes the racist slur from institutional use 
and postmodern intensification of Old Left affirmative action policies, but is sceptical towards the 
end of man as a freely determining subject, or, that forms and structures of power eventually 
reconstitute themselves. Shaftoe, in other words, does not signify the end of man (man here as 
synonymous for subject-centred reason at the core of western humanism, conflated with terror) by 
not telling Wiley to run over the coolies, but signifies that the understanding of the phenomenon of 
power suggests that its activities signify the very definition of man. If not a willing humanist subject 
– Shaftoe is the one that most knows what he is doing and he also fully understands the 
contingencies of each and every situation he is mercilessly flung into, he is still a classical liberal 
humanist subject more than he is riven by textual undecidability.
260
 He fights against the relativisms 
of truth, never failing to recognise a philosophical sensibility beyond what postwar academics see 
as insufficient understandings of the workings of power.
261
 
 
The mixing of fiction and function is given a classical (or national) symbolic orientation in 
Cryptonomicon, which can put it at odds with its postmodernist counterpart of mixing high art and 
low diction. The return to realistic end-oriented literary forms can be argued for or against. Spanos, 
for instance argues against this type of enterprise, seeing this largely as the failure of critics to think 
through what deconstructive literary theory offered by way of revolutionary portent.
262
 On the other 
hand, the return to realism, for Hungerford and McGurl, allows new challenges to be met in the 
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university. As distinctions are spread farther afield in a more complex social reality, Cryptonomicon 
offers a way to read these debates on social differentiation, as its objects are isolated in what it 
portrays as the chronic shortage of functional –not fictional—process. For instance, Lawrence 
Waterhouse, in no uncertain terms, is a wartime killer and American. Like everyone else in 
wartime, he is carrying a gas mask, but his “looks different from everybody else’s because it is 
American and military” (137). The functionality of objects which isolate discrete systems (and the 
author’s discrete yearning for authenticity) comes into plainer view when the novel traces 
comparative emotional relationships straddling postwar political and cultural links to postwar 
intercultural independency.  
 
Randy’s generational privilege and immediate ties to new technologies is enough for the academics 
to put him in the same morality league as unscrupulous cold war types and business moguls. It is 
the type of excessive technocratic rationalism of figures such as “LIEUTENTANT COLONEL 
EARL COMSTOCK OF THE ELECTRICAL Till Corporation and the United States Army, in that 
order,” who we are also to learn is the “Cold War policy –guy—the brains behind Vietnam” (127), 
that fuelled postwar academics with anger and with rage, and where patriotism in the US lost a 
sense of its classless innocence. What new Americanist scholars found particularly vulgar was not 
only that the entwinement of instrumental reason and domination translated, into practice, as 
dangerous politics, but also that its continued misuse in the political sphere under classical ideals 
translated into the institutional domain as high standards of European form. However, the 
academics are held in isolation, as they, in a new objectivist interpretive method (synonymous with 
militarism), enforce “with a kind of neo-Puritanical rigor” (585) the foundational crushing global 
hegemonic of the US and Comstock’s dangerous politics onto Randy. What was once an 
unfortunate legacy has transformed, in turn, within the academics’ vision, into an underlying 
structural racist, sexist, heterosexist, and misogynistic America. The novel follows suit, yet the 
European-run state response to despondencies of Second World War is divided and separated in 
Cryptonomicon, and attacked for holding America to just one more socially binding norm. 
Simpleminded militaristic chauvinisms are in turn isolated into discrete systems and into cultural 
particularities. The academics become so concerned with stating their case, that they are seen to 
have eroded any possibility of negation in American (literary) contexts. Cryptonomicon is to 
separate Randy’s transgenerational links and ties from the continued overburdening on ideas on 
truth and what classical ideals represent. This allows it to separate itself formally and 
philosophically from the academics’ absorption and recycling of European theories of structuralism 
and poststructuralism that resurfaces from American contexts as deconstruction, new historicism or 
feminist theory.  
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Atlantic Crossing 
Mark McGurl attempts to understand what are now becoming, for him, boring contradictions in 
cultural materialist arguments over postwar American Literature. For McGurl Cryptonomicon 
informs a socially penetrating investigative critical enquiry into the global nature of modern 
systems. He gathers up the constellation of postwar aesthetic problems in systematic terms. Like 
Gerald Graff and John Guillory before him, McGurl sets out a form of consensus for the 
contemporary period. He starts by dismantling one aspect of postmodern theory. For McGurl 
postmodernism is better understood when read through processes of reflexive modernity. He 
follows Niklas Luhmann’s systems theoretical approach, claiming no epoch break has occurred 
regarding the system of society which would justify claiming a transformation from a modern to 
postmodern society. From this standpoint, McGurl creatively revises postmodern readings of post-
1960s American Literature into concepts he names high cultural pluralism, technomodernism, and 
lower middle-class modernism. Introducing his concept of technomodernism he writes:  
 
What Roth knows about Jewishness, and Morrison knows about the African American 
experience, writers like Powers, DeLillo and Pynchon know about the second law of 
thermodynamics, cybernetic causality, communications and media theory [...] and it is on the 
basis of this portfolio of technical-cultural capital that they, too, are put on the syllabus.
263
 
 
McGurl argues that by tweaking postmodern literature as it intersects with information technology, 
a more interesting examination of narrative fiction and the literary canon can emerge in the postwar 
period.  
 
McGurl sees in Cryptonomicon what he calls “schematic symbolising,” taken from high culture and 
literary modernists, and begins to revaluate aspects of its racialised narration.
264
 Unearthing a 
superficial postmodern synthesis, McGurl argues how Cryptonomicon “holds only a superficial 
narratological allegiance to racial otherness.” The “almost impossible blood ties” in the novel for 
McGurl function as a discourse of difference, but simultaneously act as counter to the “uselessness 
of the arts” as a domain for making social and political claims on cultural forms.
265
 McGurl implies 
Cryptonomicon’s overtly pluralist fiction stems from it being held in a version of cultural pluralism 
that was originally taken form a faculty philosophy of regionalism.
266
 In the postmodern strain 
where Cryptonomicon would be gathered alongside fictional works of Barth, Powers, DeLillo and 
Pynchon, it is an underlying regionalism that draws the machine to itself, and confronts an ethics 
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forming under the aegis of a discourse of difference with “its own unmarked dialectical reverse.”
267
 
This abnormality, McGurl proceeds to argue, is a way in which the modernist aesthetic can be seen 
to ramify throughout the niche fiction of the post-1990s marketplace. In other words, McGurl offers 
Cryptonomicon not through the postmodern theory of justice but as a formalised aesthetic 
appreciation of how Lyotard’s games of perfect information are played out in an otherwise 
efficiency-oriented university environment.
268
 Seeing no way out from the single closed game of 
national culture mutations of the subject in French theory are annexed to a new style of literary and 
sociological engagement in McGurl’s analysis, and Cryptonomicon’s attempt to counter the 
devaluation of the aesthetic in academic studies is, according to him, relevant to a reading of how 
beauty-as-superiority reappears in the university, driven by the rhetoric of excellence.
269
  
 
McGurl’s crossing of a systems theory analysis with the system of monetary capital allows us to see 
more clearly into Guillory’s thought experiment. Guillory argued, in relation to arguments ranged 
over aesthetic judgment and metaphysical pretensions and political biases, that “the point is not to 
make judgment disappear but to reform the conditions of its practice.”
270
 McGurl offers his analysis 
as he recognises that there is something afoot that transcends diversity as a factor in US based 
national studies. Just as crucially, McGurl can link together thoughts and debates taking place on 
both sides of the Atlantic in terms of revaluating the modernist literary aesthetic, and the open and 
radical affair of textuality. Patricia Waugh has recently argued new critical debates as a welcome 
return to the sense of the enormous humanising potential in English, and supplements Amy 
Hungerford’s comments on the period formerly known as contemporary. These two critics see new 
adventures in literature, as now it seems modernism was not what they were talking about, or at 
least if it were, then they needed a different context to do further talking.  
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Resistances are currently being made to this growing edge of scholarly work that began in the 
1990s in the US. However it is becoming increasingly evident that scholars that look to revaluate 
the teaching and readings of literature and fiction bequeathed to a postwar generation of scholars, 
students, and activists will not go away, and that by reading creatively, they are beginning to reform 
the conditions of critical practice in the humanities.
271
 Hungerford argues how for a generation in 
graduate school with theory at or just around its peak,  
 
English was an export discipline with semiotic analysis entering history and political theory 
in the US through the work of Michel Foucault and Hayden White. Now English is 
importing, though again, in a way that honours the enduring value literary study places on 
close reading.
272
 
 
Before moving on to how new directions in literary studies affect rhetorical and fiction studies in 
US humanities contexts, Readings argued that by Guillory looking to “universalise in reality the 
conditions of access to what the present offers us that is most universal” it was only seemingly 
possible to become Kantians after Marx.273 McGurl’s analysis offers a compelling and completing 
framework to Guillory’s critique on the problem of literary canon formation and refinements now 
being made inside and outside the institution in relation to the system of monetary capitalism. His 
revaluation of postmodernism opens onto new debates concerning literary scholarship and 
educational practices in the humanities and, in doing so it offers a convincing way to re-approach 
traditional aesthetic questions, and Waugh’s welcome return of the redeemable properties of the 
aesthetic. 
 
McGurl avoids the cultural materialist argument. His starting point to reconsider the context for 
postmodernism is to first historicise the contemporary period by relocating the broader phenomenon 
known as the “turn to theory.” His realizing of an aesthetic democracy within the institution 
overcomes the pluralist overconstruction of potential space wrought on top of C. Wright Mills’ 
account of the cultural apparatus. Waugh is fully onboard with McGurl’s type of creative thinking 
and crafty reading. What she accounts as “crafty” can be read into how McGurl astutely situates his 
approach to making “literary experience relevant to a world that has many other things to do.”
274
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Mass vanity and anti-intellectualism, according to McGurl, failed to bring any meaningful 
intervention into further incursions of consumerism into the academy. McGurl is not politically 
depressed, seeing that if the world has many other things to do, then so has literature. McGurl 
believes that it is only right to protect the academy in this context. Failures of the cultural Left, if 
not embraced by McGurl, are tackled in a rather compelling (if not correspondingly bleak) way. He 
finds theoretical models and literary debates such as the “aura of rarity and the benefits of sympathy 
training” ultimately reductive. He looks to expend more of the University of Excellence’s Capacity 
to waste in a culture has become a corporate culture.
275
  
 
A pre-McGurl reading experience is attached to the academics in Cryptonomicon. They are largely 
portrayed as holding onto post-Marxist philosophies, making their way through previous visions of 
collective selfhood, with dialectical adjustments on McGurl’s thinking on the information economy. 
What was finally extrapolated in campus wars was a critique of aesthetics from a critique of the 
canon. The academics in Cryptonomicon are made to reflect in Guillory’s terms. They take the 
“refusal of aesthetic value on the grounds that aesthetic value cannot be distinguished from any 
other values in the social realm not even economic value.”
276
 Cryptonomicon’s academics fashion 
their debates from significances of what an old modernist context was purportedly to look like, but 
from their postmodern perspectives—and the novel gets stuck in this critical progressive debate. To 
McGurl the postwar experience was an inversion of the reality that was promoted in postmodern 
fiction, and that postmodern fictions were the fictions of what postwar poets and writers had learned 
from school. Those that found collective voice in the shared subjectivisms of the 1960s 
countercultural legacies were showing, in other words, what they had learned in school.   
 
Guillory argued that neoliberal critiques failed to historicise the concept of value itself, and this had 
resulted in impoverishment between the aesthetic and the economic. McGurl reapplies limited 
postmodern terms on the information economy as restrictions that plague postmodern and cultural 
materialist critique. He does not find within Cryptonomicon a cultural materialist critique of 
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existing conditions, fitting it instead into his larger project. We read through McGurl’s creative 
reading what implicitly surmounts to mass intellectuality, and casualised or underpaid socialised 
labour power in the university. This is also a way of saying that he offers a response to Guillory’s 
unmarked horizons of the canon debate, where libertarian attitudes and the capitalist culture of 
ambition and competition became streamlined in the production of a new university elite. McGurl 
ties postwar American Literature to shifting institutional processes and to the politics of the school, 
a relation that emerged between American higher education and the political sphere in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Making links to Guillory’s thought experiment where the system alone gives meaning to 
intellectual production is hugely significant, as McGurl’s project, playing in what Guillory argues is 
the game of culture, presents less dire consequences for the losers in the borders of a system that are 
strictly drawn. In other words, and in Guillory’s terms in the facing of crushing defeat to capitalist 
economics, the best way to “socialising the means of production and consumption would be the 
condition of an aestheticism unbound, not its overcoming.”
277
 Readings saw problems inherent in 
fixing culture as a closed system.
278
 However McGurl responds to Readings with a closed systems 
analysis of the postwar literary period, which is largely turning out to be very productive. McGurl 
approaches culture wars more soberly than most, arguing how the appearance of new subfields in 
the humanities, involving social differentiation and their associations with race and ethnicity, does 
not exhaust institutional meaning.
279
 As the educational system cashed out in the post-1960s 
workplace, stepping up to the plate to compete with the culture industry in the global marketplace, 
McGurl argues in a productive way how institutional process become part of postwar educational 
practices and these practices are now wholly referential to something else outside the university 
system. 
 
What begins to emerge in the abandonment of previous historical and political claims on the 
function of cultural norms in society, as the academics in Cryptonomicon turn towards the 
movement of theory and its jargon, reflects more negatively and less productively McGurl’s healthy 
concern towards political language, which has been abridged in postmodern discourse. Charlene is 
characteristic of how the American intellectual failed to develop her knowledge in new 
(Continental) formations of power, and as Readings would argue “the contemporary global 
development of capitalism as jeux sans frontiers.”
280
 Caught in the coils of consumerism historical 
materials in the US that moved on difference, identity, and multiculturalism are being productively 
challenged as extensions of program eras or literary cultural capital. What Cryptonomicon draws 
                                                          
277
 Guillory, Cultural Capital, 340. 
278
 See, Readings, University in Ruins, 108-110. 
279
 McGurl, The Program Era, 57. 
280
 See, Readings, review of Cultural Capital, 325. 
128 
 
attention to, as the academics fail to theorise in response to their project, is that America is 
becoming an increasingly shrinking space for relevant public debate (on modernist topics).   
 
It was partly through de Man’s legacy in the US that the idea of negation or subversion became 
considered a (liberal) illusion. De Man’s literary –pedagogy—reading semiology, rhetoric and –
literature—sought to replace Anglo-American authorial notions of selfhood held with interpretive 
criticism based on a process of negative totalisation. De Man’s pedagogy soon became entrenched 
in the North American academy, where Derridean critics of consciousness in literature became a 
self-serving group, tying the aporias of language into theories of the text. McCann and Szalay 
argued that  
 
Theory in American departments of literature played a pivotal role in the transformation of 
the profession of literary study – lending credibility to its claims to technical expertise and 
simultaneously legitimizing a change of values whereby the field’s long established defence 
of the ineffable powers of literature, once stonily associated with tradition and the right, 
came to seem instead the face of a new style of progressivism.
281
  
 
The liberal pluralist critique of the school curriculum appended to Charlene’s posthistorical 
discourse signals the text’s wider pre-occupation with this type of American criticism, and its 
relationship to wider discourses of social value, post-civil era identity politics, along with an 
intensification of political models such as affirmative action. 
 
A Concern for the Redeemable Properties of the Aesthetic 
Linking my reading of Cryptonomicon to Guillory’s sociological analysis of theoretical pluralism 
(as it became transferred from the institution to the wider non-academic terrain) allows me to 
reappraise McGurl’s recent interdisciplinary analysis of the conditions of production and 
consumption of postwar American Literature. Although McGurl concentrates on the school’s 
specific sociological conditions in these areas, he reads these conditions to understand and redeem 
aesthetic transformations of American fiction in the second half of the twentieth century. Bobby 
Shaftoe stands somewhat in an appositional reading alignment in the novel to McGurl, as he 
becomes a different type of American redeemer of American aesthetic experience. Tied to Georges 
Poulet’s notion of a redeemer (because he cannot have a past or a future, being separated from 
Himself, this self now separated in the apocalyptic idiom of French theory) he is transferred to a 
phenomenological reading position, and the unity of the past that was, in turn, unified in the mind 
of the American author. Poulet is a pivotal, literary-historical figure in the US literary tradition. It 
was his Phenomenology of Reading and foundational unified concept of consciousness that became 
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discredited in the 1966 John Hopkins lecture. This lecture introduced high French theory to the US 
literary establishment for the first time. McGurl’s interdisciplinary analysis, on the other hand, in 
which he undertakes to argue how literary modernism, through the creative writing program, 
throughout the niche fiction of the post-1960s marketplace, redeems what is Anglo-American 
aesthetic experience from contemporary fictions, which were emphasized to perform more directly 
cultural work. McGurl does not return to the type of humanism that I want to read into 
Cryptonomicon. For reasons already set out, reading fictions in the in the French theoretical strain 
for McGurl no longer has purpose in literary studies or politics in general. Context and meaning has 
changed for McGurl, and the rhetoric and standard of excellence he argues “seems for now to be 
holding educational institutions together fairly well.”
282
 McGurl extends Guillory’s analysis, 
tackling problems of higher educational practices that emerge either alongside or within politicised 
culture critique, and offers examples of Cryptonomicon that will set out his conceptions of 
technomodernism and high cultural pluralism. His quotation here is worth considering in full. He 
writes:  
 
We have barely begun to register the full significance of the great transformation in higher 
education for postwar American literature. This is not to say that that dominant contexts and 
themes that have been delineated by its critics and historians up to now are unimportant, as 
the earlier chapters of this book amply attest, the multiplying of ways and means of high 
technology and mass mediation, usually analyzed under the rubric of postmodernism, must 
feature centrally in any comprehensive account of the field. So, too, the systematic 
incorporation and reproduction of cultural difference in that field, represented pre-eminently, 
though not exclusively, by the rise to prominence of the ethically or racially marked writer, 
is of obviously fundamentally importance to postwar literature. The interacting aesthetic 
formations associated with these socio-historical phenomena, which I am calling 
technomodernism and high cultural pluralism sit at the peak of prestigious postwar literary 
production. the advent of television; the Cold War; the civil rights movement; grassroots and 
academic feminism; the sexual revolution; the faltering economy of the 1970s; the 
conservative retrenchment of the 1980s and the gradual dismantling of the liberal welfare 
state; the ubiquitization of computers and the Internet; globalization, and many more 
besides, can and should assert their rightful claims on the attention of the literary historian. 
But the fact is that, at least insofar as we remain interested in literature per se, the rise of 
mass higher education in the postwar period might well claim an objective priority over all 
these other elements of sociohistorical and political context, if only in the literal sense that it 
is something we should account for first if we are to understand postwar American literature 
in genuinely historical materialist terms. This is not so because it is either inherently or 
ultimately more important than the rest, but because the university has been the 
indispensable and all but omnipresent institutional mediator of the relation between postwar 
text and postwar context.
283
        
 
High cultural pluralism and technomodernism, terms McGurl prefers over multiculturalism and 
postmodernism, are noted by McGurl for their extractable, redeemable aesthetic qualities. As such 
he uses these concepts not only to challenge the current antifoundationalism found in modern 
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liberalism and current cultural studies projects but also to realise his diverse aesthetic democracy in 
the institutional a priori of the institution. His terms reflect creatively upon what is now considered 
the poverty in the humanities, of being able to reimagine the relation between the cultural and the 
economic in social life. His efforts are worth reading at least for that much. 
 
McGurl’s reading of Cryptonomicon as a strand of technomodernism is made easier by Neal 
Stephenson’s critical attitude towards a code of liberal heroics that would reaffirm national cultural 
identity and Leftist liberal anti-imperial positions, and points to how the novel adapts McGurl’s 
conflation of cultural pluralism and regionalism. For instance, unfettered individuality, usually 
associated with the heroic quest of the solitary white male, is spoofed—yet the converse position 
(the gendered subject), as well as the neutral position taken by the academics, reflects only 
Readings’s university, that has begun to behave more like a corporation than anything else.284 
Cryptonomicon operates as a discourse of difference implicitly structured by McGurl’s high cultural 
pluralist enterprise, where schematic symbolising taken from the high modernists is read through 
the text’s pluralist concerns. In applying interpretive pressure to its “overtly pluralist fiction to make 
visible the machinery involved in its production of difference,” it offers its engagements with 
information technology as a form of non-ethnic ethnicity. McGurl writes, “doing so, we see how 
even the whitest technomodernism can function as a discourse of difference, producing a symbolic 
placeholder for a paradoxically non-ethnic ethnicity, that might as well be called (with apologies to 
John Guillory) technicity.”
285
 McGurl finally sees Cryptonomicon as symptomatic of specific 
sociological conditions of production and consumption, and of a specific institutional-aesthetic 
totality that is currently, in certain sections of the literary academy, being converted into a mode of 
historical judgement. 
 
McGurl’s analysis is one way in which we can read the novel as redeeming aesthetic experience 
from previous literary productions and readings that directly relate to or perform cultural work. 
Impossible blood ties in Cryptonomicon signify retractable aesthetic qualities for McGurl. 
However, what is more prominent throughout the novel is how the modern liberal imagination fails 
to disclose itself as ideological, specifically when it produces an imaginary separation between the 
cultural and the public sphere. And in a more mundane humane offering, Cryptonomicon is 
reflective, rather than symptomatic, of cultural and literary national imagining of the 1990s era in 
both academic criticism and its discontents. The imaginary separation enables liberal subjects to 
experience the otherwise threatening contradictions released by the cold war consensus as the 
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negative capability of a whole self. The academics bringing forward contemporary views on 
historical contingency is the failure to rethink the notion of an incomplete self, and in this vein, they 
surrender the theory of the Ur coding of American literary and liberal history to what the novel 
presents as an elitist corporate standard. The major concern for Cryptonomicon is not debates in 
academia per se, but rather that the harsher realities of neoliberal economics and neorelativist 
critiques that have taken a sclerotic hold on the American university system centre in the 
institutionalizing impulses in Europe. The mass intellectuality the academics bring to the reading of 
American literature is very different from the one that American literature from the very beginning 
set out to do. Cryptonomicon, as we shall see, in this reading becomes very ethnocentric in an old 
Americanist aspect. 
 
Offering the opportunity to explore McGurl’s analysis, Cryptonomicon can hardly take a similar 
“reflexively reflexive” position. Using Langdon Hammer’s concept of the culture of the school to 
account for the production of postwar American literature has two relevant uses for McGurl.
286
 The 
first is to diversify his argument from Guillory’s, and the second is to give a new context of 
meaning in which to define what modernism looks like in the twenty first century. As Charlene’s 
group become less and not more informational less and not more communicational, Cryptonomicon 
presents itself as having a democratic job to do for all races and nations. A grand or focalising 
narrativising agency that can redeem the aesthetic from Charlene’s cultural radicalism is not held 
together in McGurl’s liberating response to Readings, but in an old Americanist strain. There is a 
sense of adversarial potential in Cryptonomicon’s language and art that uses foundational myths and 
symbols to critique a lapsed productive critique on the family institution and the nation. 
Cryptonomicon’s preoccupation with signature, how it focalizes on these characters, reflects how 
pluralist strategies (the overstated or outlived claims of performance, contingency and 
indeterminacy) helped to eliminate the regulatory environment that previously existed between the 
state, the nation and the family. In the process, the academics’ specialised conception of art was 
seen to exhaust existing critical vocabulary surrounding race and ethnicity. Cryptonomicon adds to 
its critique the ruination of Charlene’s globally oriented and Leftist discourse within a corporatized 
university system, aligning the spread of the casualisation of the academic labour force to pervasive 
forces of capital that centre in Europe.
287
 This, in turn, the novel links to Old World Marxist 
rhetoric and Charlene’s posthistorical discourse. In this reading, (and like McGurl’s but following a 
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different tack) Cryptonomicon is implicitly structured by (or intersects with) latent republican 
sentiments formed within commitments (in a canonical sense) to the constitution of what America 
was or was about to become. The academics’ dismissal of a previously true American system 
rekindles the question of nationalism, which David Shumway argues “was the strongest ideological 
force behind the emergence of American literature as a discipline...and the very basis on which 
humanities disciplines had been organised from their beginnings in the late eighteenth century.”
288
 
 
Blaming the System 
Of my two readings of Cryptonomicon I also begin to ask questions surrounding notions of feeling, 
affect (theory) and pedagogy in order to interrogate what McCann and Szalay offer as the 
libertarian turn in American literary and cultural criticism. Randy is fundamentally dispossessed of 
his Americanist nationalist civic values by default of his bourgeois humanist reason—this much is 
certain in the novel. In light of Charlene’s gendered subject position, his unfettered individuality 
and moral authority, representative of a patriarchal order, has been relocated in the academics’ 
overconstruction of potential space. Within this relationship, Randy’s realist logic of representation 
comes into conflict with something that cannot be encompassed within its benevolent orbit. To 
explain what this benevolent orbit is, the academics round upon Randy for espousing views straight 
out of a Horatio Alger novel. Without reading too deeply into Alger’s social reform experiment, 
Randy condemns the academics telling them “just because it’s an old idea, doesn’t mean it’s 
wrong” (85). Of course, Charlene’s revisionist approach (overtly structuralist and poststructuralist, 
and concentrating mainly on America as a proto-imperial power) not only challenges nineteenth 
century reform movements, but also, according to the views of McCann, Szalay, and McGurl, forms 
an integral part of the counterculture imagination and countercultural writing. Expressed in Leo 
Marx’s terms, the movement was to re-evaluate the role of traditional models of resistance and 
social reform, and notions on national identity in the US. Charlene reads postmetaphysical 
epistemology at a middling university and I have shown how her love of theory is given a spurious 
characteristic. The erotics that surrounds the discipleship of de Man can be traced to ambivalent 
theories of pedagogy that McGurl claims is an under theorised element in the 1960s countercultural 
imagination and countercultural writing. We see how this under-theorised element in the novel has 
nothing in common with democracy. Charlene surrenders her life and mind to a man. Glory, on the 
other hand, does not need to be defended by any one man. The novel challenges proposed solutions 
of postwar academics and their thinking on the information economy, suggesting it is not Randy’s 
calculation of self-interest that is at stake (as part of an elite scientific caste this could always be the 
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case) but their own interests.
289
 Without a code of liberal heroics for the grand-narratives of history, 
the novel reflects a “retreat into professionalisation” capturing this mood, both inside and outside 
the university.
290
       
 
Placing an ontological concern into Cryptonomicon’s aesthetic forms, Charlene’s retreat as a form 
of political depression offers the opportunity to appraise new resurgences in the institution towards 
public commitment. This is if one does not want to follow or realise the diverse aesthetic 
democracy model of McGurl. “Juxtapolitical” is a term used in Lauren Berlant’s women’s culture 
genre, and works alongside the public space to register a historical commitment to the social space 
that sits alongside the political. Berlant’s constructivist view of compassion (her starting off point) 
reflects “compassion’s ineffectiveness or failure to be a good in itself.”
291
 Berlant’s “affect 
formalism,” where she gets tough on compassion in order to avoid the returns to unreconstructed 
American antebellum sentimental liberalism, attempts to redefine public engagement in what John 
Johnson calls a “renovated trauma studies.”
292
 Berlant, it can be argued, resides outside McGurl and 
Hungerford’s notions of “long modernism,” and what it looks like now, from the middle to the late 
twentieth century. In Johnson’s terms, Berlant “moves towards a synthesized completion of several 
strands of contemporary theoretical discourse, including Marxist historicism, everyday life theory, 
and a renovated trauma studies.”
293
 My point here is not to thoroughly go through Berlant’s 
complex formal challenges, seeing what kinds of frameworks it offers for a reading of 
Cryptonomicon, but to argue that, when read through the novel’s attacks on the academics, 
Berlant’s toughening view of compassion is taken as recriminatory evidence or a rear-guard action 
of an otherwise depleted Left, a Left whose countercultural response to capitalist economics found 
last redoubt in the American university system.
294
 This last stand, which was isolated (even purged, 
some would say) in US American humanities contexts, with the help of culture wars of the 90s, is 
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reinvigorated in Berlant’s “Late Liberalism.”
295
 Berlant’s political Leftist initiatives (overtly and 
quite unashamedly Deleuzian and Foucauldian) undoubtedly still find linkages with antirealist 
epistemological views of postmodernism. Berlant is obviously not getting with the program of what 
the school tells us.  
 
In spite of the negative aspects postmodern linkages now hold in American contexts, affect theory 
as a renovated trauma studies continues to have a prolonged shelf life in humanities contexts—
predominantly, that is, as a route to “discussing the relationship of biological response and 
ideology, of emotion and social construction.”
296
 Berlant, it seems, was one step ahead of the game 
of culture in the backlash to academic theory, and what even McGurl argues are the “crude” 
conversions of postwar literary production (i.e. historical materialism into a mode of aesthetic 
judgement). 
 
In my reading and as a whole, Cryptonomicon plays on the other aspects of Berlant’s cultural 
studies understanding of an otherwise defeated culturalist pluralist response, by tying Charlene’s 
academic jargon with its “heavy load of shadings and connotations” (52) to old world 
institutionalizing impulses and what comes with them: the betrayal of Americanist foundational 
myths, and, more importantly, the dismantling of the “the no-saying in modernist literature.”
297
 
However, Cryptonomicon does not shy away from blaming the system, as it ties the republican civic 
ideals and values to the sadistic socioeconomic identities that emerge in the Manifest destinies, and 
the Second World War (and Cold War) ideologies. In other words, it is also critical of the system of 
American empire. For instance, Costal Indian tribes—“the Cavuse” and “the Salish”—are 
mentioned, albeit somewhat vaguely, in terms of Andrew Loeb’s “metahistorical scholarship” (and, 
for Randy, what sounded like the “beginnings of a pretty cool game” [57]). Similarly, Pacific 
military bases like “the big military base at Cavite” (42) are mentioned, which take in a huge 
amount of historical and imperialist data, beginning from Spain’s imperialist conquest of the 
Philippines to the United States takeover of Cavite in the battle for Manila bay, and the subsequent 
use of Cavite as a military landing strip used extensively during the Vietnam War. Cryptonomicon’s 
knowingness can be seen as part of the dominant antihumanist stridency that gripped both the 
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American public sphere and academic contexts (but now it seems mainly academic contexts) in the 
1980s and 1990s.  
 
According to Fluck, New Americanist and diversity studies were prone to demonstrating how 
empire (and everything that goes with it) stood at the centre of American literary history. 
Cryptonomicon bears all the hallmarks of a Pynchon or DeLillo novel, as it challenges the wartime 
and imperialist policies of Roosevelt and Churchill, and instrumentalist uses of men in wartime. 
However (and putting aside for the moment McGurl’s analysis of Cryptonomicon’s intimate 
relationship with postwar literary production and the practices of higher education) like Lawrence 
Waterhouse’s community, the community of the Native American is not turned over into a 
politicised culture-critique for a middle-class counter-culture mainstream. Loeb’s character 
caricatures the radicalized revolutionary primitive tribe of student youth and counterculture 
appropriations of Native Identity, as he makes out to re-enact dietary habits of Native Indians or 
“playing Indian.” His parents also present a dysfunctional element of the 1960s intermixing of 
corporate and counter-cultural identities. Andrew’s father is a lawyer. “After getting Andrew back 
from his mother in a bitter divorce battle his father showers him with material possessions and hires 
some fringey psychotherapists to hypnotize Andrew and get him to dredge up repressed memories 
of unspeakable and improbable horrors” (61). Cryptonomicon can be given either a reading that 
tacks it to what McGurl calls a coercive cultural pluralism (multiculturalism) and/or structural 
racism. At what level of interpretation we are to account for its difficulty is a tough task, and 
something I touch upon in the following readings.  
 
The first way to approach Cryptonomicon’s reading difficulty, perhaps through what Hungerford 
argues is the “hefty postmodern slabs that formerly sat on the syllabi as proof of difficulty,” is by 
relating it back to how McGurl sees theories of pedagogy playing an ambivalent role in the 
countercultural imagination, and modern liberalism in general.
298
 Cryptonomicon does not miss this 
under theorised element, playing on the elements of western cultural pluralism as synonymous with 
coercion. It critiques seriously a certain form of compositional doubling as Sergeant Frick, a 
wartime marine “turns Asiatic” (39), reflecting how the history of global relations (i.e. historical 
knowledge) is the “moral equivalent” of the history of Western states. In turn, Cryptonomicon 
jokingly criticises the countercultural imaginary and countercultural writing that McCann and 
Szalay express in theory (literally) “presided over the intellectual marriage of professionalism and a 
newly fortified version of the ethos of the counterculture.” They go on to note this marriage 
“[through] theory would dominate the literary academy in the last decades of the twentieth 
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century.”
299
 The point here is that the misrecognition and mistreatment of otherness in 
Cryptonomicon is built not from the marriage of theory and professionalism (i.e. Charlene and 
Kivistik), but rather from an old Americanist strain, and a textual double structure when read 
through the possibility of the older liberal values of negation. Working on the myth symbol school 
legacy that American imperialist relations were not structural or constitutive to the idea (and the 
ideal) of America but rather the unfortunate legacies largely left over from the old world, we see 
how Cryptonomicon presents itself in this vein. For instance, property relations in Cryptonomicon 
are seen as a lasting legacy of the old bourgeoisie. The novel attempts to overcome this unfortunate 
legacy by destroying Randy’s Old Victorian house, placing it within old world legacies and pasts. 
Also, Yale sits much closer to the old world and the institutionalizing impulses that centre there. In 
turn, the academics come from these places of old world interest, with what the novel presents is the 
faux radicalism of the conference circuit. California is the farthest place west of colonising instincts, 
and perhaps the last place to be affected or colonised by the pervasive forces of old world capital 
interests. California is, of course, one of the most commercialised states in the US, yet it is the 
corruptive forces of capital which are at stake here, and not capital liberalism per se. Roots and 
legacies still find their way back to the old world in Cryptonomicon, and in my reading, these 
unfortunate legacies have taken hold of the double meaning of the American text, signalling the 
lapsed possibility of negation. 
 
Blaming the system in an old Americanist strain can also be found in attacks on Charlene’s 
academic crowd’s abstract denouncements on “the Spectacle” (51).
300
 Their attitude in 
Cryptonomicon is that nobody is free from perspective, and they highlight the contemporary 
inability to set out moral claims that will make much of a practical difference to anyone, let alone 
Randy. In short, Randy is going nowhere if he stays with Charlene. He is backed down into such a 
state of enmity when the academics attempt to rob him of foundations, that he resorts to using a 
Master-Slave dialect. His possibility of negation shattered, he is confronted in a relation of 
opposites (80; 84). Charlene offers no help to Randy, and she is placed as subject to Kivistik’s 
conditions of Reason. In the scene where Randy is attacked and largely ignored by Charlene, she is 
humbled before Kivistik, and being made so, she symbolically transfers the brutality of man into 
American public space. In this reading, Cryptonomicon invokes new and old sentiments of 
pragmatists William James and Rorty. Placing classical and new pragmatism together, Daniel 
Malachuk argues that both men argued for “a religion of humility before Contingency [which] is 
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better than one of humility before Reason.”
301
 Characters in Cryptonomicon such as Randy, who, 
although are not immediately likable and thus force us to reconsider the value of the modern literary 
text, allow us into the world of the anti-intellectual consensus of a broadly defined 
antifoundationalism, and its partial capture by an upwardly mobile faction of the new middle 
class.
302
 He and other characters can represent what James Wood calls a “true fiction” that is worth 
knowing in all his fullness and complexity, to oppose what the narrator presents. 
 
Cryptonomicon’s stabs at the academics’ handing over the possible hope for negation in literary 
studies to the will of one man (Kivistik) finds common ground in Guillory and Rorty’s critical 
views on how American politically progressive social reform movements were left with an 
unplanned response to conservative laws of government. The liberal Left, following the leap of 
many “AD” scholars, sought to face down racial and other discriminations in Cold War American 
consensus politics, tracking, in cultural and public spheres, systemic effects of American sadisms 
and social biases towards women and non-white ethnic citizens. Cryptonomicon, although not 
dealing with Cold War ideological containment directly, highlights the coming inception of these 
new separated spheres for communication, and their blighted aftermath in 1990s 
telecommunications scandals. The informationalization of cultural knowledge, which robbed the 
American individual of aesthetic appreciation, tantamount to an annihilation of critical thinking in 
Andrew DuBois’s view, became another bargaining chip for capitalist economics’ continuing 
spectacular dominances.
303
 Charlene’s posthistorical attitude, in which “to stand in awe of nothing 
is the only way to feel really good about yourself” is a rebuttal seemingly of nothing, yet seemingly 
conserving of old world legacies.
304
 Cryptonomicon, on the other hand challenges a classical Anglo-
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American centre, reformed within corporate liberalism, showing how the military industrial 
complex was covertly adapted to a larger cultural industrial informational system.
305
  
 
Cryptonomicon, rather than use the metafictional form to isolate new postconventional identity 
structures in rhetorical reading strategies, isolates in intensely experiential sequences Charlene and 
her crowd’s movement away from common feeling and experience. Their performative appeal to 
inequalities of access to material goods are singled out as having removed from America direct 
action, the reading of books (such as Randy’s reading of books to learn computer language), and the 
act of critical thinking. Amy (America Shaftoe) helps to restore the complex balance between 
artists’ appreciation and intuitive feeling in Randy, as Charlene’s pluralist agenda has turned into 
one of contrasting absolute ideals. In this reading, what we see began in the new Left agenda of 
multiculturalism and subsequent postmodern ideas on truth have swept with a sneer, much like the 
Second World War veteran, Randy’s transient experience into the ash-bin of posthistorical 
discourse.
306
  
 
Paying particular attention to institutional processes, Guillory implied that discourse ethics non-
finite responsibility towards the other, and the feminist corrective to patriarchal ideology (among 
other legitimate concerns) became institutionalised and depoliticised in the context of the school. 
He writes: 
 
What the project of canon-critique still lacks is the analysis of how the institutional site of 
canonical revision mediates its political effects in the social domain. There is no question 
that the literary curriculum is the site of political practice; but one must attempt to 
understand the politics of this practice according to the specificity of its social location. The 
specificity of the political here cannot mean simply a replication of the problem of 
representation in the sphere of democratic politics and therefore it cannot mean simply 
importing into the school the same strategies of progressive politics that sometimes work at 
the legislative level. Should we not rather rethink the whole question of what the political 
means in the context of the school as an institution? The institutional question bears directly 
on the current impasse at which the pluralist agenda is lodged, its vacillation between 
integrationist and separatist institutional strategies between the incorporation of 
noncanonical works into the curriculum on the grounds that such works ought to be 
canonical and the establishment of a separate or alternative curricula which continue to be 
presented as non-canonical in relation to the traditional curriculum.
307
  
 
McGurl builds on Guillory’s reading of the school’s embracement of diversity. His reading puts it 
at odds with previous readings of postwar aesthetic dispositions forming under the aegis of an ethics 
of difference (basically what we mean when we say postmodern fiction). Although McGurl puts 
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self-expression back on the table of diversity studies, he elicits no immediate or unreconstructed 
romantic attachment to the cultural theoretical transformation of the self-present experience of 
literature.
308
 McGurl, although standing in opposition to certain kinds of ethnicity and culturally 
representative ethnic studies struggles, proffers a meta-commentary on such terms, ideas and 
debates--whilst also adding some new terms of his own. McGurl changes multiculturalism into high 
cultural pluralism, which offers a greater account of multiculturalism through the standing of the 
school, while not reducing it to terms of the previous assimilation-separation debates. Whether 
McGurl’s systems theory analysis is a useful term for further readings of postwar American fiction 
is another matter entirely. However, McGurl’s reading moves towards a re-understanding of this 
period. In some American corners, and not taking such an objective step backwards as McGurl to 
refashion notions of self-expression or reading the self as self presence in postwar American fiction, 
politicised culture critique and deconstruction techniques were seen to have robbed the American 
mind of the art of classical interpretation and appreciation. The robbing of the mind of Randy’s 
creative classical values is attacked in Charlene’s contemporary attachments to classical and 
modern understandings of power. Charlene’s turn to Kivistik and away from Randy reflects how the 
historical outlook of the novel critiques a cultural Left point of view which capitulated in more 
ways than one to a 1960s liberal Left’s defeat to capitalist economics. This is tantamount to saying, 
as Hungerford does, that “the second half of the twentieth century sees not a departure from 
modernism’s aesthetic but its triumph in the institution of the university.”
309
 The novel is complex 
in this regard, as it taps into the metafictional historiographic method, rather than literary 
perspective, to critique the new historicist critique of the aesthetic. Similar to how Jonathon Franzen 
connected the big ambitious social novel to postmodernistic expression, the metafictional form 
drops out of meaningful sight. Franzen’s taking of this approach is well documented. Behind the use 
of theories of power as a relevant critique of white western liberal humanism is an unplanned 
response to conservative laws of government. Alongside opening Cryptonomicon’s historicist 
recovery to McGurl’s extended analysis, I explore in the last reading themes and debates of what 
has happened in cultural theory, and literary response to greater forced expressions since. 
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Two Conclusions 
Both McGurl and Guillory’s arguments bend towards a similar conclusion: that an analysis between 
literary production and the practices of higher education is the best starting point to reconsider 
postwar American literature. McGurl finally takes out his meta-perspective on Cryptonomicon to 
read creatively not negatively further incursions of consumerism brought into the academy. I, on the 
other hand, read Cryptonomicon as blaming the institution for its reading in the French theoretical 
mode. It is, therefore, productive to see how it challenges the middle-class liberals, by posing 
challenges to their discourse as susceptible not only to celebrity media news culture (mass vanity + 
anti-intellectualism = jacked-up narcissism and would be mini-dictatorships), but also to a discourse 
of mastery in Old World contexts. This betrayal is often quite awkwardly portrayed in Charlene’s 
liberally progressive educational strategies to denude the Second World War American historical 
subject of any referential meaning. From this betrayal of national principles, Cryptonomicon offers 
resistance to the study of cultural works as a practice of reading and writing from a corrupted model 
of the university system, and offers opportunities to reappraise the backlash to Foucauldian Leftist 
centred views. It also offers opportunities to reappraise the backlash to those views hamstrung by a 
disabling commitment to theory and its jargon, which rounded upon the author as a modern 
invention through what is now considered highly contentious (and politically suspect) uses of 
history.  
 
McGurl’s reading of Cryptonomicon creates a problem around being able to lay counterclaims to a 
neorelativist critique attached to the culture of the school. McGurl relocates the turn to theory not in 
its original context or meaning, but in its adaptations into America. To get his point across, he 
likens Forrest Asa’ Carter to a “red-neck Paul de Man.” In doing so, it can be argued, he places 
Cryptonomicon within an updated analysis of postwar American Literature, and thus it no longer 
seems necessary to read a novel in a way that expresses it, avoiding what were once considered 
necessary linkages between Leftist politics and postmodern epistemology. McGurl’s argument 
collapses the Renaissance creativity that the author, I argue, is attempting to reinstate in processes 
of reading and writing. In McGurl’s understanding, Cryptonomicon, conversely, offers the 
opportunity to reappraise the notion that when all had been said and done in the New Critical idiom, 
it stands as a cultural monument not to previous literary production (which it also does in using the 
schematic symbolising of white modernists, and which invites in Guillory’s terms research into 
processes by which cultures are formed and how they constitute themselves by reference to each 
other), but to his analysis of the “increasingly intimate relation between literary production and the 
practices of higher education.” This, McGurl argues, “is the key to understanding the originality of 
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postwar American Literature.”
310
 The novel, in other words, sets up a discourse of difference 
between the automated community of the technocrat and the automated community of the academic 
crowd—yet, rather than saving previous literary production from antihumanist or postmodern 
epistemology, can still be read through the intimate relationship that developed between the 
institution and postwar American Literature of which, McGurl argues, Cryptonomicon’s baggier 
brand of technomodernism forms a significant part.  
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Chapter 3. Dissensus 
Without a desire for the political there is no democracy. 
Lauren Berlant. 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will demonstrate how Cryptonomicon’s tension-fraught concerns about Randy’s 
lost art of appreciation reflect a shift away from the authors and critics that were directly responding 
to themes of inauthenticity and undecidability. Through Randy’s staking a claim for his own 
individuality yet also how he alternates with other characters rather than this offer further 
reappraisals of the posthistoricist substitution of identities for arguable beliefs we will see how his 
subject position is given new ground for textual appraisal and historical study. I will offer the 
readings of the four primary texts not in the deconstructive mode where no decision can be given on 
the bases of what seems to be true but in the search for reaffirming frameworks and integrative 
narratives endemic to American contexts. Because my focuses turn not on the sociopolitcal content 
of art’s meaning but art as a meaningful form of criticism, and how this relates to the dynamics of a 
national cultural identity in the US this will lead me to reconsider in what ways the characters in 
Cryptonomicon and The Baroque Cycle begin to rewrite their politicised acts of interpretation. This 
will be more specifically addressed in terms of how these characters’ relationships, as the subjects 
of recent specialised Americanist studies, bind their attachments to ideas of truth within initiatives 
that are unique in their focus on national politics, a doctrine of individualism, and literary 
production. 
 
The emergence of a women’s culture concept in The Baroque Cycle’s three volumes invoke Lauren 
Berlant’s challenges to Bercovitch’s a priori determining apparatuses in his notion of a single US 
public sphere. The intellectual capacity of Bercovitch’s study to recall all differences in his nativist 
rhetoric is a highly convincing argument. His approach precludes the search for radical teaching 
methods and alternative perspectives on American culture, thought, and language. Just as 
Bercovitch argued that ideology in its narrowest sense could be linked to a consensus of a marginal 
or maverick group Berlant argued albeit indirectly in its broadest sense it brought back fundamental 
tenets of the constitutional framer’s acts.  In these terms we will see how ideology critique is given 
new aesthetic variants for the conflicts that reaffirm the dominant nationalist hegemony in the US. 
Berlant argues this hegemony is still masculine and still white. A key aim of the chapter is also to 
re-engage with an apparent certain weariness surrounding the project of exposing and demystifying 
the ideological forces at work in American art and culture. Taking into account Berlant and 
Bercovitch’s concerns their readings draw out a conflict of interests over the competing modes of 
interpretation that I want to argue underwrites Cryptonomicon and The Baroque Cycle’s modes of 
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experimentalism. A further aim of the chapter is to lift the tension ridden state of Cryptonomicon’s 
writing out of a deconstructive mode of analysis tying it more concretely to Bercovitch’s dissensus 
thinking to demonstrate how Cryptonomicon’s character Randy’s “private insecurity is 
proportionate to public affirmation.”
311
  
 
Through my reading of The Baroque Cycle I will invoke Berlant’s female complaint genre to 
demonstrate how an ongoing range of the sentimental in liberal culture has been re-masculinised in 
a more effusive version of itself. In the mouths of conservatives she argues compassion only 
implies a social relation previously trapped by the discourse of a liberal culture. Berlant’s academic 
relations between compassion and the range of the sentimental in liberal culture offers the 
opportunity to reappraise the uses of compassion and sentimentalism and how they manifest in two 
very distinct public spheres in The Baroque Cycle. The male-female distinctions of characters that 
are made unclear in Louis XIV homosocial-homoerotic publics at Versailles are nevertheless still 
maintained by both men and women in their attitudes towards one another in terms of compassion. 
We will also see how the compassions ranged across these floating binaries become co-opted forces 
in the changeover to Britain’s newly liberalised industrial public sphere. Connecting The Baroque 
Cycle’s themes of difference through notions of compassion, which is cold and mechanical in the 
voice of Eliza and the liberal sentimentalism, which implies only one relation among other when 
placed on the plight of the workhouse character Hanna Spates I want to argue is a way in which we 
can read through the late twentieth-century debates on the laudable objective of affirming cultural 
diversity. This, as I will argue, led Berlant to repudiate a male order that in a high stakes game 
crossed over into the middle ranges of the sphere of feminine or female intimacy to enforce a 
certain tacit dominion. 
 
The continuous resistances by the female complainers in The Baroque Cycle to both sets of ruling 
orders invoke Berlant’s engagements with the expansion of the dominion of Bercovitch’s pluralist 
paradigm, which in something like another routinisation of change has absorbed in a pluralistic 
semiotic the fractures of the US social hierarchy. The Baroque Cycle offers its female complaint in 
which to register, by paying attention, how in system’s undergoing change attempts to reroute the 
women’s culture concept away from their respective frames of ideological oppression these systems 
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refute and absorb subversive cultural energies collapsing the stakes of an as of yet better unlived 
sense of survival into the healing structures of the dominant male society. Through my reading of 
The Baroque Cycle we will see how this great cyclical process is driven by male fantasy quests and 
female homoerotic desire.  
 
Conflating together Berlant and The Baroque Cycle’s cultural work on how the range of the 
sentimental becomes a co-opted site can offer productive results for cultural work done on the 
continuing dominance of the white male hegemony. Bercovitch’s formal reappraisal of the 
American rhetoric serves to exacerbate this resistance by co-opting the pluralist semiotic needed to 
reframe better as of yet unlived senses of survival for women’s partial and contradictory interests. 
Bercovitch’s more informed way of understanding criticism’s ideological and social imperative, 
notwithstanding Berlant’s female complaint genre’s ambivalent formal withdrawal from the desire 
to be politics, will offer a final opportunity to reappraise Cryptonomicon’s relinquishing terms such 
as conservatism and liberalism, capitalism versus socialism, or, freedom versus statism for an 
approach that I want to argue is more organicist, and largely more nationalist centred.
312
 The overt 
desire for the political in terms of Stephenson’s writing is evident in terms of the inscription of 
literary semiology in the American university. The 1930s liberal crusade of planned social 
programs has somewhat come to an end and what is left is the ineffective mainstream politics of the 
academics as they turn to methods of postmodern theory and criticism for moral and political 
guidance. I will argue that Randy’s refusal to be assimilated into Charlene’s discipline of semiotics, 
and the novel’s attempts to re-vision a version of America as a unique centre for the free and open 
exchange of information, offers the opportunity to explore Bercovitch’s desire for a more 
expressive substantiate form of social integration for America society and a less expressive desire 
for the political. With no means for Randy to combat the academics strong logic of difference 
through their theory of the performativity of political discourse I read Cryptonomicon in 
conjunction with the three volumes of The Baroque Cycle in this chapter to show how new bases 
were being provided for movements beyond an amorphous opinion culture and what was becoming 
a sterile form of academic cultural politics.
313
 I begin my analysis in this chapter by offering in 
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nativist terms the search to devise a new rationale for an integrated curriculum of textual and 
historical study in US contexts.  
 
The American Ideology 
In the heyday of high theory the American literary and cultural consensus was at a crossroads. On 
the one hand, there were books like Allan Bloom’s aggressively titled The Closing of the American 
Mind, and on the other the liberatory program of the cultural Left. A group of Americanists were 
brought together to redeem traditional aesthetic questions from the post political-academic upheaval 
of the late 1960s. In the same breath as these upheavals, Sacvan Bercovitch aligned the recent 
impact of European critical theories and looked to find a solution to what he saw was a current 
blight on US literary scholarship.
314
 Ideology critique in its 1980s radical cultural incarnation, and 
as a constituent part of literary study, was all but dropped as a singular way of tackling problems 
inherent in the way the United States was believed to have appropriated America. Bercovitch 
remodelled his version of consensus to restore the principles of balance and excellence to the 
postwar university system. The concept of dissent would be the best new revisionary alternative to 
carry out both a function for redeemable civic values and rejuvenate literary and cultural practices 
for the 1990s Americanist. This would show how middle class liberalism constitutes itself in 
America to rejuvenate the active principals of debate. Postmodern ideology critique, in short, 
metamorphosed into a reshaped classical ideological mimesis, and the American form could now 
absorb in a pluralist semiotic the fractures of US social hierarchy. This transformational structure 
was accommodated within a certain embeddedness of the classic American literary master-works, 
where the term America stood for both fusion and fragmentation. Making a project out of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
those that committed the worst atrocities. Herman Goring in the novel is an atrocity maker. Bobby Shaftoe, Lawrence 
Waterhouse, and Goto Dengo although flawed heroes and thus arguable in terms of the posthistoricist substitution of 
identities for arguable beliefs take an imperfect form of postmodern justice to these scenes. Also the novel will not 
stand to use theory to govern practice from without. Alan Turing is cast as a forlorn figure in the novel as he attempts to 
step outside social systems with his highly abstract takes on information communication. He believed the way to 
transcend European systems of mastery that directly involved him within fields of oppression was to build an even 
greater theoretical enterprise than the one his mind and body was trapped within. In short, we see how the novel offers a 
more sober accounting of how theorists cannot stand outside the systems in which they eat, breathe, sleep, and basically 
live in. This inability to escape closed systems is a prevalent concern in the US humanities. This concern, I want to 
argue, is due to the nature of inequality in both Britain and the US and how it has increased significantly across all 
social spectrums in the 20 or 30 years of theory and politicised culture critique. Returning to closed systems analyses is 
way in which to see how something transcends diversity as a factor and can have implications for re-reading the lack of 
social mobility and persistent inequalities in social domains. Without repeating the past is to see it from a condition of 
hope. Bercovitch prefers not to take a direct political attitude to the public domain from his reading of Early and 
Classical American Literature. In short, he seeks to argue how consensus by ideology one must first accept the concept 
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problem of dissensus was seen as a way students could get a hand on the increasing polarity of 
interests offered through a broad range of debates offered in the university. Rather than attempt to 
heat up the antagonism in the canon wars, Bercovitch offered a way forward for reading and 
interpreting views on cultural difference. It was Bercovitch’s powerful reading of the American 
ideology that put an end to the overt deconstructionist and emerging new historicist claims, which 
were made on the basis that American literary history was reductive and parochial. Bercovitch’s 
newfound diversity in ideological analysis interpreted away the problem of whether students 
wanted to be empowered in the way that many postmodern professors believed.  
 
The main concern, as Bercovitch saw it, was that the postmodern critique of American ideology 
precluded dialogue, and thus missed a large part of what American literate culture was saying to 
itself.
315
 Bercovitch decided to act upon what he saw was the problematic of the transformational 
environment and transformative politics, terms that were becoming increasingly interchangeable 
with literary theory and cultural studies analyses of key literary texts. Similarly, Gerald Graff, 
argued against prominences of literary and cultural theory, seeing how cultural politics had left the 
originary political rhetoric in America in a general state of paralysis.
316
 Putting together the new 
Cambridge History of American Literature, Graff and Bercovitch mounted the official challenge 
that would grab consensus back from conflicting postmodern demands. Literary theory’s concepts 
of negation and ambiguity, for Graff and Bercovitch, if not already institutionalized in an important 
sense (in the university) were now returned to the academic negotiating table, as an aspect of the 
doubleness in articulation in American literature. Bercovitch writes: 
 
The American way is to turn potential conflict into a quarrel about fusion or 
fragmentation. It is a fixed match, a debate with a foregone conclusion: you must 
have your fusion and feed on fragmentation too. And the formula for doing so has 
become virtually a cultural reflex [...] It amounts to the hermeneutics of laissez-faire: 
all problems are obviated by the continual flow of the one into the many, and the 
many into the one.
317
  
 
With little or no commensurability to be found between postmodern academic scholars, and with 
the steady increase of the proliferation of new spaces in the university, Graff and Bercovitch argued 
that their compilation would see a common sense dialogue strike up between Americanists, and 
shared broad tendencies between these scholars would restore principles of research excellence and 
balance to the university. The restoration of active debate among Americanists and other scholars 
would provide a key issue to take from this collective. Americanness would be another. 
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In 1996, Bercovitch took his dissensus model to the film remake of The Scarlet Letter.
318
 Culture 
wars had become citizenship concerns in America, and Bercovitch turned political scientist Michael 
Sandel’s observations on the postwar, and more specifically the Reaganite strand of individualist 
democracy, into a narrative re-vision for his paradoxical dynamics of dissent. Sandel argued how 
political culture in the US was becoming increasingly isolated and fragmented, and Americans were 
no longer able to make protean connections that would attach them to US lifeworld networks. For 
Sandel, what had once stood as a normative case for hope and optimism (the civic conception of 
freedom) now stood between “our current culture of extremes.”
319
 Postmodern fragmentation had 
devalued the rights of American citizenship, and the American intellectual in these decentred spaces 
had, according to Graff, “enabled bureaucracy and its pseudo-meanings to become the dominant 
metanarrative in the university.”
320
 Taking his forms of compromise and constraint to Sandel’s 
study on the contemporary erosion of civic values, Bercovitch marked out the profundity of 
American dissent. Dissent, he argued, was meaningful in that it could interpret away the authority 
of consent, and thus was an example par excellence of the coming together of the American form 
and the American way. Making a virtue (and now a new national virtue) out of a period of dissensus 
(although the national-utopian promise was now couched in revisionist terms of a profane nation 
and liberal decline) Bercovitch would rejuvenate the background context of the new pluralism. 
America as “a laboratory for examining the shifting connections between politics and cultural 
expression” would alter the course of postmodern fragmentation.
321
  
 
Graff’s own arguments for teaching the conflicts beyond culture wars and Bercovitch’s narrative re-
visions took the phenomenon of the 1960s movement of humanities arts theory and ideology 
critique into a broader pluralist strategy for the Americanist. Dissent was to be not what it was, but 
the new marker of difference and the expression of a particular national utopian consciousness 
developed within the premises of American liberal culture.
322
 In many aspects, these arguments 
moved aesthetic radicalisms away from their transcanonical and deconstructive stages, to an 
integrative mode of US literary and historical analysis, which supported a narrative of America. 
Moving beyond the idea where one has to be right all the time and veering away from postmodern 
relativisms would put an end to shortcomings of traditional ideological analysis, and an occasion for 
détournement whilst challenging American poststructuralists who had made their interdisciplinary 
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sources of contact with the nation largely unintelligible.
323
 Bercovitch turned away from overt 
postmodern scepticism, and the dominant New Historicist claims that art is nothing but ideology. 
His nativist critique of a new American myth in the making, linked to a dual aspect of the 
modernity of American literature, was to become the new basis for rhetorical study and cultural and 
social analysis in the university.  
 
As one of the twenty-one spokespersons chosen for the project of dissensus Myra Jehlen argued that 
if fictional characters from Ahab to Hester to Huck were to actually realise the power of their 
individualism, this would be taboo to an organically cohesive whole, and thus make unintelligible 
the national-utopian promise.
324
 For Jehlen, American bourgeois values were not thrown back on 
themselves like they were in Europe. If this were so, she argues, it would imply an “un-American 
mutability.” She argues that it was not so much as there being no radical dissent in and against 
America for classical writers, only that the term America was the only term to rally against. Thus 
she writes “the myth that American liberalism allows for all possible surface adjustments in the 
system thus obviates the need for basic ones, was too strong, even for the national heroes, and 
especially for the historical dialect they would have energized.” For Melville, “it is almost 
inevitable that however glorious the Spirit of Equality its incarnation in the Captain of the Pequod 
must become Satanic.”
325
 The formal structure surrounding Randy (an ordinary American so 
unexceptionable that he is to become exceptionable in the American grain) is largely driven by 
Jehlen’s culturally affirming values. His liberal tolerance, which the academics literally hand back 
to him in the dialogic (rather than a dialogue) of a deconstructed selfhood, is as ideologically 
contained as their competing types of radical social consciousness that the novel portrays as largely 
borrowed from Europe.  
 
Through a nativist-rhetorical understanding of Randy, and through his continuing resistances to 
Charlene’s systemic individualism the novel adheres to Jehlen’s structuralist point of view that 
makes oppositional alternatives in the American form virtually unthinkable. Neal Stephenson has 
often been criticised for his poor endings. I argue this has little to do with his open discursiveness, 
and a lot more to do with the American form, which he lives alongside, sleeps, eats, breathes, and 
writes under. Using the dissensus model to illuminate Randy’s radical ambiguity in the text and in 
combined aspects of sacred and secular authority (Protestant nonconformity/theory of natural 
rights) Bercovitch argues, “conflict is obviated [...] by the alternation of the one into the many and 
the many into the one” (Bercovitch alludes here to the conjuncture of affective subjectivity as sin 
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qua no of the union, and the post-union rhetoric of regional and continental incorporation).
326
 The 
automated community of Randy’s technocratic crowd is often presented in alternation between 
heroic individualism (of the union) and their interests released into the very concept of nationhood. 
It is Randy’s group dynamic, in this sense, that sets up a conflict of interests, and with it a 
microcosm of the concept of America, via the rhetoric of regional and continental incorporation via 
nationhood. Cryptonomicon sees the posthistorical University as no longer holding the promise of 
being the microcosm of the nation-state. Epiphyte Corp members’ distinctive and radical 
individuality stands opposed to systemic individualism, as each member (Eb, Tom, John, Beryl, and 
Avi) has conflicting stories to tell—yet is also highly dependent on it. Taken separately, Randy’s 
group offer a form of radicalism, however, under Cryptonomicon’s Epiphyte Corp moniker, the 
group is empowered by and actually transmutes into a vehicle of socialization. Epiphyte is a mixed 
metaphor, meaning, in botanical terms, a plant that grows on its host (dependent) but does not rely 
on the host for sustenance (independent). Thus Bercovitch’s understandings of ambiguity and 
negation in Randy’s grouping become harmony-in-diversity and diversity-in-harmony, which 
combines the conditions of modernization in the United States with the principles of liberal 
democracy. And vice versa, in Cryptonomicon, these conditions redefine the trend towards the new 
pluralism, as Randy’s disappointments with democracy in the form of “Charlene’s group” (76) do 
not induce disidentifications with its potentiality. In fact the novel looks to redeem past American 
abuses through his leaving America to come back to it again in the end. Charlene and the academic 
crowd, on the other hand, are never treated in this way. Their group is too exceptional, and their 
interests and consensus on pluralism is too narrow and too self-serving to be incorporated into the 
American form. This group effectively becomes synonymous with the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century European model of the class-for-itself system, and more saliently, Alvin 
Gouldner’s concept of cultural capital tacked to the emergence of a professional managerial class.
327
 
Tracking Emerson’s words, the academics are presented as “the eager persons [who] make 
themselves ridiculous.” Emerson observed “that in the history of mankind there is never a solitary 
example of success – taking their own tests of success.”
328
 In too much of a hurry to move on to the 
meat of her argument and flushed by her own successes to hear Randy’s side of the argument on her 
academic research methods, Charlene’s critique of the American Way is folded into Randy’s 
cultural particularity and artistic appreciation of her. Remodelled against old world class concerns, 
Cryptonomicon’s historical and romantic perspective now takes place from within the American 
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ideology. As we will see, in a nativist or regional understanding Cryptonomicon offers further scope 
to examine McGurl’s aestheticizing of postwar American literature.  
 
Graff had previously offered an older radical interpretation on American literary consensus, steeped 
in the ideological origins of the American Revolution. However, he moved his terms towards 
Bercovitch’s critical readings of Hawthorne, Melville and Emerson. Their works in the collective, 
alongside other antebellum dissenters such as working men and women’s suffragists, Bercovitch 
argued, spanned the whole breadth of the American ideology. Brought to the academic negotiating 
table dissensus Graff argued could unite discourse in a new humanitarian roster. Together with the 
ideological foundations of national emergence, the classical response to the promise of America 
was constituted as “an example par excellence of the successful interaction between restriction and 
release, rhetoric and social action.”
329
 Bercovitch’s powerful reading, as Jehlen came to argue, saw 
America conceived not so much in liberty, but in liberalism.
330
 Taking the powerful symbology of 
America and criticizing it from within became the new redefining mode of literary and historical 
praxis, and deconstructionist and New Historicist scholars were forced to temper their 
interdisciplinary and experimental approaches to American literary history. Similarly, linkages 
between liberal pluralism and Leftist discourse were no longer seen as necessary or urgent, in fact, 
these ties became to be seen as ultimately damaging and harmful when related to the concept of 
formal freedoms. Bercovitch’s aspect of a new pluralism, in a self-consciously American literary 
renaissance, was the preferred option to restore principles of hope and practical political 
intelligibility to the postwar university.       
 
Americanist literary scholars Left and Right, conservative and radical, were to put to use the 
insights of recent theories. Making culture work was very much in-keeping with the earlier 
American literary renaissance consensus formation. Bercovitch argues that the Renaissance 
scholar’s ability to persuade themselves, and others, that their symbology is the last best hope of 
mankind was a virtue of the self and the nation.
331
 Bercovitch took the inability to transcend 
dominant forms of national emergence to be a patriotic obligation, declaring his own ideological 
dependence to the originary political rhetoric of the Declaration. Thus, the American way, even 
when in uses against itself, became the new scholarly insight to take to literary and historical modes 
of analysis. Scholars, in short, embraced “the need for narrative form which, in texture and 
substance, would embody the questions they shared, and on the central importance of history in 
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dealing with those questions.”
332
 America was both a source of conflict and a right unto itself. 
Through a combination of mutually antagonistic outlooks, Bercovitch’s model of ideological 
consensus would create the new national voice out of dissent. He argued how it would be a greater 
act of self-assertion for the American to recognize their limits to be true to what they most deeply 
were, while keeping faith in their boldest convictions. In many aspects, like Rorty and William 
James before him, Bercovitch—to solve the current identity crisis in the US—offered humility 
before a cosmos with the old world terrors that were enforcing what was happening in the inner 
cosmos of America.
333
 America, in short, was being fuelled with the desire of the nation to 
recommit itself to the promise of a conflict-free and integrated world.    
 
Jehlen adds emphasis to Bercovitch’s New Harmony. American liberalism would inform cultural 
analysis of the historical novel as primary text and archive. She writes that “at least through the 
nineteenth century the dominant culture seems to have been able to co-opt alternative and 
oppositional forms with unusual effectiveness, to the point of appearing to preclude their 
possibility.”
334
 As we will come to see, Lauren Berlant, in her trilogy on National Fantasy, works 
from Bercovitch’s calling for “a fresh perspective [...] on the limits of nativist modes of analysis,” 
yet holds a synthetic and eclectic (not integrative) principle up to the nativist perspective on the 
historical narrative.
335
 Her raw and tentative approach aligns itself to not being underwritten from 
Bercovitch and Jehlen’s production of a complex Hawthorne, and an inescapable telos of the 
American Way. Berlant’s concept of an intimate public seeks to offer more than a typical avant-
garde deformation of the American form, as an intimate public is Berlant’s way of reproaching 
citizen-building, which she sees heading towards a monoculture—and with it, a desperate desire to 
return to an order of things deemed normal, and an order of what was felt to be an everyday 
intimacy.
336
 Moving out from under the moniker of the politics of representation, which was being 
drawn into stalemate in the Right’s conceptual war on Left thinking—this resulted in rage at 
stereotyped peoples who appeared to have changed the political rules of social membership—she 
draws her influences from Sedgwick, Derrida, Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, and, implicitly, 
Deleuze. Her poststructural variant on Bercovitch’s seminal cultural critique of American myth 
merges the ethical interests of women, the body, technology, and the sphere of subalternity, to 
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generate relief from the political aspects of new historical convergences of the social and the 
economic objectives in the institution.  
 
Before turning to Berlant’s challenge to what she sees as codifications of cultural studies in the 
North American academy, Cryptonomicon offers an intriguing introspection on Bercovitch’s culture 
of consensus model and Guillory’s socioanalysis of the culture of the school. Cryptonomicon, in 
general, promotes the postwar drift of the modernist aesthetic, yet Randy generally blames his 
feeling of being under threat on post-1960s countercultural activism and ideology critique emerging 
out of unbounded frontiers of thought and language. The emphasis here is mainly negative, and is a 
resultant effect of what I will consider Bercovitch argues is the model of ideology inherited from 
the social sciences.
337
 Randy’s opposition in Cryptonomicon is not in opposition to the American or 
national ideology (although it is), but works in tandem with an ideological response that precludes 
all oppositional forms of dialogue with unusual effectiveness, its surface structure being so 
accommodating. The academics’ conflation of political and rhetorical terms, through what the novel 
presents as social conditioning quasi-Leftist discourse, become therefore unintelligible to Randy, 
and, as such, he sees everything reduced to sinister modes of normalization. Randy, in his frank 
ethnocriticism of European socially binding norms, points to Jehlen’s structural condition of the 
American middle class, and the way in which it achieved its hegemony differently from that of 
Europe. In the following section, I offer a view of Cryptonomicon failing to find an independently 
critical stance within the American form, yet in doing so throwing focus upon postmodern politics 
and what a generation of postwar literary critics taught in the classroom, along with how 
postmodern critics became caught up in rhetorical considerations as institutional concerns.  
 
From the rights of diversity into a Rite of Cultural Assent  
The turn to more indigenous cultural work in the North American academy, which made for what 
Paul Giles has recently argued as a new American exceptionalism through the easy elision of the 
national and transnational, took place largely in the late 1980s.
338
 The trend towards pluralism in the 
cultural turn in the humanities brought forward a new set of interdisciplinary questions and cross-
generational reference points. Rather than create another clashing prescription that would further 
heat up the antagonism with the American postructuralists, Bercovitch wrote: 
 
On the contrary: I believe that ideologically-aware analysis will show the special 
capacities of language in some sense to break free of the power structures, which the 
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language seems to reflect, and so will help us see more clearly, what we have found 
to be extraordinary, irreducible, and uncontained about our major texts.
339
  
 
American poststructuralists and deconstructionist critics were pushed to new revisionist frames of 
textual and historical reference in order to continue working in the un-American grain. Bercovitch 
spelt out that what results from reading and interpreting a group of American classics is a “new 
framework for examining our tradition of literary dissent and its problematic relation to 
America.”
340
 Only then, Bercovitch implied, would it be possible to evaluate the shift in “the 
literary centre of gravity from the nationalist orientation of the American Renaissance to the 
transatlantic enterprise of a later era [...] and the neglected emigrant ethnic writing of the early 
twentieth century.”
341
 Bercovitch sums up the extraordinary force of the Young America 
movement, arguing that although an American “work of art may be transhistorical or transcultural 
or even transcanonical it can no more transcend ideology than an artist’s mind can transcend 
psychology.”
342
 Notwithstanding Giles’s understanding when he argues that this leaves little 
national space in nineteenth century for “the sphere of subalternity,” Bercovitch’s revisionary 
intervention into canon and culture wars brought downward pressure on transformative politics of 
the cultural Left.
343
 Targeted in its narrowest sense by Bercovitch, postmodern politics was the 
basis of ideology as “the ground and texture of consensus.”
344
 His canonical rhetoric of art and 
expression overturned this aspect of cultural pluralism to become the valid culturally representative 
and defining historical term for communicating the continuing present of immediate experience in 
the North American academy.  
 
America in Crisis 
Bercovitch’s model became an encouraging methodological and practical approach to take to ward 
off crisis concerns in American literary and historical scholarship. It also intersected saliently with 
political scientist Sandel’s crisis concern with the two representatives of American culture. 
Bercovitch aligns Sandel’s model to conditions of possible conflict in American national culture. 
Both saw, from within their respective spheres of influence, that a strand of Reaganite individualist 
democracy had been carried too far, and each looked to curtail what they saw was the current 
cultural extremity in Leftist liberal thought. Bercovitch argued that, beginning from the political 
upheavals of the late 1960s and followed by the recent impact of European critical theories, these 
ongoing influences had extended into the indeterminate nature of discourse in the present, which 
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was now becoming problematic. Sandel was similarly concerned with cultural and political 
fragmentation, seeing how it was creating a culture where everything in the middle was becoming 
lost, isolated or disconnected. Sandel illustrates how Bercovitch’s literary model of dissensus could 
take on embedded nationalist significance. New points of lateral identification could be formed 
between national rhetorics of an earlier age and social action for the reproduction of a new 
homogenising sense of US state citizenship. These points of lateral identification were to symbolise, 
for Berlant, a potent reversion to the Constitution Framer’s early state settlements on subjectivity. 
 
In his production of a complex Hawthorne, Bercovitch implicitly argued for the scholarly rebinding 
of the fabric of American identity. Using Sandel’s terms on the fractured philosophical dualities of 
the American representative Bercovitch conceived his narrative re-vision to heal the fracture of US 
social hierarchy. In patriotic memory, obligation and desire Bercovitch’s reading of Hester Prynne 
illuminates my reading of Randy as he is left feeling isolated by the dogmatism of Charlene’s 
adamant approach to social norms. Bercovitch sets limits on Charlene’s postmodern scepticism, and 
looks to reform the repressive and the economic functions of art that begin in her suspicions of the 
formulaic, natural, and the already-said. Like Hester, Randy’s art “gathers meaning through acts of 
communal interpretation” which Bercovitch writes:  
 
Is not conservatism on Hawthorne’s part, any more than the movie’s defiant Hester 
signals subversion. Rather, the contrast represents two alternate routes of the 
American Way, then and now. Both of these are foundational to the very meaning of 
America, whether as a melting-pot or as a patchwork quilt. One route, the one taken 
in the film, leads towards the individual fulfillment (for self and family) [...] the 
other route, the route taken by the novel, leads towards the good society. This 
implies self-fulfillment, but it often comes into conflict with adamant individualists 
[...]. Appropriately, Hawthorne presents the individualists in the novel through 
images of containment and in situations demanding negotiation.
345
  
 
Rather than describe a European avant-garde deformation of form through his flaneur-type acts of 
walking and cabbing in Manila, more emphases are derived as and when Randy leaves his academic 
partner and her friends. Randy’s leaving America finally leads the story into one of American 
socialisation moulded, ritualized and controlled in its rich and intricate system of meanings.  
 
Randy’s character gauges a triumphant undercurrent of democratic liberalism as the farthest point in 
the development of the Anglo-Saxon race free from the push and pull of ideological inferences 
drawn from more than one or two party alliances. Rather than the colonial power structure that 
included Whigs and Tories alike, he is to take the expression and negotiation of real diversities, and 
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of genuinely richer and alternative responses to a more general situation. We see past Charlene’s 
cognitive critique of him, and the American myth he is assailed to be a part of, as Amy tells Randy, 
“It’s all part of you [...]. I don’t have to get to know you in pieces, do I” (761). Amy is a character, 
in this instance, who attempts to see the complexity inherent in any social or capitalist system. In 
her response, she confirms art is a living response between humans and ideas, and accordingly, 
Randy is given no absolutes bigger than the absolute that literature is richer than any one critic or 
book could hope to muster. Conversely, from what can now be considered the academics’ insidious 
extrinsic denomination on the America ideology, Randy is part of a brutal capitalist system of ideas 
in the service of evil. One of the problems with the “extrinsic approach,” writes Bercovitch, is that 
it “sets the critic at odds with the work of literature.”
346
 Through Randy we get to see into the 
American form, as well as a pluralist response that is a complex mixture of all major nominations in 
the emergence of US nationhood. Thus, he or it cannot be represented accurately by determining to 
one functional role or another in the narrative. He is both passive and active to equal degrees, and 
this is not always a simple straightforward analysis reduced to Marxist base-superstructure analysis 
or poststructural variants on the same theme. In fact, within the dominant mode of capitalist 
interpretation, a lot of our understanding about Randy comes from his social relations, and more 
specifically his social/sexual relations with Amy and/or Avi. These acts of communal judgment are 
also heavily played out in other pairings in the novel. Bobby Shaftoe is a character that does not 
find release in a formal pairing, yet in Jonathon Arac’s terms his conflict is pointedly circumscribed 
with a set of moral-economic-aesthetic imperatives.
347
 His counsel of despair, as he lurches from 
diversity to harmony and back again in order to find Glory, is to find affirmation in a benevolent 
overarching design.
348
 In this larger view of America as process, a continual harmony in diversity, 
diversity in harmony, Bobby, in losing Glory to leprosy, tries to impart knowledge to his son in any 
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this hero “but he is also without a future because he does not want a future. He could not desire any future without 
wanting himself to be something different from what he is, that is to say from what he wants.” Shaftoe wants Glory but 
he cannot have Glory and thus he can never have a past or a future. Corneille’s hero expresses “I cease to hope and 
begin to live.” Poulet writes “but also by ceasing to hope he finishes with living.” Connecting Shaftoe with a form of 
cultural entropy in the novel and Poulet’s redeemer leads to a connection with Jonathon Franzen who writes: “Readers 
and writers are united in their need for solitude and their pursuit of substance in a time of ever-increasing evanescence 
in their reach via print for a way out of loneliness.” The novel in Shaftoe’s search for Glory can bring forward this 
loneliness that Franzen expresses. I trace Shaftoe’s loneliness to Guillory’s examination of the elevation of rhetoric as 
technical practice. See Poulet, Studies in Human Time, and Franzen in Christopher Connery, “The Liberal Form: An 
Interview with Jonathon Franzen.” 
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way that he can in the bombed out streets of Manila. Not “a word man like Enoch Root” (775) he 
gestures to his son not to throw anything away, and in this sense his character through the 
interactive elements of art, interprets away the sorts of divisiveness that leads to radical social 
change that he encounters in other places outside the US.
349 
 
 
Seeing Cryptonomicon trying to push past libertarianism in the Reaganite Era is not only to see it 
move out from under a culture of extremes in the US (where Nina or Charlene are presented as 
extreme forms of the sexual and counterculture revolution, rather than eroticized subjects who 
speculate that other forms of collective life might be imaginable even within America) but also to 
see it offer resistances to the ideological traps in European hegemony deployed in Charlene’s 
excessive postmodern theorising and end of history narrative. Bringing forward its Second World 
War transgenerational critique in Bercovitch’s terms, the novel questions the new spaces of the 
academics and the particular brand of transcanonical values they promote. In short, Cryptonomicon 
becomes a gatekeeper to a doubleness of articulation in American literature, marking transitional 
historical change and economic and social transformation for the ongoing preservation of American 
ordinariness. This national-utopian promise – the immigrant nation where every man is a King – is 
rooted in the rhetoric of an earlier America; a rhetoric that has lost its direct social function. It 
remains, though, in Cryptonomicon, an important staple of Randy’s (and Bobby’s) national self-
identification.  
 
Postmodern paranoid 
Jehlen argued that from a “dangerously dualistic Hester on US literary writers created more relaxed 
protagonists who confronted a less objectionable south.”
350
 In this reading, where the South no 
longer serves culture directly, it operates as a shadow narrative in Cryptonomicon’s writing against 
the Yale Group. As Cryptonomicon fails to find an independently critical stance, the academics’ 
dream of a world literature can become no more than a merely a marketing gimmick to Randy; it is 
a kind of middlebrow literary tourism, which it attempts to put right by separating him from society 
and then bringing him back to it in the end. Cryptonomicon fails to see within its anti-American 
correctives on Charlene’s “neo-Puritanical rigor” (585) the Puritan ability to accommodate that 
stress within its own formal doctrine. In short, the American form transforms Cryptonomicon’s 
fully knowing condition into a symptomatic sense of the exilic one. In a diagnosis that is now 
taking place from within Bercovitch’s “indigenous residual culture” and “the ideology of the early 
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republic,” Charlene is prophetically summonsed into the integrative narrative form where she is 
doubled in a form of exilic conversion.
351
 Her political unintelligibility becomes a source of 
contradictory logic in the literary self-conscious of American Renaissance writers (fantasy 
projections of patriarchal fear about the imminent end of male hegemony within the political sphere 
rather than serious critique of that same patriarchal culture). And here we see how the novel is 
heading into an American form as a molesting vision. It is her new contradictory class structure that 
becomes reductive of a basic contextual liberal coherence. Rather than focuses being drawn on 
Randy’s localism or his sappy romantic need for integration, the novel tackles the academics’ 
systemic individualism, where the system becomes a deathly plane of regularity, and revolutionary 
immobility. What then becomes most compelling is the way in which Cryptonomicon’s 
metafictional energies are dissipated allowing us to trace through the compromised positions of its 
characters what its larger formal structure masks.     
 
Repressing a nativist or nationalist imagery of dissent Cryptonomicon’s condemnations of 
Charlene’s political correctness (synonymous in the novel with the academics’ postmodern 
unwillingness to make value judgments) illuminates McGurl’s illustration of the paradoxical 
inversion of the entire postwar academic system of cultural difference. McGurl uses his concepts to 
show how the novel is not consonant with the reality of the cultural diversity in the institution and 
thus draws that system to itself “in a form of ontological prosthesis.”
352
 The transatlantic enterprise 
of modernist themes of cultural difference in McGurl’s The Program Era is offered through 
Cryptonomicon on a larger scale than postwar experimentation. He argues “the elevated aesthetic 
ambitions of literary modernism [...] conjoins the project of authentic self-expression with the 
machinery of the program [...] The investment in this experiential authenticity is strong enough that 
the agency of this machinery is generally repressed.”
353
 In this context, Cryptonomicon draws the 
American ideology to itself in a dynamic paradoxical inversion of The Pound Era. Cryptonomicon’s 
attempt to enable a textual performance of vocal authenticity, what McGurl calls its 
“technoromanticism,” reflects how postwar American fiction as a whole repressed the dominant 
American form.
354
 More specifically for Cryptonomicon, we see how it moves the pluralist 
anxieties on the page squarely towards the footing of Europe, where a non-interventionist society is 
now characterized in accordance with Graff’s “deceptive Left-Right antithesis spawned by 
academic consumerism.”
355
 This deception, in turn, is reflected in the novel as the product of a 
spurious European socialist hegemony. Cryptonomicon, via its characters now accommodating the 
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structure of the self-enclosed closed system of the American ideology in human thought and 
consciousness, tackles the faux radicalism of contemporary academic business culture where 
aspects of their professionalisation are clearly failing to deal with loss of the subject-referent of the 
educational experience. Randy, Bobby, and Lawrence’s interpreting away metaphysical outrage to 
positive ends in Jonathon Arac’s “hermeneutics of laissez-faire” resists the abandonment of a white 
cultural homogeneity, thereby drawing a structural aspect of the American process to the surface. In 
doing so, and with McGurl’s systems theory reading now attached, it invokes the powerful 
symbology of the American form that enables the cancellation of Charlene’s European socialist 
knowledge both past and present, which the novel accrues as lying behind postmodernist 
techniques. 
 
Bercovitch’s background coherences of new trends towards pluralism offer Charlene’s post-Marxist 
solutions as the ideological traps of American civilization (civic liberties, democratic living, 
humanitarianism, and optimistic literature). Randy circumscribes her political unintelligibility in the 
old world class positions, and what are now best described as the residual and the emergent forms 
circumscribed in an American mono or metaculture. Cryptonomicon now offers the American 
Renaissance criticism on the ideological origins of the American Revolution. It is a process that 
reverts to what Graff calls the “East egg” and “West egg” of the British colonial power structure, 
which the novel presents as a worldly disaster.
356
 Graff argued that this structure underpinned the 
ideological origins of the American Revolution, and offered alternative forms of social organisation 
from that of revolutionary France or Latin America. From the perspective of this earlier ideological 
clash between North America and the British colonial power structure, Charlene’s new historicist 
position becomes a by-product of (and is tackled as) a pre-American Renaissance force of criticism. 
Cryptonomicon reflects such criticism as having made a cunning rebirth in the contemporary 
academic institution, enforcing a claustrophobic corridor of survivable experience, bordered on one 
side by unendurable enclosures, and on the other by unsurvivable exposures.
357
 Reflecting the 
institution of the humanities as perverse, the postwar university professors are now linked 
ideologically to the old world consensus critique of nationalist emergence.
358
 Charlene, reflective of 
colonial interference on the intelligibility of early American literature, is separated in the novel 
form, and under Bercovitch’s paradoxes of dissent she no longer serves directly as a staple of 
national self-definition, but as a remnant of the colonial elite that looked to control young 
America’s national history.  
 
                                                          
356
 Bercovitch, “Afterword,” 420. 
357
 See McClure, Imperial Romance. 
358
 See Ayers for how college professors had to confront their ethnic concerns with administrative processes. Ayers, 
Literary Theory: A Reintroduction, 206.  
159 
 
Randy does not surrender to Charlene’s pluralist re-trending of American mythic forms because she 
literally cannot combine his Renaissance liberal demands with conditions of modernization in the 
United States. She is thus separated and isolated in the text with other remnants of the old world 
power structure as material, and metaphysical properties in the novel are closed off. Following in 
the process of national emergence, Cryptonomicon now illustrates in ideological mimesis two 
American outsides to itself. The first is McGurl’s recent aesthetic formation, as Cryptonomicon 
becomes reflective of a process of post-1960s fiction that offered to the institution the outside to 
itself, as society became more socially diverse. Therefore, structural coupling takes place between 
system and environment, and a classical mode of sociological analysis becomes more apt, than a 
proto-Foucauldian reading of internal differentiation in American society and culture. McGurl 
measures the scale of representative norms not emanating from the individual, but to the larger unit 
of analysis, which broadens the scope of internal/social differentiation. As the system becomes 
more complex in a systems theory analytic, McGurl argues, that the “excellence of the university is 
not an index of its functional efficiency but of its more or less impressive capacity to waste.”
359
 
McGurl’s analysis offers the opportunity to reappraise a deeper social contrast with twentieth 
century modernist forms of literary ambiguity and negation. The other outside uses Bercovitch’s 
aesthetic flowering of an ideology “adopted from the start precisely for its capacity to transmute 
radicalism of all forms into forms of cultural consensus.”
360
 The national-utopian promise is used to 
summon Charlene back into the integrative narrative, which, in turn, regulates the narrative form 
against itself when it writes against the American Way. Both outsides (which is only one outside) 
mask acceptances of the authority of consent without however turning the bases of dissent into 
actual social change. In their acts of theory, and in compliance to powers melded independent of 
their will, Cryptonomicon offers parochial conflict and ideological analysis of canon change as a 
twin process of the rites of cultural assent. 
 
Analysing Randy we are afforded both the opportunity to reappraise Jehlen’s structural conditions 
of the emergence of American middle class liberalism, and Bercovitch’s positive ideological value 
inherent within American intellectual culture. Bercovitch identifies the American future as utopia, 
and its utopia does not allow the dominant culture “to enforce rules of conduct, but to circumscribe 
the bounds of perception, thought and desire [...] and utopia, therefore as the essence and telos of 
the American way.”
361
 In the novel the academics’ national-utopian promise is full of the European 
philosophical dualism that Cryptonomicon closes out. It reaches towards the notion that a large 
portion of the blame for Randy’s feeling under threat comes from post-1960s countercultural 
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activism and 1960s humanities theory, inherited from concepts taken from the social sciences. The 
novel, therefore, cannot rest its narrative on a further philosophical dualism, and its narrative, 
drenched in the saturation of meaning, is no longer affirmative of the postnational promise of a 
postmodern utopian outcome. The type of opposition to the dominant culture in Cryptonomicon 
stands not in opposition to Bercovitch’s dominant nineteenth century Renaissance culture, but 
Charlene’s post-political critique of Randy. Her engagement between history, reader and the text no 
longer precludes a dialogue of freedom in the novel for Randy but rather America in its 
distinctiveness, through a self-enclosed circle of multiple perspectives, precludes all oppositional 
forms of dialogue with unusual effectiveness. On this larger historical scale, analysis of literary 
modernisms’ aspects of negation and ambiguity, and the postwar period academics’ conflation of 
rhetorical and political terms is politically unintelligible to Randy, and the liberal pluralist 
consensus is defined as too narrow, resulting in a national-utopian promise with no political effect.  
 
In reflection of Bercovitch’s calling for heightened ideological awareness, Cryptonomicon mounts a 
structural condition of Jehlen’s middle class American liberalism. These contrasts offer the 
opportunity to re-examine a long-established cycle in American scholarship of pluralism and 
consensus. As Charlene’s Neitzschean concept of power loses its value as a term of critical analysis 
in the US, dissensus (now literally a strand of American social realism that stands oppositional to 
antirealist epistemology and the Left-Right antithesis) foregrounds my reading of Randy. However, 
this chapter is also about focusing upon Berlant’s experimental framework, which challenges the 
educationally pragmatic consensus model, the repressive force of the mid-nineteenth century 
dominant culture, and the just as repressive force she argues is taking place in the university right 
now. These concerns and debates around the processes of formation, transformation and expression 
of citizenship and collective subjectivities in the Americas, from the remote past to the present, is 
where the rest of this chapter turns to. 
 
The Female Complaint 
 
There Is No Distinction between the American University and Professionalization.  
Stefano Harney & Frank Moten, The University and the Undercommons362 
 
Lauren Berlant’s affective remapping of post-nationally concentrated cultural identity politics offers 
a competing framework within the current model of literary dissensus. Berlant does not simply wish 
to add a counterhegemonic claim or avant-garde deformation of form to a culture of consensus 
model that has taken root in the North American academy. She seeks out an alternative affective 
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framework that works within the overdetermined racial monoculture of conservative America. 
Berlant works within Bercovitch’s inescapable circle of ideological containment, by taking the 
1990s culture wars back to culturally affirming bases of dissent. Using an uncertainty of meaning 
turned into a unified design in The Baroque Cycle’s three volumes, the character Eliza retains the 
more permeable subjectivity of Eve Sedgwick. Eliza thereby overlays radical ambivalence on the 
ambiguities of group pluralism, through which consensus is established and sustained. And, rather 
than retain Bercovitch’s paradoxical permeability of dissent that welcomes the opportunity to 
contain political opposition, Eliza offers the opportunity to examine and explore Berlant’s female 
complaint, which exposes, rather than consents to, shuttling between the contradictions of 
Bercovitch’s liberal pluralist culture. 
 
Building up an affective complaint 
Graff and Bercovitch’s pedagogically framed “culture of consensus” model, no matter how 
chaotically formed, looks to restore rather than reform values of American liberalism as a cultural 
function of the academy. As I showed, their dynamics of American culture as multicultural with 
various conflicting dimensions covers all aspects of literary radicalism, including Randy’s luxuriant 
uncertainty of meaning. Berlant builds her model of Marxist critical commentary in response to this 
threatening group pluralism, and holds out ordinary feelings through which to describe a non-
sovereign subjectivity in a variety of scenes. Writers like Berlant and Sian Ngai, in their attempts to 
contest an American exceptionalism that, rather than provide the rule, has become the rule (and 
“globalization its unlovely name”), confirm what Lennon argues is a “postcolonially melancholic 
US literary studies, today.”
363
 Berlant argues that her analysis is both politically necessary and 
socially important, insofar as it allows many critical theorists “to switch between analyses of love 
and the social.”
364
 Her comment here is reflective of a case made in the Anatomy where Berlant 
stood against easy assimilations within the genre of romance.
365
 Berlant looked to track an 
alternative structure of liberal sentimental relevancy for the development of official and intimate 
publics in the early US period. Her eclectic, as opposed to integrative, analysis is to make room for 
ethical indirection in the current sober accounting of postmodern differences and emerging value-
based discourses of the university in the contemporary period. In many ways, Berlant’s synthesis of 
affect theory, psychoanalysis and Marxist critical theory opens a structure of relevancy through 
which she can disengage directly from the implicitly political aspects of ideology critique, in order 
to reengage with the realm of women’s culture from her concept of the juxtapolitcal. The 
juxtapolitcal is tied in one aspect to reconstructed conventions of romantic love inhering in a 
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relation to time, and therefore to the ongoing repetitiveness of the past into the ongoing present. 
Berlant argues that the example of the intimate public organised by affect and emotion (the quality 
of an object as it inheres in its relation to time and not in the thing presented) forces questions of the 
centrality of economies of suffering to mass capitalist aesthetics. For Berlant, in sex/culture/identity 
wars, sentimental radicalism pushed sentimental liberalism to a conservative compassion that, under 
the screen of feminism, masculinised compassion. Berlant looks to trace the effects of the culture 
and politics of compassion in the contemporary public sphere. 
 
Because Bercovitch’s model has circumscribed all contexts through emphases on one particular 
culture’s mode of resolving crisis, the problem of modern mass nationality is yet to be a problem 
solved for Berlant. She accordingly retrains her focuses on bringing back from the past not the 
rhetoric of dissent, but powers of recognition within intimate publics. In many ways Berlant 
concedes a point of defeat in the Anatomy when she writes:  
 
but it would not suffice to say that the personal would be the political for crucially 
these materials would be defined outside of their now defensive postures with 
respect to the national-utopian promise that has long conscripted their allegiance and 
their fantasy: they would be intelligible to us.
366
  
 
Challenging Bercovitch’s affective framework and rhetoric of regional and continental 
incorporation, Berlant, like Sedgwick before her, reconsiders Foucauldian repressive hypotheses. 
She argues that views on sexuality had absorbed the conservative worldview as a neoliberal order 
had capitulated to a new styled corporate managerialism. Accordingly, Berlant moved her structure 
of relevancy to advance her analysis not in sexual politics in disciplinary societies, but in politics of 
emotions held in control societies. 
 
Berlant is tough on emotions, seeing in these terms only a means of conveying one relationship 
among many. She writes “there is nothing clear about compassion except that it implies a social 
relation between spectators and sufferers, with the emphasis on the spectator’s experience of feeling 
compassion and its subsequent relation to material practice.”
367
 In working her way through the 
constructivist viewpoint on compassion she argues how its failure to be a good in itself now 
encapsulates a stinging loss of optimism in lieu of the failed politics of the cultural Left. This leaves 
an offset of what she calls “political depression.”
368
 In her view nondominant groups blindly 
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bargain for a more centralised place in patriarchal society, and therein confirm their gendered and 
unhappy connections to (subaltern) stereotypes.   
 
If the Anatomy looked to bring into view a structure of relevancy, The Female Complaint works in 
the realm of feeling to give a separate but wedded account of critical readings of the early US 
period via Hawthorne. In the Anatomy Berlant writes that “rather than display his transformations as 
exceptional personal crises, Hawthorne suggests that they are also fundamentally a condition of 
identity: the experience of identity might be personal and private but its forms are always collective 
and political.”
369
 Berlant attempts to develop a separate sphere through uses of genre for an original 
intimate public to emerge, which is helpful to examine the violation of interests of women. 
Although she concurs with Bercovitch’s wider observations “to the extent that [her] book holds that 
America’s symbolic lexicon aims to create an aura of transhistorical invulnerability for the nation” 
she extends an official state imaginary and national identity, not as fixed, but as held within the 
intersection of several cultures linked through discursive practices.
370
 
  
Michael Sandel’s recent lectures on the politics of Justice intimate some of the normative political 
demands held on subjectivity in the US public sphere that Berlant holds in abeyance. She tracks 
aloneness, isolation, and optimism (as well as anxiety, passive aggression, and torture) to name but 
a few of the commodified genres of intimacy of a subordinated population defined by its relation to 
normativity, and how this normativity is specifically related to “this bomb, that rape, this war, that 
police encounter.”
371
 The unidirectional itinerary of Sandel’s public lectures, on the other hand, are 
incited to arouse passionate debate and nostalgia of another kind, held within a collective political 
identity remediated by the state and related institutions, rather than invoke an excess of passion that 
produces a kind of irreducible autonomy. Berlant writes in another context: 
 
but this taxonomy underdescribes the dynamics of indirection and mediation that 
characterise even strong publics, while bracketing the difficult question of what 
views can be said to constitute the circulated opinion that produces civil society as a 
force in institutional political life.
372
  
 
Berlant argues how structural subordination enacted by stipulated and administrative laws and 
norms implicitly arouses passion as a political structure forcing its way into an intimate public, 
through a tiny point of identification. Her work is not to interrupt sexuality per se (as Foucault had 
done) but to make the claim that “a political structure is fundamentally an affective structure” and 
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“negative political feelings provide important openings for measuring injustice.”
373
 In line with 
Bercovitch’s culture work, she resists the philosophical dualisms of Eurocentric models of the state, 
and puts her culture of the “affectively and emotionally incoherent” to work in the American 
context.
374
 Berlant sets out to provide an angle of vision in the American ideology that track the 
invention of performative norms in relation to the hegemonic ones.”
375
 Moving away from less 
permeable angles of vision and what Roland Murray argues is “the coercive underside of the 
performative language theory that developed during the 1960s,” the women’s culture concept she 
argues thrives in a world of contradictions.
376
 Berlant argues that a contradiction in intimate publics, 
from which the women’s culture concept grows, “never bothers anyone.”
377
 What is a partially 
veiled challenge to politically (and now pedagogically) achieved American manhood relates to a 
continuing gender war taking place in the US. The linking of gender to desire is seen to have 
followed an erroneous representation of transgression. Berlant is smart enough to see this quicker 
than most. In the Anatomy, Berlant argued how “the default gender of the American citizen is still, 
alas, a masculine one.”
378
 In the Complaint Berlant re-identifies this problem as when “what was a 
minor register of survival aesthetics has also become a predominant way even for elites to 
orchestrate a claim that their social discomfort amounts to evidence of injustice towards them.”
379
 
As Readings argued, for Berlant gender now becomes simply an axis for marking the course of the 
university’s way to the current discourse of professionalization. 
 
Women’s culture in The Baroque Cycle’s three volumes, rather than throw focuses on Neal 
Stephenson’s brilliant intentionality, posits Berlant’s model of femininity as a distinct feeling 
struggling to be formed. The female complaint is, Berlant writes, “a discourse of 
disappointment.”
380
 Largely the three volumes in the trilogy are shaped by men’s experiences, and 
how women bargain in and through these scenes with power. What makes the trilogy interesting is 
that it focuses on these scenes through ordinary survival techniques rather than transgression, 
disappointment, or refusal. The lack of a unidirectional itinerary for the women in the novel is cause 
for an analysis of Berlant’s discourse of disappointment, and how, in many ways, it throws such 
affective scenes together that can offer something completely different (in terms of structural 
relations to Bercovitch’s production of a complex Hawthorne where he reinstates principles of 
exclusion or choice on an original footing). 
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In the trilogy, focuses are drawn on the ordinary, and to use Berlant’s words, “what gets uttered in 
the female complaint is a collective story that is not organized by a singular autobiography.” She 
writes:  
 
In What Is a Minor Literature? Deleuze and Guattari argue that one’s identification 
with any material marked by a minor voice performs one’s attachment to being 
generic to being a member of a population that has been marked out as having 
collective qualities that are apprehensible in individuals.
381
  
 
Women in The Baroque Cycle conform to a generic structure of affective spaces (whose shapes, 
logics, and procedures were not identical to the intellectual and political history of public life that 
Hawthorne was telling) and in many ways through the author’s narrating the ordinary through 
forgotten or lost moments of the women’s culture concept, we review the remediating of stuff (the 
glance, the gesture, tonal intensity) by paying attention.
382
 By paying attention to Randy, on the 
other hand we finally see that he does not conform to anything or anyone; he is redolent of 
Bercovitch’s concept of negation by dissent as a form of consent. No matter how closely linked 
Randy’s group is, they are rarely determined by identifiable dependencies. This sees Randy 
shuttling between twin polemics in Bercovitch’s argument on national identity where, alongside 
others, he becomes a point of socialization. As a product of Hawthorne’s fusion and telos, he 
transmutes opposition into complementarity. His ineffectualness, as the American abroad, is to 
deliver a more emphatic narrative focalization to drive forward the American social story and its 
understanding and sympathy for people of Asia and the Third World. The women in the trilogy, on 
the other hand, are narrated expertly-abstractly or more confidently, and suggest an author maturing 
in the experimental mode, finding his way to Berlant’s non-default view on gender, and in turn 
allowing a view into “the singular materials of a specific life [that] are readable only as particulars 
that are exemplary not of the individual’s life but of that kind of life.”
383
 Eliza’s first-person 
narrative, as we will see, is not so easily accommodated into Bercovitch’s paradoxical dynamics of 
dissent that provides a multivocal narrative of American liberal ideology during a crucial period of 
its formation. As such, the experience we get from experiencing her story is radically different from 
the regulatory juridical overlap in the spaces of Randy’s ordinary American everyday.     
 
Randy’s thunderous no-saying to American imperialism offers a certain imaginative vitality, yet his 
attempts to establish an independently critical stance works from a painful retreat. Once he consigns 
                                                          
381 Berlant, Complaint, x. 
382
 Berlant, Complaint, 25. 
383
 Berlant, Complaint, x. 
166 
 
the academics to the devil, as Jehlen suggests for Melville, a certain imaginative vitality seems also 
distinguished in the novel. This builds into a conflicting paranoid nativist viewpoint, aimed not at 
society, but at the possibility of active dissent (lack of symbolic reconciliation) in rhetorical 
structures.
384
 After his no to the daemonic originals of the academics, Randy becomes a more 
relaxed protagonist, an alternate vision of himself that is not so much as fixed in enclosures of 
philosophical pluralism or an alien cultural criticism, but one that is at rest in the aesthetic narrative. 
In what follows, and as he is brought into series of contrasts, he confronts a less objectionable 
America, which is easier to reconcile. Randy is even twinned with his business rival Hubert Kepler. 
In this aspect the novel brings forward to Randy not the vagueness of his relation to the object, as 
with Charlene, but the self-enclosed circle, which locks out the pervasive forces of capital that 
centre in the Old World. Jehlen writes: “A century before, [Melville] Hawthorne also retreated after 
The Scarlet Letter. The descendants of the dangerously dualistic Hester come in allegorical pairs, a 
dark lady and a fair, (Glory/Charlene) a sexy one and a chaste, (Nina/Mary) a rebel and a sweet 
conformist (Glory/Amy/Charlene). The dark rebellious self need then not be overcome 
(Newton/Daniel i.e. the Puritan origins of the American self) or absorbed: she can be exiled, 
excised.”
385
 As Jehlen further argues for Faulkner, I similarly argue that where American liberalism 
allows for all possible surface adjustments creating its aura of transhistorical invulnerability for the 
nation, Cryptonomicon’s writing “suffers” if taking a transnational perspective to it when it fails to 
establish an independently critical stance. Also, and paraphrasing Jehlen, “this is not the place for a 
discussion of philosophical dualism in American thought,” but simply to refer to the structural 
conditions of this thought.
386
 Emerson’s monistic resolutions are dangerously edified in 
Cryptonomicon, and more condemningly for women, re-replaces them in rhetorical (and therefore 
social) exile.
387
 Also, and similar to Jonathon Arac’s study of the A-politics, in Cryptonomicon 
“explication leads out from the problem of meaning into an anatomy of liberal co-optation.”
388
 
Randy’s inaction is to perceive ambiguity, and this ambiguity is rescued from “its own council of 
despair [...] by the affirmation of some benevolent overarching design.”
389
 What finally comes 
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down to Randy is the American fantasy, in the form of America Shaftoe, and not the fantasy 
imbued in Charlene that is always utopian and a critical measure of lack at the same time. 
 
Taking aspects of the trilogy as a kind of after-feminism rewriting of official history offers the 
modern American moment not through what Berlant argues is “the official timeline of national 
history, nor through a claim that family history is any sense private, but through a genealogy of 
entertainments, whose place in the collective memory makes up a nation that takes on a shimmery, 
intimate yet detached quality of the commodity form.”
390
 In such a mode of understanding Berlant 
writes:  
 
Addressing femininity from the perspective of mediated fantasies that magnetize 
many different kinds of women to the scene of suffering, sacrifice, survival, 
criticism, and sometimes sublimity that has historically provided that narrative of 
women’s culture thus shows us something about the operation of mass-mediated 
identity – that is, how it manages to sublimate singularity on behalf of maintaining 
proximity to a vague prospect of social belonging via the generic or conventional 
love plot that isolates an identity as the desired relay from weakness to strength, 
aloneness to sociability, abandonment to recognition, and solitary agency to 
reciprocity [...] For the writers of these narratives both the nation and capital have 
two special kinds of function. One function is institutional, in their disciplinary 
organisation of materialized or lived life. The other function is to serve not as 
sources of reciprocity or justice, but as magnetizing forms for fantasies of reciprocity 
and justice whose very impersonality and constitution in an ongoing near future is a 
source of relief and optimism.
391
  
 
If Eliza offers what Berlant argues is the structure of a “multiply mediated agitation against the 
narrow, privatised version of the American way of life,” then she also comes close to being written 
from the spiritual scene that generates relief from the political.
392
 By paying attention to how Eliza 
attempts to overcome alienation through affective spaces (where she generates those veerings of the 
sexual drive to find bearable terms of reciprocity), she reaffirms Carolyn Porter’s insistent 
engagement with (an intolerable) society rather than a flight from it.
393
 Eliza counters desire for 
performative and transparent community by proposing an inheritance without a mimetic 
compulsion or fear of emotional opacity. In doing so, she rejects the normative presumptions and 
idealisations of transparency. Her plight in the volumes is to oppose all forms of slavery, from the 
abduction of the fair Abigail Frome, sold into service of sexual slavery, to black African man 
servant Dappa’s reduction to a precise and individual discovery. She does this with compassion that 
is hardly masculinised, and within an emotionally charged set of experiences.  
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Eliza’s eighteenth century liberal sympathy is tellingly amiss as she visits the whores at Bridewell 
Palace. The whores face slow death, through the attrition of subjects by the exchange values of 
capital. Eliza’s sentimental plight is to oppose slavery in all its forms. Yet in this scene she rejects 
the normative presumptions and idealisations of transparency even of that of a bourgeois subject 
who is beginning to write her own jouissance. In her response to Daniel’s request for investment in 
his “logic mill,” where the whores would pump the bellows to make the punched cards needed to 
transfer information to material sources, Eliza asks Daniel to join him in her carriage for her return 
journey. She tells Daniel that Johan (her son) will travel with Mr Ham as he “has a head for 
numbers” while she has “a head for relationships.” Eliza as “it turned out had a vicious head for 
numbers” (vol. 3, 156) yet proffers terms of discourse to Daniel of “the relationship, or to be blunt, 
what precisely is to be the security of her proposed loan” (vol. 1, 418-426). Eliza’s business 
transactions are always held in a double articulation, which decodes the modern logics of 
corporations. I deal with this aspect later. In this scene I focus on Eliza’s countersentimental 
narrative. Eliza or Princess Caroline can hardly be described as sympathetic human beings. In The 
System of the World, Caroline thinks nothing of detaching from her one true love Johan when she 
becomes wedded to the service of state power (vol. 3, 875). Conversely, in the Bridewell scene 
Eliza’s pains to assert that all men (and women) are naturally free and equal does not take in the 
labour-mixing formula of master-servant with the relation of class. We see in these women not 
necessarily conflicting and contradicting emotions culminating in what Berlant calls a “Zizekian 
representation of affective self-maintenance” but emotions that signal that, for these women at least, 
there is no transcendence anywhere (neither for Hannah the Bridewell pumping whore who is 
picked out one form entrenched social hierarchy into another) and not specially through a thrilling 
(libidinal) or comforting image.
394
 By paying attention to how these women negotiate and bargain 
with power, we see that there is no family relationship or specific male attachment through which 
they form specific bonds of attachment, yet in Berlant’s understanding there is an “explicit aversion 
to the activity of disavowal.”
395
 She writes that  
 
The bargain struck in these works demands not the sacrifice of intelligence and 
ethical potential about the catastrophic and petty lies, violence, and disappointment 
with which the world proceeds without guarantees, but confirms all that while 
demanding the maintenance of proximity to the promise of affective continuity, 
recognition, and, metatextually, membership in the community of people constituted 
by whatever longing, the longing of people who showed up. Nothing is hidden or 
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unknown in this double movement: the doubleness is a commitment to maintaining 
contradiction and a project of making explicit the difficulties of bargaining.
396
      
 
Eliza will not curtail the vagueness of the scene at Bridewell through sentimentality that Amit Rai 
argues “can also function as an agent of the police.”
397
 Such non-curtailment about the relation of 
any object of optimism allows an affective structure to arise, offering potentiality immanent in 
anyone. Eliza’s resistance is apt in this figuration, as she holds up American culture’s preoccupation 
with familial feeling as the foundation for sympathy, and sympathy as the basis of a democratic 
republic. 
 
In The Baroque Cycle the character Daniel Waterhouse holds open a contrast to Eliza and a 
rejection of the old world that, Jehlen argues, came by the very process of national emergence. 
However, because the trilogy is such a massive and noteworthy compendium of historical fact and 
fiction it would be inconclusive to simply read all of its characters though parallels unearthed in 
versions underpinned by Bercovitch’s readings of classical dissensus and ideological mimesis. 
After all, dissensus is a model about not being right all the time, but a source of study through 
which students can make their own decisions about American literate culture and an originary 
political rhetoric. While Bercovitch’s profundity of the goal of the scarlet letter (it had not done its 
office therefore it had a goal) would be a relevant reading to take to the trilogy, it would cover 
ground already made in the breaking of ties between Leftist politics and antirealist or postmodern 
epistemology in the North American academy throughout the 1990s. To go over this ground again 
would offer very little in the way of formal new insight or the reinvention of new relational modes, 
though it would offer new grounds upon which the American form could offer structural effects that 
challenge early dominances of British-European hegemony. The trilogy could be appropriate to 
read through McGurl’s brilliant realignment of the classroom as “dialect of structure and agency,” 
as well as relevant context through which to discover the institutional a priori of what he calls the 
“long now.”
398
 However, Berlant’s analysis offers us both the creative possibilities and limitations 
group pluralisms afforded on the basis of dissensus. And, following Deleuze’s understanding of 
“worker-school-kids or bureaucratic students” we are offered an insight into Berlant’s reform of the 
school system as being, in reality, its dismantling.
399
 As an alternative approach to the model of 
dissensus, I offer an analysis of women’s culture in The Baroque Cycle, to pose questions on how 
individually experienced pain gets turned into modern forms of entertainment. I then consider what 
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that aesthetic experience says about a forgotten context that would help explain a contemporary 
cultural moment in the long now.      
 
Intimate Publics 
In The Female Complaint, Berlant tracks affective and emotional attachments in relation to official 
public policy and the mediated public sphere, to span the ongoing power and range of sentimental 
culture in the US. Berlant’s attempt to articulate radical re-imagination tactics is part of her larger 
endeavour to bear witness to American political culture’s fraudulent claims to popular consent on 
the back of politico-sentimental texts. In the culture wars, the Right had invariably won for Berlant, 
and she looked to read through the whirling mass of these debates that swung spectacularly from 
this way to that with no real political outcome. She writes: 
 
I first conceived [the complaint] in the late 1980s as a way of helping to elaborate 
what I had learned from the Anatomy that publics were not just structural effects but 
also affective spaces whose shapes, logics and procedures were not identical to the 
intellectual and political history of public life that Hawthorne was also telling. My 
aim then became to tell the long story of US women’s culture as a sphere of intimacy 
with a complex relation to nationality and political metaculture. My plan was to 
track novels that had become adapted into melodramas […] by the Hollywood 
culture industry […] Above all I wanted to use the story of feminine publicity after 
1837 to tell what happened as cities and mass culture became conjoined sites for the 
production of social belonging in the United States that did not always remediate the 
collective sense that was building through the public sphere.
400
  
 
Berlant’s separate sphere of public intimacy (which branched off from, without entirely becoming 
antagonistic toward, the political scene of inequality) can be used to define how cultural struggles 
are used to identify how different cultural groups tell different literary stories through the wide 
expanse of fictionality in the university establishment.
401
  Taking her stance literally from 
resistances to moral and social conservatisms built from the Reagan Era, she generalises affective 
frameworks of consumerism, before the subsequent encroaching de-differentiation of their material 
vehicles. She takes what she calls a juxtapositional attitude towards those that float with 
displacement of politics to the realm of feeling, seeing this heterosexual sphere as somewhat 
blinded to its negative representations of pathologies on non-dominant groups in media space and 
US policy. Similarly, as arguments are made for the new sociology of literature in the university, it 
is important not to lose sight of these stories relevant across all economic sectors in a world where 
fictionality and the stories we tell ourselves are locked together. As James English concurs:   
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The process of counting and tabulating requires one to specify the units of analysis 
(in Moretti’s case, “devices, themes, tropes,” “clues,” and so on) but these are, Frow 
argues, “neither given in advance nor arbitrarily constructed by an analytic choice, 
but are, rather, necessarily implicated in and derived from a process of reading and 
interpretation.” The “sociological” method, that is, itself depends on literary 
practices.
402
  
 
It is then not simply the case of telling another story about presentism, relativism, truth, 
indeterminacy or the commercialised, but to argue for ways of reading and interpreting as a way to 
rethink the contemporary issue of global struggle (anti-capitalism) that is becoming increasingly 
harder to define.  
 
Insofar as it survives as a recognizable thing, the women’s culture concept can be put to work in 
The Baroque Cycle’s three volumes. Rather than simply focus on the trilogy’s ability to narrate or 
bring forward Berlant’s affective concept of crisis ordinariness, it also carries a structural demand 
on the way 1980s American culture was in process of remodelling itself. Berlant turns away from 
this semi-cum-political-affective framework. For her, 1980s personhood was beginning to be 
reframed in symbolic acts similar to first instances of the Constitution Framers symbolic acts, the 
nation form and sexual difference. For Berlant, those that see themselves in terms fully assimilable 
to the identarian ethos of ethnic fiction, as well as the discourse of difference and writing tagged as 
ethnic that fully assimilates the self-reflexive interests of literary modernism, erroneously turn the 
power of that writing back upon the self in bouts of unselfconscious presentism. She remarks:  
 
A growing number of scholars and activists who speak from identity movements 
celebrate the ways US subalterns develop tactics for survival from within capitalist 
culture: forms of activity like gay marriage, critically-motivated acts of commodity 
consumption, and identity-based economic based economic investment zones are 
said to make marginalised social groups more central, more legitimate and powerful 
in capitalist society. Yet for all the importance of survival tactics, a politics that 
advocates the subaltern appropriation of normative forms of the good life makes a 
kind of (often tacit) peace with exploitation and normativity.
403
 
 
Berlant looked to counter what she saw were misdirections from the state overwriting critical 
groundwork made during the phase of US literary experimentalism and interpretive activism. She 
argues that “the displacement of politics to the realm of feeling both opens a scene for the analysis 
of the operations of injustice in lived democracy and shows the obstacles to social change that 
emerge when politics becomes privatised.”
404
 Berlant moves her terms on from the culture and the 
canon wars to the sex wars, in order underwrite a genealogy of sex in America that “would register 
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how intensively sexual white American relations have been to African American people and people 
of colour.”
405
 She argues how in the spaces of nation and capital the “hegemonic achievement of 
Reaganite conservatism” bestowed upon the American public, “also evident in its effects on its 
adversaries on the left,” a less than visible ideological barrier to self-realisation.
406
 Out a sense of 
political urgency Berlant halted her project on the business of sentimentality to challenge not only 
the Reaganite Revolution, but also the capital optimism of cultural studies in general, which she 
saw had become a tool of power.  
 
In the Queen Berlant writes that:  
 
the account of the total correspondence between acts and identities that marked the 
controversy over gays in the military manifested the juridical understanding of 
sexuality: my perverse act expresses my perverse identity; the state has a compelling 
interest in protecting the family by repressing my perversion; hence, no gays in the 
military; and hence, no privacy protection for any non-reproductive sexual practice 
or identity.
407
 
  
Similarly, and writing on Toni Morrison’s Beloved, she argues there is a countersentimental 
narrative “which refuses to confuse survival with freedom, justice, or the good life.”
408
 The idea that 
a character or characters can bring forward Bercovitch’s unified design in the friction emerging 
between private interests and the public good is far more remote an option in the trilogy than in 
Cryptonomicon. Randy may bring home a point against homophobia in the military and, it may use 
Lawrence Waterhouse to defend Alan Turing’s non-reproductive sexual capabilities, yet this is 
always from an overarching design through which the ironies of personal agency and the 
ambiguities of Epiphyte Corp’s group pluralism and their links to wartime group pluralisms of 
Lawrence, Bobby, and Goto are finally established and generalised in a desire for community and 
continuity. Although the cross-generational aspect of these groups speak of literary ambiguity, with 
its indeterminate obliquity of signs, they interpret away metaphysical outrage of Japan and 
Germany’s crude recommencements of slavery (old world terrors) with the academics’ internal 
appropriation of subaltern populations placing them on an original footing as the products of one 
more European socially binding norm. Thus, for all of Cryptonomicon’s inconclusive luxuriance of 
meaning, it prevents the sort of divisiveness that leads to radical social change, and finally offers 
the differences in their relations with America as an object of optimism in a constant democracy.     
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Having tried to argue that interpretation in Cryptonomicon is largely to perceive ambiguity, I have 
also expressed that the novel’s characters find it very hard to not speak from a multiplicitous whole 
through Arac’s council of despair. In their inability to remain open and porous, the characters lead 
us away from the academics’ wilful self-binding of truth to the redemptive vision of many truths. In 
doing so, they throw up a structure of relevancy that returns them to a Nativist understanding, 
where Arac’s problem of meaning turns Cryptonomicon into an anatomy of liberal co-optation. 
There is, on the other hand, radical ambivalence in which women emerge in the trilogy, which 
makes the sympathy toward the national unintelligible and “inconstant.”
409
 As they invoke a people 
to a promise of affective continuity Berlant illustrates a condition of their reality. She writes: 
 
Sentimentalists strive to save the political from politics. To do this they constitute 
the citizen not as someone with potential jeopardizing qualities or with a status in a 
hierarchy – but as someone with attachments and intentions and pain capacities – for 
example, as a subject of feeling – who longs for what everyone is said to long for, a 
world that allows access to vague belonging, a sense of unanxious general social 
membership that ought to be protected by the institutions that bind power to ordinary 
life.
410
 
 
It is also possible however to read--from within the trilogy’s own moment of high historical 
nationalism--a culture of consensus that absorbs the fractures of social hierarchy (in a pluralist 
semiotic), where women symbolise how the US is too abstract at this moment, because however 
utopian it may be, it has, at present, codified an intense high-stakes polarity between national 
interests and local identities. However, unlike in Cryptonomicon, the women or the group in the 
trilogy do not come in allegorical pairings, and do not offer either an exercise in narrative exile or 
the reproduction of life on scenes of narrative transgression or refusal. Instead, they draw focus 
towards scenes of ordinary survival and disappointment. In Eliza’s bargaining with power to keep 
Princess Caroline from the demands of the lecherous Elector Fredrik, or in the forced abandonment 
of her baby due to political opinion, she reflects literally the sphere of intimacy that you get “if the 
nation were no longer held to be the ideal type of political structure that secures justice for its 
citizens.”
411
 Eliza encapsulates the generic structure of Berlant’s survivor, and her complaint in the 
trilogy is to expose the circuits of erotic and political dominance that have permeated the collective 
life in the US. We can think here of Eliza being forced into an unjust sexual act by Prince William 
yet also how William, or Le Roi for that matter, cannot exile Eliza to a political scene of inequality 
and the subaltern appropriation of women as a sexual underclass. In these scenes The Baroque 
Cycle offers structural as well as affective resistances to overt chest-baring of American manhood, 
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which finds fictional truth with Berlant’s attacks on the patriotic nationalism of Reagan 
Republicanism, which sought to shrink the state while intensifying identification with the utopian 
symbolic nation.
412
 
 
Women in particular that have to bargain with power in the trilogy cannot be as easily exiled as 
women in Cryptonomicon. They, in other words, reflect a whole duality, which is not suffused 
through readymade allegorical pairings. Eliza, Liselotte, Sophie, Hannah, Catherine, and Caroline 
are complementary of each other, and mark out Deleuze and Guattari’s attachment to being generic 
as part of something social, even if, as Berlant argues, “one’s singular relation to that belonging is 
extremely limited, episodic, ambivalent, rejecting or mediated by random encounters with 
relevantly marked texts.”
413
 These women are all dangerously dualistic, and speak of an alien 
encounter in Jehlen’s dominant culture and the Constitution’s framers’ hegemonic relations. It is 
important to show what Berlant argues is affective-structural dominance, and therefore I give her 
commentary in full. She writes: 
 
The Constitution’s framers constructed the person as the unit of political 
membership in the American nation; in doing so, they did not simply set up the 
public standard of abstract legitimation on behalf of white male embodiment – 
technically, in the beginning, property ownership was as much a factor in citizenship 
as any corporeal schema. Nonetheless, we can see a real attraction of abstract 
citizenship in the way the citizen acquires a new body by participation in the 
political public sphere. The American subject is privileged to suppress the fact of his 
historical situation in the abstract person: but then, in return, the nation provides a 
kind of prophylaxis for the person, as it promises to protect his privileges and his 
local body in return for loyalty to the state. As [...] others have argued the implicit 
whiteness and maleness of the original American citizen is thus protected by national 
identity. This is a paradox because if in practice the liberal political public sphere 
protects and privileges the person’s racial and gendered embodiment, one effect of 
these privileges is to be without notable qualities while retaining cultural authority. It 
is under these conditions that what might be an erotics of political fellowship passes 
for a meritocracy or an order defined by objective mutual interests. The white male 
body is the relay to legitimation but even more than that the power to suppress that 
body to cover the event of its tracks and traces is the sign of real authority according 
to constitutional fashion.
414
 
 
It was Nietzsche who wrote that knowledge is an invention behind which lies something completely 
different from itself, the play of instincts, impulses, desires, fears and the will to appropriate. 
Berlant shows how the women’s culture concept is evidently a Neitzschean structural condition of 
abuse. Through a reading of Hawthorne, she offers a continued site of social differentiation, where 
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male gendering and domineering has not taken up (or been allowed to take up) the peculiarities of 
such reference points. These spaces are from which publics in America are organised differently 
from each other, allowing complex identifications that locates real life in the affective capacity to 
bracket many kinds of structural and historical antagonism.
415
      
     
In practical returns to readings of race and power before her more nuanced ethical reconsiderations 
of women’s culture in the Complaint, Berlant writes in the Anatomy that “if racial privilege 
becomes glaringly the one local identity in which Hawthorne feels nationally uncontested, the 
politics of gender and nationalism take on vastly different and more intimate issues.”
416
 “The racial 
and gendered sites of [Hawthorne’s] entitlement” (his local identity which superintend the 
emancipated ethnic identity Hawthorne lives) brings into clearer view the structural conditions of 
racism and whiteness in the contemporary US.
417
 In the Complaint, Berlant sees an overt male-
constructed manhood forming a dominant metaculture that is tacitly white.
418
 In marking out her 
tactical point of entry into a male US metaculture, Berlant writes “what makes work that is written 
from and for an intimate public realistic is also what makes it sentimental and juxtapolitical: its 
excesses and displacements are demands for recognition of the importance of the situation in terms 
of affectively alternate realities.”
419
 The national-local serves in Hawthorne’s work as a mnemonic 
of another sort, where Berlant’s new local provokes a redefinition of post-melodramatic subjectivity 
in contemporary political life.  
 
We find redefinitions of feminist realist sentimentality seen historically and across a wide variety of 
locations in the trilogy, as Eliza questions Dappa on his collection of small slave narrative tracts: on 
“the execrable crime that slavery is” (vol. 3, 59). Eliza’s mechanical coldness in these situations 
operates in concert with—but always beyond the reach or in excess of—the political economy and 
patriotic memory. Berlant writes that “seen en mass these diverse sites of identity knowledge and 
practice provides a kind of antidote to American monomania.”
420
 Eliza’s “placid cruelty” (vol. 1, 
746; vol. 2, 794) put towards bringing an end to such inhumane gestures as slavery and misogyny, 
within Berlant’s view, not only brings into play a reverse affective pathology of American manhood 
in mass nationality, but a rhetorical quality that can speak of rage, pain, helplessness and politics all 
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in one breath.
421
 Eliza’s hyper-vigilance in these scenes is not the opposite of disavowal and self-
deception; it is also often their guardian, and sits on what Giles considers as a “dangerous and 
uncomfortable boundary where residual assumptions about autochthonous identity are traversed by 
something different.”
422
 Pointing to the structural inequality in the construction of US male 
homosocial political culture both past and present, women’s culture as presented in The Baroque 
Cycle shows convergences of a different type than Hawthorne’s work. Rather than signal a 
homogenous or organic whole (no matter how chaotically organised), these women speak the 
languages of a repressive white dominant male liberal culture, radical subalternity within that 
culture, and the subordination techniques of white American male metaculture. Berlant, by opting 
to return to an approach that was deemed largely trite and unsexy, narrates the situation in terms of 
where a path of resistance is to be found. It was only by reclaiming a link to the National Symbolic 
(while many other writers like Charlene were involved in denying this type of intolerable 
particularity of her selfhood) that the women in the trilogy can reinstate resistance in an affective 
National Symbolic. 
 
With the perceived postructural threat all but extinguished in the American ideology, and what I 
have so far described as libertarian attitudes that took effects on adversaries on the left, The 
Baroque Cycle’s formal structure now works through the network of ideas through which American 
nationalist and corporate culture justifies itself. On the one hand, Charlene and Randy’s relationship 
in Cryptonomicon tracks Berlant’s apprehension of the problem of modern mass national identity 
from the hegemonic achievement of Reaganite conservatism, and where a structure of relevancy 
around Randy reveals the threat about the imminent end of male hegemony. Randy fails to find an 
independently critical stance; he interprets away the radicalism that postmoderns were led to believe 
would lead to decisive social change or at least secure policies for the betterment of the good of 
education. Eliza’s relationships, conversely, redraw intense focuses on the classical American 
ideology, an optimistic literature made virile by criticism of the actual in comparison with the ideal. 
In relations between females, a generic structure is being formed out of an eclectic borrowing of 
residual elements. As Eliza holds sway in her abeyance to future optimism, her fantasy projections 
which carry the fortitude of common sense and their centrality to the political economy, generate a 
formal structure that describes the complaint genre. Her relations with Rossignol intimate that there 
is a structure, as her dreams of boarding a ship with him to sail off to “Amsterdam or London to 
raise their baby in exile” (vol. 2, 77) are a glimpse at the identification of a counterfactual in the 
narrative that is raised to a degree of general significance. The women in the definitively male-
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oriented trilogy recalibrate experiences pointing to Berlant’s mass intimacy that has promise to 
include them.  
 
Eliza was accustomed to being looked at, and did not mind it. But she was 
preoccupied now for a little while. Rossignol had no feelings whatsoever for the 
baby. He had not the slightest attention of being its father. He wanted her for what 
lay at either end of her spinal column […] certainly not for her offspring […] It 
would have made matters a good deal simpler if he had fallen in love with the baby 
and proposed to elope with her, and him to some other country. But this, as she now 
saw clearly, was unthinkable in so many different ways that to dream of it any more 
was a waste of time. Oh well (she thought) if the world were populated solely by 
persons who loved and desired each other symmetrically, it might be happier, but not 
so interesting. And there would be no place in such a world for a person such as 
Eliza […] If there was to be no doting father so be it. (vol. 2, 48)  
 
Developing her “wiles for surviving, thriving, and transcending the world as it presents itself,” Eliza 
shapes such a historical form of optimism that can be affective as a marketised message in and 
across the capitalist media sphere. Her “aesthetic structure of affective expectation” offers the 
chance to reappraise new historical convergences of social and economic objectives in the 
institution.
423
   
 
Women’s Culture 
In the Complaint, Berlant argues how women’s culture becomes more recognizable as a thing in the 
US because “its central fantasy [...] is the constantly emplotted desire of a complex person to 
rework the details of her history to become a vague or simpler version of herself, usually in the 
vicinity of a love plot.”
424
 In many instances women’s culture in the trilogy is perceived in this way, 
whether it is the unremarkable shedding of everyday tears in “domestic life, controlled 
unremarkable” (vol. 2, 158) that frames a particular aspect of Eliza’s story, or Princess Caroline’s 
folding the sum of her losses into her life story (vol. 3, 328), these women offer forms in generic 
terms of fantasy improvisation (usually in the vicinity of a love plot) that seek the social to one side 
of the political “as something other than a failure to be politics.”
425
 In the following section, I look 
to how the trilogy, through Berlant’s concept of women’s culture, throws up affective scenes that 
neutralize the threat of the hegemonic achievement of Reaganite conservatism (social and moral) 
which was to advocate the subaltern appropriation of normative forms, and offer rhetorical 
affectations of sexual underclasses in contemporary culture along with their involvements in the 
historical political life of the polis. 
 
                                                          
423
 Berlant, Complaint, 2-3; 4. 
424
 Berlant, Complaint, 7. 
425
 Berlant, Complaint, 25. 
178 
 
Moving on from the perceived postructural threat in Cryptonomicon, which the novel sees as 
coming in on planes and academic conference circuits, and in which in many ways the American 
form closes out, The Baroque Cycle begins to offer passages in poststructural variants of cultural 
materialist terms. The System of the World offers a simple understanding of Berlant’s “false 
distinction between the merely personal and the profoundly structural” and with it “the narrow, 
privatised version of the American way of life.”
426
   
 
But relations between one who was a princess and one who was not were governed, 
not by what a Princess was really feeling and thinking, but rather by certain forms 
that were supposed to ensure the steady functioning of the Court, and by extension, 
the secular world. (vol. 3, 318)  
 
 
Eliza’s intimate scenes with Caroline, as with other women in the trilogy and across a wide variety 
of locations, constitute a variety of scenes played out in the gendered register of the female, can be 
read in Berlant’s transformative political terms that “seek to harness the power of emotion to 
change what is structural in the world.”
427
 Eliza’s intensively sexual white relations, in voluntary 
acquiescence with dominant male white metaculture, become an instinctive source of creative 
release. This is drawn in her affectionate relationship with Rossignol, where he, as the King’s 
cryptanalyst, is drawn into her vague prospect of social belonging.  
 
Rossignol […] extended his arms [to his baby]. He had never seen the woman 
before, and had no idea who she was, but it did not require a Royal cryptanalyst to 
read the situation: Eliza, despite being trapped and detained in Dunkerque with no 
money, had not only figured out a way to move into this vacant chateau, but had also 
managed to retain at least one competent, loyal, and trusted servant. (vol. 2, 48) 
 
Berlant’s critical confidence and good intention in affect and emotion is reflected in Eliza’s building 
of a community with “ex-whore […] Nicole, recruited from one of Dunkerque’s waterfront brothels 
[…] [and who] had already given the baby more love than he would get in a lifetime with 
Bonaventure Rossignol” (49). This scene creates an understanding of Berlant’s feminine realist-
sentimentality, which thrives in proximity to the political, and offers not so much an object of 
transgression but the instance of a structure of survival.  
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We see how Eliza grows from Berlant’s “loosely organised, market-structured juxtapolitical sphere 
of people attached to each other by a sense that there is a common emotional world available to 
those individuals who have been harshly treated in a generic way.”
428
  
 
Thus d’Avaux let her know the stakes of the game. She might end up in a work-
house, or a countess at Versailles. And her baby might be raised a thousand miles 
from her, or a thousand yards. Or so d’Avaux wished her to believe. But though she 
did not gamble, Eliza understood games. She knew what it was to bluff, and that 
sometimes it was nothing more than the sign of a weak hand. (vol. 2, 62) 
 
Eliza sends a message that shapes a historical form of American optimism “regardless of how what 
is personal has been threaded through mediating institutions and social hierarchy. It marks out the 
non-political situations of most ordinary life as it is lived as a space of continuity and optimism and 
social self-cultivation.”
429
 Her strange kind of optimism is to “know and understand things” (vol. 1, 
637). With some needlework we are told she “makes garments over into ones that, while not quite 
fashionable, will at least not expose her to ridicule” (vol. 1, 640). On the other hand, her fantasies at 
Versailles calibrate nothing for her in terms of how to live. Regardless of the “cruel words” which 
Liselotte places on her, Eliza knows that the “only cruel words” at Versailles are to express that 
“she is a nobody. And Madame had not said that. Consequently the King had to look at her for a 
few moments longer” (vol. 1, 644). Berlant writes “what makes a public sphere intimate is an 
expectation that the consumers of its particular stuff already share a worldview that they have 
derived from a broadly common historical experience. A certain circularity structures an intimate, 
therefore; its narrative and things are deemed expressive of that history while also shaping its 
conventions of belonging.”
430
 As we will see, many of Eliza’s relationships are posed in this way, 
and distinguish a view that is marked by fantasy.  
 
On meeting the bigger, older, richer, and stronger woman d’Oyonnax, a structure or relevancy is 
revealed in a “domain of detail [that] is always being negotiated, debated and taken personally.”
431
 
D’Oyonnax tells Eliza:  
 
There used to be at court many practioners of the Black Mass. Do you think that all 
of these people woke up one morning and said, today I shall worship and offer 
sacrifices to the Prince of Evil? Of course not. Rather it was that some girl, desperate 
to find a husband, so that she could not be sent off to live out the rest of her life in 
some convent, would hear a rumour that such and such a person could prepare a love 
potion. She would save her money and go into Paris and buy some magic powder 
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from some mountebank. Of course it had no effect at all; but she would cozen herself 
into believing it had worked a little bit, and so conceive a desperate hope and a 
desire for something a little bit stronger: a magic spell perhaps. One thing would lead 
to another, and in any time she might feel herself stealing the consecrated host from 
some church taking it to a cellar where a black mass would be sung over her naked 
body. Errant foolishness all of it. Foolishness leading to evil. But did she set out to 
do evil? Did she ever conceive of herself as evil? So much for lonely hearts 
desperate for love, said Eliza. What of those that were married, and whose husbands 
dropped dead? Did they act out of love? Do you propose to act out of love, 
mademoiselle? I have not heard the word love escape from your pretty mouth. I have 
heard something about honour instead; which tells me that you and I have more in 
common than you would like to admit. (vol. 2, 161)    
 
D’Oyonnax’s narration of anxiety and depression—what Sedgwick calls “those veerings of the 
sexual drive to find bearable terms of reciprocity in invented forms, nonce practices, or just 
adequate objects rather than holding out for entire ways of life,”—attempts not to be sucked into the 
encroaching de-differentiation of their material vehicles, such as the humanist frame of classical 
melancholia that keeps the ego attached to the lost object (so that emotionally it is not lost or you 
are lost with it).
432
 D’Oyonnax has no need for her fantasy to be material, and the exchange is 
expressed hyperbolically. Such a scene offers an affective framework, where d’Oyonnax offers a 
fantasy improvisation “so she can feel in a general sense that she has known the feeling of love and 
carries the memory of having been affectively recognised and emotionally important.”
433
 A type of 
broad shared circularity between these women signals survival techniques “which are forms of 
social realism when social suffering is the apriori of experience,”—and where, as Foucault argues, 
an a priori is not a condition of validity for judgements but a condition of the reality of 
statements.
434
 Together d’Oyonnax and Eliza address femininity from the perspective of mediated 
fantasies that draw out aesthetic gestures that define living as responsiveness to the urgencies of the 
ongoing moment. In the American ideology this small complex scene becomes big and simple in 
the revolutionary moment of its simplifying recognition.
435
  
 
McGurl’s suggestion about the experience economy becomes apt in drawing parallels with 
d’Oyonnax and Eliza. Rather than these figures symbolise allegorical parings doubled in a form of 
exilic conversion in the integrative narrative form (and thus simply reconstitute old components of 
labour power and disciplined capitalism), they draw alignments instead to how different material 
and expressive components have intermingled to form business hierarchies. Karl Palmas writes on 
the evolution of the corporation “as such, the history of the modern corporation can be understood 
as a series of innovations that have affected these components, and – more specifically – the ability 
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of corporate assemblages to “suck in” matter/energy and territorialize economic activity.”
436
 In 
relations between Eliza and d’Oyonnax, their business transactions are staged as a set of memorable 
experiences, and always held in tension with the thing being sold. D’Oyonnax tells fanatic Jesuit 
priest Edouard de Gex “perhaps I’m not so different as you phant’sy from Eliza. She is a business 
woman – she does nothing for free” (vol. 2, 640). D’Oyonnax further relates to de Gex the staging 
of business transactions as a set of memorable experiences that McGurl argues “would be as various 
as the individuals who enjoy them” (or not, as the case may be).
437
 D’Oyonnax tells de Gex a small 
story of a “thrall” (vol. 2, 641) she did not have, the point being that both Eliza and d’Oyonnax 
“affect a structure that emerges from the “double articulation” of corporate structures/components 
playing both material and expressive roles.”
438
 Palmas illustrates here what I argue are formal acts 
of resistance to new forms of modular domination when he writes:  
 
So, in an attempt to remove the spectre of Marx from the text, our focus should not 
be “how is Capital re-aligning itself against labour in the societies of control?” or 
“how does the value theory of labour manifest itself in this new society?” Rather, we 
could ask questions such as “how are the previously panoptic assemblages (notably 
corporations) maintaining their constancy, even though the disciplinary diagram is 
'finished'?” and “what are the new material and expressive components that yield 
assemblages and hierarchies?
439
 
 
Eliza and d’Oyonnax point to McGurl’s catastrophic deflation of brand name value (and per unit 
profitability), the organisation of new hierarchies of power in corporate assemblages, and Manuel 
de Landa’s circuit breaker that makes it possible to chart the emergence of new forms of control.
440
           
 
Using Berlant’s understandings, we see how women’s movement in The Baroque Cycle offers an 
experience that confirms some homogeneity and elaborates social distinctions. Berlant writes “the 
female complaint focuses on what has evolved and shifted around but not changed profoundly in 
the history of public-sphere femininity in the United States – a love affair with conventionality.”
441
 
Often the women’s culture concept in the trilogy “operates in concert though, sometimes in 
competition, [with] the couple/family form, the nation, and capitalism,” and in many ways 
identification with others such as d’Oyonnax and her identification with Eliza (vol. 2, 640) allows 
us to get hold of Berlant’s radical understanding of the privatisation of US citizenship.
442
 She 
writes: 
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More than ever, as the vote itself is seen as the corrupted vehicle for the 
misrepresentation of political will in the United States, citizenship is measured in the 
broader sense of social membership and is more likely to be enacted optimistically in 
response to events in mass culture especially those signifying evidence of democratic 
accident or ongoing violence – for example, the police beating of Rodney King, the 
Thomas Hill controversy, O.J. Simpson’s murder trial, and the attacks of September 
11, 2001.
443
  
 
Bercovitch’s account of “necessary friction between private interests and the public good” no 
longer holds when thinking in terms of society as a whole, when in The Baroque Cycle’s three 
volumes resistances are posed that link art to a people suffering injustices in societies of control.  
 
Misdirection from the State 
In the Queen, Berlant relates her political urgency to how conservative cultural politics aimed to 
dilute oppositional discourse of people of colour, women, gays, and lesbians. She expresses that, to 
stave off the assault of multiculturalism, and more specifically the tarnishing of the family and 
family-making, a supericonicity was produced. Berlant’s rebelling against an image that was 
“tacitly white [...] and the blueprint for the reproductive form that assures the family and the nation 
its future history” was largely due to how she saw how the Reaganite Era had exhausted cultural 
struggle over the material and symbolic conditions of US citizenship, and how in the culture wars 
the Right set out to incite nostalgia for a lost world of American iconicity, and that lost world as a 
utopian horizon of political aspiration.
444
 It was the moral and social conservatism of voters around 
issues such as abortion, crime and patriotism, Graham Thompson writes, that enabled Reaganomics 
to shape the decade.
445
 Reaganomics, Thompson argues, was not just an economic vision, but also a 
moral vision. It is important to understand Berlant’s argument within the view of patriotic 
nationalism of Reagan. She writes that this form of nation and national belonging elicits  
 
a rhetorical shift from a state based and thus political identification with nationality 
to a culture based concept of the nation as a site of integrated social membership; the 
expansion of a mass mediated space of public opinion formation that positions the 
citizens as isolated spectators to the publicity that claims to represent them; the 
marketing of nostalgic images of a normal familial America that would define the 
utopian context for citizen aspiration.
446
 
 
In many ways we see how Eliza is involved within the networks of sympathy and recognition that 
create alternative spaces of survival and solidarity. Berlant writes in the Anatomy “the law [of 
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statements] and the spaces of everyday life provide overlapping contexts for tracking the 
developments of official and intimate publics in the early US period.”
447
 Through Eliza, we access a 
specific way of understanding how US citizenship is privatised, and how Eliza can represent an 
aesthetic gesture that defines living as responsiveness to urgencies of the ongoing present. She 
offers Berlant’s concept of crisis ordinariness that “constitutes the struggle to master a social 
situation rife with contradictions about desire and suffering.”
448
 This, in turn, poses questions about 
how family history is now being produced through a genealogy of entertainments.  
 
In the trilogy, sons are abandoned, sons are found, families are ruined, babies wanted, babies not 
wanted, fathers doting, fathers not doting: these binaries do not make up the general patriarchal 
dichotomy or failed modernistic aesthetic. It does not even, when run through Eliza, amount to 
1990s market place criticism of the failed modernist aesthetic. In Eliza’s spaces of resistance, there 
is a breaking of the grotesque triangle of the Oedipus complex. It is more Deleuze than Freud as she 
breaks down all gendered dichotomies behind the façade of male corporatized consumer oriented 
relationships. Not only this, but Eliza diverts from Marxist materialist readings of the world of 
(male) gendered hierarchies, ground out in the mechanics of institutions and patriarchy. These 
institutions are, somewhat unusually, disconnected through Eliza from the exploitative modes 
behind the social imagining of the extraction of profit system that form surplus labour (and slow 
death through the attrition of subjects by the exchange values of capital). Not only do we see a 
divergence from traditionally held views on Marxism and patriarchal binary distinctions, in Eliza’s 
movement through the more complex nuances of capitalist oppression (an old story but not without 
some considerable weight), but understandings of power and governmentality flank representations 
of church professionals, and the centrality of the asylum Bedlam to civic social life.  
 
Eliza transvalues negativity as a marketized message, which now takes the detached quality of the 
commodity form, and brings into view Berlant’s concept of fantasy not as disavowal, but as an 
affective claim. As Eliza enters the opera house in volume three, she is directed not towards the 
swordplay between de Gex (the crackpot Jesuit priest who has a powerful and constantly distracting 
and obsessive infatuation with Eliza) and Jack (her lover and also her symbolic attachment to cruel 
optimism) but to the music of the violins and the violoncellos. “The theatre etiquette had somehow 
taken over from her street instincts, and she was disinclined to make a fuss [...] She was interrupted 
for a moment by a voice from the stage [...] Eliza cowered [...] those theatre-going habits again” 
(vol. 3, 578; 579). The shaming habits that involved going to an opening for Eliza (going to the 
opera previously, she was deemed a nobody, a counterfeit princess, a whore and thus entered the 
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circuit of shaming) is to embody an attitude that Berlant reads into the trope in her chapter on 
Dorothy Parker “going to an opening.” Reading through the commodity form Berlant writes that 
Parker, in order to “delaminate that scene of stuck potentiality from her image of having a life,” 
 
adapts the conventions of sentimental optimism not to express the American static 
nostalgia for a home in love that never existed nor to embody that Greek fierce 
nostalgia that asserts a sensually embodied communal knowledge against the 
political attritions of the present. Parker’s sentimentality is more Kafkaesque: a 
return to a door that is always open to (love); a self-reproaching reapproach to a 
scene that calls for courage despite the odds against being able to enter it and rest 
somewhere; and a kind of radical impassivity in her stubborn refusal to go 
somewhere else.
449
  
 
In this scene, Eliza also speaks of a home in love that never existed. It is there as she enters the 
opera house, in her stubborn refusal to go somewhere else.  
 
She thinks about the prophecy Jack had alluded to. Jack styled it a prophecy, 
anyway; in her mind it had been more in the nature of a blunt promise. She had 
spoken it to Jack twelve years ago in the Petit Salon of the Hotel Archon in Paris, 
with Louis XIV as witness. Most inconveniently she had forgot the exact wording of 
it. It had been something along the lines of that Jack would never see her face nor 
hear her voice until the day she died. Eliza being somewhat of a stickler for promises 
and commitments, she now reviewed the last few minute’s events in her mind, and 
satisfied herself that this promise had not yet been broken. At no time had Jack 
gotten a look at her [...] and she had not spoken any words he was likely to have 
heard. (vol. 3, 581-582)  
 
Berlant writes that such a pulse (Eliza’s commitment to undefendedness) is what the real ought to 
feel like.
450
 Eliza (and Caroline’s) negotiating with dangerous and disappointing worlds can be open 
towards politics but is abundantly on the outside of it refusing its status as determining the real of 
power agency or experience. In Berlant’s understanding, Eliza stands as a “paradigm female 
complainer” as she revolts against the kind of “Zizekian realism that sees fantasy as a mechanism of 
disavowal that enables failed ways of life to endure.”
451
 Attempting to read through Berlant’s 
affective complaint register, these women make demands for reciprocity on both persons and 
worlds. Berlant writes “the female complainer’s exemplarity derives not just from her skill at 
playing out a formally ambivalent and contradictory sexual politics in a long term historical context 
but also from the way the work expresses the formal problem of even imagining actually detaching 
from the disappointing object or world.”
452
 Eliza, Caroline, and d’Oyonnax offer senses of loss to 
compromised conditions of possibility, through which Berlant’s better worldness would exist if 
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only real life would step up to the plate.
453
 Their doubleness is a commitment to maintaining 
contradiction and a project of making explicit the difficulties of bargaining.   
  
Shame 
Through the broken circuit of shame and through the marginalised positions of women in the text 
and the way in which the world takes from Eliza, her son and her son is held captive by a demented 
banker whom the boy loves, the narrative expresses the formal problem of ever actually imagining 
detaching from the disappointing object or world. Berlant writes 
 
For [Sylvan] Tompkins, shame occurs when a child experiences the refusal of their 
attachment. When the child looks away because it feels that it’s been refused or 
rejected by its mother, that is the exemplary moment of shame. In my own work, I 
argue that the feeling of the world withdrawing from you and therefore throwing you 
back on yourself could be described as shame, but that says nothing about the 
experience of it. The broken circuit could also involve anger, numbness, hunger, a 
desire to self-stimulate, a compulsion to repeat, the pleasure of a recognition, grief, 
and/or curiosity, and these wouldn’t merely be defences against the impact of the 
pure feeling of shame, but actually different responses to being affectively cut off.
454
 
 
Eliza offers a way for us to read the experience of shame. The loss of her child to Lothar is not the 
end of the story. She is told that the boy will be her downfall (a bastard) if she does not agree to his 
demands to give him up. Already it is “too late” (vol. 2, 348-350) to do anything she tells Bob 
Shaftoe, and we never get a simple clear visceral truth about anything, neither in Eliza’s shame nor 
in her loss. Eliza manages her loss through what Berlant calls cruel optimism, a phrase which points 
to a condition different than that of melancholia, and a process of fomenting and circulating fantasy, 
within the condition of maintaining an attachment to a problematic object in advance of its loss.
455
 
 
Through Eliza’s attachment/detachment to Jean-Jacques as he becomes a lesson in a fomenting 
subject (in which the continuity of the form provides something of the continuity of what it means 
to keep on living, in a world that keeps on taking) we get to see an understanding of Berlant’s cruel 
optimism. Berlant’s larger project comes from a source of political depression. She writes  
 
The politically depressed position is manifested in the difficulty of detaching from 
life-building modalities that can no longer be said to be doing their work and that 
indeed become obstacles to the flourishing of the subjects whose optimism animates 
them. My assumption is that the conditions of ordinary life in the US are conditions 
of attrition or the wearing out of the subject and that the irony – that the labour of 
reproducing life in the contemporary world is also the activity being worn down by it 
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– has specific implications for thinking about the ordinariness of suffering the 
violence of normativity and the technologies of patience that keep these processes in 
place.
456
     
 
Eliza’s often ambitious fantasy–of being able to continue to make sense in the places that test the 
senses and overdetermine the object relations that make a world material for its inhabitants—is one 
way in which to remark that the trilogy invokes intimate publics, which attempt to break the 
universalising transcendence in pop homogeneity, compassionate self-performance and celebratory 
nationalist historicising. It is also how we see an aesthetic of attachment which is not oriented to the 
past disengaging from the ordinary present, in favour of excursions into cultural history whose 
relation to the “now” of its execution is largely left implicit. 
 
Affect: An Institutional or Interdisciplinary Concern 
Some have argued that it was naive to begin with to believe that mere changes in 
academic literary criticism could effect significant political change, as if theoretical 
and social revolution were coextensive. 
Eva Carton and Gerald Graff,
 The Cambridge History of American Literature457 
 
Starting with Graff and Carton’s above observation, in this final section I look to how Berlant’s 
affect formalism and principles of affective pedagogy are considered not as transcendences of 
cultural particularity, but rather from a point of view that sees it as a compelling aesthetic vehicle 
for the appreciation of that culture’s reassuring repositories of cultural diversity and authenticity.   
 
According to Berlant, affective politics (the displacement of politics to the realm of feeling) brought 
to the forefront of American policy concerning personhood brings no vision of sustained individual 
or collective criticism.
458
 Berlant sets this view as that which sets itself out in a conflict between a 
patriotic view of national identity, and a view that is frequently perceived as unpatriotic and victim-
obsessed. Rather than tack to existing debates about diversity, Berlant set out to work within the 
space of the American National Symbolic engaging with a fantasy-based concept of what mutuality 
in love might actually look like. This was unlike Habermas’s concept of mutuality, in which 
individuals come together to form a public body, but a public space where circumstances “are never 
just right; they are always just being righted.”
459
 In this manner, Berlant attacks the reassertion of 
publics in culture wars an idealised, nostalgic and singular version of the public sphere, where 
subaltern bodies and identities usually bear the burden of representing the desire for the nation 
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generally. Berlant argues that redefining citizenship, and framing what can legitimately be read as 
national, becomes more and not less central to any analysis of political identity in postmodern 
American culture. She writes:  
 
The definitional field of citizenship denoting simple identification by a national 
identity category a reflexive operation of agency and criticism or a mode of social 
membership is precisely what is under contestation as the development what we 
might call mass nationality changes the face of power both in the U.S. and 
globally.
460
  
 
Berlant moves on from the culture wars to the sex culture wars in which the national culture 
industry emphasises sexuality, the scandalous anus, and the cancerous breast as the fundamental 
index of a person’s political legitimacy. There is, of course, a diverse array of hetero- and 
homosexual relationships competing in Cryptonomicon, however, finally what comes through this 
zone of intimacy is not so much as an identity fixed for Randy but one that is at rest. Working from 
a homogenising friendship to a transgressive understanding that charts alternative cross-gender 
applications, as well as a queering of these applications (and because women’s culture is not so well 
thought out in this novel) does not alter Cryptonomicon’s narrative of dissent as one of revisionary 
continuity instead of rupture.  
 
The context for reading Cryptonomicon begins to change, as it is now situated within debates that 
centre on narrative re-visions of Hawthorne, and an aspect of nonconformist culture that sits 
problematically within the American metaculture. Readings challenged making consensus out of a 
misplaced emphasis on the object of study, arguing that it was impossible to find injustices in terms 
of regimes of truth, as they no longer carry within them an automatic political or cultural 
orientation. For Readings, the University of Excellence (a sad conflation of what Readings argued 
the university without external referentiality should be) is now understood as a bureaucratic system, 
whose regulation is entirely self-interested without regard to wider ideological imperatives. 
Notwithstanding Reading’s reading that the stakes of the University of Culture’s functioning are no 
longer essentially ideological (because they are no longer tied to the self-reproduction of the nation-
state) and feminism is exemplary only for its introduction of a radical awareness of gender 
difference. Berlant looks to uncover new modular forms of domination being brought forward in 
affective protocols/selfhoods reorganised around questions of the political collective identity of 
national state. She argues that the politics of intimacy should no longer overorganise the terms of 
public discussion about power, ethics and the nation. Having seen no real way out of culture wars, 
Berlant took to re-examining the Reaganite Revolution and the ways it had been opposed. 
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Cryptonomicon, via Berlant’s critical lexicon, is given an alternative productive base. However, its 
resistances to opportunistic exercises of transnationalising US American literary studies is to view 
the long half-life of the politics of the counterculture, and the rise and resistances to New Left 
theory in the humanities. This is in addition to seeing how shoring up moral authority within 
existing academic hierarchies is to see them form comfortable accommodation with the state 
bureaucracies that currently finance and control higher education.
461
  
 
John Guillory’s seminal text had an optimal effect on the canon, sex, or culture wars, and shifted 
terms of assimilation and separation, cultural politics and real politics. Guillory helped move a 
certain brand of cultural studies from politically untenable claims on cultural interventions in the 
politics of American national culture to their institutionalisation in the North American academy. 
We see also here the oppositional backlash mounting to too much unnecessary jargon inflected by 
too much Leftist quasi-sociological shaping analysis on institutions, including the institution of 
literature. Although Foucault’s concepts of governmentality are used in sociological analysis, 
McGurl argues “Discipline and Punish is not a similar kind of book to Goffman’s Asylum (1961).”
 
462
 The point, here, is that a certain kind of Leftist imaginary, linked to post-war practices of higher 
educational reform (i.e. multiculturalism) is in the process of being completely removed and 
isolated from strands of critical thinking. Guillory’s central claim is quite startling:  it somehow 
revives, maximises or ends the period formerly known as contemporary, giving a salient reminder 
that anti-institutional posthistorical discourse is simply the continuing production of a certain kind 
of professionalization of literary studies in US university contexts. Guillory moved emphases of 
canon debate over to terms of their institutionality. Before McGurl’s subsequent revamped 
institutional analysis, Guillory’s codifications were part of larger debates about formalism versus 
historicism in the university, as we see in debate taking place between Graff and Readings. Graff 
responded to Readings’s debunking of his method of teaching the conflicts (and the implications it 
held for the organisation of departments in universities) by explaining that  
 
there exists enough common discourse between Cheney and hooks to permit the 
reasons why these two are at odds to become intelligible to students and other third 
parties. Neither I nor Bill could have described the incommensurability of such 
discourses if no such metadiscourse were possible.
463
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Graff moved his understanding of “a traditional political Left as an avatar of the Right” to teach the 
conflicts within Bercovitch’s model of dissensus, seeing how there could be no real outcome from 
aesthetic radicalism’s critiques of Enlightenment modernity.
464
 Graff, for Readings comes to act 
more like an administrator, and, in Moten and Harney’s terms “he goes upstairs in polite company 
among the rational men.”
465
 Graff’s clarification on cultural incoherence is how Readings saw the 
university as becoming to resemble a place of work rather than a grouping of a place of scholars. 
Notwithstanding the seriousness of the issues, Bercovitch and Graff’s joint efforts of restoration, 
rather than emphasise radical reform has been a smart example, encouraging scholars not just to do 
their own thing, but also to remerge in spaces of public debate.     
 
In marking out Graff and Bercovitch’s interventions into US literary canon formation—as 
Derridean différance became irreversibly linked to nationalist politics and the pluralist theme of 
cultural difference, and Foucauldian lenses brought forward the notion of literature as part of some 
strategic operation: a locus of discursive –power—they each circumscribe Berlant’s post-nationally-
concentrated cultural interventions in the politics of mainstream American national culture. 
Exploring certain characters in Cryptonomicon within Berlant’s affect and psychoanalytical 
formalism helps to illuminate debates of Graff and Readings, and sociological links taken out 
between Guillory and McGurl to move beyond culture wars, along with what it was post-war 
professors taught in the classroom. Berlant’s experimental explanatory power, although running 
counter to the main current of history in the university, is still relevant. Strains of American 
poststructuralism in Cryptonomicon offer it as relevant to view areas of literary critical debate in 
contemporary US scholarship, yet we see also how postmodern principles of fusion through 
fragmentation never made it far past the university walls. In McGurl’s analysis and writing on “the 
consolidating of theory’s empire” he argues how theory “had noticeable effects on Sandra 
Cisneros’s writing, which it is tempting to sum up simply as its postmodernisation.”
466
 It would be 
tempting to sum up Berlant’s (writing) in a similar way, yet her art is not only the thing produced if 
there is a retreat into the professionalisation of literary discourse rather than in active spaces of 
public debate. 
 
Graff writes “although it has become a common place that literary criticism itself is a political act 
and is inseparable from power, this view has arisen at a moment when criticism has become 
peculiarly closed off within the university, a fact that complicates further the problem of how the 
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political effects of criticism should be measured.”
467
 From the perspectives of Guillory, Graff and 
Bercovitch, and more belatedly McCann, Szalay, and McGurl, a dominant literary critical pattern 
emerges against Berlant and her postmodern synthesis of postructural themes. Graff and Carton 
further set the tone for literary and cultural theory’s demise in its radical anti-consensus formulation 
arguing:  
 
In part the theoretical drive is an extension of the professionalizing and 
systematising impulse that dates back to the beginnings of academic literary study in 
the 1940s. Unlike the theorizing of the 1940s and 1950s, however, the most 
prominent theories since the 1960s have sought not to consolidate and rationalise 
existing professional procedures and assumptions but to challenge and deconstruct 
them. Theory is what results in a period of dissensus, as Bercovitch calls it, a 
moment when premises which at one time were so shared within a community they 
did not have to be recognised as premises, something that has happened today to 
formerly received ideas about what literature is and what counts as great literature or 
as proper reading.
468
 
 
McGurl’s reading of the postwar literary experience in the US, through the concept of the 
emergence of the creative writing program, offers an alternative to sum up Graff and Bercovitch’s 
shifting of rhetorical aesthetic experience, and forces further reconsiderations of those who “took 
inspiration from the vivaciously creative postructuralist cognitive style.”
469
  
 
Avoiding the temptation to sum up Berlant’s affective complaint as part of some academic jargon, 
or simply to see her writing as its postmodernisation, John Johnston argues that she “does more than 
simply foreground affect as a new critical focus, by demonstrating that from such registrations of 
affect as are evident in these novels we can learn to recognise and chart the singularities of 
experience that define our present, both in its historical determinations and still-forming vectors of 
becoming different and unknown.”
470
 Johnson is an avid enough reviewer of Berlant to give affect 
theory a fair critical hearing without simply reconsidering it as endemic of a powerful background 
contextual coherence rooted in mid-nineteenth-century American literary classics. However, the 
picture painted of Randy largely shows that academic jargon as Graff and Carton contend is a 
stumbling block for readers who might otherwise be willing to give that criticism a fair hearing. 
Summing up Randy’s mood in the US can be given a comparison in Philip Gould’s recent book 
review on Steven Shapiro’s The Culture and Commerce of the Early American Novel: Reading the 
Atlantic World-System (2008). Although expressing how there are many insightful revisionist 
avenues explored, the reviewer writes on Shapiro’s need to turn towards jargon.  
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The first part of the book offers a sweeping synthesis of social and economic history 
of the colonial periphery of the British Empire, issuing statements like this one: The 
Caribbean trade probably ensured the Republic’s survival as a political entity. 
Shapiro however offers a thorough analysis of the geoculture of this mercantile class, 
which was involved in the subjects of sensibility, sensation, slavery, and 
sentimentality. The second half turns to the writings of Benjamin Franklin and 
Charles Brockden Brown in light of this geocultural context. Though these readings 
are plagued by jargon, they offer insightful moments about individual texts, 
particularly Brown’s novels.
471
 
 
As equally telling as the insightful moments, what comes through for the American reviewer is the 
author’s turn towards academic jargon. This can seem perverse as Carton and Graff suggest and 
write:  
 
This sort of objection to recent criticism has been frequently — and in some 
instances appropriately — raised. For this reason, it seems necessary before 
proceeding to take up the question of "jargon," partly in explanation of the current 
jargon we will be using in writing this history, but also because the jargon of recent 
criticism is the most persistent stumbling block for readers who might otherwise be 
willing to give that criticism a fair hearing. To many, such jargon seems to have no 
function except to confer a spurious mantle of expert superiority on the critic, 
shrouding the discussion of literature in mysteries that exclude lay readers and 
students. Moreover, jargon seems particularly reprehensible when applied to 
literature, since, in modern times, it is literature that has been supposed uniquely able 
to resist language's technological debasement. Finally, the perversity of jargon seems 
compounded when critics claim to seek the transformation of society while speaking 
in a vocabulary that is incomprehensible to those whose lives are presumably to be 
transformed.
472
  
 
A similar claim is levelled more bluntly at Charlene’s critical theory. Her unnecessary jargon in 
defamiliarising the language of common sense looks to make cases of egregious inequality seem 
like a structural condition, rather than exceptions to the national standard. Or, as Foucault would 
say “we have seen the enemy and he is us.”
473
 Essentially portrayed as an “Old Left critic,” Randy, 
with his allusions to Horatio Alger, is caught between Leftist evaluations of poststructural 
performances and a naively realist Cartesian epistemology. Bending a critical reformulation of 
Graff’s on American poststructuralists Randy’s “claim to designate reality as if it were out there 
prior to linguistic formulation is a logophallocentirc mystification, regardless of what may have 
been intended by the claim.”
474
 In Cryptonomicon, as in The Baroque Cycle, Charlene now bears all 
the hallmarks of a naughty child being allowed for too long to do her own thing.    
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The understanding of being able to “to do your own thing” was covered in Graff’s response to 
Readings, and Bercovitch’s conflation of political scientist Sandel’s crisis concerns into a revision 
of continuity where the symbol of America continues to be the miracle of progress. Graff believed 
that those that followed the radical anti-consensus brigade had closed criticism off within the 
university, and he saw that as complicating the problem of how the political effects of criticism 
should be measured. Bercovitch argued that to do your own thing in liberal strands of individualist 
democracy was only part of the symbolic story nationalist America told itself. In The Baroque 
Cycle, Daniel’s brother Raleigh is similarly charged, alongside the banker Apthorp. They are 
conceived as playing a trick on the whole of a self-determining American culture (confirming 
Graff’s analysis of the ideological origins of the American Revolution) as they transform one 
former belief system (i.e. Catholicism and hereditary birthright) into another variant of the same 
dominant culture (i.e. British Whig parliamentarianism). This is a culture not so much conceived in 
liberation but in liberalism. As Jehlen argues, “it was a new home that the middle-class built for 
itself according to a design it deemed not only desirable but natural.”
475
 Natural laws (of the 
market) in the trilogy are underwritten by Newton’s natural philosophy (a Whig construct), and not 
theological matters or hereditary birthright. Bercovitch argues that this was the ideological context 
of the debate in the early republic (i.e. should our allegiance be imperial or national, Anglo-
American or self-determined?) about the mission of American literature. In many ways, The 
Baroque Cycle is all about reclaiming ground from this ideological context. Enoch Root asks Daniel 
“who or what are you? And why does Creation teem with others like you, and what is your 
purpose?” (vol. 1, 880) Daniel rebukes Root for being too comfy with Newton and constitutionalist 
Locke (Routes to self-determination are maligned in this liberal political consensus formation, Root 
here being the operative word).
476
 Daniel takes the root of self-determination but only through a 
strand of an alternative form of colonial organisation. On the other hand, Enoch Root resembles 
both sides of the dominant contract now being enacted in England. He represents both Anglo-
imperial aspects of American allegiance, and the spurious legacy of America conceived in a 
gentleman’s club liberalism. Daniel’s character is made complex. His alternate form of domination 
(self-determination) is run through the legacies of Leibniz, not Newton or Locke, and thus an 
alternative narrative in philosophy is given to America’s emergence from oppression. This debate in 
the early republic about the mission of American literature is circular (notwithstanding Neal 
Stephenson’s attempt to singlehandedly determine a new metaphysics of presence for the entire 
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early republic), and Graff accordingly concurs with the dissensus model to break this circularity, 
through which Bercovitch establishes his American symbolic lexicon.   
 
Berlant’s winnowing out an affective National Symbolic to draw out structural conditions of 
possibility challenge Bercovitch’s observations on resolving crisis. She writes  
 
Americaness is as central to their sense of entitlement and desire as any family name 
and tradition and sensation itself might be. The nation’s presence in the generic 
citizen’s daily life is more latent and unconscious than it is in his incidental, 
occasional relation to the national symbols, spaces, narratives and rituals: still, 
whether consensually or passively transmitted, national identity requires self-
ablation. Citizenship becomes equivalent to life itself and also looms as a kind of 
death penalty: both activity in and exile from the political public sphere feel like 
cruel and unjust punishment. It is apparently a quality of nations to claim legal and 
moral privilege to inspire identification and sacrifice, as well to make citizens feel 
violated in public and private. Thus the complexity of Hawthorne’s tone: the pain 
and pleasure of his citizenship and the sublime jocularity of his exile.
477
 
 
Not only do we see Berlant move her terms from a Eurocentric model of the state to a post-
nationally-concentrated cultural identity politics, but also from the issue of hegemony discussed by 
Raymond Williams, brought forward from Gramsci’s stress on ideological hegemony as a totality 
“which is lived at such a depth, which saturates the society to such an extent that it even constitutes 
the limits of common sense for most people under its sway.”
478
 Endemic to the American context, 
Berlant too conforms to the model of dissensus, under which Graff also moved his terms.   
 
Alongside Berlant’s critical reading (of Hawthorne) her defamiliarization techniques, in which 
“there is no inevitable America and dominant ideological and political formation that means 
America,” were the postmodern unintelligible claims that resulted in overburdening the traditional 
identity.
479
 Charlene’s posture with respect to the new national-utopian promise reflected in Kivistik 
resulted in the backlash to poststructural politics and postmodernist themes, and the approaching 
doctrine of multiculturalism. However, Berlant continues to take issue with the largely male-
structured modes of address of the American Renaissance, and her National Symbolic is to express 
a commitment to literary form for literary historicism, resituating the American cultural object in a 
redefining mode of (historical) praxis.
480
   
 
Two Sides of Glory 
                                                          
477
 Berlant, Anatomy, 4.  
478
 See Berlant, Anatomy, 259, and Jehlen, “The Novel and the Middle Class in America,” 127. 
479
 Berlant, Anatomy, 16.  
480 Berlant, Anatomy, 29. 
194 
 
In my final reading of Cryptonomicon, I develop themes that sit within Bercovitch and Berlant’s 
national reimagining of the postwar literary experience. Their twin aspects of reading Hawthorne 
are taken as a comparative lens, not interdisciplinary analysis, to focus on the institutionalisation of 
contemporary US literary criticism. In each case, the US is made to express and shape critically a 
particular culture’s mode of resolving crisis. Bercovitch’s view maximises the new historicist 
imaginary. Berlant’s proposition is that an official state imaginary accounts fully neither for its own 
or its citizens’ experiences, memories opinions or desires. She follows Stuart Hall in the Anatomy, 
arguing how the nation was suggestively “the horizon of the taken-for-granted.”
481
 Yet, as Giles 
argues, her reading of Hawthorne can hardly be understood except within the framework of 
particular contexts endemic to American culture.
482
 Bercovitch’s model of dissensus and her 
intimate public convertibility to politics (or to be something other than a failure to be politics) 
expend serious amounts of energy on what is the final outcome of the scarlet letter. Hawthorne’s 
work in this context is not only an index to the profundity of his times, but a site of extraordinary 
expression. As such, Bercovitch and Berlant offer wedded but separate conflicting demands on 
contemporary US literary studies, and each can be given their merit of intercultural esteem within 
aesthetic concepts of cultural diversity and authenticity.     
 
Rereadings of Hawthorne, although conducted in the late 1980s and 1990s, reflect a current site of 
contrast. What amounts to a disclaimer, expressed in a recent article by Berlant, suggests that this 
debate is still alive and current. Berlant’s debate with Bercovitch would symbolize to Graff how it 
is active antagonism that restores traditional principles in the university, without repeating older 
alignments or forcing a further retreat into the professionalisation of literary discourse. Harney and 
Moten’s slogan that “there is no distinction between the American university and 
professionalisation,” in this context, is unnecessarily reductive, and which Graff would signal as 
only criticism that has become closed off within the university. Before she begins to write her 
review on Whitehead and Gibson (the same article on which Johnson writes his review of her) she 
offers this: 
 
The essay to follow takes as its literary archive two models that are, in some strong 
sense, about the US [...] However it claims no interest in contributing to American 
literary history insofar as that project sees the US as the protagonist of its own story 
or even as the magnet that organises stories about it, however chaotically. Rather this 
essay takes on the linked problem of writing the history of the present and the 
literary history of the present. It sees the problem of affect, a problem of 
                                                          
481
 Berlant, Anatomy, 202.  
482
 See Giles, Transatlantic Insurrections, 164.  
195 
 
apprehending heightened moments in which certain locales become exemplary 
laboratories for sensing or intuiting contemporary life.
483
 
 
Berlant now sees the contemporary period, and with it the male ethics of privilege, completely 
enshrined in Bercovitch’s antagonistic model of dissensus. She continues to track in her own 
formalist aesthetic conditions of survival that enable the reproduction of normativity not as a 
political program but as a structure of feeling, and as an affect singling out that her mode of 
tracking injustice generates relief from the political, as it is a space managed by elites—and 
accordingly a field of threat that retraumatizes rather than offer conditions of possibility.
484
  
 
As a culturally non-affirming type in relation to dissensus, in the Queen Berlant carries an early 
riposte to those that had developed a labile and optimistic cultural pluralist perspective. Her notion 
of “Diva Citizenship” as a “genealogy that is only now beginning to be written” is therefore made 
to express a salient point to 1990s feminist writers examining neglected women’s writing of early 
American literature.
 485
 The Diva for Berlant  
 
Renarrates the dominant history as one that abjected people have once lived sotto 
voice, but no more; and she challenges her audience to identify with the enormity of 
the suffering she has narrated and the courage she has had to produce, calling on 
people to change the social and institutional practices of citizenship to which they 
consent [...] Her witnessing turns into a scene of teaching and heroic pedagogy.
486
 
 
Berlant here alludes to Anita Hill’s highly publicised sexual harassment claims as she testifies 
before the Senate and the American people. Berlant writes “yet in remaking the scene of public life 
into a spectacle of subjectivity it can lead to a confusion of wilful and memorable rhetorical 
performance with social change itself.”
487
 Berlant’s argument here is that narrative 
revisions/normative optimism of the self and collective selfhood that are culturally affirming 
reproduce what Giles argues is “the conceptual matrix framing and informing those very categories 
which it seeks to evade or renew.”
488
 Berlant’s affect formalism is a strategy, it can be argued, that 
turns nihilism into a complex fantasy of real belonging, and informs complementary dialogues such 
as Sianne Ngai’s reinterpretation of classical aesthetic concepts as ugly feelings. 
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In Berlant we see how artefacts in the intimate public that carries a vernacular sense of belonging 
overhaul weighted responses towards Republicanism and liberalism in national literary history 
(begging the question of Clinton’s phoney compassion and boxer shorts jibe in attempts to inhabit 
intimate publics). In many ways, Berlant works her affect formalism on political spheres that 
require active antagonism, seeing a need to relate a complex sphere of intimacy to nationality or 
political metaculture. Peter Coviello writes in his review of Berlant’s The Female Complaint that 
this “intimate public sphere is produced by agents and proponents of women’s culture,” begging the 
question of whether Stephenson is a kind of feminist.
489
 The compassionate view that is, circa 2003, 
recycled as the Republican view, promotes “highly symbolised, relatively immobile structures of 
intimate attachment from the family and the nation to God.”
490
 Berlant is at odds with the ethics of 
privilege on compassionate conservative grounds. 
 
Rorty’s culture wars on the politics of difference brought a renewed sense of patriotic optimism 
towards American civic national pride. His pessimistic accounting of professionalism and 
institutionalisation held that un-patriotic behaviours extended harmfully into critical teaching 
practices of the national school curriculum. He wrote:  
 
 The heirs of the New Left of the 1960s have created, within the academy, a cultural 
Left. Many members of this Left specialise in what they call the politics of 
difference or of identity and recognition. The Leftist ferment, which had been 
centred before the 1960s in the social science departments of the colleges and 
universities moved into the literature departments. The study of philosophy – mostly 
apocalyptic French and German philosophy – replaced that of the political economy 
as an essential preparation in Leftist initiatives.
491
  
 
However, what is important for my reading of Berlant is how Rorty’s highly publicised debates 
with Martha Nussbaum shifted literary emphases in a unique way as he urged for the central 
importance of “the emotion of national pride” and a “shared sense of national identity.”
492
 Berlant 
sought to challenge those that attempted to return to “what was sometimes called the American way 
of life” did so from a species assumption of what America was.
493
 She argues that not only is there 
“no inevitable America, no ur-American citizen, no simple emergent, archaic and dominant 
ideological or political formation that means America” but also that 
 
In the patriotically permeated pseudo public sphere of the present tense, national 
politics does not involve starting with the a view of the nation that as a space of 
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struggle violently separated by racial sexual and economic inequalities that cut 
across every imaginable kind of social location. Instead the dominant idea marketed 
by patriotic nationalists is of a core nation whose survival depends on personal acts 
and identities performed in the intimate domains of the quotidian.
494
  
 
In many ways, Berlant’s the Queen offers an alternative to debates on ethical, cultural, moral and 
national educational curriculum reforms. In her seminal study on Hawthorne, Berlant moved within 
these terms (and backlashes to the new historicism) by concentrating on the culture and politics of 
emotion, which, it turned out described a particular kind of social relation. “Indeed, [she writes] it 
would be possible to make an argument about the image of the human the compassion archive 
provides for us that could bring down on our heads the whole project of feeling committed to 
compassion.”
495
 Unlike Guillory, Bercovitch, Graff (or even Readings) Berlant writes from within 
the parameters of dissensus (being smart enough) but follows philosophical ideals (and dialectical 
images) of Benjamin, Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze and Gamben, which work against 
administrative and curricular strategies (and an endlessly repeated foundation) that consensus critics 
in the US promote.   
 
Without pushing affect theory too far forward into what it can do for surrounding public spheres 
Berlant argues that it allows many critical theorists to shift between analyses of love and the social. 
She writes “the political question is how to understand the difficulty of attaching love from life-
worlds that wear out life rather than sustain it.”
496
 Berlant’s argument is traced to the upsurge on 
literature surrounding sentimentality. Leonard Cassuto writes 
 
Sentimentalism, in short, is enjoying an exciting afterlife in American literary and 
cultural studies, with no end in sight to its resurgence. Sentimentalism now functions 
as a kind of prism through which to understand myriad cultural realms. As a result, it 
has become a source of some of the most vital and creative work being done in 
today’s American studies. That is a considerable historical legacy, but the effect of 
sentimentalism also extends to the present. Sentimentalism turns out to be a 
remarkably long-lived example of the power of the imagination to affect the 
organisation of real life. The real life in this case is the way that people think about 
family and domesticity and the way that they act – both privately and publicly – on 
their thoughts and beliefs.
497
 
 
There is, then, no need to make outlandish proposals on the nature of Berlant’s interpretive activism 
and affect theory (as it tries not to absorb in a pluralist semiotic the fractures of social hierarchy) 
other than it questions the nature of family and domesticity, and the relation between public and 
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private worlds. In one sense, we can see how language, in Berlant’s affective complaint register of 
specific gendered norms and “the nation’s presence in the generic citizen’s everyday life,” cast fears 
about the ways that families have worked in the past.
498
 It, however, does not offer newer 
arrangements for how they might work in the future, or as Berlant argues not at least in “an idiom 
of politics, or valued in the elitist terms of value that mark capitalist culture.”
499
 This opens the 
space for a Rortyian dialogue where a cultural Left posited little in the way for notions of reform. 
However, Berlant’s radical ambivalence, which Rorty (and Bercovitch, perhaps more 
complicatedly) would argue stops short of political involvement.
500
 In many ways, Berlant 
surrenders the play of policy to the elites, and deals in the common experience of the everyday, and 
to see how “the creative energy of living has gotten taken up in intimate spheres that promote such 
absorption.”
501
 She does, however offer endlessly uncompromised space through the holding 
together of the utopian promise and critical lack, in which one can sense the loss of a beloved object 
and to compromised conditions of possibility. Fluck writes 
 
If the unifying conflict (and the tacit claim that it is the key to America) is 
established metonymically then various claims for submerged foundations can easily 
co-exist. Depending on what conflict is put at the centre, America looks different and 
yet it is always the same because all the different conflicts point to the same 
fundamental problem that of systematically produced forms of misrecognition. This 
is in fact the normative basis of the radical cultural critique voiced by diversity 
studies: a radical egalitarianism that can speak in one breath, as Lauren Berlant does, 
of the continued and linked virulence of racism, misogyny, heterosexism, economic 
privilege and politics in American culture. Which one of the submerged foundations 
is the key foundation – racial difference, gender difference, empire or the imaginary 
nation-state – need not be decided in the context, because, despite their difference 
they are manifestations of the same underlying principle. The American literary 
history that we currently have is that of different social movements which co-
exist.
502
    
 
Although operating under a project that comes from what remains a source of political depression, 
Berlant’s intimate public, although held in Bercovitch’s culture that absorbs in a pluralist semiotic 
the fractures of social hierarchy, remains a strong practical and defamiliarizing force.
503
 It is still a 
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relevant angle of vision in current debate, even if it is only a rather compelling aesthetic vehicle for 
dissensus appreciation. 
 
An apology of sorts for Berlant’s argument is in need, because it is widely accepted in this current 
historical conjuncture that the substitution of an ethics of difference for political reason failed to 
uphold systematically cultural appeals over more traditional politics. In other words, there is now a 
problem with contextual philosophers who have shown a tendency to assign, no matter how 
reluctantly, some sort of favoured status to moral appeals which stress equality as well as mutual 
recognition and appreciation of different forms of life.
504
 Berlant writes that the urgency for 
counterpublic scholarship “has led to conventional distortions in the moral and political analysis of 
subculture, a concept that has been rightly critiqued for its tendency to homogenise members 
without having a concept of homogeneity as a desire.”
505
 This illuminates not only fears 
surrounding a Left point of view facing obscurity, as traditional economic and political programs no 
longer have the same power to illuminate situations or motivate actions, but also interdisciplinary 
analysis now under increasing pressure from a new sociology of literature. As Shai Dromi and Eva 
illouz write, literary ethical critique is now threatening to paralyse cultural inquiry, and see how 
“while the various offshoots of Marxian, Gramscian, and feminist approaches to texts and culture 
have been immensely useful in highlighting the social underpinnings of literature and its role in 
relaying formations of power, these perspectives now threaten to paralyze cultural inquiry by 
relying on mechanistic distinctions between the powerful and the oppressed.”
506
 In the context, 
where there is an unplanned response to conservative laws of government, do characters such as 
Randy and Avi as they fly across the Pacific achieve any recognisable aims?
507
 Held as they are in 
readings of Frankfurt school theories of power and ensuing European-led poststructural reflections 
on presentism, relativism and cryptononormativism they preserve, as Habermas expresses, 
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transcendental performances in the basic concept of power while driving from it every trace of 
subjectivity. Again, this is not a further mediation of those that mediate on Foucault per se, only 
that these political and economic arrangements of power, as Frank Lentricchia argues, “rob the self 
of itself by rationalising the self in the name of the genius of capital and the commidification of 
human labour.”
508
 Change was evidently needed in the US, but the entwinement of instrumental 
reason and domination that substitute economic and political programs of welfare state liberalism 
and socialism for the aporias of theories of power are now seen to have made unintelligible the 
American experimental potential space. The abstract quality of these appeals could only be upheld 
systematically by culturally contextualizing them, and thus making their validity contextual. While 
William Spanos argues that this gave Native Americans, blacks, women, gays, ethnic minorities a 
cultural context to answer back to dominant culture, E. D. Hirsch argued “at what cost?” Berlant 
remains once removed from these concerns, preferring to use the unplanned response to 
conservative laws of government, by binding the more abstract qualities of US citizenship (linking 
regulation to desire, affect to political life) to something that seems stable, like national, racial, 
sexual, gendered, and class identity. In this way, as Fluck points out, Berlant can speak in one 
breath of the continued and linked virulence of racism et cetera.    
 
Is it possible to see, in Cryptonomicon’s writing on women’s culture, debates about an ethics of 
privilege that has moved from the Great Society welfare state to a very small individualistic and 
self-sufficiency based one. Amy, in pushing Randy into having what Berlant calls a “humanising 
emotion” that is not a spectacle of subjectivity, offers the opportunity to reappraise these concerns. 
Charlene’s compassion for the other, whose suffering is deemed to be social, provides energies of 
attachment that can indeed become, as Berlant argues “mobilised as counterpublicity but usually 
aren’t.”
509
 On compassion, Berlant writes “yet in remaking the scene of public life into a spectacle 
of subjectivity cultivates the liberal cultivation of expensive, selfish and impotent subjectivity.”
510
 
In contrast to Amy’s compassion for Randy, which is hard fought, Charlene’s compassion is the 
cultivation of “expensive, selfish and impotent subjectivity [...] where permanent Cultural 
Revolution coexists with permanent political deadlock.”
511
 Charlene’s compassion for Randy 
promotes confusion, as she aligns it through memorable rhetorical performance adduced with social 
change itself.
512
 Berlant writes “social optimism has costs when its conventional images enforce 
normative projects of truth and orderliness.”
513
 Randy equates Charlene’s policies for social change 
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to the “schoolmarmishness he sees in all her friends” (27). The academics in the novel are made to 
sit comfortably and uncomfortably in relation to Kivistik. Berlant writes “this kind of bargaining 
demands scrutiny, in that desires for progress in some places are so often accompanied by comfort 
with other social wrongs.”
514
 Charlene, in her desire to be non-conventional, makes peace with 
comfort and security afforded by Kivistik, finding her conditions of possibility in a codified 
triangulation of dominance, exemplified in the novel as coming from somewhere else. The easy 
elision of the national into the transnational that Cryptonomicon makes in its use of the aesthetic 
form of metafiction as it is tied to leftist politics is made just as easily back again, as certain 
downward pressures are now placed on overtly pluralist fictions, and is most evident where the 
novel sits dangerously on the boundaries of US nationhood.    
 
Beside Berlant’s dangerous boundary lines and intersects (cultural exchanges), Cryptonomicon 
stabilises the social hierarchy, and a pure hierarchy of goodness ensues. Of course the author of 
Cryptonomicon does not write from the New Critic’s church of impersonality (and thus he is not 
immediately sullied as the invisible whiteness in high poetic formalism), however his attempt to 
find a singular voice to unite within the shared subjectivism of the non-formalist historiographic 
method is undercut by a strong communitist appeal born out of racial (or national) not cultural 
allegiance to identity. This type of authorial self-expression relays a link to the Bercovitch model of 
reinstating history in aesthetic criticism that can now in turn be linked to the breaking of anti-
consensus ties between antirealist or postmodern epistemology in the US. The reformulation allows 
us to reconsider those specific orientations of Leftist politics when approaching the reading of the 
text. Intersects between French différance and US cultural pluralism (transnational literary 
approaches) are, in other words, no longer deemed necessary or salient in approaches to reading 
literary fictions in the US. In fact, they are deemed as highly damaging by cultural historians in this 
field. The limited experiences of characters framed in large-scale wartime trauma in 
Cryptonomicon, rather than reflect a European-led response to the despondencies of the Second 
World War, highlight the shift in ethical priority of literary theory to the US (a return of history, 
class and economics). Berlant’s cultural work is significant in the US, in that she posits Giles’s 
uneasy awareness to the new nation’s own strategies of internal racial colonisation. As he argues, to 
“resituate American literature within a postcolonial matrix is not to confine it within a rigid 
theoretical model of coercion and resistance but to suggest how various vectors of authority and 
authorization criss-crossed each other in complicated patterns with time and space.” Bringing such a 
transnational literary based perspective is not my intention, yet it is important to see a reaction 
across the Atlantic to what Giles argues is a “doggedly antitheoretical outlook [...] of US cultural 
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scholars to reconceive national narratives in the light of wider global framework”: a debate that had 
already been covered as I have shown between Readings and Graff.
515
  
 
It is important finally to return to Guillory’s understanding of the subject who is supposed to know 
at this point. Guillory writes: 
 
We observe that Lacan and de Man appear to set off resolutely in opposite 
theoretical directions but that they end up in the same place, the place of the subject 
who is supposed to know. The ineradicability of this subject for the disciples is 
evidence of how difficult it was for them to learn de Man’s lesson. But that is 
because their transference is an unconscious replication of psychoanalysis’s 
transference transferred and hence it displaces the desire of the disciple to nowhere 
by reducing it to a pathos which is only tangentially involved in the cognitive 
processes of teaching. The disciples cannot possibly know what to do with their 
affect because the transference it signifies is supposed to correspond to nothing in 
the teacher since he has no desire. In his impersonality he rather resembles language 
itself or more accurately he resembles his teaching about language. To return now to 
the argument about the resistance to theory we can see in retrospect that the 
disavowal of the intersubjective relationship in the context of teaching for de Man a 
necessary consequence of the advent of theory, which occurs with the introduction of 
linguistic terminology into the metalangauge about literature.
 516
   
 
Guillory’s debate hinges on how theorists de Man and Lacan set off resolutely in opposite 
directions, yet end up in the same place: i.e. the subject that is supposed to know. This debate 
largely centres on the transferral of linguistic terminology into the metalangauge about literature. 
The argument becomes circular in the Graff/Readings debate as each critic believed the other’s 
model of the university promotes a second order observation on consensus. Readings implies that 
consensus cannot ultimately hold as an egalitarian assumption as the university of culture does not 
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appear as a pure instance of communication and therefore communicational transparency is not 
what you get when you realise that domination is an effect of failed communication. Graff argues 
that Readings’s University, where he is allowed “to do his own thing” has in fact reinstated 
traditional dominances through isolation, a point of view shared recently by Ayers. Readings’s 
posthistorical University is largely the one that Cryptonomicon indicts for scandalous deregulation 
initiatives of the 1990s i.e. the one where no meaningful institutional engagement with public issues 
can be measured, characterised or evaluated. Randy’s discomfort with the posthistorical university 
is displayed in a number of ways. He takes offense particularly with the way the academics openly 
destroy the image of the veteran, and their incessant talking on the Spectacle, while in the real 
world telecoms industries were plundering the global marketplace. The text, however, is always 
radically ambivalent, and as such the University itself could be, as Readings argues, not pure 
instances of communication between subjects, but that of brute examples of domination. We see 
how Charlene’s university extracts a quarter of a million dollars worth of work from Randy while in 
turn handing out a much smaller amount for his services. An extreme form of cost-benefit analysis 
emerges from the university where subjects are calculated on the basis of their efficiency, and not 
their creativity. It is the transferral of the knowingness levelled at the author, whom in turn levels it 
at the academics, which is where, ultimately, an intentionalist reading for the novel can lie. Randy 
concurs, in this sense, with Bercovitch’s dangerous narrative. 
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